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Latecomers’ science-based catch-up in transition: 
the case of the Korean pharmaceutical industry 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis investigates the 25-year transitional process of the Korean pharmaceutical 
industry from its initial focus on the imitative production of generic drugs to the 
development of new drugs. The catch-up dynamics of latecomer countries in science-
intensive industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, is an overlooked research topic 
in existing literature on innovation studies. This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of 
Korea’s science-intensive catch-up and applies an ‘exploration and exploitation’ 
framework to a latecomer setting and in a novel institutional and market context of the 
transitional phase.  
 
This thesis argues that the rate of change in the transition from imitating drugs to 
developing new drugs depends on the institutional and organisational mechanisms that 
enable a new form of technological learning, termed ‘exploratory learning’. This form of 
learning is often unfamiliar to firms in latecomer countries, whereas it is necessary for 
producing innovative drugs. That is, latecomers’ institutional and organisational 
promotion of exploratory learning is related to a ‘pattern change’ in the previously 
established institutional and organisational routines associated with imitative learning.   
 
The findings show that the rate of industrial transition in this sector was constrained by 
the problematic operation of S&T policies promoting key characteristics of exploratory 
learning, such as high-risk long-term learning as well as dense interactions between a 
diverse number of innovation actors. The findings also illuminate some latecomer firms’ 
initial difficulties in managing the new mode of technological learning, and in strategically 
applying that mode of learning to overcome the barriers to moving through the 
transitional phase towards producing competitive innovation. 
 
The thesis also suggests that the nature of drugs as integral products, deeply grounded 
in science, makes it difficult to effectively promote institutional and organisational 
transformations in favour of exploratory learning.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
1.1 Motivation and Aims  
This thesis examines the 25-year transition of the Korean pharmaceutical industry (KoPI), 
from its initial focus on the imitative production of generic drugs to its more recent focus 
on the development of new drugs. The research was initially motivated by an interest in 
the process of catch-up in science-based industries.  
A preliminary investigation identified some of the institutional and technological initiators 
of science-based catch-up in the KoPI, its main industrial players and its overall transition 
rate. First, a series of changes ranging from intellectual property rights (IPRs) to national 
health insurance (NHI), and a new biotechnological paradigm in the industry, seemed to 
initiate and accelerate the transition. Second, the demographic characteristics of the 
KoPI are also interesting, as the main industrial players are typically small- and medium-
sized companies, unlike other industries in South Korea, which are led by large 
conglomerates known as Chaebol. 
Third, the present market and technological position of the KoPI indicates the overall rate 
of transition. On the one hand, the 25-year transition has witnessed the accumulation of 
innovative technological capabilities, at least to some extent. More than 25 new drugs 
acquired new drug applications (NDAs) from the Korea Food and Drug Administration 
(KFDA), and two of them acquired an NDA in the US. 1  On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the significant technological efforts in the industry, the preliminary data 
suggests the market performance of the new drugs developed in the KoPI has been 
relatively insignificant.  
Four bodies of innovation-related literature (organisational learning, innovation systems, 
latecomers’ technological capability building and science-based innovation) theoretically 
underpin the research process of this thesis. It draws on studies that deal with changing 
patterns of technological learning during the transitional phase, on both an organisational 
and an institutional level. It also uses studies on sector-specific knowledge dynamics in 
the pharmaceutical industry, such as science-based innovation and the integral product 
architecture of drugs.  
                                                          
1 In 2003, Factive, developed by LG Life Sciences, acquired an NDA in the US. In 2014, Sivexstro, developed 
by Dong-a, acquired an NDA.   
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Based on the literature, the thesis assumes that, to a large extent, the rate of the 
transition may depend on the effective enhancement of a new mode of technological 
learning: exploratory learning. Subsequently, it also assumes that the enhancement of 
exploratory learning is affected by a series of institutional and organisational 
mechanisms, such as science and technology (S&T) policies and firms’ organisational 
structures.  
However, there is a lack of studies on latecomers’ enhancement of the exploratory mode 
of technological learning for science-based transition. Most literature on industrial catch-
up has focused on modular product-based industries driven by engineering and 
technology-based innovation with a relatively short learning cycle. Meanwhile, studies 
on the pharmaceutical industry have mainly dealt with long-term exploratory learning and 
science-based innovation in the leading industrial nations, such as the US and UK.  
In this regard, the literature gap provides an opportunity to extend knowledge about the 
transitional phase of latecomers, particularly in the science-intensive and integral 
product-based pharmaceutical industry. To do so, both the institutional and 
organisational dynamics involved in the key mode of learning for transition, exploratory 
learning, are considered. In line with this, two main research issues are explored: 
1) How have S&T policy rearrangements affected innovation actors’ enhancement 
of the exploratory mode of technological learning? 
2) How have latecomer firms strengthened the exploratory mode of technological 
learning for new-drug R&D?  
Specifically, the thesis examines four perspectives on exploratory learning:  
 The influence of the revised S&T policies on exploratory learning in 
organisations 
 The influence of the revised S&T policies on exploratory learning between 
organisations 
 Ways of engaging in exploratory technological learning in new-drug R&D 
 Ways of reconfiguring organisational processes to deal with increasing 
exploratory technological learning 
By answering the research questions, the thesis will argue that the enhancement of the 
new mode of technological learning in the KoPI is highly influenced by both previously 
established imitation-oriented institutional and organisational mechanisms and new, 
innovation-oriented institutional and organisational mechanisms. The transitional 
3 
 
process has had both positive and negative effects on the KoPI. It also argues that 
determining which factors influence exploratory learning may provide a better 
understanding of the transitional dynamics from imitation to innovation in a science-
based industry that produces integral products. 
The following four sections will present the empirical (Section 1.2) and theoretical 
background (Section 1.3) for this thesis, the overall research strategy (Section 1.4) and 
the structure of the thesis (Section 1.5).  
1.2 The empirical context 
This section provides an overview of the KoPI in terms of the general market composition 
of the pharmaceutical industry, and the institutional and technological changes that have 
occurred within it. It then identifies the present level of technological achievement and 
market position of the KoPI, which provides a starting point for the research.  
First, in general, the global pharmaceutical industry consists of two noticeably different 
market categories.2 One is the market for new (original) drugs, often referred to as new 
chemical entities (NCEs) or new molecular entities (NMEs). The other market is for 
generic drugs, often called copy drugs. This demarcation directly reflects the large 
technological and patent gap between innovation-based original drugs and imitation-
based generic drugs. 
Innovation leadership in the new drug market has long been dominated by a small 
number of developed countries and their major pharmaceutical companies (so-called 
‘Big Pharma’), such as the US (Pfizer), the UK (GSK), Germany (Merck), Switzerland 
(Novartis) and France (Sanofi). These five countries and Japan accounted for more than 
80% of the NDA approvals by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) between 1998 
and 2007 (Kneller 2010).3  
In the generic drug market, which is based on price competition and process 
imitation/innovation, the four largest generic companies (Teva, Israel; Mylan and Watson, 
USA; Sandoz, Switzerland) took almost 40% of the sales in the worldwide generic drug 
market (Harding 2010). In the past decade, Indian pharmaceutical firms, such as Lupin 
                                                          
2 The size of the worldwide pharmaceutical market reached US$791 billion in 2010, and about 82% of the 
total sales occurred in the Triad (the US, the European Union and Japan) (Pharm Exec 2011). 
3 This was 210 of the total 252 new drugs approved in the period, and, in particular, half of all the new drugs 
by US developers (Kneller 2010). Other developed Western countries, including Australia and Canada, 
accounted for most of the rest, taking up almost 20% (Ibid). 
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and DRL (Dr Reddy’s Laboratory), have rapidly penetrated the growing generic drug 
market.  
The KoPI has enhanced the new-drug development over the last 25 years. This move 
towards the innovation stage can be seen by looking at the increase in local firms’ 
development of NCEs (Table 1.1). The KoPI saw the first market launch of an NCE in 
1999, an anti-cancer drug named Sunfla that was developed by SK Chemical. Based on 
an average 10-year lead time for drug development, this indicates that the KoPI began, 
at least partly, an industrial transition from the late 1980s. 
Table 1.1: List of new synthetic drugs developed by Korean firms 
No Company Brand Indication NDA 
Lead 
time 
Sales size          
(million $, until 2012) 
1 SK Chemical Sunpla Anti-cancer 1999 10 0 
2 Dongwha Milican Anti-cancer 2001 8 0 
3 JW Q-Roxin Antibiotic 2001 11 5 
4 LG Life Science Factive Antibiotic 2002 11 3 
5 CKD Camtobell Anti-cancer 2003 11 3 
6 Yuhan Revanex Peptic ulcer 2005 15 4 
7 Dong-a Zydena ED* 2005 9 18 
8 Bukwang Levovir Hepatitis B Virus 2006 11 6 
9 Daewon Pelubi Osteoarthritis 2007 7 5 
10 SK Chemcial Mvix ED 2007 10 1 
11 Ilyang Noltec Gastric ulcer 2008 22 3 
12 Boryung Canab Hypertension 2010 12 25 
13 JW Zepid ED 2011 10 5 
14 Ilyang Supect Anti-cancer 2012 10 2 
15 LG Life Science Zemiglo Diabetes 2012 9 3 
16 CKD Duvie Diabetes 2013 13 - 
17 Crystal Genomics Acelex Osteoarthritis 2015 14 - 
18 Dongwha Zabolante Antibiotic 2015 18 - 
19 Dong-a Sivexstro Antibiotic 2015 10 - 
20 Dong-a Suganon Diabetes 2015 11 - 
Source: Various data sources and each company’s web page 
* ED: Erectile dysfunction 
The industrial transition has been affected by a series of institutional and technological 
changes. The three most significant of these changes are the enforcement of the product 
patent system in 1987, the radical reformation of national health insurance (NHI) in 2000 
and the proliferation of biotechnology and increasing government attention paid to this 
new technological paradigm since the 1990s. 
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First, along with some other newly industrialised economies (NIEs), such as Taiwan in 
1986 and Canada in 1987, Korea introduced the product patent system in 1987, 
becoming the first late-industrialising country to adopt the rule (Qian 2007). This was the 
beginning of the link between international trade and IPR, which was spearheaded by 
the US as an early version of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
(Nam 2006b). The product patent system first pushed new-drug R&D in the KoPI beyond 
the imitative learning of process technologies for producing generic drugs.  
Second, Korea entirely reformed its NHI system in 2000. The introduction of a system 
for the separation of prescribing and dispensing (SPD) was the most significant change.4 
The reformed NHI had a direct effect on the KoPI, leading to a radical change in market 
structure. The ethical (ETC) drug market became the major market segment, overtaking 
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. This market change forced local pharmaceutical 
companies to develop more technologically complex ETC drugs. 
Lastly, the KoPI’s transition was shaped by the emerging biotechnological paradigm. 
Some leading local pharmaceutical firms and a few Chaebol had been exploring 
biotechnology since the late 1980s. More importantly, the government began to support 
this new technological paradigm, predicting that it would become an engine of economic 
development. In 2010, biotechnology, including healthcare technology, became the 
second-largest recipient sector of government R&D funding, narrowly following 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). In addition to the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST), several ministries started to support biotechnology. Public 
innovation actors such as government research institutes (GRIs) and universities have 
been the main beneficiaries of this national support.5 At the same time, the government 
established a new R&D funding system, the so-called project-based system (PBS), for 
facilitating and incentivising innovative research in national R&D programmes (NRDPs). 
The KoPI’s effort to transition into developing its own new drugs was initiated and 
accelerated by these three institutional and technological changes.  
The KoPI is very dense, full of family-based small and medium enterprises (SMEs), with 
the exception of a few affiliates of Chaebol. This is very different from most other Korean 
industries, which are dominated by Chaebol. In 2006, 237 drug manufacturers and 351 
                                                          
4 The reform indicated that the KoPI had been fully incorporated into the public health sphere through the 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement system. 
5 However, this national effort also had a dark side: for example, the damaging scientific scandal surrounding 
supposed stem cell cloning, led by Dr Woo-seok Hwang in 2006, revealed the hastiness of Korea’s strong 
desire to lead in biotechnology (e.g., Gottweis and Triendl 2006, Gottweis and Kim 2010). 
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pharmaceutical ingredients manufacturers were in operation in Korea (Yeo 2008). Still, 
no domestic firms have grown to the degree where they can conduct the full development 
cycle of a new drug from discovery to NDA at the global level.6  
In terms of performance, the present speed of the industrial transition can be explained 
by the outcomes of technological and market catch-up in the new drug business. At the 
beginning, the KoPI showed a certain degree of technological catch-up. About 16 NCEs 
have been licenced to Big Pharma and Japanese companies since 1989, and 19 NCEs 
have been approved by the KFDA (Table 1.1). LG Life Sciences (LGLS) became the first 
domestic firm to acquire NDA approval from the US FDA for Factive (an antibiotic) in 
2003, followed by Sivexstro (an antibiotic) in 2014, which was developed by Dong-a. In 
this regard, it is clear that KoPI has, to some extent, reduced the technological gap 
between itself and the leading pharmaceutical industries. The KoPI’s technological 
performance in new-drug R&D also indicates a continuous enhancement of the 
exploratory mode of technological learning. 
However, in terms of market catch-up, the KoPI failed to realise the expected market 
profits from the new drugs. The industry’s first new drug, Sunfla, was withdrawn from the 
market because of a sales slump, and Factive has been seen as a failure in global 
marketing. Overall, few new drugs, either in the domestic or the global market, have 
allowed domestic firms to take a meaningful position as innovators, thus cementing their 
role as copycat drug producers. Additionally, even in the global generic drug market, the 
KoPI has not been able to obtain significant market share despite its mastery of 
synthesising existing active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).  
Therefore, the intermediate outcome, after about 25 years of new-drug R&D, can be 
described as a bumpy transition with certain interrupting factors. At first glance, these 
factors seem to be directly associated with firms’ R&D and marketing activities. Also, 
there is the institutional influence on new-drug R&D and business in that the series of 
institutions surrounding the KoPI have changed.  
If the process of industrial transition had not been disturbed by certain factors, the KoPI 
would presumably have shown a more consistent performance between technological 
and market catch-up and, ultimately, a faster rate of transition than has occurred. This 
                                                          
6 In general, new drug development is estimated to cost about US$1 billion for each NCE. Hereafter, the 
NDA at the global level indicates the NDA approved by the US FDA due to market and regulatory leadership 
by the US in the industry.     
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recognition of the present position of the KoPI becomes the starting point of the attempt 
in this thesis to understand the transitional process of the KoPI in depth.  
1.3 The Theoretical Context 
This thesis is theoretically underpinned by four bodies of literature. First, two theoretical 
areas of innovation provide the key underlying concepts of the study: a) organisational 
learning and b) innovation systems. Two areas of contextual literature related to the KoPI 
are also drawn upon to interpret the industrial transition of the KoPI: c) latecomers’ 
technological catch-up and d) science-based innovation. 
a) Recent research on innovation refers to organisational learning as a learning process 
through which new products and processes are generated (e.g., Stata 1989, Lundvall 
and Johnson 1994, Buckler 1996, Beckman and Barry 2007). This approach to 
innovation as a learning process is grounded in the question of how to bring about 
innovation rather than simply how to observe innovation (e.g., Senker 1996, Van de Ven 
et al. 2008). In reality, as will be seen in an examination of the KoPI’s transitional process, 
focusing on processes of change seems to be more effective for understanding how 
countries, industries and firms organise means of innovation and engage in real practises 
that spur innovation.  
More specifically, the way in which firms innovate can be seen through two perspectives 
on the learning process: technological and organisational. Bell and Pavitt (1995) 
emphasise that technological capability encompasses both the accumulation of 
technological knowledge and the development of corresponding organisational factors. 
In particular, the transitional phase increases the need for non-technological strategic 
and organisational perspectives in building technological capability (e.g., Dutrénit 2000, 
Hobday et al. 2004). 
In line with this, this thesis draws on the concept of organisational learning as a 
comprehensive term that embraces both technological and organisational perspectives 
on learning. In particular, literature on the two different types of organisational learning, 
exploitation and exploration, is addressed (e.g., March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993). 
Exploitation refers to the use of ‘things already known’, whereas exploration is ‘a pursuit 
of new knowledge’ (Levinthal and March 1993). Because of the different natures and 
goals of these two types of learning, they lead to trade-offs in a firm with limited resources 
(e.g., Leviathan and March 1993, Benner and Tushman 2003). 
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Latecomer countries or firms in the transitional phase are faced with the task of 
developing more innovative products and processes, beyond just imitating dominant 
designs. This implies a need for enhancing exploratory modes of learning. In this context, 
this thesis draws upon literature on organisational learning combined with traditional 
technology-centred studies on innovation (e.g., Bell and Pavitt 1997, Kim 1997a, 1997b). 
b) The innovation system is a common conceptual approach used to identify institutional 
conditions and how they promote or inhibit innovation actors’ technological learning (e.g., 
Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993). This systemic approach considers the 
individual actors’ collective and interactive relationships in generating and diffusing 
innovation under certain institutional circumstances. The thesis examines two types of 
innovation systems, the national innovation system (NIS) and the sectoral innovation 
system (SIS). The NIS refers to the structural differences in production systems and 
institutional setups, such as S&T policies and financial and educational systems, and 
their influence on the nation’s innovation patterns and performance (e.g., Lundvall 1992, 
Anderson and Lundvall 1997). The SIS refers to the innovation pattern of an industry. It 
focuses on the relationship between sector-specific knowledge dynamics, sectoral 
institutional settings and innovation actors’ interactive learning (e.g., Malerba 2002, 
McKelvey et al. 2004). 
Examining the NIS and the SIS is useful because the KoPI’s transition has taken place 
under the influence of broadly national S&T policies as well as the sectoral 
characteristics of the (Korean) pharmaceutical industry. 
c) Although the concept of innovation is commonly used to mean something ‘new to the 
market’ (noted by Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001, p. 791), latecomers’ innovation activities 
have been conducted in a manner that is ‘new to themselves only’. In other words, 
latecomers’ innovation is characterised by the effective use of imported technological 
knowledge (Westphal et al. 1985). Many early studies of technological learning adopt 
this view of innovation to interpret the industrial catch-up at both the institutional and firm 
levels (e.g., Katz 1987, Amsden 1991, Lall 1992, Hobday 1995, Bell and Pavitt 1997, 
Kim 1997a, Ernst 1998).  
More specifically, in the institutional-level approach, the literature identifies effective 
policy operation for the establishment of competent private and public innovation actors 
as the best institutional means to promote knowledge utilisation and commercial 
performance (e.g., Kim 1997a, Mazzoleni and Nelson 2007). In the firm-level approach, 
literature often integrates the product life cycle (PLC) model posed by Utterback and 
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Abernathy (1975) with the absorptive capacity model put forward by Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) as a way of understanding latecomer firms’ catch-up (e.g., Kim 1997a, Hobday 
1995). Stepwise catch-up by rapidly reversing the PLC from the assembly of imported 
components to the development of their own designed product is a representative 
example of this approach (e.g., Hobday 1995). 
Some recent literature addresses a more advanced catch-up stage, that is, the 
transitional phase, as some latecomer countries and firms have begun to be more 
innovative. In the institutional-level approach, the literature examines the transitional 
process from knowledge utilisation-oriented innovation systems to knowledge 
generation-oriented innovation systems (e.g., Kim 2000, Dodgson 2009, Vertesy 2013). 
It focuses on the evolution of the NIS/SIS to deal with the changing knowledge base and 
competitive environment. The drivers for and barriers to transition are identified in the 
literature, including institutional flexibility/rigidity and cohesive/incohesive networked 
learning.  
The literature on firm-level transitions examines the increasing complexity of 
technological and market catch-up in the transitional phase and ways of dealing with this 
complexity. One group of studies focuses on the process of building innovative capability 
to develop more novel products and conceptualises certain types of capabilities for 
transition, such as combinative capability and embryonic strategic capability (e.g., 
Mathews and Cho 1999, Dutrénit 2000 and 2004). The other studies identify various 
paths for advanced catch-up. For example, three conceptually possible paths for 
transition are suggested by drawing on the reversed PLC (e.g., Song et al. 2006 and 
Choung et al. 2014). Some other studies address the potential of devising firms’ own 
path for transition with respect to the degree of competition with forerunners and the 
possibility of utilising new technological paradigms (e.g., Hobday 2005, Lee et al. 2005). 
The path approach can be related to the effectiveness of latecomers’ exploratory learning 
in real competitive environments and amidst a changing knowledge base. 
d) Although studies on catch-up provide the broad contextual basis for this thesis, they 
are not sufficient to interpret the transition of the science-based pharmaceutical industry 
due to their focus on technology- and engineering-based industries. Literature about 
science-based innovation in bio-pharmaceutical sectors is drawn on to identify sector-
specific knowledge dynamics and learning. First, literature about the nature of science-
based innovation is discussed and compared to literature on engineering-based 
industries (e.g., Pavitt 1998, Pisano 2006). Second, studies on the influence of the 
emerging biotechnological paradigm in the synthetic chemistry-based pharmaceutical 
10 
 
industry are identified (e.g., Powell et al. 1996, Burns 2005, Pisano 2006). Lastly, 
literature on the nature of drugs with integral product architecture in comparison with 
modular products is discussed (e.g., Baldwin and Clark 1997, Pisano 2006). 
Overall, by drawing on these four bodies of literature (organisational learning, innovation 
systems, latecomers’ catch-up in transition and science-based innovation), the key 
characteristics of the exploratory mode of technological learning can be determined; 
these characteristics are necessary for transition in the pharmaceutical industry. The 
literature also provides a theoretical basis for the research questions and the conceptual 
framework of this study. 
1.4 Research Strategy, Design, Methods  
The transition of the KoPI is investigated using two underlying strategies. First, the 
changing pattern of technological learning is interpreted in view of the argument that 
enhancing exploratory learning is the key mode for transition. Second, multi-dimensional 
perspectives involved in exploratory learning are considered as the foreground of the 
analysis, including the macro- (institutional) and micro- (firm) levels.  
The conceptual framework is built in line with a more transformative view of institutional 
settings and firms’ organisational mechanisms involved in the move from imitation to 
innovation. More specifically, the framework emphasises the transitional process as the 
transformation of institutional and organisational mechanisms to promote an exploratory 
mode of technological learning. In relation to institutional mechanisms, the 
transformation is seen as the reconfiguration of the innovation system from knowledge 
utilisation to knowledge generation. S&T policies that influence the reconfiguration of 
innovation systems are examined, including R&D investment policy, incentive regimes 
and administrative patterns of governmental R&D support. In the firms’ organisational 
mechanisms, the effective enhancement of the exploratory mode of learning is 
addressed in terms of R&D process and strategy, and organisational structure. 
Because this thesis focuses on the process (‘how’) of the transition, a case study 
approach is employed (e.g., Ragin and Becker 1992, Yin 2003). Specifically, an 
embedded single-case approach is adopted to embrace both macro (innovation systems) 
and micro (firms) units of analysis, examining national R&D programmes (NRDPs) 
involving new-drug R&D to investigate the influence of S&T policies in innovation actors’ 
learning patterns, as well as looking at the new-drug development projects of nine 
domestic pharmaceutical firms.  
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The data used were mainly collected through formal and informal interviews, in addition 
to secondary sources such as firm and government reports, business newspapers and 
patent and publication data. The data were gathered in four broad categories: one related 
to the environmental changes in institutions, technologies and the market; one related to 
the operational process of NRDPs; one related to the process of the firms’ new drug 
development (that is, technological learning); and one related to the organisational 
processes of new-drug R&D. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of three main parts. The first part presents the theoretical and 
methodological foundation of the research (Chapters 2 and 3). The second part 
empirically analyses the changing market selection environment, and the macro- and 
micro-level transitional process (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). The last part encompasses the 
overall discussion and provides a conclusion (Chapters 8 and 9).  
In the first part, Chapter 2 reviews the key theoretical concepts of innovation, such as 
technological capability, organisational learning and innovation systems. Next, the 
innovation characteristics of the transitional phase and the science-based 
pharmaceutical industry are illuminated. On this basis, the chapter lays out the key 
characteristics of exploratory learning in the pharmaceutical industry, which is the key 
learning pattern for new-drug R&D. This underpins the theoretical constructs and the 
analytical scheme of this thesis.  
Chapter 3 develops the research questions and frameworks and presents research 
methods and the structure of the data. In particular, an alternative approach to 
addressing the transition is proposed: the transformative view. This approach considers 
the need for changes in institutional and organisational mechanisms to promote the 
exploratory mode of technological learning.  
In the second part, Chapter 4 presents the major institutional and technological changes 
as well as the changed market selection criteria during the transitional period of the KoPI 
(1987 onwards). The drug R&D process, the changing technological paradigm and the 
institutional context, such as the IPR regime and the inception of the NHI, are detailed in 
the latecomer context. Then the industrial response to these – the changing market 
competition structure – is outlined. Moreover, the overall reform of S&T policies to 
promote innovation activities is presented, showing that policy changes have directly 
affected the learning patterns of innovation actors. 
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Chapter 5 analyses the influence of this S&T policy rearrangement on innovation actors’ 
enhancement of exploratory learning, specifically the operating mechanisms of NRDPs, 
such as investment, incentives and administrative patterns, and the problems with these 
mechanisms. This chapter concludes by revealing certain types of institutional distortion 
and conflict in conducting exploratory learning for new-drug R&D.  
Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the new-drug development of the nine case study firms, both 
in technological learning (Chapter 6) and corresponding organisational perspectives 
(Chapter 7). Exploration practise and strategic and organisational perspectives are 
examined in the comparative view between the completed first round and the on-going 
second round of new- drug R&D. These chapters conclude by identifying the contrasting 
pattern of technological exploration between the first and second rounds.  
In the last part of the thesis, Chapter 8 presents the findings and discusses the overall 
transitional dynamics of the KoPI. It first determines the ways in which institutional 
elements have affected the enhancement of exploratory learning: the dual influences of 
S&T policies on promoting exploratory learning, and the resulting lag of cohesive 
interaction between public actors’ and pharmaceutical firms’ exploratory learning. It goes 
on to discuss organisational elements in relation to the firms’ exploratory learning: 
latecomer firms’ blind replication of existing innovation models and their recent search 
for their own paths of innovation and ideal organisational structure to heighten the 
commercial viability of exploratory learning. Chapter 9 summarises the research, 
including the main findings and limitations, and provides some policy and management 
implications.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical context  
2.1 Introduction 
As methodological literature (e.g., Miles and Huberman 1994, Van de Ven 2007) and 
recent PhD theses (e.g., Kale 2005, Medeiros 2011) have suggested, the research 
questions and conceptual frameworks for a thesis are derived from repeated comparison 
and integration of preliminary data on the thesis topic with the existing literature (Figure 
2.1). This research follows this process throughout the literature review chapter (Chapter 
2) and research questions and design chapter (Chapter 3) to formulate its research 
questions and frameworks.  
 
 
 
 
 
In line with this, this chapter first considers the extent to which innovation patterns and 
conditions identified in the existing literature can be applied to the empirical focus of this 
study, that is, science-based catch-up in the KoPI. More specifically, this chapter first 
revisits key concepts related to innovation such as technological and organisational 
learning and innovation systems; it then reviews the literature on catch-up in newly 
industrialised economies (NIEs) in Asia, and on science-based innovation.  
In doing so, the chapter identifies the multi-dimensional complexity of latecomers’ 
science-based innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, and argues that there is a need 
for institutional and organisational change to promote the key form of technological 
learning for science-based catch-up, that is, exploratory learning. Based on the literature, 
it further determines the key characteristics of the exploratory mode of technological 
learning. The review chapter ultimately provides the theoretical underpinnings for the 
research questions and conceptual frameworks. 
In brief, Section 2.2 presents an overview of the core concepts of innovation in the 
latecomer context. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 review features of innovation as presented in 
two bodies of contextual literature. Section 2.5 raises the problem of the limited 
Preliminary data on 
the KoPI 
Extant literature on the catch-up 
process and science-based 
innovation 
Research questions and 
conceptual frameworks  
Figure 2.1 Flow of the research design 
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understanding of latecomers’ science-based innovation activities in the literature and 
determines the key characteristics of exploratory learning. Section 2.6 summarises the 
review.  
2.2 Key Concepts of Innovation in the Latecomer Context 
This section clarifies key theoretical concepts concerning innovation in the transitional 
phase of the KoPI. First, the fundamental nature of innovation is briefly presented (Sub-
section 2.2.1), followed by an overview of innovation in the latecomer context (Sub-
section 2.2.2). Then, the concepts and modes of organisational learning and innovation 
systems are clarified (Sub-sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4). 
2.2.1 Uncertainty, innovation, learning and resources 
Recapitulation of key theoretical antecedents of innovation studies provides an effective 
way of clarifying the general mechanism of innovation. Four key concepts are discussed 
here: uncertainty, innovation, learning and resources (Knight 1921, Schumpeter 1934 
and 1939, Coase 1937, Penrose 1959, Cyert and March 1963).  
Uncertainty imposes on firms the need for a continuous organisational response to 
environmental change over time. 7  It implies dynamic (interactive) organisational 
responses to the external environment, which includes institutions and other firms. 
Innovative activity is a major organisational response in that innovation involves the 
development of new processes and products that allow a firm to survive and grow under 
conditions of environmental change.8 
Two original views of firms – the resource-based view (RBV) and the organisational 
behaviour perspective – argue for two different internal mechanisms for generating 
innovation: an endogenous base of innovation, and innovation activity as a dynamic 
organisational process. 
First, in the Penrosian view (1959), the extent of a firm’s growth is determined by its 
ability to utilise heterogeneous resources through their variant combinations, thereby 
creating productive services (Pitelis 2007). The creation of new productive services leads 
not only to growth in terms of quantitative production, but also to qualitative 
transformation (Turvani 2007). The latter is realised through reinforcing knowledge about 
                                                          
7 Knight (1921) classifies the uncertainty into two types: measurable uncertainty and true uncertainty.  
8 Heterogeneity of the firm is raised based on the entrepreneurs’ and further organisational differences to 
operate resources available in responses to uncertainty, as Knight insinuates. Resource-based inter-firm 
heterogeneity has been increasingly studied in recent innovation studies. 
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resources and the surrounding environment, which leads to the construction of a firm's 
distinctive capabilities (ibid.). 
This interpretation sees innovation as a learning process based on resource 
management, regardless of whether firms are frontrunners or latecomers. The initial 
acquisition of resources, their novel combination and the creation of new productive 
services over time are all caused by the continuous interaction of firms with uncertain 
environments through internal learning processes based on their resources.  
On the other hand, Cyert and March (1963), who conceptualise the firm as an 
autonomous entity (a discretionary organisation), see internal decision-making 
processes as organisational responses. The sequence of decisions is coordinated and 
each is aligned with the others through the four organisational behaviours: quasi 
resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search and organisational 
learning (ibid.).9 
 Quasi resolution of conflict means that firms tend to resolve their intra-
organisational conflicts (e.g., different goals and decisions across subunits) 
through the allocation of specific decision rights to each subunit.10 
 Uncertainty avoidance indicates that the firm strives to avoid rather than predict 
risk and uncertainty by introducing decision rules, particularly for attending to the 
near future and arranging the external environment in order to control it.  
 Problemistic search indicates a passive tendency wherein firms do not start to 
search for alternatives until they realise or expect some problems, such as falling 
profits.  
 Organisational learning is defined as the three different adaptive processes of 
changing organisational goals, attending new rules and modifying search 
procedures in coping with an uncertain environment. 
These four types of organisational behaviour are combined during searching activities to 
discover alternatives to problems identified (i.e., the firm’s realignment process between 
organisational goals, expectations and choice in the changing environment). The 
searching activity, driven by organisational slack, consists of short-term, problem-
oriented search under the pressure of failure to meet organisational goals, and long-term, 
                                                          
9 The firm as a discretionary organisation is based on the three major assumptions of bounded rationality, 
imperfect environmental matching and unresolved conflict. The sequence of the decision-making process 
consists of three major subcategories: organisational goals, organisational expectations and organisational 
choice. 
10 Quasi resolution of conflict means that firms tend to resolve their intra-organisational conflicts (e.g., 
different goals and decisions across subunits) through allocation of specific decision rights to each subunit. 
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innovative activity when firms have enough organisational slack.11 Cyert and March’s 
argument provides insight into the organisational process of determining the scope and 
degree of innovation activities in a changing environment, although it is based on the 
observation of daily work-based decision-making processes. 
Overall, these original studies provide complementary theoretical frames for 
understanding the underlying nature of innovation. Combining these, a firm’s innovation 
activity is treated as a dynamic process of searching for and learning of existing or new 
opportunities based on their resource holdings. ‘Dynamic’ mainly indicates that the 
process is interactive and timely in responding to external environments and organising 
internal innovation processes. Cyert and March (1963) categorise innovation activity into 
two types of search and learning patterns: (i) problem solving activity (i.e., proximate 
searching and learning) and (ii) more innovative activity (i.e., distant searching and 
learning).  
Change in uncertainty and learning type of the KoPI 
In the case of the KoPI, which has been in transition over the course of developing 
several new drugs, the degree of uncertainty and learning type are now changing. 
Greater involvement in new-drug R&D requires increasingly more distant searching and 
learning that deviates from the routinised proximate searching and learning carried out 
when producing copy drugs. This transition implies changing goals, directions and rules 
for searching and learning. As a result, resource management is likely to need a more 
dynamic operation in dealing with the transitional phase. The following sub-section 
clarifies the relevant key concepts of latecomers’ innovation activity.  
2.2.2 Latecomers’ technological capability  
Innovation activity in the latecomer context has been commonly understood by drawing 
on the concept of technological capability, which is defined as ‘the ability to make 
effective use of technological knowledge’ (Westphal et al. 1985, p.171). That is, this 
concept emphasises the utilisation of existing technology for latecomers’ innovation. 
Latecomers are able to acquire existing technologies from advanced countries with no 
need to develop them on their own. Thus, mastering the imported technologies becomes 
the most critical learning task. In this context, technological capability building has been 
viewed as the learning process that allows the proficient use of imported technological 
                                                          
11 In this sense, the organisational slack can be seen as corresponding to the ‘excess resources’ proposed 
by Penrose (Pitelis 2007). 
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knowledge (Kim 1980, Dahlman and Westphal 1982, Bell 1984, Westphal et al. 1985, 
Katz 1987, Lall 1992). 
This technological capability-centred view of innovation is based on the macro-level 
evolutionary interpretation of production function through technical changes (e.g, Dosi 
1982, Perez 1985, Nelson 1994). At the same time, this view has a micro-level 
conceptual base of capability and learning (e.g, Selznick 1957, Arrow 1962, Polanyi 1962, 
Cangelosi and Dill 1965, Nelson and Winter 1982, Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Malerba 
1992, Leonard-Barton 1995, Teece et al. 1997). This sub-section describes latecomers’ 
innovation activity within these perspectives on technological capability.  
2.2.2.1 Concept  
In the literature, latecomers’ technological capability is conceptualised based on the level 
of capability accumulated. For example, Westphal et al. (1985) divide it into three levels: 
production capability for operating imported production facilities at the beginning level, 
investment capability necessary for expanding production capacity and new production 
facilities, and innovative capability that embraces basic and applied research, as well as 
development activities for developing modified and new processes and products. In the 
investment capability stage, it is also important to develop non-technological capabilities, 
because managerial and organisational issues become more complex. 
Bell and Pavitt (1997) identify technological capability as the driving force for moving 
from simple production capacity to further innovative learning stages. Production 
capacity refers to the resource for the duplicative production of a given production 
function. In contrast, technological capability refers to growth in the stocks of resources 
that enable latecomers to generate technical change for improving production efficiency 
or product quality.12 
As many scholars have explored empirically (e.g., Dutrénit 2000, Athreye et al. 2009), 
mastering each level of technological capability and upgrading to the next is achieved 
through deliberate effort, not automatic processes, such as the accumulation of various 
types of resources in both technological and non-technological contexts.  
                                                          
12 Resources are exemplified as skills, knowledge, and institutional structures and linkages, while resources 
of production capacity are mainly related to the operation of a given level of production function, such as 
equipment and labour skills that are often guided by technology transfer (Bell and Pavitt 1997). In particular, 
knowledge has increasingly gained attention as a major constituent of the stocks of resources, in 
investigating the internal learning process of building/enhancing technological capability (e.g., Kim 1999, 
Dutrenit 2000). In the increasing attention to knowledge, Archibugi and Coco (2005) arrange technological 
capabilities into three dimensions: embodied/disembodied knowledge, codified/tacit knowledge, and 
knowledge generation/diffusion. 
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2.2.2.2 Stages of technological capability building 
More specifically, the building of latecomers' technological capability occurs through the 
technological trajectory that follows a reverse product life cycle (PLC) (e.g., Katz 1987,  
Kim 1997a, Hobday 1998a, Dutrénit 2000) (Figure 2.2). 
Duplicative imitation stage: Latecomers commence technological capability building by 
acquiring and assimilating existing mature technologies from advanced countries. 
Manufacturing productivity is initially lower than in forerunner competing firms because 
of the higher learning cost associated with the early stage (Khan and Blankenburg 2009). 
However, if their learning is successfully adaptive to the technologies acquired (i.e., if 
technological assimilation occurs), latecomers eventually achieve an even lower 
marginal cost and have a cost advantage in the global (low value-added) market (ibid).13 
This process is driven by learning by doing and using as the ‘by-products’ of the daily 
production activities (Lundvall and Johnson 1994). 
Creative imitation stage: Latecomers attempt to upgrade their technological and market 
position through the acquisition of more sophisticated technologies and strengthening of 
in-house R&D (Kim 2001b). In the intermediate stage of technological accumulation, they 
try to design their own products, aiming to improve existing foreign products. However, 
this is not innovative; these are ‘facsimile products’ with improved performance (Kim 
1999). Learning by searching becomes important as a type of ‘intentional learning’ 
(Lundvall and Johnson 1994) at this stage.14 
Innovation stage: Latecomers eventually reach the innovation stage. At this point, 
technological and scientific knowledge are generated on their own. They are in direct 
market competition with forerunners based on innovative products – either by adding 
new features or functions and architectural innovation, or by creating further radical 
innovation-based products (Figure 2.2). Distant searching and learning become critical 
at this stage. Accordingly, uncertainty and cost of learning by (more distant) searching 
sharply increase compared to the previous stages, especially in science-intensive 
technology.  
 
                                                          
13 Moreover, the absolute labour cost is much lower than in advanced countries (ibid.).  
14 In terms of learning costs and market competition, they lead again the same cycle seen with the initially 
higher learning cost but it has a gradual achievement of lower marginal cost and then penetration to the 
global market. Hobday (1997, p.32-33) stresses the deliberate effort and investment of technological learning 
as the manner of willingness rather than the simple learning-by-doing as a passive form. 
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Figure 2.2: Technological catch-up trajectory 
Source: Minor modification of Kim (1997a, p.89) and Song et al. (2006) 
2.2.2.3 Driving forces of technological capability  
The stage model of technological capability is constructed based on an operational 
capacity concept, absorptive capacity. An increase in absorptive capacity drives the 
latecomer to move up in position towards the more creative imitation and innovation 
stages. Absorptive capacity was originally defined by Cohen and Levinthal as a firm’s 
ability to effectively internalise external knowledge sources for innovation activity 
(1990).15 On the one hand, the existing knowledge base and its further accumulation act 
                                                          
15 In their term, the ability to ‘recognise the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends’. 
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as a foothold to absorb external knowledge effectively (i.e., they increase absorptive 
capacity) (Kim 1997b, 1999).16 On the other hand, when the new knowledge base that a 
firm is eager to acquire is different from the current knowledge base and R&D, the firm 
needs to deliberately generate absorptive capacity apart from the current R&D (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990).17  
2.2.2.4 Technological capability in the transitional phase  
Once latecomers begin to transition from the imitative production stage to the innovative 
development stage, they face increasing uncertainty in both technological knowledge 
and environmental conditions, as recent studies have shown (e.g., Dutrénit 2000, 
Hobday et al. 2004, Kale 2005). Thus, confronting tasks needed for transition involves a 
broader scope and new kinds of learning, both technological and non-technological. In 
line with this, returning to Bell and Pavitt (1997), this research approaches technological 
capability in transition as a change-generating dynamic capability that leads to 
reconfiguration of their imitative learning pattern and resource operation and adaptation 
to environment change.18 That is, the research conceptually treats the technological 
capability building as a transitional learning process of latecomers towards more distant 
searching and learning. 
2.2.3 Micro-dynamics of innovation: organisational learning  
Bell and Pavitt (1995) emphasise that technological capability encompasses both the 
accumulation of technological knowledge and the development of corresponding 
organisational factors. The organisational perspectives can be seen in the concept of 
organisational learning.   
2.2.3.1 Definition  
Organisational learning is theorised to represent interactive learning between 
organisational members, given environmental change (e.g, Cyert and March 1963, 
Simon 1969, March and Olsen 1975, Argyris and Schön 1978, Miles and Snow 1978, 
Duncan and Weiss 1979, Fiol and Lyles 1985). The interaction can be expressed as a 
                                                          
16 I.e., problem-solving activity through dynamic knowledge conversion and interaction between members.  
17 Absorptive capacity is automatically accumulated as a ‘by-product’ of firms’ current R&D if they carry out 
future innovation activity around their present knowledge area (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) 
18 Dynamic capability is defined as ‘the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments’ (Teece et al. 1997). In particular, the concept of 
dynamic capability stresses change processes by reconstituting existing structures of business and resource 
combination (Helfat et al. 2009: p.29). At the extreme, even though firms have the same kinds of resources, 
they express differentiated competitive advantages because of the diversity of their ability to conduct these 
tasks using the same resources. That is, resources are transformed into ‘firm-specific assets’ that connote 
the nature of inimitability and heterogeneity. Several theoretically similar definitions corresponding to the 
dynamic capabilities within the resource based view have been introduced, such as core competencies and 
knowledge-based view of the firm (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Grant, 1996).   
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sequential interaction, a socialising process or a collective action process that facilitates 
the adaptation of individuals and organisations to an environmental change.19  
Through this process, an organisation stores individual knowledge collectively over time, 
and in turn, builds its own identity that influences the learning pattern of individual 
members (Nelson and Winter 1982, Simon 1991). An organisational routine emerges, 
carved out by all organisational members over time (Cyert and March 1963, Simon 1997, 
Feldman and Pentland 2003, Becker et al. 2005). 20  In turn, the strength of the 
organisational routine affects the retention of a certain type of organisational learning 
(Simon 1991).21 Core capability (Leonard-Barton 1995) is formed in this process of 
routinisation.22  
Routinisation, on the one hand, can lead to a virtuous circle of a series of routines over 
time by refreshing organisational memory, acting as a source of organisational flexibility 
for change (Feldman and Pentland 2003, Becker 2004). On the other hand, excessive 
routinisation of a specific organisational learning pattern can create organisational inertia. 
In this case, organisational capability at a given time is transmuted to organisational 
rigidity at a later point in time (Leonard-Barton 1995). 
Thus, the key issue, in view of dynamic capability, becomes the proactive preparation 
and timely establishment of proper (alternative) organisational learning patterns. With 
respect to latecomers’ transitions, the task faced is distant searching and learning 
patterns must be established to build innovative technological capability, overcoming the 
proximate organisational learning routine for imitation.  
Relatedly, Kim (1997a, pp. 4-6) describes technological capability as ‘the level of 
organisational capability’ at a given point in time. Because of the dynamic nature of the 
transition, this research sees technological learning as conceptually equivalent to 
organisational learning, which more explicitly exposes the strategic and organisational 
                                                          
19 As Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) noted, knowledge conversion between codified and tacit knowledge is 
processed through these interactive mechanisms. 
20 It is originally defined as parts of organisational activities that have been carved into an organisation 
through repetitive action, such as human habits, and are thereby implemented without supervision and 
directions (Stene 1940).  
21 Interestingly, wear of the organisational memory has two sides that have positive and negative influence 
on the organisation (Simon 1991). On the one hand, useful knowledge learned by individuals within an 
organisation can gradually slip from organisational memory as the personnel are substituted over time. On 
the other hand, the timeworn, and therefore irrelevant, knowledge for the present organisational learning 
can be positively eliminated from the organisational memory. 
22 Thus, organisational learning has three kinds of nature: routine-based, history-dependent, and target-
oriented (Levitt and March 1988). By virtue of this nature of organisational learning, an organisation can be 
identified as an independent evolutionary entity over time, displaying inimitability and heterogeneity in 
dealing with resources. 
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dimensions in a firm’s technological capability building. Hereafter, technological learning 
is considered interchangeable with organisational learning. 
2.2.3.2 Exploitation and exploration 
Related to these transitions, two different modes of organisational learning are identified 
in the literature on organisational theory: exploitation and exploration (e.g, Argyris and 
Schön 1978, Miles and Randolph 1980, Shrivastava 1983, March 1991, Crossan et al. 
1999, Benner and Tushman 2003, Gilsing and Nooteboom 2006, Gupta et al. 2006). 
Exploitation involves ‘reactive’ and ‘single-loop’ learning based on existing rule-based 
error correction processes. Production, refinement and efficiency are involved. By 
contrast, exploration indicates ‘proactive’ and ‘double -loop’ learning that leads to rule 
and pattern changes. Risk-taking, discovery, experimentation, variation and unlearning 
are involved. Therefore, the two modes of organisational learning have different goals 
(March 1991): ‘the use and development of things already known’ versus ‘a pursuit of 
new knowledge’ (Levinthal and March 1993, p. 105). 
In terms of technological learning, the technologies in use at a given time come from two 
search processes: ‘the search for refinement’ and ‘the search for innovation’ (Levinthal 
and March 1981). The search for refinement is aimed at fine-tuning and economising 
existing technologies for efficiency, and thus it indicates exploitive learning. The search 
for innovation involves developing new and improved technologies; it indicates 
exploratory learning.  
In this context, short-term competitive advantage mostly relies on exploitive learning, 
whereas exploratory learning is necessary to sustain a firm’s longer-term competitive 
advantage. Thus, the two modes of learning are mutually complementary for the survival 
and growth of a firm. In addition, it should be noted that these types of learning are two 
different phases that are linked to each other during the learning cycle, which moves 
from an initial search for problems to problem solving, and then on to improvement of 
solutions. The degree of exploration and exploitation, and the proportion of learning that 
is focused on each of the two modes will vary depending on the external and internal 
situation of each firm. As March (1991, p.72) points out, ‘The evolutionary dominance of 
an organisational practice is sensitive to the relation between the rate of exploratory 
variation reflected by the practice and the rate of change in the environment’. 
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2.2.3.3 The vulnerability of exploratory learning 
Mutual exclusivity between the two modes of learning occurs when there are limited 
resources available within a firm and there is resource competition between exploitative 
and exploratory learning (March 1991). Thus, a firm must decide whether to focus on 
exploitation-oriented or exploration-oriented learning, and how many resources should 
be allocated to each route (ibid.).  
Often, this mutual exclusivity leads to the intensification of exploitive learning, 
encroaching on developing long-term competitiveness through exploratory learning 
(ibid.). The return from exploitive learning can be realised in a stable and predictable way 
based on its involvement primarily with refinement and improvement of existing 
technologies and routines. On the contrary, the expected return from exploratory learning 
is relatively uncertain (‘distant’ and even frequently ‘negative’) because of its 
engagement with novelty, experimentation and discovery (ibid.).23 
Thus, the adaptive process of exploitive learning is much easier than that of exploratory 
learning, and may lead to an over-focus on present goals, profits and capabilities, even 
when firms are faced with environmental change (He and Wong 2004). When excessive 
exploitive learning occurs, it lessens the opportunities for initiating or continuing 
exploratory learning, leading to a competency trap (Levitt and March 1988, March 
1991).24 This has been referred to as ‘vulnerability of exploration’ (March 1991) and ‘the 
myopia of learning’ (Levinthal and March 1993).25 
In brief, the difficulty of carrying out both types of organisational learning in balance can 
be attributed to limited resources available to the firm and excessive routinisation. 
Exploratory learning can be continuously operated by guaranteeing the autonomy of 
exploration-conducting sub-units, acquiring the support from senior management and 
overcoming organisational inertia (Benner and Tushman 2003, O'Reilly and Tushman 
2008). 
2.2.3.4 Exploratory learning in the transitional phase 
                                                          
23 If the returns from the two modes of organisational learning can be rationally calculated and compared, 
then the allocation of resources available to an organisation will be rationally conducted. However, the 
relatively higher predictability of calculating the return from exploitive learning, and conversely the relatively 
lower predictability of estimating the return from exploratory learning, increases the difficulty of the firm’s 
decision as to whether it will choose exploitation or exploration to build and sustain its competitive advantage. 
Thus, basically it would be natural for an organisation with bounded rationality to be inclined to choose 
exploitive learning. 
24 In this context, the present core capabilities are deteriorated to core rigidities within a certain time frame 
(Leonard- Barton 1995).  
25 Conversely, excessive exploratory learning in an organisation in which the exploration is routinised can 
also destroy the organisation because of on-going negative profits from the excessive exploration. 
24 
 
The literature on the two modes of organisational learning mainly considers the trade-off 
between them, and the dilemma this creates for innovating firms. For forerunners, the 
main task comes in monitoring and learning new technologies through exploratory 
learning while also maintaining technological dominance in established technological 
areas through exploitive learning – that is, ambidexterity. Ambidexterity refers to creating 
a ‘balance between the needs of today’s innovation demands with that of tomorrow’s 
innovation possibilities’ (Tushman et al. 1997, p. 6). Some have argued that 
organisational ambidexterity is the root of the dynamic capabilities of firms (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, O'Reilly and Tushman 2008). 
However, in a latecomer context, the key task may not be balancing these two modes of 
learning. Instead, it is likely to involve the reinforcement of a pattern of exploratory 
learning while casting off the learning associated with exploitation that had dominated 
during the imitation stage. A fundamental feature of this transitional phase involves 
developing technological learning associated with ‘new to the market’ innovations that 
goes beyond the previous focus on ‘new for the firm only’ innovations. A higher amount 
of exploratory learning is necessary to allow the firm to search for more novel processes 
and products. In research on the KoPI, it is therefore important to examine how the 
exploratory mode of technological learning has been enhanced as the industry has tried 
to develop new drugs and move beyond the production of generic copy drugs. 
Overall, the contrasting features of different learning patterns associated with 
exploitation and exploration provide a conceptual lens for understanding the changing 
patterns of latecomers’ technological learning during the transitional phase, which 
involves the initial building of new innovative capability. As a consequence, this research 
has adopted a slightly different approach from previous literature, which tends to focus 
on ambidexterity. It instead focuses on the establishment of a highly explorative mode of 
technological learning. Lastly, it should be noted that the two modes of learning are 
graduated rather than dichotomised concepts; in any given learning cycle, there can be 
various degrees of exploitation and exploration. 
2.2.4 Macro-dynamics of innovation: innovation systems 
While the micro-dynamics of building technological capability in transition are 
conceptualised through changes in a firm’s organisational learning, the macro-dynamics 
can be understood through a systemic approach to innovation (e.g., Freeman 1987, 
Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Carlsson 1995, 2002, 
Breschi and Malerba 1997, Cooke et al. 1997).  
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Edquist (1997, p. 13) quoted Fleck’s (1992, p. 5) definition of a system: ‘complexes of 
elements or components, which mutually condition and constrain one another, so that 
the whole complex works together, with some reasonably clearly defined overall function’. 
In line with this, an innovation system ‘is constituted by elements and relationships that 
interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge’ 
(Lundvall 1992, p. 2). No single actor can create, disseminate and apply necessary 
knowledge for innovation on its own; thus, the concept of an innovation system considers 
interactive learning among actors (e.g., Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997). 
The concept is particularly useful in understanding the relationships between innovation 
elements and their interactive learning patterns. Innovation actors can be classified into 
primary and secondary types (Liu and White 2001). Primary actors are real performers 
that conduct innovation activities such as R&D, production, education and linkage (e.g., 
firms, universities, public research institutes, factories and consumers). Secondary 
actors (e.g., central and local governments and regulatory agencies) are in charge of 
guiding the behaviour of primary actors. Relational institutions guide the inter-actor 
relationships via means such as policies, industrial standards and an intellectual property 
rights (IPR) regime. 
While most literature focuses on the structural establishment of innovation – that is, the 
roles of innovation actors and the formal linkages between them – there have been some 
studies that look at the function of innovation systems (e.g., Johnson 2001). Taking the 
second approach, Johnson (2001) divides the functional aspects of innovation systems 
into two categories: direct and supportive functions. Direct functions of Innovation 
systems work on identifying their problems, such as bottlenecks and functional failures, 
and solving them by creating alternative knowledge, such as new technology and 
products (ibid.). Supportive functions facilitate the direct functions by, for example, 
providing incentives for innovation actors or guidance in directing the search and 
stimulation of markets (ibid.). For example, the changed evaluation system of national 
R&D projects can be regarded as a supportive function to guide the direction of 
innovation activities.  
2.2.4.1 National and sectoral innovation systems 
This sub-section will review the concepts of the national innovation system (NIS) and the 
sectoral innovation system (SIS), because the transition of the KoPI has taken place 
under the influence of the national institutional setting and within the context of the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
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First, the NIS is generally defined as an innovation system for economic development, 
comprising diverse actors and institutional settings (e.g., Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992). 
Actors in the NIS include industrial firms (producers and users), public research institutes 
and the government. Institutional settings include S&T and industrial policies, rules and 
market mechanisms.  
The concept of the NIS is built on the assumption that innovation patterns are different 
across nations, depending on the structural differences in production systems and 
institutional settings (Anderson and Lundvall 1997, Lundvall 1992). Structural differences 
include the ‘internal organisation of firms’, ‘inter-firm relationships’, ‘the role of the public 
sector’, ‘institutional set up of the financial sector’ and ‘R&D-intensity and R&D-
organisation’ (Lundvall 1992, p. 14). For example, a highly integrated large firm-led 
economy and a network-led economy of smaller firms would have different patterns of 
innovation, and different modes of governance would be necessary to promote 
innovation generation and economic development (Anderson and Lundvall 1997).  
Overall, the NIS provides a conceptual frame to illustrate the macro-level influence of 
‘the structural characteristics of a national economy such as its specific production 
structure, technical infrastructure, and other institutional factors’ (Guerrieri and Tylecote 
1997, p. 107) on individual actors’ innovation performance. 
On the other hand, the SIS considers the innovation pattern of specific industries. The 
concept shares the underlying frame of the NIS – collective learning for knowledge 
generation and diffusion among diverse innovation actors and the influence of 
institutional settings on innovation. Malerba suggests that there are seven key elements 
of an SIS: products; market and non-market actors; knowledge and learning processes; 
basic technologies, inputs and demands and their linkages and complementarities that 
comprise a sector’s scope; interactive processes within and without external firms; 
competition and selection processes; and institutions (2002). 
These elements differentiate the conceptual focus of the SIS from that of other innovation 
systems in two respects. First, the SIS deals more directly with the product, its market 
and its competition. Second, the SIS considers the relationship between the sector-
specific knowledge base and the institutional and national factors surrounding the 
industry (McKelvey et al. 2004). The sector-specific knowledge base is interpreted in the 
context of the technological regime of a sector.  
The technological regime consists of the characteristics of knowledge, cumulativeness 
of knowledge, and opportunity of innovation and its appropriability (Breschi and Malerba 
27 
 
1997). It is an underlying knowledge dynamic that affects ‘the nature of problems firms 
have to solve’, ‘the type of technological learning’, the structure of incentives and ‘the 
basic processes of variety, generation and selection’ (Malerba 2002, p. 250). In other 
words, each industry has distinct interactive and competitive relationships and 
organisational boundaries in creating innovation, depending on its technological regime 
(Breschi and Malerba 1997).  
In the latecomer context, an industry in the transitional phase encounters a changing 
technological regime because the industry shifts from being imitative (based on 
knowledge exploitation) to being innovative (based on knowledge generation). Moreover, 
a new core technology’s penetration into a sector such as biotechnology also requires 
the reconfiguration of the SIS, that is, the interactive pattern of innovation actors and 
institutional settings must change to deal with the new knowledge dynamics.  
2.2.4.2 Innovation systems in the transitional phase 
While innovation systems are used in this thesis as the main analytical framework to 
understand the innovation structure of the KoPI, capacity/capability-based (more 
prescriptive) interpretations of innovation systems are also drawn upon. For example, 
the national technological capabilities suggested by Lall (1992), the national learning 
system by Viotti (2002) and X-efficiency of the NIS by Niosi (2002), all have to do with 
the capability view of the NIS, which includes the effective constellation of innovation 
elements and the efficient allocation/reallocation of resources to embedded actors and 
their interlinks. With respect to latecomers’ transitions, the key issue of system-level 
dynamic capability becomes how effectively institutional and country-specific factors are 
reconfigured to cope with changing knowledge and to promote the embedded actors’ 
exploratory learning.  
2.3 Technological Capability in the Transitional Phase 
The following two sections look into two areas of literature that are contextually related 
to the transition of the KoPI: industrial catch-up, including the transitional phase, and 
science-based innovation. To begin, this section reviews the common features of a 
successful catch-up in Asian NIEs, and the main issues that occur during a transition. It 
goes on to look at the firms’ technological learning and innovation systems. 
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2.3.1 Micro-level dynamics  
2.3.1.1 Features of rapid catch-up 
There are two underlying drivers that enable stepwise technological capability building 
in latecomer Asian NIEs26: enhanced absorptive capacity in reversing the PLC and active 
participation in the global production network. Both of these drivers involve establishing 
a virtuous cycle between technological catch-up and market catch-up.  
Absorptive capacity is regarded as a main factor conditioning the rate of latecomer firms’ 
technological catch-up. In empirical studies, absorptive capacity in technological catch-
up is often explained using the cases of Samsung and Hyundai (e.g., Kim 1997b, 1998, 
Mathews and Cho 1999, Lee 2000). In particular, Kim (1997b, 1998) emphasises that 
technological learning is a function of a firm’s absorptive capacity, which consists of two 
elements: upgrading the prior knowledge base and an intensified learning effort.  
The literature shows that Korean latecomer firms' rapid market catch-up is realised by 
active participation in the global production network. Pack (2000, p. 72) highlights the 
importance of exports in the catch-up of Asian NIEs as follows: ‘Export growth became 
the standard by which all policies were judged, including those that provided initial 
protection for infant industries’. Furthermore, the export-led catch-up by Korean 
latecomers seems to intensify as they move up to become innovative learners.27 
In industrial practice, a model combining original equipment manufacturing (OEM), own 
design and manufacture (ODM) and own brand manufacture (OBM) (Hobday 1995, 
1998a) clearly shows the mechanism of building virtuous cycles between technological 
and market catch-up, particularly in consumer electronics by Samsung and PCs by Acer 
(e.g., Hobday 1998a).  
The initial stage of catch-up relies on buyers’ advanced technological and marketing 
capabilities. OEM contracts led Korean and Taiwanese latecomer firms to build 
production capability and use foreign buyers as export channels with minimum marketing 
costs. The latecomer firms then quickly moved to design and develop their own imitative 
products based on enhanced absorptive capacity and technological guidelines from the 
buyers. These activities are referred to as ODM in the creative imitation stage. From this 
stage, companies face increasing difficulty in receiving technology transfers, as 
                                                          
26 Main literature used: Kim 1980, Hobday 1995, Chen and Sewell 1996, Ernst 1998, 2000, Ernst and 
Guerrieri 1998, Mathews and Cho 1999, Choung et al. 2000, Mathews 2002.  
27 For instance, overseas sales for Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motors accounted for 83% of their 
total sales in 2011. In addition, LG Electronics also took 85% and Kia Motors took 80% (Money Today 
2/2/2012). Of course, the proportion does not mean the total proportion of net export because the figure 
includes overseas production.  
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advanced firms start to recognise the latecomers as potential challengers. Finally, the 
latecomers begin to design their own products and compete directly with advanced firms. 
These activities are called OBM in the innovation stage. 
For example, Anam (now Amkor Technology), once the largest chip-packaging company 
in the world, followed the catch-up path from OEM to ODM (Hobday 1995). It entered 
the semiconductor business by receiving orders for simple assembly with technological 
support from a US company in the late 1960s. It then advanced to a sophisticated 
packaging stage with little technological support from overseas clients in the late 1980s, 
and then to new chip-packaging design and processing in the 1990s. The same pattern 
of incremental technological upgrade can be seen in the case of Hyundai, a Korean 
automobile company (Kim 1998). In the late 1960s, Hyundai started its business by 
assembling components from semi-knock-downs transferred from the Ford Motor 
Company. Hyundai succeeded in producing licensed cars in the 1970s and developed 
its first compact car with its own developed engine, Accent, in 1994. 
At present, some of the Korean and Taiwanese latecomers in high-tech industries have 
successfully developed their own R&D and brands such as Acer, Hyundai, Samsung and 
TSMC. Overall, taking the long-term view from the outset of their business, they followed 
a similar stepwise catch-up path by building technological capability incrementally and 
exploiting the export market.28 
2.3.1.2 Technological capability in the transitional phase  
In response to the increasing presence of latecomer firms in the innovation stage, some 
recent literature has focused on the transition from the imitation stage to the innovation 
stage (e.g., Dutrénit 2000, Hobday et al. 2004, Kale 2005). In the transitional phase, 
latecomer firms often face rising uncertainty in both technological learning and 
environmental conditions. They compete more directly with innovative rivals in more 
novel and complex product markets. Thus, latecomers must have the technological and 
non-technological capabilities to deal with the change. Ways to do so include deepening 
a company’s current knowledge base and extending to a new knowledge area, 
identifying the changing characteristics of the catch-up environment in the market and in 
institutions, building or reorienting strategic goals, searching for alternative methods and 
reorganising resources. The goal of these actions is to upgrade imitative capability to 
                                                          
28 The following remark symbolises some latecomers’ leapfrogging: “Rudely pushing the Japanese aside are 
South Korea's Samsung, LG and Hynix. Nor, is it only and electronics phenomenon. In the auto industry 
South Korea's Hyundai/Kia Motors…The same goes for shipbuilding and even soap operas where the 
Korean shows are even all the rage in Japan” (Prestowitz 2012). 
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innovative capability in a timely manner. In other words, the dynamic nature of a 
latecomer’s technological learning emerges in the transitional phase.  
Three main approaches for understanding transition are identified in the literature, all of 
which are related to one another: a) strategic complexity in dealing with the transitional 
phase, b) the need to build dynamic capability and c) the variety of technological catch-
up paths in the transitional phase.  
a) Strategic complexity in dealing with the transition phase 
Hobday et al. (2004) analysed 26 innovation-seeking Korean firms and found two types 
of complexity in their transitional phases. On one hand, developing OBM products 
requires technological learning itself to become more explorative and complex. On the 
other hand, non-technological catch-up factors become more complicated, such as the 
relationship with buyers (often as industrial leaders) and the structure of market 
competition. 
Specifically, latecomers try to secure a market return through their imitative products for 
OEM/ODM. At the same time, they also try to develop more innovative. In the transitional 
phase, one potential risks is competition in the OBM market with the companies that buy 
their ODM/OEM products (ibid.). That is, latecomers are forced to deal with competitive 
and collaborative relationships with the forerunners, such as continuous subcontracts 
and more horizontal competition. 
In dealing with strategic complexity, some Korean and Taiwanese firms attempt to take 
a dual-portfolio strategy, becoming what are known as hybrid firms; they may operate 
both leadership and ‘followership’ strategies, depending on the degree of innovation in 
each product line (ibid.). Some products are developed for OBM, while others are 
developed as ODM or OEM. Regardless of its final success, this dual strategy can be 
seen as the strategic response of latecomer firms to adapt to the changed technological 
and market environment in the transition.  
b) The need to build dynamic capability 
Latecomer firms cope with the strategic complexity of the transitional phase by building 
dynamic capability. Some studies have identified substantial features of latecomer firms’ 
emerging dynamic capability, such as combinative capability, latecomer absorptive 
capacity and embryonic strategic capability (e.g., Mathews and Cho 1999, Chuang 2010, 
Dutrénit 2004). These features can be seen as ways of upgrading latecomer firms’ 
technological capability to cope with a more dynamic technological and competitive 
environment. 
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Combinative capability (Mathews and Cho 1999) stresses the ability to rapidly assemble 
imported technologies, enabling further speedy resource uptake and rapid entry to the 
new generation of products. That is, combinative capability is the competence platform 
for moving up to more advanced product versions. The enhancement of combinative 
capability is exemplified by Samsung’s rapid mastery of product generations in dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM), especially its development of the world’s first 64M 
DRAM. Latecomer absorptive capacity (Chuang 2010) is the learning platform to quickly 
expanding high-tech product fields towards other product categories. An example of 
using latecomer absorptive capacity is the Taiwanese firms’ entry to the LCD business 
based on their existing specific technological bases in PCs and semiconductors.  
While these two kinds of absorptive capacities concentrate on the technology-centred 
dynamic learning process in transition, embryonic strategic capability (Dutrénit 2000, 
2004) focuses on the managerial and organisational complexity of technological 
capability building in the transitional phase. 29  The concept of embryonic strategic 
capability focuses on the latecomer firm’s primitive strategic capability to drive forward 
to build more internal innovative capability and create a complex knowledge base.30 Thus, 
this concept involves the initial establishment of an internal knowledge base in a specific 
technological area beyond a company’s capacity to borrow and imitate (Dutrénit 2000). 
Embryonic strategic capability emphasises the organisational mechanism of 
technological learning, such as knowledge management, due to unseen complex 
learning processes (Dutrénit 2004).31 
As they face the transitional phase, latecomers require technological and non-
technological capabilities that are different from those needed in the imitation stage. 
Their knowledge base should become broader and deeper as their surrounding 
environment becomes more competitive and dynamic. The organisational process of 
technological learning also becomes more complicated. 
c) The variety of technological catch-up paths for transition 
The third approach to understanding transition relates to the variety of catch-up paths for 
moving beyond the transitional phase. Whereas the early catch-up stage (that is, the 
                                                          
29 This is based on her earlier empirical work on large Mexican glass manufacturing companies (Dutrenit 
2000). 
30 The innovative technological capability to “build, nurture, and renew strategic capabilities” (Dutrenit 2000) 
involving an innovation stage. 
31 The ultimate strategic capability, by innovative firms, involves the management of all technical-functions 
needed to deal with the changing environment. In this context, the organisational capabilities for managing 
complex strategic assets are highlighted in much of the strategic management literature dealing with this 
issue (Dutrenit 2004).  
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duplicative imitation stage) is commonly initiated by learning simple production 
technologies by drawing on external technologies, the literature reflects an increasing 
variety of paths for further catch-up in the transition phase.32  
Three possible paths for overcoming the transitional phase can be identified through 
observing recent information and communications technology (ICT) products and 
systems developed in Korea (Choung et al. 2014, Song et al. 2006): (i) the development 
of more innovative products that advance the reverse PLC, (ii) the architectural 
differentiation of the product entering just after fixing a dominant design, and (iii) the 
development of innovative products prior to establishing a dominant design (see the third 
image in Figure 2.2). 
For example, Samsung’s DRAM business successfully overcame the transitional phase 
by intensifying process innovation along the reverse PLC, that is, path (i) (Choung et al. 
2014). Some Korean firms follow innovation path (ii), which is known as architectural 
differentiation (ibid.). MtekVision and Core Logic, developers of camera control 
processors (CCPs) and camera application processors (CAPs) for mobile phones, 
quickly entered the camera phone market just after the dominant design of the mobile 
camera phone was established in 2002. Through joint R&D with mobile phone 
manufacturers such as LG and Samsung, they were able to change the interface 
between the system (mobile handset) and component (camera module) to enhance 
image processing.33 In particular, Song et al. (2006) suggest the technological path has 
high potential for latecomers’ transitions with no need to develop novel technologies on 
their own. In fact, this architectural differentiation underlies the recent trend of R&D in 
Korea focusing on the convergence of ICT products.  
Similarly, Forbes and Wield (2000) argue that latecomers may enjoy the benefit of 
followership when they enhance innovative design capability based on dominant 
technologies. This design capability enables latecomers to maintain a very small gap 
with forerunners, a distinctive form of competitiveness. Although they do not refer to 
architectural innovation, the authors clearly suggest the value of followers’ design 
capability for architectural innovation based on existing technologies.  
Innovation path (iii) is more radical. Latecomer companies on this path focus on 
developing innovative products prior to the establishment of a dominant design (Choung 
                                                          
32 For example, in the ODM stage, the different catch-up paths among Asian NIEs become apparent. 
Taiwanese electronic companies focus on deepening specialisation in the ODM, while the Korean Chaebol 
try to jump to the OBM stage with vertical integration in parallel with ODM contracts (Hobday 1995). 
33 Joint R&D also led to the simultaneous development of the system and its components (ibid.). 
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et al. 2014). However, in practice, latecomers engaging in radical innovation often fail. In 
2005, the world’s first commercialised mobile TV technology, digital multimedia 
broadcasting via terrestrial transmission (T-DMB), failed to find a market in Korea. The 
cause was a lack of institutional capability on the part of latecomer firms and the 
government to establish global technology standards, create an early-stage market and 
coordinate diverse innovation actors (ibid.). 
Lee and Lim (2001) similarly lay out three different technological paths that latecomer 
firms can take to accelerate the transitional phase: path-skipping, path-creating and path-
following technological capability building. 34  First, a few Korean firms successfully 
carried out a transition phase by skipping the intermediate learning stage, instead using 
emerging technologies from outside the company. For example, at one time, a 
carburettor-based engine was the dominant design in the automobile industry. Instead 
of mastering the dominant technology, Hyundai focused on learning about the new 
electronic injection-based engine from foreign developers and thereby narrowed the gap 
in its engine technology.  
Other Korean companies moved beyond the transition stage by developing new 
technologies, such as the world’s first commercialisation of a code division multiple 
access (CDMA)-based mobile communication system. By doing so, they skirted the then-
dominant communication systems, such as the time division multiple access (TDMA)-
based global system for mobile communications (GSM) in Europe and the analogue 
system in the United States.35  
The opportunity of latecomers to exploit a new technological paradigm (Perez 1985) is a 
critical driver for creating a new path of development. Lee et al. (2005) argue that Korean 
TV manufacturers were able to overtake their Japanese forerunners by swiftly changing 
the technological focus to the emerging technology of digital TV, away from the 
incumbent-led analogue TV.36  
Lastly, it is worth considering the underlying motive of the varied catch-up paths. 
Regardless of the kinds of paths latecomers take, each path reflects their effort to search 
for routes that rapidly reduce the gap with frontrunners. Hobday (2005) suggests that 
latecomer firms have to consider a way of substituting deficits in technological and 
                                                          
34  Three different paths are also based on the consideration of the differences in each industry’s 
technological regime and their influence on latecomers’ transitions. 
35  Meanwhile, the Korean electronic Chaebol also was strengthening technological capability in its 
conventional catch-up path in consumer electronics.      
36  As stated, the rapid technological shift is also based on combining with the prior accumulated 
complementary asset such as the experience of TV production, i.e., the importance of absorptive capacity.  
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marketing conditions, which are shaped by earlier movers. The manner in which they do 
so can be seen as a major factor in producing a variety of catch-up paths (ibid.).37 In line 
with this, the ways of substituting the preconditions and formulation of own catch-up 
paths should consider different national, sectoral, and resource conditions (Hobday 2003, 
2005, 2011). Hobday’s argument is based on adopting Gerschenkron's model, which is 
the complementary substitution of missing prerequisites for economic catch-up 
depending on each country’s circumstances:  
In Gerschenkron's model…only by choosing and successfully following 
distinctive paths (and therefore stages) of development can latecomer nations 
meet the new circumstances presented to them by the actions of earlier 
developers (cited in Hobday 2003, p. 295). 
Overall, the variety of catch-up paths reflects increasing variation across latecomer firms 
in searching for more suitable ways of building the technological capability concerned 
with the complicated technological and market dynamics in transition. The argument for 
the complementary substitution of missing prerequisites can guide latecomers who are 
searching for their own catch-up paths.  
2.3.1.3 Changing nature of technological learning  
A latecomer firm’s rapid catch-up is framed within a stepwise catch-up model, composed 
of enhancing absorptive capacity in technological learning coupled with export market 
performance. In this general framework, recent literature extends the focus to the 
complication of latecomers' technological learning in the transitional phase. 
The recent literature further shows that latecomer firms face less favourable and more 
competitive market environments in the advanced catch-up stages, especially in their 
relationships with leading incumbent firms. In addition, the attempt to develop innovative 
products itself imposes more complex and distant technological learning on latecomer 
firms. That is, the literature describes the discontinuous characteristics of the 
technological learning pattern between the previous imitation stage and the advanced 
catch-up stage. Specifically, latecomers in the transitional phase must overcome 
technological and market conditions and rules, often shaped by the earlier movers.38 
                                                          
37 For example, the catch-up by Samsung is exemplified as the strategic outcome of forming own catch-up 
path considering barriers and advantages of technological and marketing sides as a latecomer.  
38 However, this does not mean that surmounting the conditions/rules established can be achieved only 
through direct competition with the forerunners. 
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Because of these challenges, the change of the technological learning pattern in 
transition becomes a critical issue. Hobday et al. (2004) suggest that there is a need for 
latecomers to sustain research activities through structural, behavioural and managerial 
flexibility. This suggestion is in line with the so-called anti-routine view of innovation 
(Hobday 2005), which holds that innovation occurs when routinised imitative learning 
patterns become innovative learning patterns. Whether latecomer firms can build 
dynamic capability for transition has to do with the change-generation of the imitative 
learning pattern. 
Recent studies have addressed some problems that occur in changing the learning 
pattern from imitation to innovation. Lee and Lim (2001) briefly mention that Hyundai 
prevented the penetration of an imitative learning routine into its first engine development 
project by establishing a new R&D centre. Kale (2005) reveals the difficulty in changing 
individual researchers’ approaches when trying to move from generic drug development 
to new-drug R&D in Indian pharmaceutical firms. 39  These examples show that 
latecomers need to find effective ways of strengthening the exploratory mode of 
technological learning for transition. 
However, in general, the literature has addressed the pattern change in latecomer firms’ 
technological learning only in a limited way, and mostly concentrates on a few Chaebol-
led and engineering- or technology-driven catch-up industries, as shown earlier. The 
dynamics of transition and the technological learning pattern in the science-based 
pharmaceutical industry remains an overlooked area. 
2.3.2 Macro-level dynamics  
2.3.2.1 Features of institutional conditions 
Other literature on catch-up focuses on the institutional influences in industrial catch-up 
(e.g., Freeman 1987, Westphal 1990, Amsden 1991, Lall 1994, Mowery and Oxley 1995, 
von Tunzelmann 1995, Kim 1997a, Ernst and Guerrieri 1998, Wong 1999, Viotti 2002, 
Mazzoleni and Nelson 2007, Maio 2008, Khan and Blankenburg 2009). These studies 
illustrate that Asian latecomer firms’ rapid catch-up occurs not only through their own 
efforts, but also by institutional conditions. The common institutional features that led to 
successful industrial catch-up are summed up in the three macro-level conditions 
identified by Mazzoleni and Nelson (2007): a) ample flow of human resources between 
the catching-up and advanced countries, b) strong governmental support, such as R&D 
                                                          
39 His study seems to be the first research that apparently raises the issue of ‘learning’ and ‘unlearning’ in 
latecomer pharmaceutical firms.  
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investment and various incentives, and c) loose operation of an intellectual property 
rights (IPR) system.  
Ample flow of human resources 
Koreans with overseas training and PhD holders who returned to local Korean 
companies such as Samsung are a critical factor that strengthened absorptive capacity 
(Kim 1997b). Similarly, formal and informal networking between local Taiwanese 
companies (e.g., Acer) and Taiwanese engineers in technologically advanced regions 
(such as Silicon Valley) provided a channel of technological learning that fostered the 
Taiwanese computer industry (Kim and von Tunzelmann 1998, Ernst 2000). 
Governmental leadership and industrial policies 
The successful catching-up countries (the US, Japan, Korea and Taiwan) were active in 
the use of industrial policies to protect and foster infant industries, especially target 
industries (Mazzoleni and Nelson 2007). Biotechnology is the most recent case of a 
targeted sector in Asian NIEs. In the literature on Asian NIEs,40 governmental leadership 
is actualised in two institutional dimensions: strengthening national absorptive capacity, 
and market creation through domestic market protection and export support. 
To strengthen national absorptive capacity, the main institutional actions taken were to 
concentrate on the establishment of necessary innovation elements, such as the supply 
of qualitative human resources and the establishment of GRIs as the mediators of 
technology acquisition and diffusion. 41  As some latecomer countries deepen the 
transitional phase, national support since the 1990s has extended to fostering research-
oriented universities and technology-intensive start-ups. Such institutional elements can 
be seen as a national resource commitment for promoting active technology absorption 
(Viotti 2002).  
Market creation can occur through industrial policies linked with trade policy. In general, 
the Asian NIEs instituted various performance-based incentives for efficient national 
resource management, such as direct and indirect subsidies for R&D, high entry barriers 
to the domestic market such as tariffs and regulations, procurement and export support 
through financing, and focusing on targeted industries (Lall 2000). From a macro-level 
                                                          
40 It is often compared with other regions’ catching-up processes and performance (e.g., South America).  
41 GRI – e.g., ITRI (Industrial Technology Research Institute) in Taiwan and KIST (Korea Institute of Science 
and Technology). 
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view, these incentives were intended to actualise an industrial policy that combines 
export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) with import-substituting industrialisation (ISI).42  
By linking technological and market-side industrial policies, Korea and Taiwan were able 
to couple upgrading absorptive capacity with profit creation within a relatively short period 
of development. Linking these policies can be seen as the institutional driver of the 
formation of stepwise catch-up cycles of duplicative imitation, creative imitation and 
innovation stages over the last 40 years.  
Loose IPR regime 
In the past, latecomers could access forerunners’ technologies with loose IPR 
restrictions in the catching up period, as long as they did not encroach on the markets of 
advanced countries (Mazzoleni and Nelson 2007). Interestingly, licensing was 
considered a tool for creating economic profits through technological transfer rather than 
a means of aggressive IPR protection for forerunners (ibid.). 
2.3.2.2 Innovation systems in transition 
Some recent literature on Asian NIEs’ innovation systems focuses on the changing 
institutional setting in the transitional phase. In general, this change can be thought of as 
the reconfiguration of innovation elements and their relationship, moving from a system 
of utilising external knowledge to a system of internally generating innovation source. 
Two interrelated perspectives on this institutional change occur in the literature: a) the 
successful transition of latecomers’ innovation systems, and b) institutional rigidity and 
flexibility in dealing with the transitional phase.  
a) Successful innovation system transition 
Dodgson et al. (2008) discuss a morphological (structural) reconfiguration of the NIS, 
drawing on the Taiwanese case of transition from technology use to technology 
generation. They compare the network formation of the present burgeoning 
biotechnology industry with previous industrial cases of ICTs. While the industrial 
network of ICTs was established to exploit imported technologies and is thus capable of 
catching up, the biotechnology network was formed to create its own knowledge base 
led by domestic research institutes. The new establishment of science parks and 
intermediary agencies support this knowledge base creation. While the authors illustrate 
                                                          
42 When the incentives provided to firms resulted in dissatisfactory performance in exports, the government 
retracted the incentives offered, and thus the inefficiency of allocating input resources could be eliminated. 
By contrast, South American countries have been open-ended in forming efficient incentive structures, in 
general (Westphal 1990).  
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the overall transition of the NIS, they also note that there is a lack of a cohesive network 
between innovation actors. 
The emergence of Singapore as one of the top three Asian countries in aerospace 
technology (Matthews and Zhang 2010) is a substantial example of a successful 
transition of a latecomer SIS in a high-technology sector (Vertesy 2013).43 There were 
several factors that led to a ‘transition without interruption’ of the industry (ibid., p. 137). 
One of these was institutional capability – the government’s guidance of the direction of 
industrial transition and support for relevant innovation elements. The Singaporean 
government strategically considered the participation of the high-technology industry’s 
global value chain by focusing on a specific segment, that is, component supply and the 
field of maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). This specialisation strategy was 
strongly backed by active investment in infrastructure and local R&D, as well as 
incentives to attract foreign manufacturers. The stable management of the air force in a 
small independent country and its geographical advantage as an airline hub also 
underpinned the strategy of focusing on MRO (ibid., pp. 127-128 and p. 135).  
The other driver is the strong possibility of technological accumulation in the MRO field 
within a short learning period, compared with the aerospace industry in general. While 
aircraft manufacturers have long development cycles, MRO-related products and 
services have no need for long development times (ibid., pp. 127 and 135).  
Overall, this case shows an effective way of overcoming the transitional phase and 
establishing a competent SIS through a smart and flexible industrial policy (ibid.). 
Singapore strategically combined its prior technological capability accumulated in the 
pure learning stage of maintenance and repairs to meet small domestic demand within 
the context of an industry’s changing global value chain. Therefore, it was possible to 
incrementally upgrade technology and make a smooth transition to market profit. In 
contrast, the aerospace industry in Indonesia, which attempted to develop its own aircraft 
based entirely on public support, struggled to penetrate the global market (ibid.).  
b) Institutional flexibility/rigidity of innovation systems 
Some literature provides a more problematic view of latecomers’ reconfiguration of 
innovation systems toward knowledge creation. To begin with, Kim (2000) broadly 
describes the systemic transmutation of the imitative Korean NIS (K-NIS) into a barrier 
that delayed the transition to an innovation-generating NIS. The government failed in 
coordinating various policy activities in the transition. The Chaebol were seen as 
                                                          
43 The other two countries are Japan and Korea (Matthews and Zhang 2010). 
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candidates for further restructuring. They were increasingly regarded as an obstacle to 
fostering small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The education policies intended to 
support industrial technology led to a lack of research capability in the universities. 
Moreover, in terms of organisational culture, the proliferation of a top-down style, 
bureaucratic and militaristic characteristics, and short-term efficiency prioritisation also 
contributed to the delayed transition.  
Interestingly, the rigidity of the Korean NIS can be traced by the implicit criticism in 
comparative studies between Korea and Taiwan. Wang (2007) argues that Taiwan's 
transition is based on upgrading a ‘neo-Marshallian network-based’ collective learning 
system comprising SMEs, public research institutes, and multinational corporations 
(MNCs). In contrast, Korea's transition is based on the acceleration of ‘Schumpeterian 
scale-based technological development’ led by a few large conglomerates (Chaebols) 
that are vertically integrated.44 The preponderance of resource allocation into Chaebols 
and the lack of network-based technological learning are indications of the systemic 
rigidity of the Korean NIS. They make adoption of the Korean catch-up model difficult for 
other latecomer countries.  
Wong (2005) uses the case of fostering biotechnology to identify a procedural problem 
in the Taiwanese transition. He argues that the emerging innovation network of 
biotechnology in Taiwan has evolved with a lack of ‘cohesive collaboration’ due to the 
failure of the coordinative function of the government. He stresses the need for qualitative 
change in the manner of governmental intervention in the transitional phase:  
Second, measuring the role of governments in promoting biotechnology 
innovation solely in quantitative terms, more or less intervention, is problematic 
when we consider that what has always mattered most in the developmental state 
model – and not just the East-Asian variant – are the types of interventions 
initiated by governments, and furthermore, how well these initiatives match up 
with specific political, economic, social, and technological imperatives…in 
understanding the transitional dynamics of the developmental state in Taiwan 
(Wong 2005, p. 185). 
In an innovation system, qualitative change in government intervention is associated with 
the effective transformation of the innovation actors and their network, changing 
knowledge utilisation for indigenous knowledge-generating innovation actors and 
                                                          
44 The Taiwanese structure seems to be particularly suggestive regarding the industrial structure of the KoPI 
led by SMEs, which is likely to be closer to that of Taiwanese major industries than that of Korea led by 
Chaebols. 
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networks. For example, the top-down style of governmental leadership, which is effective 
in facilitating imitative learning, is not suitable for the promotion of biotechnology 
innovation (Wong 2005). Instead, biotechnology innovation takes place in an 
increasingly pluralistic institutional context among non-state innovation actors embedded 
in a local private and global research network (ibid.).  
Overall, the literature shows that a latecomer’s NIS faces increasing institutional 
challenges during a transition. 
2.3.2.3 Changing institutional conditions 
Overall, the common institutional features of rapid catching up were reviewed in the 
frame of innovation systems. These features can converge in a streamlined institutional 
environment for industrial development, thereby leading to efficient and rapid national-
level resource operations. Technological capability building has been led by selected 
private firms with institutional guidance from government.45 Chaebols were formed in this 
circumstance. Little conflict of interest between the private and public actors and between 
different institutional contexts (e.g., between the industrial development and the welfare 
system) disturbed Korea’s rapid industrial development. 
Some recent literature covers emerging institutional issues identified in the transitional 
phase (e.g., Kim 2000, Wong 2005). This literature mainly focuses on macro-level 
structural changes of innovation systems towards the fostering of internal knowledge 
generation and cohesive industrial networks. Institutional rigidity is also suggested as a 
potential difficulty in the reconfiguring of innovation systems. 
However, empirical analysis of the reconfiguration of innovation systems is still limited to 
a macro-level general interpretation and policy suggestions. That is, the micro-dynamics 
of the change, such as the impact of S&T policies on technological learning practices, 
have rarely been addressed, particularly in the context of science-based industry in 
Korea. 
2.4 Nature of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry  
This section reviews the distinctive dynamics of knowledge that underlie science-driven 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.46 Three major features are discussed. First, 
                                                          
45 The boundary of technological learning between the private and public actors has been fairly clear. 
46 The literature domains of science-based industries seem to be dispersed across other literature domains, 
such as public S&T policy, public and private R&D collaboration, the IPR regime and sectoral-specific areas 
(ICT, the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology and nanotechnology). This review approaches the more 
general context of science-based industries rather than serving as a pharmaceutical industry-specific 
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the institutions and mechanism of innovation generation that establish science-based 
industries are described (Sub-section 2.4.1). Second, the emergence of biotechnology, 
which is often regarded as the substitutive technological paradigm for chemically 
synthesised drugs, is discussed (Sub-section 2.4.2). Third, the integral product 
architecture of drugs is reviewed and compared with modularity-based industries, which 
are most of the major catch-up industries in Korea (Sub-section 2.4.3). On this basis, the 
last sub-section (Sub-section 2.4.4) discusses the influence of these three features of 
knowledge dynamics on R&D trends in the pharmaceutical industry. 
2.4.1 Science-based innovation  
2.4.1.1 Basic institutions  
There are a few noticeable characteristics of science-based industries: a) the 
appropriation of research outcomes as a property right, b) the close connection between 
public science research and corporate R&D and c) the financial sources that feed them.  
a) In general, scientific research is conducted in distinctive institutional contexts featuring 
both public and private actors (Partha and David 1994). Due to the fact that scientific 
research is often considered a public good, private firms have a tendency to avoid 
investment in scientific research unless the research can guarantee a direct economic 
profit in the short term (Nelson 1959, Partha and David 1994).47 Therefore, setting a 
patent regime for economic appropriation of research is necessary to attract private 
actors to science-based innovation.  
b) In parallel with an increasingly stringent patent regime, the division of labour between 
public science research and corporate R&D has become blurred. This trend was 
accelerated by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US, which allowed public-funded 
research to be patented (Friedman 2004). This has led to an increasing overlap between 
public and private sector R&D. In turn, a niche business field has emerged ‘around pre-
product development’ based on 'upstream patents' of scientific discoveries (Eisenberg 
and Nelson 2002).48  
                                                          
literature review. The KoPI is now viewed as transitioning from a production-based sector to an innovation-
generating sector; thus, the theoretical angle is closer to the generation of science-based innovation by 
latecomer countries than by that within the pharmaceutical sector-specific frame. Of course, it relies 
considerably on the pharmaceutical industry-based literature. 
47 Traditionally, large, established firms led the scientific research for innovation, dating back to the early 
1920s and as exemplified by the cases of the German chemical companies (Meyer-Thurow 1982, Mowery 
and Nelson 1999) and the emergence of industrial giants such as Dupont, GE and RCA in the US (Smith 
1990). 
48 Related to this, the concepts in Mode 2 of producing knowledge by Gibbons et al. (1997) and Triple Helix 
by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) are proposed to emphasise the closing relationship between the public 
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c) In terms of finance, venture capital is the main funding source for the earliest stages 
of science-based business, specifically prior to entry into the public stock market. This 
new type of financing has flourished in the US (Kortum and Lerner 2000). It led to the 
rise of the small technology-intensive companies that drove the economic growth and 
employment in the US in the 1980s (Gompers 1994).  
However, these three characteristics of science-based industries seem to be expressed 
in different ways in latecomer countries. First of all, IPR acts not only as an institutional 
facilitator but also as a barrier to rapid technological learning and industrial upgrade. This 
is particularly true in cases when patents are institutionally linked with the international 
trade regime. For example, the experience of the Indian pharmaceutical industry shows 
both sides of the impact (e.g., Kale 2005, Athreye et al. 2009). Moreover, many 
developing countries cannot foster science-based innovation due to weak science 
research capability and little financial room in the public and private sectors. 
2.4.1.2 Science-driven learning and innovation 
In general, two types of problem searches lead to innovation in high-tech industries such 
as electronics and pharmaceuticals: science-based and engineering-based. Science-
based innovation, in general, involves a higher degree of uncertainty than engineering-
based innovation.  
Science-based innovation, such as drug R&D, builds on a small number of established 
paths of knowledge (Pisano 2006). As noted above, an increasing number of approaches 
have emerged for generating new drugs, from conventional (organic) chemistry to 
molecular biology to genomics. However, the scientific knowledge base is still in its 
infancy or development stage. Hence, it is often difficult to identify and select the ‘right’ 
path of knowledge to follow in the face of scientific uncertainty (Pisano 2006).49 Moreover, 
scientific knowledge is typically produced in a highly fragmented manner, spread across 
individual labs in universities, public research institutes and private companies (Knorr-
Cetina 1999).  
An engineering-based problem search, by contrast, has a relative advantage compared 
with a science-based one. It is based on more certain knowledge, as many engineering-
related problems can be solved based on scientifically validated core operating principles 
                                                          
sector (mainly universities) and the private sector (i.e., industries) in generating innovation based on public 
scientific research.  
49 The reproducibility of research outcomes (i.e., experiments) is also highly affected by the individual 
scientist’s routines and experiences (Knorr-Cetina 1999). In the interpretation of this argument, they are 
referred to as ‘results that are not readily translated from one scientist to another’ (Dunne and Dougherty 
2006).  
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and dominant designs. The scientific discoveries and principles underlying engineering 
problems are already known and have been further ‘packaged’ into the dominant design 
(e.g., components or products).50 Thus, there is less need for direct involvement in 
fundamental science research. Moreover, engineering-related problems often have 
comparable (benchmarking) products or criteria (Dunne and Dougherty 2006). Therefore, 
engineering problems are more tangible and thus easier to identify than science-related 
problems (ibid.).  
For example, engineers in electronics and semiconductors are not really concerned 
about ‘whether the basic technology is feasible’ (Pisano 2006). They can assume that 
their products will work regardless of functioning efficiency (ibid.). By contrast, drug 
researchers are normally unable to ascertain whether they can discover materials and 
biological mechanisms related to what they want to research. Furthermore, they are not 
sure whether the materials they discover will be feasible for use in the human body until 
clinical trials are conducted (ibid.).51 Thus, scientific researchers have to first find out, 
understand and further validate the basic relationships between causes and effects. Only 
then can they integrate these outcomes with knowledge about biological systems – which 
itself is still fragmented in understanding.  
On the whole, science-based innovation requires researchers to take two steps: 
simplification for discovery through in-vitro experiments and integration for development 
(Pavitt 1998). The uncertainty of innovation in development time, learning cost and 
probability of failure becomes high. 
2.4.2 The emerging biotechnology paradigm 
Biotechnology is having a number of effects on traditional synthetic chemistry-based 
drug R&D. The discovery and preclinical development stages of R&D have benefited 
from biotechnological methods since the 1990s. For example, the emergence of 
genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics has broadened the possibility of identifying 
                                                          
50 Strictly speaking, many engineering-based industries are outcomes of technological evolution from initial 
science-based innovation and its further ‘engineered’ technologies through the use of established scientific 
principles. Scientific research still serves as a main driver of innovation, especially at the frontier, such as in 
electronics. In this context, Pavitt (1991) distinguishes the two main patterns through which scientific 
knowledge is applied to innovation, the application of skills and training (e.g., research techniques and basic 
principles) and the content of the knowledge itself. Physics, as a representative case of the former type, is 
widely and indirectly utilised for its meta scientific principles in the various industries. Conversely, in the latter 
case, biological knowledge is applied directly to the development of new products. Similarly, Marsili (2001) 
departmentalises the science-based industries into two technological regimes: life science-based industries, 
such as drugs and bioengineering, and physical science-based industries such as computers, electrical, 
telecommunications and instruments. 
51 Besides, the scientific experiments are conducted away from the ultimate target of the research: the 
biological system of the human body (Dunne and Dougherty 2006). It further poses the issue of integration 
of research outcomes with the biological system. 
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potential targets. In addition, combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening 
(HTS) have facilitated the mass synthesis of all possibilities and the rapid screening of 
compounds in terms of whether they fit with the target (Burns 2005: 116-122).  
These processes have led to the efficient identification of potential drug candidates and 
reduced costs and time expenditure (ibid.). Owing to advances in new biotechnology and 
relevant chemical and information technologies, drug R&D is now transitioning from the 
random screening era to an era of rational drug design (RDD) (Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3: Technological evolution of drug R&D 
Source: Arlington et al. (2002) 
However, much about the biochemical mechanisms of diseases still remains unknown, 
and drug research to tackle them has had mixed results.52 The extensive science base, 
the variability of approach and its immaturity of scientific knowledge of human body has 
led to low productivity in new drug development (Burns 2005, pp. 69–72 and Pisano 
2006).  
Overall, the penetration of a new biotechnological paradigm into the synthetic chemistry-
based innovation pattern of drug R&D provides both opportunities and uncertainties. 
Biotechnologies offer various new knowledge bases and techniques to understand the 
human body and conduct more sophisticated drug R&D. However, the extensive 
knowledge base forces innovation actors to apply state-of-the-art but unstable 
biotechnologies to drug R&D. In brief, the present state can be described as follows: ‘on 
                                                          
52 As noted, the biochemical mechanisms are approached from various science disciplines: from genetics, 
molecular and cell biology, and from biochemistry, bio-informatics, computational chemistry, combinatorial 
and protein chemistry and medicinal subjects (Pisano 2006). 
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the “spectrum of understanding” we sit midway between empiricism (finding out by trial 
and error) and engineering’ (Jon Northrup, cited in Burns 2005, p. 70).  
2.4.3 Product nature as an integral product 
The third feature of the knowledge dynamics stems from the nature of drugs, which have 
integral product architecture. Here, product architecture refers to the way the functions 
of a product are allocated to components or subsystems (Ulrich 1995).53 In line with this, 
product architecture involves how individual research outcomes, such as materials or 
components, are integrated with other components/products. In general, there are two 
different forms of product architecture: modularity and integrality.  
Modular products are developed through ‘smaller subsystems that can be designed 
independently yet function together as a whole’ (Baldwin and Clark 1997, p. 84). Each 
subsystem (or component) has its own function that is necessary for the ultimate function 
of the final product. They are integrated with one another as a single final product. This 
is based on the feasibility of the physical decomposition of a product into its various levels 
of subsystems or components (Henderson and Clark 1990, Brusoni and Prencipe 2001). 
That is, a modular product consists of high independence across subsystems and high 
interdependence within each subsystem (Pisano 2006). Many products related to 
mechanical operation belong to this category of product architecture, such as aeroplanes 
and computers. 
In contrast, modularisation is often impossible when developing drugs because of the 
difficulty of physical decomposition (‘partition’) (Pisano 2006). Specifically, integral 
products have ‘a high degree of interdependence or interconnectedness among 
components or problems’ that require their ‘joint optimisation’ (ibid) for product function. 
In Pisano’s example, the modularisation of a drug into components such as an active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) and formulation parts (non-API materials) is difficult, 
because these two parts are organically interdependent in terms of realising product 
functions like efficacy and safety. Furthermore, API itself consists of a single kind of 
physical entity with a range of functions such as efficacy and safety. 
2.4.4 Impact of the knowledge base on pharmaceutical R&D 
Pharmaceutical R&D has rapidly been complicated under the three features of 
knowledge dynamics, particularly in the two dimensions of interactive learning: i) 
                                                          
53 The concept is extensively elaborated through similar concepts such as product platforms (Meyer and 
Lehnerd 1997), architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark 1990), and complex product systems 
(Hobday 1998b). 
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increasing networking between heterogeneous innovation actors, and ii) simultaneous 
and dense interaction across R&D tasks/steps. 
i) First of all, the deep reliance of biotechnological innovation on science across various 
disciplines has accelerated the participation of diverse public and private R&D actors in 
drug R&D networks. Diverse public and private innovation actors operate in 
heterogeneous institutional contexts and have different R&D goals, reward systems, 
ways of conducting research, and so on. Here, the point is the extensive R&D network 
for drug development leads to blurred divisions and an overlap of R&D tasks between 
innovation actors.54 
 No single pharmaceutical giant can afford to internalise R&D for the whole system 
of the human body due to the limited biotechnological knowledge base. Their core 
competencies often reside in conventional chemistry. Thus, they need to 
strengthen external R&D networks to compensate for their weak knowledge base. 
There are various ways that pharmaceutical firms acquire external innovation 
sources, from a direct M&A to loose R&D collaboration and outsourcing (with 
DBFs and public research institutes). 
 DBFs generally specialise in upstream biotechnology research but lack financial 
resources and downstream knowledge (i.e., clinical and marketing ability). They 
seek to develop and transfer novel drug candidates and process technologies to 
pharmaceutical giants.  
 Public actors, such as universities, are rarely knowledge integrators, but are 
rather fragmented knowledge creators based on a high degree of scientific 
exploration. Their research outcomes are protected by patenting and transferred 
to industrial actors for further development. Unlike private R&D actors, the 
incentive of university research is not only patenting, but also academic 
reputation through publication. 
ii) The functions of drugs, such as efficacy and safety, cannot be physically separated. 
The nature of integral products essentially imposes simultaneous, repetitive and 
continuous feedback across the R&D tasks and processes. The difficulty of dividing 
functions based on the physical decomposability of drugs can cause organisational and 
                                                          
54 It is based on the literature on R&D networks in the pharmaceutical industry (e.g, Arora and Gambardella 
1990, Powell et al. 1996, Galambos and Sturchio 1998, Malerba and Orsenigo 2002, Zucker et al. 2002, 
Quere 2003, Rothaermel and Thursby 2007). A summary of the literature is given in Appendix 1. 
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institutional confusion in terms of allocating R&D tasks by team, and clarifying 
performances.55  
Overall, the penetration of biotechnologies into pharmaceutical R&D, with its profound 
science base, has necessarily drawn various public institutes and DBFs into drug R&D. 
Thus, interactive learning through R&D networks has become thicker and now comprises 
more heterogeneous innovation actors. Moreover, R&D teams need to conduct more 
simultaneous and dense interactions. At the same time, the ‘integrality’ of products 
makes it more difficult to effectively divide R&D tasks and teams.  
2.5 New Challenge: Understanding of Science-Based Catch-Up  
The final review section, first of all, poses the need for radical enhancement of an 
exploratory mode of learning for transition in science-based industries (Sub-section 
2.5.1). It then determines the key characteristics of an exploratory mode of technological 
learning based on the literature review (Sub-section 2.5.2). Lastly, the limited 
understanding of science-based catch-up and latecomers’ exploratory learning in the 
existing literature is summarised (Sub-section 2.5.3).  
2.5.1 Challenges for science-based transition  
Three unique features of knowledge in the pharmaceutical industry, combined with the 
general obstacles of transition, saddle latecomers with having to make radical changes 
in their pattern of technological learning.  
First of all, the transition in the pharmaceutical industry requires a broader and deeper 
scientific knowledge base. Here, the point is the dual characteristics of science-based 
innovation, which is both fragmented and systemic. As highlighted above, when new-
drug R&D is conducted, the relevant scientific knowledge is typically fragmented across 
various disciplines and innovation actors. At the same time, the fragmented knowledge 
must also be comprehensively understood in the context of a complex biological system 
like the human body. By contrast, in the imitation stage, which focuses on producing 
generic drugs, firms rarely engage in such highly explorative and integrative learning. 
They generally acquire scientific knowledge that has already been ‘packaged’ in an 
engineering context. A full understanding of the scientific base of the products at this 
point is unnecessary in reversing the product life cycle, even in drug production. Thus, 
                                                          
55 In contrast, in modular products, the organisational boundaries of tasks set by each firm or team can be 
clearly demarcated due to the independent nature of the subsystems/components. 
48 
 
latecomers face significant barriers in dealing with the dual perspectives needed during 
the transitional phase.  
Second, the integral architecture base of drugs creates a further knowledge gap between 
the imitation and innovation stages of development compared with what would be found 
in the modular products. The difficulty of physical decomposition and high 
interdependence between functions forces latecomers to master a complex knowledge 
base within a short period of time if they want to develop their own drugs.56 In contrast, 
in the imitation stage, there is widely diffused information about off-patent original drugs. 
Thus, firms can learn through reverse engineering of synthetic processes with less need 
for understanding the discovery and design process of the chemical composition. 
However, the process-related capability will not enable latecomers to design and test 
novel integral products. That is, new-drug development requires a high level of 
exploratory learning, whereas the synthesis of off-patent drugs is based on exploitive 
learning. 
Third, the emerging biotechnological paradigm also leads to complexity of learning in 
achieving science-based transition. Biotechnology can provide new opportunities for 
latecomer pharmaceutical firms’ catch-up, just as, for example, Korean TV 
manufacturers exploited the emerging technological paradigm of digital technologies 
(see Sub-section 2.3.2).  
However, being able to take advantage of these new opportunities is difficult for two 
reasons. One is the fact that the speed of technological advance at the frontier influences 
the speed of catch-up in the new technological paradigm (Mytelka 2004). This is related 
to how quickly the forerunners move on to new technologies (ibid.). If the transitional 
period (of technology) becomes shorter, the latecomers with a limited knowledge base 
will have less of a possibility to catch up due to the intense science base of the emerging 
technological paradigm (ibid.).57 The other is associated with latecomers’ direct ability to 
deal with institutional and organisational conditions involving new technologies (ibid.). 
Surrounding institutions must determine how they can promote the exploratory learning 
                                                          
56 By contrast, modular products such as electronics and computers, have the relatively easy characteristics 
to realise the incremental change of the learning pattern. For example, the nature of physical 
decomposability underlies the successful stepwise catch-up often characterised by OEM and ODM. They 
initiated technological learning by supplying simple components to overseas manufacturers with limited 
engineering knowledge. They then incrementally expanded the supply scope of components and 
subsystems by improving their knowledge base. The design capability of the original product can be 
gradually acquired through the incremental expansion of exploration. 
57 This is based on the illustration of the increasingly difficult environment surrounding taking the catching-
up opportunities in new wave technologies such as biotechnology due to the extensive scientific knowledge 
base, the increasing need for collaborative and interactive learning by local innovation actors and the rapidly 
changing technologies (Mytelka 2004). 
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of new technologies. In addition, it is essential that latecomer firms expand their 
exploratory learning to take advantage of new opportunities 
On the whole, to deal with complicated knowledge dynamics, there is a need for radical 
enhancement of the exploratory mode of technological learning.  
Table 2.1: Key characteristics of exploration in science-based industries  
 Exploration Exploitation 
Basic nature  
of learning  
(Problem 
identification 
and solving)  
 Distant search and learning (for 
future products/processes) 
 Ill-defined problem 
 High uncertainty  
- in cost and time 
 Scientific research  
 Proximate search and learning 
(around daily production activities) 
 Articulated problem 
 Low uncertainty 
- in cost and time  
 Engineering operationalisation 
Knowledge base 
 Broad science subjects 
 Dispersed and fragmented 
 Immature and interconnected  
 Limited science knowledge 
 Often packaged and manualised 
 Mature and engineered 
Interaction 
 Dense and tacit  
 Simultaneous 
 High openness and more horizontal  
 Thin and codified 
 Sequential 
 Limited openness and often vertical 
Competition 
 Quality differentiation - novelty 
 Often market creation or niche focus  
 Patent protection base 
 Cost efficiency  
 Established market segment 
 Off-patent base  
Governance of 
leaning 
(Organisation/ 
system) 
 Autonomous and loose 
 Active public research actors, 
Active science-intensive start-up 
 Complex and heterogeneous 
institutional context 
 
 Centralised and tight 
 Dominated by industrial incumbents 
 Streamlined institutional context  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Gilsing and Nooteboom (2006) 
2.5.2 Key characteristics of exploratory learning  
The initiation and establishment of an exploratory mode of learning is the main challenge 
in embarking on a science-based transition. In the latecomer context, it is assumed that 
the smooth expansion of exploratory learning ultimately influences the speed of the 
transition. This subsection determines the key characteristics of exploration in science-
based industries with integral products compared with those of exploitation.  
The review of organisational learning (Sub-section 2.2.3), first of all, identified some 
basic natures of exploratory learning, which is very different from exploitive learning 
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(Table 2.1). In general, exploitation involves the improvement of daily production 
activities through proximate search and learning with low uncertainty. It is often 
interpreted as incremental innovation with minor modifications. In contrast, exploration 
is performed for creating novel products and processes by distant search and learning 
with high uncertainty. In particular, exploratory learning in the pharmaceutical industry 
involves considerable scientific research, whereas exploitive learning is mainly related 
to engineering operationalisation.  
As discussed in Section 2.4, sector specific knowledge dynamics also influence the 
different patterns of interactive learning, competition and selection criteria, as well as the 
governance of learning mechanisms of exploratory learning from exploitive learning 
(Table 2.1).  
2.5.3 Limited understanding of science-based catch-up  
The literature on catch-up has tended to focus on modular product-based industries that 
successfully followed the stepwise catch-up process with incremental expansion of 
exploratory learning. Interestingly, none of the four Asian NIEs have yet shown significant 
catch-up in the science-intensive and integral product-based pharmaceutical industry. 
Relatedly, the process of enhancing exploratory learning in science-based industries 
with integral product architecture has tended to be overlooked.  
The literature on science-based innovation continues to focus on the challenges of 
advanced countries, which have already accumulated a considerable science base and 
to a large extent already established the exploratory mode of technological learning. 
Thus, R&D collaboration and balancing exploratory and exploitive learning have become 
the main interests of the literature (in innovative firms). In contrast, the challenges that 
latecomers face in initiating and enhancing exploratory learning have been overlooked 
in the literature. 
All in all, the existing literature has limitations for understanding the changing dynamics 
of technological learning, as it shifts from exploitation to exploration during the process 
of science-based catch-up, particularly in industries such as the pharmaceutical industry, 
which are based on integral product architecture. This thesis focuses on the changing 
dynamics of technological learning in the science-based catch-up that seems to be 
increasingly important to sustain industrial upgrading in the latecomer context. 
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2.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the four bodies of literature that underpin this thesis’s main 
research problems, the formulation of research questions and the construction of its 
conceptual frameworks.  
First, key theoretical concepts on the general innovation process in the latecomer context 
were reviewed. In the literature on micro-level technological capability, the transition of 
latecomers was discussed in terms of a qualitative reinforcement of the exploratory mode 
of technological learning to overcome the imitation stage. The macro-level institutional 
setting was then discussed by presenting a restructuring of two innovation systems (NIS 
and SIS) to promote innovation actors’ exploratory learning.  
The review of the empirical literature first explored the common features of rapid catch-
up, discussing the stepwise catch-up model of the Asian NIEs. This model is driven by 
enhancing absorptive capacity and acquiring export markets. It then showed that recent 
empirical studies of the transition clearly confirm the need for changes in organisational 
and institutional mechanisms from imitative learning to innovation generation. The 
transition of the KoPI can be interpreted within this frame.  
Moreover, the review of the literature on science-based innovation showed that there is 
a bigger gap in technological learning between the imitation and innovation stages in the 
pharmaceutical industry, with its integral product architecture, than in the major catch-up 
industries that make modular products. 
The review finally determined the key characteristics of exploratory and exploitive 
learning in the science-based pharmaceutical industry. It also pointed out that existing 
studies have only a limited understanding of the dynamics of science-based catch-up. 
On this basis, the next chapter establishes the research problems, research questions 
and a framework.  
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Chapter 3: Research Questions, Frameworks and 
Methodology  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of three parts. First, it identifies the main research issues and 
formulates the research questions (Section 3.2). Conceptual and analytical frameworks 
are then constructed (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). The research methodology is then 
presented, clarifying the overall research strategy and the structure of the data collected 
(Section 3.5); this is then followed by a summary (Section 3.6). 
3.2      Research Issues and Research Questions  
This section explains the thesis’s research objective and its corresponding research 
questions. It is based on the identification of the main research issues, which are not 
known by the preliminary data on the transition of the KoPI (Sub-section 3.2.1). The 
research objective and ensuing research questions are then laid out (Sub-section 3.2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Formulation of research questions and frameworks 
3.2.1 Research issues  
The literature review first recalled that strengthening organisations’ ability to conduct 
more distant search and learning helps them accumulate innovative capability. This type 
of learning was conceptualised as exploratory learning, and contrasted with exploitive 
learning.  
The review then identified a series of challenges faced by latecomers during their 
transitional phase. For example, latecomer firms are exposed to more direct competition 
Preliminary data on the 
KoPI 
Extant literature on catch-up and 
science-based innovation 
Facts identified in the 
transition of the KoPI 
Unclear issues in the 
transition of the KoPI  
Research objective and 
research questions 
Conceptual and analytical 
frameworks  
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with forerunners in more novel product markets. This requires more internal 
technological and strategic capabilities. Similarly, latecomer countries face institutional 
challenges in moving from innovation systems based on knowledge utilisation to systems 
based on knowledge generation. 
The challenges of transition are more difficult in the pharmaceutical industry because of 
its unique knowledge dynamics. Three features of the sectoral knowledge base widen 
the gap between the imitation and innovation stages: an extensive science base, integral 
product architecture and the diffusion of new biotechnologies.  
In line with this, the review argued that both quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of 
the exploratory mode of technological learning become necessary to overcome the 
heightened barriers to transition in the pharmaceutical industry.58 
Meanwhile, preliminary data on the KoPI roughly estimated the rate of transition, which 
can be identified through clarifying the starting point of new-drug R&D and the present 
outcome of the new drugs developed. The following statements can be made about the 
transition of the KoPI. 
a-1) The transition began soon after the introduction of the product patent system 
in 1987 and was deeply affected by the NHI reform of 2000. Emerging 
biotechnology served as the other critical force influencing the transition since the 
early 1990s. These institutional and technological changes were the force 
majeure that directed the transition toward the development of innovative drugs 
and away from the purely imitative production of generic drugs.  
a-2) As the intermediate outcome of the transition, by 2014 about 25 new drugs 
had been developed domestically (i.e., approved by the KFDA), and two had 
acquired an NDA from the US FDA. These data signify the present status of the 
industry and the rate of the transition to date, particularly in terms of technological 
catch-up. 
a-3) The preliminary data also confirmed that firms’ new-drug R&D has gone 
along with the reform of S&T policies. This includes a rapid scaling-up in national 
R&D investment, an increasing drug R&D support by some ministries and the 
introduction of new incentive and evaluation systems. The aim of the policy 
changes was to make the country an innovator rather than a proficient imitator. 
                                                          
58 See Hopkins et al. (2007) for more details of the sector-specific difficulties.  
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a-4) On the whole, the firms’ 25 new drugs and policy reforms supporting 
innovation generation firmly suggest that exploratory learning, at first glance, has 
been enhanced.  
a-5) However, most of the market profit of the KoPI has continued to be sourced 
from the imitative production of generic drugs, even after the 25-year transition 
effort.59 
These facts highlight a key issue about the process and speed of the transition: has the 
present status (rate) of transition been reached in a relatively smooth manner, or has it 
been interrupted? This question directs us to examine the influence of institutional and 
organisational factors on the process of enhancing exploratory learning and the rate of 
transition. As noted, institutional and organisational mechanisms shape the pattern of 
technological learning and influence the speed of catch-up.60  
Overall, this research seeks to understand firm- and institutional-level factors that might 
have affected the heightening of exploratory learning and therein the achievement of the 
latecomers’ science-based transition. 
3.2.2 Research objective and questions  
In line with this, the research objective is as follows: 
Research objective:  
To understand the factors that determine the enhancement of the exploratory mode of 
learning, and therein ultimately influence the rate of a science-based transition. 
                                                          
59  Only three new drugs are estimated to have exceeded the minimum level of the domestic market 
expectation. Like the blockbuster in a global context (i.e. USD$1 billion per year), ten billion won (KRW, 
about $0.1 billion) of revenue per annum has been the practical criterion of market success in the domestic 
market. 
60 There seems to be another approach: focusing on the singular perspective of the knowledge dynamics in 
science-based innovation. One can simply ascertain that most latecomer countries in the short- and mid-
term cannot resolve the sector-specific knowledge dynamics, i.e. the weak scientific knowledge base and 
the wide gap of market segments between generic drugs and original drugs that are strictly divided by the 
global patent system. Relevant to this are comments from a few scholars: ‘Survival of the KoPI itself under 
the changing institutional change and Big Pharma leadership can be seen as a success’ (comment by 
Steinmueller); ‘No latecomer countries have succeeded in taking the stable position of new drug developers. 
Even among the advanced countries, only a few countries such as the U.S., the U.K. and Germany [and 
France] have kept the position in the pharmaceutical industry’ (comment by Orsenigo). However, unlike the 
pharmaceutical industries in other latecomer countries, the preliminary data showed that the KoPI has 
challenged the development of its own new drugs with the overall reform of S&T policies, including the 
national support of biotechnology. It leads the research to focus on the institutional and organisational 
perspective rather than the intrinsic knowledge dynamics themselves.  
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Research questions are formulated to narrow down the focus of the research objective 
and further provide a rationale for building a conceptual framework.61 In this thesis, the 
two dimensions of the research issue identified above – institutions and organisations – 
shape the scope of the research focus. 
The first research question deals with how latecomer countries attempt to institutionally 
facilitate innovation actors’ exploratory learning. Accordingly, the first sub-question seeks 
to uncover the influence of the reformed S&T policies on strengthening exploratory 
learning in R&D organisations. It particularly concerns whether the basic characteristics 
of exploration identified previously, such as a highly distant search and a long period of 
learning, are promoted under the new S&T policies. The second sub-question seeks to 
understand the influence of the policy reforms on encouraging interactive learning across 
R&D organisations, which is another key feature of exploratory learning. Specifically, it 
focuses on the interaction between the exploration practices of private and public 
innovation actors, an institutional arrangement that has become necessary in the current 
science-based pharmaceutical industry.  
The second research question handles how effectively latecomer firms actualise the key 
characteristics of exploration in their new-drug R&D projects. As seen, latecomers’ new-
drug R&D can be interpreted through two dimensions on exploration practices. One is 
related to the dimension of technological learning practice for new-drug R&D. The other 
involves the organisational dimension surrounding the technological learning practice.  
Research questions: 
RQ 1: How have S&T policy rearrangements affected innovation actors’ enhancement 
of the exploratory mode of technological learning? 
RQ 1.1) How have the reformed S&T policies influenced exploration practices in 
R&D organisations? 
RQ 1.2) How have the reformed S&T policies influenced interactive learning 
between public and private innovation actors?  
RQ 2: How have latecomer firms strengthened the exploratory mode of technological 
learning for new-drug R&D?  
                                                          
61 The research questions are set up using the following rationale. First, the research questions help the 
research focus on certain aspects of the broadly identified research problem (Van de Ven 2007). Moreover, 
the research questions lead to the building of a conceptual framework, and guide the collection and analysis 
of the data (Miles and Huberman 1994). Overall, the research questions provide the research with a more 
substantial guide to address the research objective and to create the research design. 
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RQ 2.1) How has the exploratory mode of technological learning been reinforced 
in new-drug R&D practices? 
RQ 2.2) How have firms’ organisational mechanisms been reconfigured to deal 
with exploration-driven new-drug R&D activities?  
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
This section presents a conceptual framework for both institution- and firm-level 
dynamics that promote exploratory learning. In the institutional dimension, the policy 
rearrangement involved in new-drug R&D and its influence on learning practices is 
conceptualised using an SIS. The firm-level dynamics focus on technological learning 
and corresponding organisational mechanisms. They are framed by organisational 
learning aimed at exploration.  
An underlying viewpoint of the sectoral transition is first outlined (Sub-section 3.3.1). 
Subsequent sections then expound on the theoretical focal points to trace the institutional 
and organisational perspectives of enhancing the new form of learning (Sub-sections 
3.3.2 and 3.3.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The transformative view of the sectoral transition 
Source: Own elaboration 
3.3.1 Sectoral transition as transformational process  
The conceptual framework is built on the view that latecomers’ transition involves the 
transformation of institutional and organisational mechanisms. It is based on the 
assumption that technological learning is promoted or stumbled upon by certain 
institutional and organisational mechanisms. In particular, in the transitional phase, the 
institutional and organisational mechanisms are engaged with the unlearning of the 
previous, imitation-oriented learning pattern and the strengthening of the innovation-
oriented learning pattern. The previous chapter argued that latecomers’ innovation-
Transformation of 
institutional  
mechanisms in an SIS 
 
Transformation of  
organisational 
mechanisms in firms 
 
Enhancement of  
exploratory mode of 
technological learning 
 
Sectoral  
transition 
57 
 
oriented learning in the pharmaceutical industry is driven by the enhancement of the 
exploratory mode of learning. In line with this, the rate of transition is assumed to be 
influenced by the effectiveness of institutional and organisational transformation to 
promote the key characteristics and conditions of exploratory learning (Figure 3.2).62 
The following two sub-sections present the organisational and institutional elements that 
might have influenced the intensification of innovation actors’ exploratory learning (Table 
3.1). These elements are identified using the concepts of SISs (Sub-section 3.3.2) and 
firms’ organisational learning (Sub-section 3.3.3).  
Table 3.1: Conceptual framework of a latecomer sectoral transition 
                 
             
 Dimension 
Elements of transformational process  
Innovation 
systems 
Governance 
of S&T 
policies 
a) Investment  
b) Incentive and evaluation  
c) Industrialisation of exploratory learning 
d) Alignment of relevant policies  
Behaviours  
of innovation 
actors  
(Under governance) 
e) Exploration practices within an organisation 
f) Mutual interaction in exploration practices across actors  
Firms’ 
organisational 
learning 
Technological 
development  
g) R&D process  
h) R&D strategy  
Organisational 
mechanisms 
i) Organisational structure 
j) Top management 
k) Mind-set of individual actors  
Source: Own elaboration  
3.3.2 System-level transformational process 
The concept of an SIS underpins the institutional-level transformation. An SIS consists 
of various innovation actors and institutions that characterise the relationship between 
innovation actors in relation to knowledge creation, production and competition. As 
stated, in the imitation stage, an SIS is initially created for the efficient production of 
imitative products such as generic drugs. Innovation actors and relevant policies focus 
on exploiting externally existing technologies for economical production. In this stage, 
                                                          
62 Of course, this does not imply the rejection of the nature of technological, organisational and institutional 
continuity, often expressed as cumulativeness, routine or path-dependency in industrial evolution. Rather, 
the transformative view is the conceptual frame for recognising the systemic and behavioural changes in the 
transitional phase. 
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knowledge generation is largely confined to improving process technologies for more 
efficient use of existing technologies.  
The knowledge-generating activities in an SIS are expanded when latecomers try to 
innovate in the transitional phase. This role of an SIS can be identified in the changing 
institutional mechanisms, such as the rearrangement of S&T policies (Sub-section 
3.3.2.1) and their influence on innovation actors’ exploratory learning (Sub-section 
3.3.2.2). That is, an SIS in the transitional phase is understood in terms of how the SIS 
and relevant S&T policies evolve toward promoting exploratory learning to cope with the 
sector’s complex knowledge dynamics. 
3.3.2.1 S&T policies – investment, incentive, industrialisation and alignment 
Three policy categories cover the major aspects of innovation activities, such as resource 
input, its operation and output generation: a) investment policies for innovation actors, b) 
incentive and evaluation policies for innovation activities and c) industrialisation policies 
for exploratory learning. These are drawn from the literature on the catch-up of Asian 
NIEs (Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.3.2). 
a) Investment policies for innovation actors 
The first pressing policy is the structural establishment of new innovation actors that can 
perform advanced exploratory learning, and the restructuring of established actors that 
focus on technological assimilation and exploitation. The SIS of the pharmaceutical 
industry requires the participation of various innovation actors, including public 
researchers such as GRIs and universities, and private actors such as biotechnology 
start-ups and incumbent pharmaceutical companies.63  
In the latecomer context, the rapid fostering of such innovation actors is a significant 
challenge. In particular, given the industry’s weak research and financial capabilities, 
national R&D investment is a critical means to foster public research actors and 
research-based start-ups. This can be done by building science-related infrastructure 
such as science parks, and by providing national support to universities to heighten 
research capabilities. Such national efforts promote an exploratory mode of learning. To 
use a more specific example, the take-off of commercial biotechnology in the US in the 
1980s was based on government investment in public innovation actors in molecular 
biology in the 1960s and 1970s (Collins 2004, p. 88 and p. 126). 
                                                          
63 In addition, competent regulatory entities that can monitor and guide science-based innovation activities 
become necessary. 
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b) Incentive and evaluation policies for innovation activities 
Another key point relates to the effective operation of national R&D investment to 
promote innovation activities. This involves understanding how incentive and evaluation 
systems encourage innovation actors to conform with the key features of exploratory 
learning, which is the key mode of learning in pharmaceutical R&D. For example, there 
must be incentives to promote innovation actors’ engagement with ill-defined scientific 
problems, as well as long-term and highly uncertain research related to drug discovery. 
Collaborative research across diverse innovation actors must also be incentivised.  
In the successful catch-up industries in Asian NIEs, rapid technological assimilation and 
its translation into profit were driven by providing various incentives along the path from 
technological learning to market creation. This is often referred to as a ‘carrot and stick’ 
policy. 
In the emerging science-based industries, the conventional focus on competitiveness of 
industrial technologies is being replaced by concerns about research capability. For 
instance, national focus on encouraging scientific publications reflects a policy trend to 
promote exploratory learning in Asian NIEs. However, it should be noted that the 
scientific outcomes need another process for commercialisation, unlike the previously 
mentioned catch-up industries.  
c) Industrialisation of exploratory learning  
Promoting the commercial translation of research into profit becomes another policy 
challenge for the latecomer countries. S&T policies can promote the coherent 
interconnection of heterogeneous and dispersed exploration practices, ranging from 
public upstream science to industrial R&D.64  
Conceptualising two contrasting directions of exploration practices seems to be useful to 
trace the interconnection of diverse exploratory learning: research-oriented exploration 
and business-oriented exploration. Research-oriented exploration is mainly conducted 
for knowledge generation by public actors such as universities and GRIs; it is less goal-
oriented, less profit-seeking and highly fragmented across academic subjects and 
laboratories. In contrast, firms’ business-oriented exploration has a clear goal of 
developing commercial products. For example, while universities and firms may both 
                                                          
64 This point is also based on a few popular concepts such as Mode 2 of producing knowledge (Gibbons et 
al. 1997) and Triple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000), which deal with the relationship between the 
public sector (mainly universities) and the private sector (i.e. industries) in generating innovation based on 
public scientific research.  
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engage in exploratory learning, universities tend to prioritise academic publications, 
while firms prioritise patenting.  
In the imitation stage, policies for supporting the industrialisation and commercialisation 
of technological learning worked relatively well. The close relationship between 
technological learning through reverse engineering and its direct applicability to industrial 
practice underlies the effective support of commercialisation. More straightforwardly, the 
scope and direction of technological learning was determined based on industrial utility. 
That is, technology policy can be regarded as the sub-policy dimension of high-level 
industrial policy. Science policy merely influenced the industrialisation of technological 
learning in the imitation stage. 
In contrast, in the transitional phase, the increasingly long R&D cycle from upstream 
scientific research to downstream development came to cover both research- and 
business-oriented exploration. As a result, the high interdependence between public 
research and corporate development raises the need for a comprehensive 
industrialisation policy that can connect their dispersed exploration practices. Here, the 
conceptual focus involves the administrative roles of concerned ministries in dealing with 
industrialisation, that is, the downstream development of upstream science research, in 
that multiple ministries are the real designers and conductors of relevant policies.  
d) Alignment of S&T policies  
The concept of ‘network alignment/misalignment’ (von Tunzelmann 2010) provides the 
basis for understanding the complicated dynamics of S&T policy and its influence on 
exploratory learning.65  ‘Alignment’ is defined as the orientation of various functions, 
resources and spaces to produce ‘mutually compatible outcomes’. Conversely, network 
misalignment indicates the mismatch of outcomes produced by elements of the network, 
despite the fact that they have the overall same development goal (von Tunzelmann 
2010, von Tunzelmann et al. 2010).66 Von Tunzelmann et al. argue that the lack of 
dynamic interactivity between elements is one of the main causes of misalignment.  
                                                          
65 In brief, the original concept of network alignment was concerned with the highly complicated issue of the 
economic transition of central and eastern European countries (CEECs) from a state-driven to a market-
driven production system. The transition involves the reorientation of a production system with various 
economic elements such as actors, resources and functions including finance, management, technology 
and production skills. Domestic resources and functions that were once organised under state-driven 
hierarchical national production systems were reorganised under market-based systems led by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) (ibid.). Therefore, in the transitional process, these economies faced a series of 
institutional and industrial complications stemming from the heterogeneous global, national and local 
networks with different production contexts (ibid.). The alignment of global, national and local networks is 
argued to be critical for sustaining transition (ibid). 
66 Three types of network failures are suggested, arguing that the misalignment originated from a kind of 
network failure: (a) the absence of the network (i.e. the innovation system in this study) required for 
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In this thesis, alignment is an important aspect of the industrialisation policy on scientific 
research identified above. Specifically, it has to do with the ability of policy alignment to 
connect dispersed exploratory learning between public research and industrial R&D.67 
The extremely long drug R&D process cannot be deployed without institutional 
coordination due to the different directions of business- and research-oriented 
exploration and the increasing involvement of plural ministries in the industry. Therefore, 
various S&T policies must be coherently aligned so that heterogeneous innovation actors 
can perform mutually compatible exploratory learning, thereby producing beneficial 
learning outcomes through dynamic networking in an SIS. 
3.3.2.2 Behavioural pattern of exploration practices  
The other dimension to understand the knowledge-generating function of an SIS is the 
real influence of changing policy dynamics on innovation actors’ exploration practices. 
The influence on the micro-level learning process is in line with the two sub-research 
questions. One is the intra-organisational response to the policy reform when innovation 
actors conduct exploration practices (E in Table 3.1). The other is the response in inter-
organisational R&D collaboration, in particular between public and industrial actors (F in 
Table 3.1).  
3.3.3 Firm-level transformational process  
This sub-section determines the conceptual focus of latecomer firms’ organisational 
mechanisms of technological learning by drawing on ideas about firms’ exploratory 
learning. There are two conceptually useful dimensions of organisational transformation. 
One deals with latecomers’ technological development practices in proceeding with drug 
R&D (Sub-section 3.3.3.1). The other considers the organisational mechanisms that 
correspond to technological development practices (Sub-section 3.3.3.2). 
  
                                                          
development; (b) the presence of the network with no direction toward the development goals; (c) the 
presence of the network toward the development goal, but ‘the outcomes from its components are mutually 
inconsistent (misaligned)’. 
67 It is particularly related to the mix of two heterogeneous institutional spheres and its potential risk to 
undermine the key characteristics of exploration. The operational mechanisms of the science system are 
strongly affected by the business system and therefore affected by the more profit-creating rules; they will 
lose the diversity of scientific research and thus ultimately lose the innovation sources (Kaufmann and 
Tödtling 2001). 
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3.3.3.1 Technological development practices 
The R&D process and R&D strategy are the two conceptual constituents of technological 
development practices. The R&D process for a new drug is the actualisation process of 
an exploratory mode of technological learning (g). R&D strategy involves the commercial 
effectiveness of latecomers’ technological development practices in the changed 
competition environment (h). 
g) Exploration practices in the R&D process  
If they attempt to develop new drugs, latecomer firms essentially pass through a 
transformation from exploitation-centred to exploration-oriented technological learning. 
New-drug R&D requires a change in the process logic and habits of technological 
learning, in comparison with the development of generic drugs. 
Specifically, the production of generic drugs is mainly based on technological exploitation, 
although the imitative production itself can be regarded as an outcome of exploration in 
the very early stages of learning for latecomers. The development of generic drugs hardly 
needs the discovery and validation process of drug candidates – the dominant methods 
and detailed goals of development are already known. Interactive learning thus takes 
place in a relatively codified manner and under the well-defined division of R&D tasks.  
In contrast, the original development of new drugs needs a high degree of scientific 
discovery and validation. Scientific research is highly explorative and takes a long time. 
Simultaneous and dense interaction between R&D actors and across R&D tasks is 
needed for joint validation and optimisation. In other words, the characteristics of 
exploratory learning are notably expressed in the new-drug R&D process. 
Latecomers’ new-drug R&D practices can be understood as adapting to the key 
characteristics and conditions of exploration, as well as unlearning the ingrained learning 
mode of exploitation.  
h) R&D strategy in the transitional phase 
As noted, firms’ exploratory learning is ultimately directed at creating economic profit. In 
this regard, business-oriented exploration needs strategic consideration to cope with the 
changing competitive environment in the transitional phase. That is, new drugs to be 
developed through exploratory learning should be sellable in competition with drugs 
launched by Big Pharma.  
To begin with, in broad terms, the stepwise catch-up model seems to be strategically 
effective in the overall catch-up path of the KoPI. The KoPI has initiated catch-up through 
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following the reverse PLC and then entering new-drug R&D stages like other successful 
catch-up industries have done.  
However, entry into the transitional phase faces latecomers with a more complex catch-
up environment (Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.4). First, they face direct competition with Big 
Pharma. Second, they are exposed to broader technological and institutional contexts, 
as their R&D expands to both upstream science and downstream clinical development. 
For example, the inclusion of new drugs in latecomers’ product portfolios forces them to 
deal with various institutional contexts, such as drug pricing and approval-related 
institutions. Third, they must grapple with the emerging biotechnology paradigm with 
unarticulated markets, which provides both opportunities and threats for catch-up.  
Therefore, identification of the strategic response of the changing technological, market 
and institutional environment is crucial to understanding latecomers’ exploratory learning. 
Based on the literature review on latecomer firms’ transitions (Chapter 2, Sub-section 
2.3.1), the changes in paths, focal area and commercialisation of new-drug R&D are 
considered to analyse latecomers’ strategic strengths and weaknesses. 
3.3.3.2 Organisational mechanisms 
The other area of focus lies in organisational mechanisms of technological exploration. 
This issue includes organisational and managerial adaptation to the key characteristics 
of exploration and casting off the organisational routine of exploitive learning (e.g. 
Levinthal and March 1993, Benner and Tushman 2003, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). 
In particular, organisational structure is crucial because the design and operation of 
organisational structures for R&D can influence latecomer firms’ organisational capability 
in dealing with the key mode of technological learning for developing innovative drugs. 
Additionally, individual-level issues, such as the role of senior management and 
organisational code, are underlying factors of organisational transformation. 
i) Organisational structure 
A company can balance the two seemingly incompatible types of learning by setting up 
‘dual organisational structures’ that perform exploitation and exploration (Duncan 1976). 
Through operating a dual organisational structure, firms can guarantee their present 
(through exploitation) and future (through exploration) survival (Levinthal and March 
1993). Ambidextrous organisations are composed of loosely coupled exploitive and 
exploratory sub-units; each sub-unit should be internally consistent in terms of culture, 
goals and individuals (Benner and Tushman 2003).  
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More specifically, in order to guarantee autonomous exploratory learning, firms may 
operate smaller sub-organisations devoted to exploration while concurrently running 
larger sub-organisations committed to exploitation (Tushman et al. 1997). Explorative 
sub-units are ‘smaller and decentralised with loose cultures and processes’, whereas 
exploitive sub-units are ‘larger and more centralised, with tight cultures and processes’ 
(ibid.). This physical separation of sub-units has been one of the prominent theoretical 
solutions for building ambidextrous organisations. 
However, in the context of latecomer firms, the most important thing is not balancing 
exploration and exploitation, but on enhancing exploration. Therefore, the organisational 
structure of R&D must be reconfigured away from technological exploitation. In this 
context, two characteristics of exploration are particularly related to organisational 
structure. One is the influence of the structure of R&D organisations on the interactive 
learning between R&D teams. A multidisciplinary knowledge base and integral product 
nature impose the need for active and simultaneous interaction (Chapter 2, Sub-section 
2.4). The other is associated with the organisational design for sustaining exploratory 
learning. It considers latecomer firms’ high vulnerability if they continue exploratory 
learning. 
j) The role of senior management 
Top management, often company owners in the case of the KoPI, also plays an 
important role in sustaining the vulnerable learning mode of exploration. Striking a 
balance between the two modes of learning requires not only the autonomous operation 
of exploratory sub-organisations, but also the contextual guidance, coordination and 
integration of the two learning patterns (e.g., Andriopoulos et al. 2009, Raisch et al. 2009). 
For example, coordination is critical in resolving tensions and conflicts that arise during 
resource allocation to each sub-unit. Guiding whether R&D organisations focus on more 
incremental (exploitive) or radical (explorative) innovation activities is also vital. These 
tasks are the responsibility of senior management teams (Tushman, Anderson et al. 
1997, Benner and Tushman 2003, Jansen et al. 2008). 
Therefore, for latecomer firms, the theoretical focus here examines whether top 
management promotes or interrupts the initiation and strengthening of exploratory 
learning. As noted, exploratory learning is particularly vulnerable in a latecomer firm 
because of a lack of short-term profitability and need for long-running R&D; such firms 
are financially weak and small in size. Because of this, initiative taken by top 
management is likely to be a critical factor. 
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k) Organisational code 
March (1991) identifies the relationship between individual behavioural patterns and 
organisational code as an influential factor in conducting exploration. The exploitation-
oriented organisational inertia of latecomer firms may inhibit the emergence of 
exploration-oriented learning by individual researchers when the company starts new-
drug R&D. A generalised solution is the proper turnover of individuals to sustain 
exploratory learning (March 1991).  
3.4 Analytical Framework 
This section describes the thesis’s analytical framework. This framework provides the 
conceptual focus for the empirical analysis. First, the system-level analytical framework 
(Sub-section 3.4.1) is presented, followed by the firm-level analytical framework (Sub-
section 3.4.2).  
3.4.1 System-level analytical framework and its elements 
In this conceptual framework, institutional transformation is conceived as the 
rearrangement of S&T policies and their influence on innovation actors’ exploratory 
learning in the context of an SIS. An evolving SIS in the transitional phase is seen as the 
functional expansion of the system into active knowledge generation by encouraging 
innovation actors’ exploratory learning. Three policy categories are examined to 
understand institutional transformation: policies for R&D investment, incentive regimes 
and industrialisation. Policy alignment was also considered for dynamic exploratory 
learning. 
In line with this, the analysis focuses on addressing the rearrangement of S&T policies 
and their influence on innovation actors’ exploration practices (Figure 3.3). Two analytical 
dimensions are outlined. Dimension A provides the overall institutional and market 
background of initiating new-drug R&D. Dimension B is the foreground of the analysis, 
in which substantial S&T policies are operated and exploration practices take place.     
(A) Market selection environment and landscape of S&T policies  
As stated, the transition of the KoPI was initiated and accelerated by a series of external 
institutional and subsequent market changes at two points in time, (i) after the 
introduction of the product patent system in 1987 and (ii) after the NHI reform in 2000 (A 
in Figure 3.3). At the same time, the macro-level national goal for S&T investment has 
changed during the transition from imitation- to innovation-based economic development. 
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This includes greater national attention to emerging biotechnology and a range of 
reforms of substantial S&T policies.  
Thus, to begin with, this research addresses external institutional pressures, changed 
market structure and the changed landscape of S&T policies (Chapter 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: System-level analytical framework of the transition of the KoPI 
Source: Own elaboration based on Vanichseni’s industrial innovation system 
(B) Effect of S&T policy changes on NDRPs 
The impact of the revised S&T policies on exploration practices can be addressed by 
looking at the changes in operational mechanisms of NRDPs. This analytical frame is 
based on the conceptual focus on whether both research-oriented and business-oriented 
exploratory learning have been well promoted and interlinked under the changing S&T 
policies.  
First of all, the operational mechanisms of the three policy categories identified above – 
R&D investment, an incentive regime including both incentive and evaluation of national 
R&D projects, and the industrialisation policies of the three leading ministries in new-
drug R&D support – are analysed. The responses of private and public innovation actors 
(including universities, GRIs, DBFs and pharmaceutical firms) to the operational pattern 
of the new S&T policies are examined. In doing so, the pattern of innovation actors’ 
enhancement of exploratory learning under the institutional changes is empirically 
examined.  
NRDPs are the main object of the analysis; they represent a practical space where a 
conceptual SIS and its expansion of function to knowledge generation can be captured. 
There are two key features of NRDPs. First, they can be seen as the institutional interface 
between S&T policies and innovation actors. The operating mechanisms of NRDPs are 
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shaped by the three main S&T policies: national R&D funding, industrialisation policy by 
the three ministries, and incentive and evaluation policies for R&D funds. Thus, 
innovation actors participating in the NRDPs are naturally influenced by S&T policies. 
Second, NRDPs also serve as a collective and interactive learning space between 
diverse participants from both the public and private sectors.  
The analysis of the NRDPs is mainly conducted based on data from the three large-scale, 
long-term projects under the 21c Frontier Programme: functional proteomics, intelligent 
microsystems, and microbial genomics and applications. These projects were all 
conducted over the last decade. However, the analysis takes a general approach to 
identify the policy impact and different responses by innovation actors, not an in-depth 
historical analysis of each project. This is because no project covers all the steps of new-
drug R&D from upstream target identification to the development stage.  
3.4.2 Firm-level analytical framework  
The conceptual framework of the firm-level transformational process emphasised that 
the organisational adoption of the key characteristics of exploratory learning is critical for 
latecomers’ successful new-drug development.  
The analytical framework is composed by applying the concept of exploration and 
exploitation to the proprietary-product-process grid model developed by Forbes and 
Wield (e.g., Forbes and Wield 2002) (Figure 3.4). This original model can be thought of 
as the applied version of the latecomers’ reverse PLC in the patent-based 
pharmaceutical industry (see Figure 2.2).  
The analytical framework draws on the model with minor modifications for the empirical 
observation of the increasing degree of the exploratory mode of technological learning 
in the KoPI’s expansion to new-drug R&D. The x-axis is formed by process R&D and 
product R&D, following the original model. The y-axis represents increasing exploratory 
learning as latecomer firms’ R&D moves up to develop more novel products. 
Taking together the two axes, the pharmaceutical drugs can be classified into four groups 
(Figure 3.4). The first group is generic drugs, including the production of existing APIs 
with the lowest level of exploration effort. Because off-patent original drugs are free for 
copying, latecomers can master production technologies of these drugs through reverse 
engineering. Thus, in practice, this product group can be thought of as the exploitation-
driven product group. Most developing countries remain in this development stage.  
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The second group consists of incrementally modified drugs (IMDs) with minor levels of 
modification of the original drugs. The drugs are developed by changing some peripheral 
parts of the original drug molecule or improving the drug delivery system, making it easier 
to absorb or digest. IMDs have partial patent rights related to the aspect of the drug that 
was changed. A certain level of exploratory technological learning is necessary to 
develop IMDs.  
The third product category is follow-up NCEs. These accompany a high level of 
exploratory learning and are fully protected for 20 years by product patents. Although 
this kind of drug is developed based on the same chemical platform as earlier NCEs, the 
full cycle of new-drug R&D, including drug discovery and optimisation and clinical trials, 
is conducted. A very low number of developing countries reach such degrees of 
exploration.  
The fourth category is entirely novel NCEs that are developed through the highest level 
of exploratory learning, through a process of establishing an unknown chemical platform, 
that is, a lead compound. The drug research starts from zero, which means there are no 
benchmarking drugs with the same biochemical mechanism; this type of NCE thus needs 
a very profound scientific base. A few developed countries are mainly involved in this 
technological stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      * New Drug Delivery System (NDDS), New Molecular Entity (NME) 
Figure 3.4: Firm-level analytical framework of the transition of the KoPI 
Source: Author’s modification of proprietary-product-process grid model (Forbes and Wield 2002) 
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Based on this, the exploration practices (new-drug R&D) of nine domestic firms are 
analysed, first from the perspective of technological development in the transitional 
phase (C in Figure 3.4), then examining how well the firms’ internal 
organisational/managerial mechanisms fit with the characteristics of exploration (D in 
Figure 3.4).  
(C) Technological development based on exploration 
Technological learning based on exploration is analysed in two transitional rounds: (i) 
the first round completed between 1987 and the early 2000s, after the introduction of the 
product patent system, and (ii) the on-going second round since the 2000s, in the context 
of NHI reform. Prior to 1987, Korean pharmaceutical firms focused almost singularly on 
the production of generic drugs and existing APIs. Exploitive learning was the main form 
of technological learning. This was despite the fact that there had been continuous 
advancement of the technological capability to master the synthetic technologies of 
known APIs in the 1970s and 1980s, starting from the point of simple packaging and 
formulation of imported APIs in the 1960s. The exploratory mode of technological 
learning was, in practice, initiated after 1987 when pharmaceutical firms first attempted 
to develop their own new drugs after the introduction of the product patent system. 
The growing process of exploration is addressed by identifying the similarities and 
differences of new-drug R&D patterns between the two rounds. The analysis focuses on 
the procedural barriers to new-drug R&D practices and how firms overcame these 
barriers, as well as the path, focal area, and commercialisation of new-drug R&D.  
(D) Organisational mechanisms for exploration 
The change in the overall organisational structure of R&D centres is examined in terms 
of how well the organisational structure fits with the key characteristics of exploration. 
Moreover, the role of top management and the influence of organisational routine on 
latecomers’ exploitation and exploration are addressed.  
3.5 Methodology  
The last section presents the overall research strategy (Sub-section 3.5.1), methods of 
data collection to operationalise the research design (Sub-section 3.5.2), and an 
explanation of how the data will be analysed and interpreted (Sub-section 3.5.3). 
3.5.1 Research strategy and design 
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The research aims to investigate the factors that might have influenced the reinforcement 
of the key mode of technological learning for transition and, hence, the present status of 
the KoPI’s transition. The study takes an interpretive approach based on qualitative data 
analysis, rather than a positivist approach for statistically inferring the causal relationship 
of events. It is a process study that deals with ‘how things change and develop over time’ 
(Van de Ven 2007, p. 194). Spender (1996, p. 72) clarifies these two different 
approaches: ‘The object of positivist research is the development of a coherent abstract 
representation of the world out there, the presumed and independent seamless but 
knowledge reality in which we are embedded. The focus of the interpretive research is 
on the ways in which attach meaning to our experience’.  
As this research pertains to the interpretation of latecomers’ historical experiences of 
science-based catch-up, and seeks to analyse the managerial/policy side of the 
innovation process, it takes an interpretive approach using qualitative case studies. This 
helps determine how certain institutional and organisational factors influence the 
enhancement of exploratory learning and the present status of the transition. Three key 
aspects of the overall research strategy that were already applied above are 
encapsulated here. 
3.5.1.1 Rationale of the conceptual framework 
The conceptual and analytical frameworks were designed by drawing on previous 
literature and applying a transformative view of institutional and organisational 
mechanisms. The frameworks treat the sectoral transition as a function of the system-
level and firm-level changes made to promote exploratory modes of technological 
learning.  
The decision to use this transformational view was made because of the limited 
applicability of the typical conceptual approach to an investigation of the transition of a 
latecomer science-based industry. An incremental view of technological capability 
building can explain the success of catch-up in technology- and engineering-based 
industries such as electronics. However, the review showed that science-based 
transition, particularly in integral architecture-based industries, needs a more radical 
view of change to interpret the discontinuity of institutional and organisational 
mechanisms between the imitation and the innovation stages.  
3.5.1.2 Embedded single case study 
This thesis makes use of two embedded units of analysis: innovation systems (at a 
macro-level) and firms’ learning dimensions (at a micro-level). 
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Innovation systems are used to analyse the influence of the S&T policy rearrangement 
on the promotion of exploratory learning. While the SIS of the KoPI is treated as a formal 
unit of analysis, the practical scope and degree of the analysis of the SIS is controlled 
through investigating institutional relationships between innovation actors conducting 
NRDPs. It is based on the fact that the NRDPs were designed and operated by the 
various S&T policies and innovation actors related to new-drug R&D. Different responses 
by innovation actors to the NRDPs in terms of exploration practices are captured by 
drawing on the large-scale, long-term projects under the 21c Frontier Programme.  
As the KoPI is characterised as a densely populated SME-led sector, the thesis draws 
on nine case firms to analyse firms’ learning. These are the first-tier domestic firms that 
initiated new-drug development just after the introduction of the product patent system 
in 1987, and succeeded in developing their own NCEs or IMDs in the transitional phase.68 
They were selected as representative domestic companies with long-term experience in 
R&D and marketing of new drugs. In examining multiple cases, replication logic and 
complementary/comparative analysis between firms can potentially be achieved (in the 
application of Yin’s multi-case study method (Yin 2003, pp. 49–51)).69,70 
3.5.1.3 Dynamic view of the research issue 
The research addresses the transitional phase by comparing the initial stage of new-
drug R&D and the follow-up second round of new-drug R&D. In doing so, it tries to 
understand the long-term dynamics of the technological learning pattern, including the 
institutional and organisational factors that influence this pattern.  
3.5.2 Methods of data collection 
This sub-section briefly presents the methods of collecting data and the data gathered. 
There are two points concerning the process of data collection. First of all, the data were 
collected and further analysed while keeping in mind the concern with maintaining ‘a 
chain of evidence’ (Yin 2003, pp. 105-106). The data collection particularly considered 
the direct relevance between the original research issue, its theoretical and conceptual 
                                                          
68 One R&D-intensive domestic company, SK Chemical, was excluded from the study due to the difficulty in 
collecting and clarifying data. This company is an affiliate of the SK Group, a Chaebol, and operates bio and 
pharmaceutical R&D as a business unit. 
69 Complementary analysis: That is, observation of nine firms can lead to the possibility of identifying variety 
(similarities/differences) in latecomer firms’ transformation toward an innovation-generating firm. 
70 Observation of multi-case firms is likely to be more reflective in the many SME-led industries, such as 
KoPI, compared to monopolistic or oligopolistic industries. The latter industries are basically simpler than 
the former in terms of sampling and interpreting the sectoral change by focusing on one or two large 
companies. Thus, a few companies’ innovation movements are easily treated as sectoral innovation (e.g. 
most of Korea’s caught-up industries such as electronics, ICTs and automobiles), giving an impression of 
the industry as an autonomous entity itself. 
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framing in the two embedded units of analysis, and the data collected. Second, as many 
case studies carefully address, data collection was conducted to acquire a maximum 
level of data triangulation. 
(i) Content of data collected  
The data were collected to answer the research questions, drawing on the conceptual 
framework and its focus on the two dimensions of the analysis: the macro-level impact 
of policy on exploratory learning and micro-level firms’ learning patterns. In terms of the 
macro-level dimension, data were gathered regarding the changing market selection 
environment and changed relationship between innovation actors in dealing with NRDPs 
under the S&T policy reform (Table 3.2). In terms of the firm-level perspective, data about 
new drug development processes and about relevant organisational processes of the 
nine case firms were collected (Table 3.3).  
Table 3.2: Types of data about macro-level environmental conditions 
Dimension of data Types of data collected  
Innovation 
systems 
Market 
environment 
∙ Institutional change: IPR regime and NHI system 
∙ Technological change: influence of biotechnology 
∙ Market data: Market segments and products 
NRDPs  
∙ National S&T and industrial policies  
∙ Elements of innovation systems  
∙ NRDPs surrounding the KoPI and biotechnology  
∙ Relationship between innovation actors 
∙ Incentive structure and evaluation pattern 
 
Table 3.3: Types of data about micro-level firms  
Dimension of data Types of data collected 
Firms 
R&D process 
 
∙ History of case firms’ R&D  
∙ New drug R&D processes 
∙ Commercialisation of new drugs developed  
∙ Patent/publication trend 
Organisational 
mechanism 
∙ Organisational structure of R&D centre 
∙ Top management’s response on new drug R&D  
∙ Organisational inertia and researchers’ mindset  
  
(ii) Methods of data collection 
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The data were collected mainly through three approaches: a) interviews, b) secondary 
data, and c) additional patent/publication information. Taking the three approaches was 
expected to provide at least a minimum level of reliability of the data (i.e., the 
convergence of the data). Moreover, attempts were made to secure the validity of the 
data by cross-checking the viewpoints of different types of concerned innovation actors 
on the patterns of institutional influence, technological learning and industrial transition. 
In terms of interviews, both open-ended and semi-structured interviews were conducted 
during the two fieldwork periods (Table 3.4). The use of both types of interviews tended 
to generate unpredicted or more in-depth information as well as data that the fieldwork 
originally aimed to gather. Of the 55 interviews conducted, 44 were recorded; the 
remainder were conducted with note-taking due to the rules of the organisations and 
personal preference of the interviewees. 
Table 3.4: Overview of interviews71 
Fieldwork Area of interviewee  
(No. of interviews) 
Period 
First round 13 Firms - DBFs and large firms (17) 
6 GRIs (10)  
5 Universities (5) 
Aug, 2008 ~ Oct, 2008 
Feb, 2009 
Second round 7 Domestic pharmaceutical firms (14)  
2 Big Pharma (2) 
3DBFs (4) 
Sep, 2010 ~ Oct, 2010 
4 e-mail interviews and 2 anonymous interviewees 2010, 2011 and 2013 
During the initial fieldwork, interviews were mainly conducted with people outside 
pharmaceutical firms, such as those at DBFs, universities and GRIs. The DBFs, 
universities and GRIs interviewed consisted of three categories. The first group were 
those who participated in long term NRDPs, mainly the three Frontier Programmes that 
included new drug R&D. The second group were those who had experience of public-
private collaboration and technology transfer. It was aimed to complement the practical 
limitation between the public and private interaction in the three NRDPs.72 The last group 
involved the policy and industry researchers of the pharmaceutical and biotechnological 
sectors, governmental officers, and researchers of Big Pharma, who previously 
experienced the KoPI or NRDPs. In doing so, data were expected to identify the overall 
                                                          
71 See Appendix 2 for more details of the interviewees, and Appendices 3 and 4 for the questionnaire and 
survey. 
72 As will be seen, most NRDPs containing public and private actors have been conducted with few horizontal 
collaborations, rather in the way of sub-contractors. 
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institutional conditions surrounding the innovation activity in the KoPI and operational 
mechanisms of NRDPs.  
The second round of fieldwork gathered data about the firms’ exploratory learning 
involved in new drug R&D by focusing on the new drug development processes and 
strategies, and organisational perspectives. In addition, the data of the operational 
pattern of the NRDPs were also gathered in the view of the KoPI.  
Most interviewees, including policy-side people, were junior and senior level PhD holders. 
This was due to the characteristics of the industry, which requires personnel with higher 
levels of scientific knowledge. For example, all project leaders of NRDPs, CEOs of DBFs 
and CTOs of pharmaceutical firms are PhD researchers. Herein, it should be noted that 
there was little need to interview young (PhD) researchers because the data collection 
focused on historical experiences of the transition and only the senior researchers had 
experienced the transitional period. Moreover, because the unit of the analysis was 
basically the firm and system levels and all companies that had operated small-sized 
R&D organisations, detailed investigation of the (short experience) individual 
researcher’s behavioural pattern (at the lower levels of the organisational hierarchy) 
appeared to be unnecessary for this study.73 
b) In terms of secondary data, all kinds of secondary data sources were used for data 
acquisition, ranging from the government, public and private institutes’ policy reports, 
firms’ annual reports and newspapers, to conference and exhibition attendance. In 
particular, two types of secondary data sources were unexpectedly useful. First were the 
web pages that stored video clips of interviews with people from industrial and academic 
biotechnology communities and the KoPI. These included researchers’ in-depth 
comments about their professional communities. 74  Second, various industry-specific 
business newspapers provided complementary information of the NRDPs and case 
firms.75  
                                                          
73 In addition, conducting surveys was attempted during both fieldwork periods. However, the response rate 
was not meaningful and responses were mainly obtained from CEOs, CTOs or project leaders. As noted, 
because their R&D organisations were mostly small or medium sized, these respondents seemed to feel no 
need to circulate survey questionnaires to their researchers, as they made sure that they were aware of 
most critical R&D situations in the company as the representative respondents. As a result, the data gathered 
from the survey were not explicitly used for an empirical analysis, but were used as complementary data for 
the qualitative analysis and discussion. 
74 In the professional area of biotechnology, including pharmaceutical R&D in Korea, there has been a 
particularly influential cyber community (BRIC: Biological Research Information Center, 
http://bric.postech.ac.kr/). For example, the scientific fraud of stem cell research led by Dr Hwang’s team 
was first raised and scientifically refuted by anonymous young and junior researchers in the cyber community. 
75 In total, 18 out of 24 pharmaceutical and health care specific business newspapers were used over the 
research period. 
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c) In terms of patent information, data for patent applications sent to the Korea Patent 
Office by the nine case firms, and their publication data acquired from Web of Science, 
were compared with qualitative data gathered regarding the exploration pattern. The 
patent and publication data were expected to provide the opportunity to confirm and 
complement the contents of interviews and qualitative data gathered from other sources. 
3.5.3 Analysing the data 
The collected data were analysed through two steps after the first and the second 
fieldwork sessions. As noted, the analysis after the first fieldwork focused on interpreting 
the operational mechanisms of NRDPs and the response of the four types of innovation 
actors to the operational pattern of NRDPs. The second main analysis (after the second 
fieldwork session) concentrated on interpreting the series of new drug R&D projects in 
each case firm in terms of learning process and strategy. The analysis also considered 
the underlying relationship between other private and public innovation actors and the 
pharmaceutical firms, and between the organisational change of R&D centres and the 
expansion of new drug R&D projects.  
The data gathered were manually coded and analysed. First of all, the interview 
transcripts were re-described based on a timeline that went from the initial point to 
present status of the transition across two major categories of institutional and 
organisational dimensions. They were then rearranged based on the sub-categories in 
each dimension depending on the types of innovation actors. These innovation actors 
included pharmaceutical firms, GRIs and three ministries. The data related to exploratory 
learning, for each type of innovation actor, were then re-illustrated, connected and 
compared, drawing on a series of codes drawn on the one hand from the literature review 
and preliminary data, and on the other partly emerging from the interviews. These 
included ‘autonomous’ and ‘long-term’ technological learning, ‘the change of 
organisational structure’, ‘influence of project-based system (PBS) on research activities’, 
and ‘hidden conflicts between the pharmaceutical firms and DBFs’. The analysis enabled 
the research to identify the patterns of influencing that connect institutional and 
organisational factors to innovation actors’ exploratory learning.  
Lastly, one analytical limitation should be pointed out. The macro-level analysis through 
NRDPs is conducted not by observing the operational pattern of a specific programme, 
but by investigating the operational patterns of several programmes relating to new drug 
R&D in a general context: the large-scale Frontier Programmes partly including new drug 
R&D combined with interviewees from outside of the three NRDPs. No NRDP conducted 
comprehensive upstream and downstream R&D steps; instead, most industrial actors 
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joined small-scale projects, often as contractors, or they received support for individual 
clinical development, thus imposing the general-level analysis of NRDPs. 
3.6 Summary  
This chapter established three axes for conducting the overall research: formulating the 
main research questions, developing conceptual and analytical frameworks and 
establishing a research methodology. 
First, it formulated the research questions that deal with tracing the enhancement of the 
key mode of technological learning for transition, that is, exploratory learning. Based on 
the literature review, it was found that the overall rate of the transition of the KoPI is 
affected by the effectiveness of exploratory learning, and that exploratory learning is, in 
practice, influenced by institutional and organisational processes. Thus, it focused on 
developing research questions to understand how institutional and organisational 
mechanisms enhance exploratory learning.  
Second, a conceptual framework was developed that takes a transformative view of 
institutional and organisational mechanisms that help latecomers’ technological learning 
move from an exploitation-oriented to an exploration-oriented mode. The transformation 
of the institutional mechanisms was conceptualised in terms of the influence of 
rearranged S&T policies on the innovation actors’ exploratory learning within the frame 
of an SIS. Organisational transformation at the firm level was conceptualised as a 
change in (R&D) exploratory practices and corresponding organisational processes. 
The analytical framework was then laid out. At the innovation system level, NRDPs were 
introduced as the main analytical object. At the firm level, new-drug R&D processes in 
the first and second round were chosen to be examined.  
Lastly, the overall methodology employed in this research was presented, and the 
advantages of the embedded single case study approach were discussed. Moreover, the 
scope of data collection and the overall process and limitation of data analysis were 
presented.  
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Chapter 4: Research context 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents how the technological and institutional contexts surrounding the 
KoPI have changed over the last two decades, from a developing to a developed 
country’s circumstances. On this basis, special attention is given to the changing market 
selection environment by the external institutional pressures such as IPR regime and 
NHI reform. It also pays attention to the changing S&T policies that directly affected 
technological learning patterns of innovation actors surrounding new-drug R&D. 
In particular, these types of institutional and technical changes, such as the IPR regime, 
national health system, and biotechnology, are not unique to Korea but are also 
applicable to other developed or developing countries. What makes Korea’s experience 
idiosyncratic is the country’s subtle position between the A7 76  countries and the 
developing countries. It has experienced both groups’ institutional and technological 
issues in the very compacted period of the 1980s onward.  
To begin, this chapter describes the two basic perspectives of the pharmaceutical 
industry, namely the drug R&D process and the general market structure, in a global 
context (Section 4.2). This is followed by a presentation of the local institutional contexts 
(Section 4.3). Section 4.4 identifies changes in the market selection mechanism that 
have been shaped by those institutional pressures and that have, in turn, driven new-
drug R&D. Section 4.5 presents the macro-level changes in S&T policies directly 
involving new-drug R&D of innovation actors. A summary section (Section 4.6) concludes 
the chapter.  
4.2 Overview of the Pharmaceutical Industry  
This part describes the overall process of drug development (Sub-section 4.2.1), as well 
as the general business model of a new drug in terms of its market life cycle (Sub-section 
4.2.2). In particular, the view of latecomers underlying the explanation of both the drug 
R&D process and the business model is explored.  
4.2.1 Technological context 
                                                          
76 A7 countries, which have led the pharmaceutical industry, refer to the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy and Switzerland. 
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New-drug R&D consists of both product and process development (Figure 4.1). Product 
development comprises four major steps often characterised as new-drug R&D. It 
involves the exploration of drug candidates, sophisticated tests for their reliability, and 
the development of a specific formulation. Process development, in contrast, involves 
the efficient synthesis and qualitative production of the new drug. This section briefly 
illustrates the main technological activities of each of the R&D steps. 
4.2.1.1 Product development 
1) Step 1 – Drug discovery  
This first step has two main goals: selecting the biochemical target and developing drug 
candidates that act on that target. The former includes two research activities: i) target 
identification, and ii) target validation. The latter includes two more activities: iii) lead 
identification, and iv) lead optimisation.  
i. Targets that intervene in a process of disease expression (i.e., promote or block) 
are identified at various levels such as the receptor, biochemical pathway, and 
further gene levels.  
ii. The target candidates should then be validated to confirm whether they are 
‘druggable’. Only a few targets can be shown to be druggable, by proving 
effective bonding with the molecules of the disease. This process requires long-
term experiments that should show a statistically significant relationship between 
disease expression and the presence of the target candidate (Pisano 2006).77 
This initial research, (i) and (ii), substantiates the concept of the potential drug to be 
developed by understanding the relationship between disease expression and the target 
candidate. They are the most upstream scientific research part of the whole drug R&D 
steps.  
iii. Based on the target selected, an attempt is made to develop a few lead 
compounds that can inhibit the binding of the disease molecules with the 
identified target. This involves synthesis and screening of thousands of molecules 
(about 10,000 compounds: Pisano 1997) to search potential drug candidates 
(‘hits’). The drug candidates that structurally bind to the target with the expected 
degree of activity are selected as the lead compounds. This process involves 
repetitively collaborative long-lasting research between chemists and biologists. 
Given biochemical information about the target from a biologist, a chemist 
                                                          
77 The process is typically conducted through the use of a disease model using ‘knock-out’ mice. The term 
knock-out (knock-in) mice means experimental mice that are genetically manipulated to underexpress 
(overexpress) the target candidate. 
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synthesises a series of structurally modified molecules, then the biologist 
observes the response, the activity of disease expression, in the disease model. 
iv. However, the lead compound cannot be the final drug candidate without further 
optimisation. To do this, several derivatives based on the lead compound are 
synthesised and tested experimentally in an animal model to find the best-fitting 
compound for the target and the most effective characteristics as a medicine 
(Pisano 2006). In this process of discovery research, which usually takes about 
two to five years, a few drug candidates are developed.  
This drug discovery stage is regarded as the upstream side of the whole drug R&D chain. 
These scientific experiments are often conducted by public actors such as universities 
because these stages are the explorative and discovery-oriented, particularly in the 
stages of target identification and validation and lead identification. Of course, 
exploratory R&D by pharmaceutical firms also begins in this stage. Due to the broad 
range of diseases and the variety of levels of biological mechanisms, from gene to 
symptom expression, the upstream research is extensively fragmented across the 
laboratories of universities, GRIs, DBFs and pharmaceutical firms in the world.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The process of new-drug R&D 
Source: Based on Di Masi and Grabowski (2007), Burns (2005), and Drews (2000) 
2) Emergence of a new-drug business model 
Key product patents (i.e., the lead compound and its further derivatives), and patents for 
the composition of matter of NCEs, are generated during the lead identification and 
optimisation steps. These patents are regarded as the most vital and valuable 
commercially (Burns 2005), as 20 years of exclusive sales are guaranteed. As the 
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patented drug candidate requires further testing in preclinical and clinical trials, the real 
period of protection in the market is closer to around 10 years. This product patent is the 
fundamental basis for the new-drug-driven business model of Big Pharma.  
In the drug discovery process, two types of new drugs are identified. First, if a new drug 
is developed based on the identification of a new target or biochemical mechanism, it is 
generally referred to as the first-in-class drug, or innovative new drug. Second, if a 
new drug is developed based on the modification of the existing lead compound of an 
innovative new drug, it is classified as a follow-on new drug, aiming at being a me-too, 
me-better or best-in-class drug.  
3) Step 2 - Preclinical development  
As a subsequent step, preclinical development with animal tests is necessary to check 
the toxicity, potential effectiveness, and biochemical processing of the derivative (i.e., the 
drug candidate), prior to proceeding to clinical trials in humans, due to safety and 
effectiveness issues (Pisano 2006).78 A most promising candidate and a few ‘back-up’ 
candidates are chosen in this step (ibid). This takes one year, and the firm submits the 
investigational new drug (IND) details, with all the data collected about the preclinical 
tests, to the regulatory authorities, such as the FDA, to secure permission to conduct 
clinical trials in humans (Burns 2005). That is, new-drug R&D is highly regulated in the 
R&D stage, unlike most other industries.  
4) Step 3 - Clinical trials 
The clinical trials of the drug candidate commence to evaluate the toxicity (safety) and 
efficacy in humans after the approval of the IND. As safety is prioritised ahead of efficacy, 
a phase 1 trial is conducted to confirm safety within a small sample of volunteers (about 
20 to 100) (ibid). This generally takes one and a half years (Paul et al. 2010). If the safety 
criteria are met, then the second phase of the clinical trial is performed. In particular, the 
second phase proceeds with two sequential steps: phase 2a and 2b.  
Phase 2a is concerned with investigating the efficacy of various dosages and 
corresponding side effects (ibid). That is, phase 2a is the pilot study that evaluates safety 
and checks efficacy. In contrast, phase 2b, called the pivotal study, is conducted to 
demonstrate efficacy and to determine the optimal therapeutic dosages and the best type 
of formulation. In particular, this stage is conducted in strict compliance with regulatory 
guidelines. The completion of phase 2 indicates an increased probability of final success, 
                                                          
78 The investigation of biochemical processing is referred to as ADME studies (Absorption, Distribution, 
Metabolism, and Excretion of the derivatives). 
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to a rate of about 30-60%; therefore, it is regarded as the ‘major fulcrum of value in the 
development part of the value chain’ (Burns 2005: 61-64).  
Phase 3 is to confirm the long-term efficacy and safety through confirmation of statistical 
significance and comparison with rival drugs (Burns 2005). Thus, phase 3 normally 
needs a large number of patients from multiple sites for the clinical trial (for the global 
launch, about 1,000 to 5,000 patients). This phase takes approximately two and a half 
years and costs about $235 million (Paul et al. 2010). As the entry into phase 3 signifies 
a higher probability of a successful market launch of the drug candidate, this process, in 
many respects, is regarded as the initial phase of commercialisation rather than the final 
stage of the development process (Burns 2005: 64-65). That is, this phase involves 
showing evidence of overall specifications and clinical benefits (efficacy and safety) of 
the drug candidate to stakeholders such as regulatory authorities in various nations, 
prescribers and final consumers (ibid). 
5) Step 4 – Approval and global launch  
Acquisition of NDA approval requires that all data for the clinical results and drug 
information be analysed and submitted to the regulatory authority, such as the US FDA 
or the European Medicines Agency. The preparation of the NDA also requires significant 
levels of documentation and the preparation of responses to questions from the FDA 
(Burns 2005: 65-66). With the review by the FDA taking a year, the NDA is approved with 
particular specifications (e.g., dosage form, amount, substantial efficacy and potential 
side effects) (Pisano 2006). In general, this takes about one and a half years, including 
the review (in the case of the US), and costs about $40 million (Paul et al. 2010).  
4.2.1.2 Process development 
In parallel with the product development steps, process R&D is also necessary to 
develop an efficient synthesis route and commercial production. The real process 
research concerned with commercial production starts in preclinical development 
(Pisano 1997).79 Devising the most commercially efficient (with simpler reaction steps) 
and technologically effective (with higher purity and stable reaction steps) method of 
synthesis, and its scale-up, becomes the main goal of process development (Table 4.1). 
Additionally, the optimal synthesis route for the chosen type of formulation (e.g., tablet, 
injection, capsule, or patch) should be decided. This process development is generally 
completed in parallel with the phase 2 clinical trial (Figure 4.1).  
                                                          
79 Although the initial synthesis method for the candidate compound is devised in the discovery step, it is 
seen as a discovery process rather than process research for developing the synthesis route for commercial 
production. 
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Moreover, this process development is a critical R&D stage in producing biological drugs 
because of the technological difficulty of controlling the whole processes of organically 
high-molecular characteristics and maintaining the yield rate of the production at the 
same quality. Thus, process development becomes vital, even in a copy version of 
original biologics. As noted, it is attributed to the low level of engineering in integrality-
based biological drugs. That is why the copy of original biologics is called a “bio-similar”, 
not a “bio-copy” or “bio-generics”. 
Table 4.1: Key perspectives of the process development 
 Initial discovery process Final commercial production process 
Number of  
chemical steps 
25 7 
Equipment 
Test tubes; 1-liter flasks 2,000-4,000 gallon stainless steel 
vessels 
Batch size (output) ~1 gram 100 ~ 200 kg 
Operators 
PhD chemists Technicians; semiskilled plant 
workers 
Purity 1%-10% 99.9% 
Cost per kilogram ~ $20,000-$50,000/kg ~$3,500/kg 
Criteria for process 
design 
Biological activity of 
molecule; patent issues 
Cost; quality (purity);  
conformance with drug and 
environmental protection regulations; 
operability 
Source: Pisano (1997: p.121) 
4.2.1.3 Latecomers’ approach 
It is worth noting the application of the reversed PLC cycle in the pharmaceutical industry. 
As seen briefly, based on the case of the KoPI, technological accumulation in the 
latecomers’ pharmaceutical industry also seems to follow the overall trajectory of the 
reversed PLC (Figure 4.2). The latecomer pharmaceutical firms start to accumulate 
technological capability initially by establishing production capability, then by developing 
generic drugs, focusing on synthetic and formulation technologies, and finally by trying 
to develop their own new drugs. 
However, what makes the stepwise industrial catch-up in the industry more difficult is 
primarily rooted in the product patent barrier and in scientific research capability. Once 
new drug material acquires a product patent, there is legal prevention of copying the 
drug by latecomers for 20 years (in general 10 years after market launch) (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2: Technological catch-up pattern reversing the PLC  
Source: own elaboration based on the PLC model 
Thus, even though latecomers can master the production and synthetic technologies of 
the material (i.e., process development), they are not allowed to penetrate the market. 
Furthermore, mastering the process technologies never guarantees the scientific 
research capability that allows drug discovery. The latter capability is only accumulated 
through long-term and high-risk internal and upstream research, as in advanced firms.  
Summing up, for latecomers mostly focusing on imitative production, the product patent 
means the forestalling of copying for 20 years, even though the technological 
specifications of drugs are open to the public through publication and patent. Thus, the 
product patent regime has made the pharmaceutical market clearly separated between 
the high-value-added new-drug market, mainly based on exploratory learning and 
protected by the patent system, and the cost-competitive generic-drug market, based on 
exploitive learning and possible only after the expiration of the patent.  
4.2.1.4 Decreasing R&D productivity  
In spite of the benefit of new technologies and sciences, R&D productivity in new drug 
development has noticeably decreased. The annual number of applications for new 
molecular entities (NMEs) to the US FDA has continuously decreased for the last two 
decades (Figure 4.3). Consequently, the number of NDA approvals of NMEs has 
decreased from an average annual number of 36 between 1995 and 2004 to 22 between 
2005 and 2010 (Dubin 2012). In contrast, annual R&D expenditures, in the example of 
the PhRMA member firms (including most Big Pharma companies), has sharply 
increased, by almost four-fold over the last 20 years (to $48.5 billion in 2007 from $11.5 
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billion in 1992). 80  Overall, it is apparent that R&D productivity in the industry has 
worsened; a phenomenon referred to as the ‘innovation gap’.  
 
Figure 4.3: Annual number of NDA filed with the US FDA 
Source: Parexel White Paper (2010)  
Although they are not easily ascertained, both technological and institutional factors of 
this decreasing productivity have been identified. First of all, in terms of technology, new 
drug development through identifying novel targets instead of concentrating on known 
targets has increased the uncertainty of discovery and clinical development (Hu et al. 
2007). That is, opting for more novel targets means that clinical development becomes 
riskier. This technological pressure seems to be largely attributable to the previously 
successful era of new drug development and a resulting saturation of available known 
targets (Booth and Zemmel 2004, Hu et al. 2007, Dubin 2012).81 
Consequently, the relative abundance of drugs presently being marketed, and the 
incomplete understanding of biological mechanisms, has resulted in intensified 
institutional demand for clinical differentiation by the FDA and has made extensive and 
large-scale clinical trials necessary (LaMattina 2012). As a result, pharmaceutical firms 
have been forced to take more novel approaches with safer and more effective 
specifications than for the presently dominant drugs. Between 2007 and 2010, the failure 
rate of phase 3 and NDA increased rapidly, to almost 50% (83 projects) (Arrowsmith 
2011).  
 
                                                          
80 Meanwhile, the number of NDAs by the member firms decreased from 26 to 19. 
81 Moreover, as pointed out, the scientific advances in understanding of the biochemical mechanisms are 
still underway, resting somewhere between empiricism and engineering.  
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4.2.2 Market context  
In 2009, global pharmaceutical sales reached $800 billion, doubling in just seven years 
(from about $400 billion in 2002), led by Big Pharma (Table 4.2). In particular, the 
concentration of the top ten sales companies intensified from 29% to 45% over the same 
period. Meanwhile, the generic drug market has grown to about 10% of the global market 
share in terms of sales size.  
Table 4.2: Sales size of Big Pharma in 1990 and 2009 (US$ billions)82 
 Company (in 1990) Sales Share Company (in 2009) Sales Share 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Merck 
Bristol/Squibb 
Glaxo 
Johnson & Johnson  
Smith Kline Beecham 
Ciba-Geigy 
American Home Product 
Hoechst 
Lilly 
Bayer 
Roche 
Pfizer 
Sandoz 
Rhone Poulenc  
Upjohn 
5.7 
5.3 
5.2 
4.5 
4.3 
4.2 
3.9 
3.8 
3.7 
3.3 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
2.4 
3.8% 
3.5% 
3.3% 
3.0% 
2.9% 
2.8% 
2.6% 
2.6% 
2.5% 
2.2% 
2.2% 
2.2% 
2.2% 
2.1% 
1.6% 
Pfizer*  
Merck & Co (MSD) 
Novartis* 
Sanofi-Aventis* 
GSK * 
AstraZeneca 
Roche 
Johnson & Johnson 
Lilly 
Abbott 
Teva 
Bayer 
Boehringer Ingel 
Amgen 
Takeda 
57.0 
39.0 
38.5 
35.5 
35.0 
34.4 
32.8 
26.8 
20.3 
19.8 
15.9 
15.7 
15.3 
15.0 
14.4 
7.6% 
5.2% 
5.1% 
4.7% 
4.7% 
4.6% 
4.4% 
3.6% 
2.7% 
2.6% 
2.1% 
2.1% 
2.0% 
2.0% 
1.9% 
Total 59.1 39.5%  415.4 55.3% 
Source: Various sources on the global pharmaceutical industry 
4.2.2.1 Conventional business model: Branded new drugs and generic drugs 
The pharmaceutical market is divided into two product categories, new drugs and generic 
drugs, and is concerned with the PLC of drugs in the same class (indication or 
therapeutic area). To begin with, as the first drug developed in a therapeutic area, the 
launch of the ‘first-in-class’ drug (i.e., innovative new drug) initiates the PLC (A in Figure 
4.4). New drugs follow, with improved safety or efficacy, developed by competing 
companies and often based on the same lead compound but with considerable 
modification of the chemical structure, i.e., ‘me-too/me-better/best-in-class’ drugs (B in 
Figure 4.4). These still require full-scale clinical trials and NDA approval. These drugs 
                                                          
82 Pfizer: Pfizer, Warner-Lambert, and Pharmacia; Novartis: Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz; GSK: Glaxo, Wellcome 
and Smith Kline Beecham; Sanofi-Aventis: Sanofi, Hoechst, and Rhone Poulenc.  
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are referred to as ‘branded’ drugs. In general, industry leadership has been based on 
these branded and patented drugs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The market life cycle of drugs in a class 
Source: Own elaboration based on various sources 
The product patents of these new drugs expire after 20 years of exclusivity. Then, a new 
rule of market competition emerges, based on cost efficiency and time to market (C and 
D in Figure 4.4). These off-patent generic drugs and incrementally modified drugs (IMDs), 
partially patented, are developed mainly through process development, i.e., alternative 
synthesis routes of the original drugs (Sub-section 4.2.1.2). They are approved through 
bioequivalence tests or aNDA (abbreviated NDA) that exempt the drugs from full-scale 
implementation of clinical trials. These drugs compete with other generic drugs based on 
cost and time to market.  
In terms of the new drug market, between 1950 and 2008 1,222 new drugs (i.e., new 
chemical and biological drugs) were approved by the US FDA (Munos 2009). 
Interestingly, 21 companies accounted for half the new drugs and only half those 
companies have survived (Munos 2009).83 
                                                          
83 For example, Merck developed almost 60 new drugs, followed by Lilly, Roche, and Pfizer (each about 50 
new drugs). Moreover, the fluctuation of the ranks between 1990 and 2009 is, at first glance, attributed to 
the outcome of new drug launch as well as M&A. For example, Pfizer, Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis, and Roche 
have developed 13, 11, 8, and 10 new drugs, respectively, between 2000 and 2007 (Pammolli et al. 2011), 
leading to their industrial leadership (Table 4.3) 
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From the view of latecomer firms, it is noticeable that the pharmaceutical industry has 
not allowed latecomers to take over the market or to take technological leadership until 
now. All the top ten Big Pharma are located in the US and a few European countries, i.e., 
mainly in A7 countries. 
Meanwhile, the global generic drug market also rapidly grew in the 2000s, accounting 
for about $80 billion in 2009, compared to less than $50 billion in 2004. Traditionally, the 
major demand for generic drugs came from developing countries, which have weak 
purchasing power for new drugs (Dubey and Dubey 2009). However, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act in 1984 considerably lowered the entry barrier to the US market for generic drug 
producers.84 This Act aimed to reduce national medication costs. Since then, generic 
drugs have increasingly taken the majority of the largest pharmaceutical markets, 
reaching 78% of the total number of prescriptions in 2010 from 19% in 1984 (von 
Koeckritz 2012).  
In reality, institutional change has provided the generic drug developers with a new 
market opportunity, which has been regarded as a potential threat to the profit source of 
the new-drug-based Big Pharma. Specifically, since the technological source of the 
generic drug business is based on technological accumulation in process development, 
this lower technological requirement has allowed domestic and overseas generic drug 
developers to penetrate the US market. Core capabilities are involved in the rapid 
development and market launch of generic drugs through reverse engineering and 
acquisition of production standards, such as Current Good Manufacturing Practice 
(cGMP), by the US FDA. The recent successful entry into the US market by Indian 
pharmaceutical companies signifies the possibility of market catch-up through exploitive 
technological learning.  
Table 4.3: Classification of drugs 
Source: Own elaboration based on various sources 
                                                          
84 This act removed the need for conducting full scale clinical trials of generic drugs, replacing these trials 
with short-term bioequivalence tests.  
 Technological base 
Chemical synthesis Biological development 
Degree of 
innovation  
Innovative 
(created) 
∙ NCEs (chemistry-based) 
∙ Phytomedicines  
      (plant-based) 
∙ Biologics  
    (biological new-drugs) 
Imitative(modified) ∙ IMDs ∙ Biobetters 
Imitative (copied) ∙ Generics ∙ Biosimilars 
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4.2.2.2 Changing business model: The emerging niche markets  
Under sharpening innovation pressure resulting from technological and institutional 
changes, the conventional business model, which polarised pharmaceuticals into two 
dichotomised markets, seems to be changing. The current, more complicated, state of 
affairs has led to the emergence of niche markets (Table 4.3). Basically, the emerging 
niche market seems to be an interactive and strategic response both from Big Pharma 
and generic drug producers in dealing with technological and institutional changes.  
With respect to the new-drug-based Big Pharma, and based on the literature review four 
types of responses are observed in parallel with maintaining internal new-drug R&D:  
 ‘Ever-greening strategy’: Companies have tried to extend the period and scope 
of patent protection by acquiring multiple peripheral patents embracing various 
aspects of the original product patent, referred to as an ‘ever-greening strategy’ 
(Thomas 2009). In doing so, they intend to delay the entry of subsequent generic 
drugs.  
 IMDs: Product differentiation based on the original drug is articulated to extend 
the life cycle of the original drug, constantly surpassing rival new drugs and 
generics. IMDs such as combination drugs have been observed.  
 Entry to the generic drug market: In the increasing market size of generic drugs, 
both in the home countries of Big Pharma and in emerging markets, companies 
have entered the generic drug market by acquiring local generic drug producers 
or making alliances.  
 Open innovation: The outsourcing of potential targets and drug candidates has 
intensified and often deals with the view of ‘open innovation’. This point indicates 
that even Big Pharma companies cannot conduct all of the necessary research 
within their R&D organisations in the rapidly broadening and deepening scientific 
knowledge bases of new drug R&D in the emerging biotechnology paradigm.  
In the view of the generic-drugs-based latecomers, in general, they face both threats and 
opportunities in coping with their changing industrial environment:  
 Generic drug based global market penetration: First of all, some latecomer firms 
have clearly taken new opportunities with the expanding generic drug market in 
advanced countries. The grasping of this opportunity requires mastery of 
production capability and managerial/marketing capability to enter the overseas 
advanced market. 
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 IMD strategy: In contrast, they also face strengthened patent pressures from the 
ever-greening strategy of NCEs and other trade policies linked to the IPR regime. 
To cope with the IPR regime, they have tried to bypass the patent based on 
technological modifications.  
 Impact of open innovation and new technological paradigm: Like other emerging 
opportunities, presumably, the outsourcing trend of drug candidates in Big 
Pharma, open innovation, and the new technological paradigm of the 
biotechnology might positively affect the transitional dynamics from generic drug 
producers to new drug developers.  
As mentioned, the environment for the transition of the KoPI in the last two decades has 
been influenced by global technological and institutional changes. In this context, the 
influence of the global industrial context on the local environment, and thus on the 
transitional catch-up, needs to be addressed in addition to the nation-specific institutional 
context of the KoPI. The following section deals with this perspective.  
4.3 Institutional Environment of the KoPI  
This section addresses the local institutional and technological background for the last 
25 years’ transition. First, it briefly presents the accumulation of production capability 
before entering into the transitional period (Subsection 4.3.1). Then, it describes the two 
major external institutional pressures that have ignited and accelerated the transition: the 
introduction of the product patent system as an initial version of TRIPS, and the reform 
of the NHI (Sub-section 4.3.2). It then describes the macro level industrial and S&T policy 
landscape that has directly affected the pattern of new-drug R&D by innovation actors 
(Sub-section 4.3.3).  
4.3.1 Mastering imitative technologies in the 1970s  
The real take-off of technological learning in the pharmaceutical industry was driven by 
a governmental policy in the 1960s to substitute active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). 
Because of the enormous trade deficit in the industry (Park 1990), the import substitution 
of pharmaceutical materials became one of the most critical issues in any industry.85 The 
initial strategy was to setup joint ventures (JVs) for achieving local production.86 The 
                                                          
85 In 1960, the total amount of import of drugs including APIs, about US$5.26 million, accounted for 26% of 
the GNP. At the time, technological imports were strongly administered by government policy to regulate the 
outflow of foreign exchange (i.e., dollars) as noted above (KPMA 2005). 
86 Under the promotion act for introducing foreign capital, seven joint venture companies were organised, 
such as Handok (with German Hoechst, 1964), Kukje (with Italian Lepetit, 1959), Korea Schering (1967), 
Korea Pfizer (1969), and Korea Upjohn (1969). 
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pharmaceutical sector was the first industry that tried to absorb foreign technologies 
through JVs and technological transfer with advanced foreign companies in Korea 
(KPMA 1995).  
In the 1970s, the ISI was intensified by institutionally guaranteeing domestic companies 
the exclusive rights to monopolise localised APIs for a certain preferential period (KPMA 
2005). The government prohibited the import of raw materials developed by domestic 
companies for three years. Competing companies producing the same finished drugs 
had to purchase the API from the first domestic developer, as the import of APIs was 
banned.  
Under the industrial policy, domestic pharmaceutical companies focused primarily on 
developing alternative synthetic routes. As a result, the ISI strategy, with an incentive 
system for technological learning, led to the assimilation of the fundamental synthetic 
and production capability, which are prerequisites for further imitative and innovative 
R&D activities (Figure 4.5).87 It should be noted that the pharmaceutical companies were 
more attracted by the rapid growth of the domestic market than by exploiting overseas 
markets.  
 
Figure 4.5 Import and export trend in the pharmaceutical industry unit: million $ 
Source: Reformation from KPTA Statistics, 1987 
4.3.2 Major institutional changes  
While the initial technological accumulation was successful, based on the duplicative 
imitation under the active market protection, the industrial environment has shown 
considerable turbulence since the 1980s. The introduction of the substance (product) 
                                                          
87 The ISI strategy was operated with a link system between export and import; therefore, the importer had 
to export corresponding amounts of materials or finished products (Ahn 1991). This especially affected the 
import and export of oriental medicine materials (ibid). 
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patent became the initiator of the transition (Sub-section 4.3.2.1), and the reform of the 
NHI has accelerated the transitional effort (Sub-section 4.3.2.2).  
4.3.2.1 Reinforcement of product patent in 1987 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the US started to force some developing countries, such 
as Hungary, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea, to strengthen their IPR regimes (e.g., 
product patents, trademarks and copyrights) (Nam 2006b). This was a period of 
reshaping the economic relationship between the US and Korea, as Korea had rapidly 
increased its exports to the US, while the US economy was stuck with so-called twin 
deficits in the first half of the 1980s (ibid.).  
Under pressure, the Korean government decided in 1986 to introduce a new patent 
system, which took effect in 1987. The scope of the substance patent included newly 
synthesised chemical materials as well as ‘invented’ micro-organisms, vectors, natural 
substances, recombinant genes and cell lines, which had not previously been patentable 
in Korea. This became the first practical link between the international trade policy of the 
US and IPR issues (ibid.). 
Although the accommodation of the product patent system seemed to be unavoidable 
for Korea at that time since the economic growth of the country was based on exports, 
many to the US (Park 1994), 88  the KoPI still saw it as too radical, in that it was 
immediately enforced the following year, 1987, without any grace period and with 
excessive accommodation of so-called ‘pipeline products’.89,90 In addition, the protection 
period of the patent was extended from 12 to 15 years, and then extended again to 20 
                                                          
88 In retrospect, the pharmaceutical industry and other precision chemical industries, which had received 
little attention compared with heavy chemical industries (HCIs), became the scapegoats of international trade 
in order to bypass the trade offensive from the US and save the export-oriented leading industries of Korea 
(Park 1994). Under this political economic pretext, in 1985 the Reagan administration of the US instructed 
the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) to investigate the actual state of the protection of IPR in 
Korea, alluding to the possibility of execution of the Super 301 bill, which would lead to the restriction of 
exports to the US (Nam 2006a). In the trade talks, USTR raised the IPR issues of Korea, such as the scope 
and degree of copyrights and the introduction of substance patents. Korea became the first country to which 
the Super 301 bill of the USTR was applied. 
89 The government agreed with the application of the product patent retroactive to 1981. Therefore, all 
substance patents that were registered in the USPTO after 1980, but not yet launched as products in the 
US or Korean markets, could be protected in Korea. These products were called "pipeline products". This 
generally concerned pipeline products between the patent registration and the authorisation of new drugs 
by the US FDA. A total of 515 substance patents were protected as pipeline products by 1997, and domestic 
companies could not manufacture these drugs by 1997.  
90 The year of the introduction of the product patent system: the US (year of introduction of the substance 
patent: 1790), the UK (1949), West Germany (1968) and France (1969). For example, Japan enforced the 
substance patent system in 1976, 25 years after the issue was first posed. By 1976, 86 new NCEs had 
already been developed by Japanese domestic companies. Moreover, many late-industrialising countries, 
such as Italy, Spain, Mexico, Brazil and Norway, had not adopted a substance patent by that time. 
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years in 1996 by TRIPS. The same agreements with the EU and Japan were made in 
the early 1990s.  
As a result, the introduction of substance patents blocked the duplicative imitation of the 
patented original drug. This led directly to changes in the rules of the game of domestic 
market competition and technological learning, in combination with liberalisation of the 
commodity and capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s. Prior to the introduction of the 
substance patent system, Korea had only admitted manufacturing process-related 
patents, so domestic companies could produce the same substances (drugs) if they 
proved some technological difference in the synthesis process.  
As a result, the introduction of substance patents in Korea became a turning point that 
ignited an exploratory mode of technological learning for developing new drugs, although 
the copying and imitation strategy still echoed around the industry until at least the end 
of the 1990s. The CTO of Dong-a pointed out that substance patents led the industry to 
take on new-drug R&D (Interview 57 (K-Pharma)). That is, the product patent system 
became the ‘push factor’ for domestic firms to conduct exploratory learning. 
4.3.2.2 Reform of national health insurance in 2000 
The national health insurance system established in 1977 was fully reformed between 
1999 and 2001 across three dimensions: financing of NHI, pharmaceuticals, and drug 
price reimbursement (Kwon and Reich 2005).91 First, in 1999, all 350 insurance societies 
were integrated into a single payer, the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC). 
Second, the separation of prescribing and dispensing drugs between physicians and 
chemists (SPD) was enforced in 2000. Lastly, the criteria for drug price reimbursement 
were changed in 2001 to curtail the expenditures of the NHI. 
In particular, the reinforcement of SPD and changes in the criteria for drug price 
reimbursement directly affected the pharmaceutical industry. Prior to the implementation 
of SPD, chemists were able to arbitrarily prescribe drugs for some common diseases, 
whilst after its implementation they were no longer allowed to do this. Moreover, the main 
criterion for drug price reimbursement was changed from the officially notified price (ONP) 
to the actual transaction price.92 The actual transaction price system was regarded as 
                                                          
91 The progressive new government tried to reform the economic system and strengthen social welfare 
systems, e.g., the enhancement of the public healthcare system and the reform of Chaebol-based economic 
growth.  
92 The ONP, which was determined by the composite of the ex-factory price, a fixed wholesale margin and 
VAT (value-added tax) supervised by a drug pricing commission of NHI, was used for pharmaceutical 
reimbursement (Chung and Kim 2005). The setting up of a fixed price for the ONP was intended to apply an 
identical repayment price (the price for reimbursement) to all hospitals and clinics (Kim and Choi 2002). The 
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being able to lower the economic margin of pharmaceutical firms below that of the ONP. 
The actual transaction price system was based on the lowest transaction price examined 
between the pharmaceutical firms and medical service providers as the price of the drug 
reimbursement. 
In addition, the drug reimbursement scheme became more favourable towards imported 
new drugs (branded original drugs from Big Pharma). Imported drugs could be listed 
without restrictions in the drug reimbursement scheme. Prior to 2000, there had been 
non-tariff barriers to the import of new drugs to prevent multinational companies from 
direct entry to the domestic market; these barriers included the reimplementation of some 
clinical tests, the removal of imported drugs from the reimbursement list,93 and the 
establishment of production factories in Korea (Rozek and Berkowitz 1998).94 95  
Overall, the NHI reforms led to a change in the structure of the domestic market that 
further implies a change in the technological learning. The following section discusses 
this change in market structure.   
4.4 Changing Market Selection Criteria  
This section examines the change in the market selection environment in the KoPI over 
the 25-year transitional period. This change was driven by the institutional pressures 
described above. In the first period of the transition, between 1987 and 1999, the market 
selection environment was shaped by the combined outcome of the implementation of 
the product patent system and the loose operation of NHI. In the on-going second period 
of the transition after 2000, the reform of NHI sharply changed the domestic market 
toward ETC drug-centred competition and cost curtailment of NHI. 
4.4.1 Prior to the reform of NHI 
After the reinforcement of the product patent system, copying original drugs without 
licensing was no longer a viable business model. Instead, local companies grappled with 
how to strengthen the development of OTC drugs and the licensed-in drug business 
                                                          
ONP of a drug first registered served as the benchmark price for other follow-up drugs with the same 
constituents, i.e., the same API. 
93 Thus, the medical providers had to apply the reimbursement of dispensing imported drugs one by one 
and pricing was done on a case by case basis.  
94 It should be noted that this research was supported by the representative US industrial association, 
PHRMA. The elimination of institutional discrimination continuously demanded by the US was mostly 
accepted in the reform of 1999 (ChosunIlbo 16/5/1999). 
95 The pricing criteria for imported drugs were also changed in a favourable way. The reimbursement price 
of imported drugs was set at the average price in the A7 countries, allowing higher pricing for imported drugs 
in the Korean market than in some A7 countries (Chung and Kim 2005). A7 countries: the US, Japan, 
Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Switzerland. 
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through alliances with Big Pharma and Japanese companies. Domestic firms, facing an 
unfriendly pricing policy for imported new drugs, made room for brokering the domestic 
market and Big Pharma through licensed-in drug production. OTC and domestically 
produced licensed-in drugs became critical sources of success in the domestic market 
until the reform of NHI in 2000.96  
Along these lines, market competition occurred mainly through marketing capability 
rather than technological innovation. The problem was the considerable technological 
homogeneity of drugs between the domestic firms. Under intense competition, they tried 
to supply drugs at a discounted price to the healthcare service providers, while also 
attempting to maintain a higher ONP.97 As a result, they were attracted to not only an 
official marketing channel, but also private networks to win over the physicians and 
chemists. This frequently led to dumping and illegal marketing activities such as bribing 
hospitals, clinics and chemist shops. It was the main mode of marketing by the 
pharmaceutical companies before 1999. 
Overall, due to the limited technological capability to develop new drugs, the expansion 
of the NHI with a loose drug evaluation system led to the distortion of the micro-level 
market selection mechanism, forcing domestic firms to concentrate on marketing 
activities. Although the product patent system clearly stimulated new-drug R&D among 
domestic companies, technological capability scarcely influenced market selection at 
that time.  
4.4.2 After the reform of the NHI  
As stated, the SPD and the new actual transaction price system were enacted in 2000. 
The reform was regarded as a substantial threat by domestic pharmaceutical firms, as 
they had to change their marketing and technological learning patterns.  
Two noticeable changes in the market selection environment were observed: (a) a 
reversal of the proportion between OTC drugs and ETC drugs, and (b) the increase in 
market share of Big Pharma (Figure 4.6).  
                                                          
96 OTC drugs accounted for 58.6% of the domestic market in 1991.  
97 The lowered ONP meant a decrease in profit for the pharmaceutical firms. Thus, the higher the gap between ONP 
and the real transaction price they charged the healthcare service providers, the more profit they were guaranteed. 
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Figure 4.6: The change in the pharmaceutical market after SPD in 2000 
Source: KHIDI (2010b), HIRA Statistics 
(a) First, the increasing demand for ETC drugs became a considerable threat to most 
domestic firms, as their product portfolios were mainly based on OTC drugs and (off-
patented) generic drugs. Physicians generally prefer original branded drugs to generic 
drugs. The sharp increase in ETC drugs was partly due to the direct effects of the SPD.98 
Prior to the reinforcement of the SPD, many patients had a tendency to go to chemists 
when they felt that their diseases could be managed by drugs alone, without seeking a 
diagnosis from a physician. However, the prohibition of arbitrary prescription by chemists 
resulted in an increase of ETC drugs prescribed by physicians.  
 
(b) The other notable change was the direct encroachment on the market by Big Pharma 
with innovative ETC drugs rather than giving licenses to domestic firms. The direct 
intrusion of Big Pharma was based on the changing pricing system for drugs and the 
inclusion of imported drugs on the drug reimbursement list after the reform, which made 
importing new drugs more favourable. Subsequently, Big Pharma companies rapidly 
increased their market share after the reform of the NHI around 2000 (Figure 4.6).  
As a consequence, the changing market selection environment led to a narrowing of the 
market leadership of domestic firms. 
 
4.4.3 Intermediate outcome of the change 
                                                          
98 The other reason is the increasing chronic diseases, such as lifestyle diseases as income levels become 
higher, and as a consequence of aging in society. 
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In response to these changes, two opposing movements by domestic companies can be 
identified: i) a rush into the generic ETC drugs to supplement the sharp decrease of OTC 
drug sales,99 and ii) reinforcement of new-drug development.  
i) For most domestic companies, the production of generic drugs became a survival 
strategy to compensate for a lack of innovative capability. This was in large part because 
of the government’s supportive position for generic drugs. By 2006, the pharmaceutical 
reimbursement policy had maintained an apparently high reimbursement rate for the first-
listed generic drugs, up to 87% of the original drug price. As a result, domestic companies 
were able to enjoy, to some extent, very lucrative revenues from maintaining their generic 
drug business, just as they did in the 1990s.  
ii) Some domestic companies reinvested the profits acquired from the higher pricing of 
generic drugs into new-drug R&D. IMDs, NCEs, and biological drugs developed through 
exploratory learning have begun to emerge in the domestic market and R&D pipelines 
over the past decade. In 2008, one phytomedicine and one IMD developed by domestic 
companies (Stillen by Dong-a and Amodipin by Hanmi) were on the top ten sales list for 
outpatient prescriptions (Table 4.4). On the top 100 list, there was one NCE (Revanex 
by Yuhan) and three more IMDs. Furthermore, a domestic company, LG Life Science, 
acquired an NDA from the US FDA in 2003 for its new drug, Factive. 
Table 4.4: Top 10 ETC drugs and firms (outpatient prescription sales)100                                                                                                                                 
Rank 
Item 
 (in 2008) 
Launching company     
  (Original developer) 
Size of EDI-based claim 
(Unit: Korea billion won) 
1 Plavix Handok (Sanofi-Aventis) 111.1 
2 Novask Pfizer 75.3 
3 Lipitor Pfizer 70.7 
4 Stillen Dong-a 69.3 
5 Gleevec Novartis 677 
6 Amodipin Hanmi 55.9 
7 Ultra Bayer 47.3 
8 Crestor Astra Zeneca 44.2 
9 Olmetec Daewoong (Daiichi Sankyo) 44.0 
10 Gasmotine Daewoong (Eisai) 415 
Source: Edit from Yakup Newspaper Statistics 2010, EDI: Electronic Data Interchange  
                                                          
99 Product patents of 183 new drugs (branded drugs) expired between 2008 and 2013.  
100 The size of the EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) based claims (bills) represents the sales size of 
outpatient prescription drugs, reflecting the real marketing performance of pharmaceutical companies under 
SPD.  
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To some degree, this indicates real achievements in domestic pharmaceutical 
companies’ transition to being new-drug developers. This initial performance is the 
outcome of long-term trials in new-drug development spanning 20 years. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that there is still a great deal of failure and stagnation of new-
drug R&D.  
In summary, the appearance of new drugs on the domestic market is the intermediate 
outcome of new-drug R&D initiated by the enforcement of the product patent system in 
1987, and its acceleration by the reform of the NHI in 2000. Although market competition 
based on generic drugs is still the major criterion for market survival, the new market 
selection criteria based on new-drug R&D have been increasingly influencing the survival 
and growth of domestic pharmaceutical firms. Further, institutional measures to prevent 
informal marketing activities for selling generic drugs and FTAs with the US and the EU 
started in the 2010s, accelerating the changes in the KoPI’s market selection 
environment.101 
4.5 Changing S&T Policy Landscape 
While the changes in the patent system and NHI, and the resulting alterations in the 
market structure, have forced domestic companies to conduct R&D for new drugs, S&T 
policies (and partly industrial policies) have directly influenced the endogenous pattern 
of new-drug R&D. Three policy changes particularly affected new-drug R&D.  
First, the incumbent pharmaceutical industry conducted new-drug R&D under an overall 
lack of industrial policy during a considerable part of the transition period, until its recent 
reappearance (Sub-section 4.5.1). In contrast, emerging biotechnology has been 
strongly supported by a series of industrial and S&T policies from its conception (Sub-
section 4.5.2). Finally, S&T policies are universally changed, particularly in managing 
R&D programmes to promote the generation of innovation (Sub-section 4.5.3).  
4.5.1 Disappearance and reappearance of industrial policies  
While imitative capability in the KoPI was successfully accumulated under the strong 
industrial policy for import substitution of APIs by the early 1980s, no further industry-
                                                          
101 To eradicate such marketing patterns based on illegal rebates aimed at lowering the actual transaction 
price system, in 2010 the government introduced a so-called ‘dual punishment system’ between physicians 
and pharmaceutical companies. This punishment system caused additional turmoil among the stakeholders 
of the pharmaceutical companies, physicians and chemists, thereby influencing the market performance of 
the companies, under the policy change of generic drug pricing in the late 2000s. 
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specific industrial policies were actuated in the following transitional period under the 
liberalisation of the commodity and capital markets.102 
In the absence of industrial policies for an industrial upgrade, the product patent regime 
and the reformed NHI operated as practical institutional signals to determine domestic 
firms’ marketing and technological activities. Given the industrial policy vacuum, as will 
be seen, pharmaceutical firms’ new-drug R&D has been supported only in fragmented 
fashion, to a large extent under the policy to foster emerging biotechnology rather than 
any sector-specific policy. 
However, in 2011, a pharmaceutical-sector-specific industrial policy was instituted, 
aiming to provide comprehensive support to the industry, including the promotion of new-
drug R&D, commercialisation and export.103 Interestingly, the pharmaceutical industry-
specific industrial policy overlaps with national policies for supporting emerging 
biotechnology due to similarities in the two industries’ knowledge base and target market.  
Overall, the period of the most transition in the KoPI proceeded without any 
comprehensive industrial policy until recently.   
4.5.2 National attention to biotechnology  
The Korean government has been attracted by emerging biotechnology as the prominent 
momentum of the next generation of economic development since the 1990s. Since then, 
despite the stagnated growth of biotechnology as an industry, a series of S&T policy 
measures, including large-scale R&D investment, were carried out to establish 
infrastructures and a knowledge base for biotechnology. In a sense, the active S&T-
policies to support biotechnology, instead of relying on industrial policies, can be seen 
as an effective substitute for the Industry-specific industrial policy because of the deep 
reliance on scientific research of the industrialisation of biotechnology including drug 
R&D.  
Specifically, the Promotion Act for Genetic Engineering drew public attention to 
biotechnology, igniting the first boom of biotechnology between the mid- and late-1980s 
(Table 4.5). On the basis of this Act, the Genetic Research Centre (GRC) was 
established under the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in 1985, led 
                                                          
102 In the Korean catch-up context, the industry-specific industrial policies for each industry served as a kind 
of guidepost for the subsequent supportive policies such as the financial and R&D support, procurement and 
export support (Heo 2001). 
103 The Pharmaceutical Promotion Act was intended to cope with the threat of FTAs with the EU and the 
US. 
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by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). It was expanded as the independent 
GRI, Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology (KRIBB). The Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) also began to support the industrialisation of 
biotechnology. The Biotechnology Association of Korea, composed of DBFs, was 
founded as a leading industrial community approved by MOTIE in 1991.  
Table 4.5: Key S&T policies for the development of the biotechnology 
Year 
Industrial and S&T policies 
(leading ministry) 
Policy implementation 
1983 Promotion Act for Genetic Engineering (MOST) 
- Genetic Research Centre 
- Korea Genetic Engineering Research 
Association  
1989 
Plan for the Development of  
the Biotechnology Industry (MOTIE)  
- Biotechnology Association of Korea  
1994 Promotion Act for Biotechnology (MOST) 
- Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and 
Biotechnology  
1994 
: First Promotion Act for Biotechnology (MOST) 
- Biotech 2000 
- Long-term, large-scale NRDPs 
   : Frontier Programme 
2007 
: Second Promotion Act for Biotechnology 
(MOST) 
- Biovision 2016 
- Enlargement of the Frontier Programme 
- Focus on industrialisation of biotechnology 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on several policy reports  
In 1994, as the most fundamental and comprehensive S&T policy, the Promotion Act for 
Biotechnology, called Biotech 2000, was established in an attempt to comprehensively 
support the emerging technological field and to clarify the role of relevant ministries in 
fostering the biotechnology industry, such as MOST, MOTIE and the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MOHW) (National Archive 2007).104 The new plan, mainly designed by 
MOST, largely focused on three perspectives of the innovation system: the necessary 
establishment innovation actors; a detailed plan for the execution and coordination of 
R&D policies, and the accumulation of human resources in biotechnology (ibid). 
Through the Biotech 2000 project, Korea was estimated to have established an 
innovation system of biotechnology facilitating R&D capabilities of the participants and 
R&D collaboration between the private and public institutes (Chung 2001).  
This act has been continuously amended, stressing the industrialisation of biotechnology 
over the last decade. In line with this, the government published the Second Framework 
Plan for the Promotion of Biotechnology, the so-called Bio-vision 2016, which started in 
                                                          
104 The first stage was to arrange the supportive policies for R&D activities, while the second stage focused 
on producing the outcomes of R&D. The third stage was meant to commercialise the scientific products. 
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2007. This act aims to regain status as a G7 country and strengthens the funding size 
by three times more than the first promotion act (about US$14 billion by 2016). 
Table 4.6: Main NRDPs related to drug R&D  
National R&D programme 
Number  
of firms 
Period 
Executive 
ministry 
Special R&D programme (firm-led R&D)  17 1987 ~1989 MOST 
Special R&D programme (government-
led) 
22 1990 ~ 1992 MOST 
HAN Project (G7 Project) 26 1992 ~ 1997 MOST 
Intermediate Core Technology 
Development 
9 1993 ~ 1994 MOST 
Core Industry Technology Development  17 1994 ~ 1996 MOST 
Core National R&D Project 6 1998 ~ 2002 MOST 
Bio-Challenger Project 2 2003 ~ 2005 MOST 
Biomaterial Development Project 1 2003 ~ 2004 MOST 
Health and Medical Technology 
Development  
36 1996 ~ present MOHW 
Midterm Technology Development  13 1998 ~ 2002 MOTIE 
Strategic Technology Project 16 2005 ~ present MOTIE 
Bio-Star Project 8 2005 ~ present MOTIE 
Source: Revision based on KDRA Whitepaper (2009) 
Under the policy acts, the series of NRDPs to promote biotechnology R&D have 
increasingly been launched, including the Highly Advanced National (HAN) programme, 
Science Research Centre (SRC), and Engineering Research Centre (ERC) projects 
(Table 4.6).105  
The first R&D programme was initiated in 1987 by MOST in response to the enaction of 
the product patent system in 1987. It was further supported under the HAN programme 
(i.e., the so-called G7 project) to develop frontier technologies.106 MOHW also started to 
support new-drug R&D through Health and Medical Technology Development, starting 
in 1996. Overall, the number of NRDPs and the size of R&D expenditures have increased 
                                                          
105 Biotechnology-related projects accounted for about 25% of all SRC and ERC projects by 1999, aimed at 
building the upstream research capability of universities. The nine-year long R&D project of SRC and ERC 
was launched on the basis of the Promotion Act for the Advancement of Basic Science Research enacted 
in 1989, to raise the excellence of basic research groups (SRC) and goal-oriented applied research capability 
with a view to its industrial exploitation (ERC). The SRC and ERC were one of the representative national 
R&D projects of the 1990s, broadening the scope of knowledge bases and funding size. The Promotion Act 
contained fourteen biotechnology-related projects, such as biomedical engineering. 
106 It is often referred to as the G7 project, implying the ambitious goal to raise the technology level to that 
of the advanced G7 countries, especially in engineering and technology fields such as semiconductors, high 
definition TV (HDTV), nuclear energy and mechanical areas. One of eighteen projects was to develop new 
drugs between 1992 and 1997. 
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almost proportionately since 1993, especially after the recovery from the Asian economic 
crisis in the late 1990s (Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.7 Government Investment in drug R&D 
Source: Data from KHIDI reports (2002, 2005, 2010b) and the KHIDI White Paper 2009 (2010b) 
To sum up, all subsequent biotechnology-related NRDPs based on the Biotechnology 
Promotion Act, Biotech 2000 and Biovision 2016 show Korea’s desire to take 
biotechnology leadership beyond the imitation stage of existing technologies. Indeed, 
Korea has boldly increased R&D investment in biotechnology compared with other 
technologically advanced countries (Table 4.7)  
Table 4.7: Public R&D spending on biotechnology 
Country 2003 2009 
Million PPP 
$ 
As % of total 
public R&D spending 
Million PPP 
$ 
As % of total 
public R&D spending 
Canada 550 12 724 7 
Denmark 131 10 199 10 
Finland 105 7 129 5 
Germany -. - 4,605 21 
Korea 727 15 2,083 20 
Singapore 
(2005) 
360 28 - - 
Spain 452 - 1,302 14 
Taiwan 618 31 - - 
United Kingdom 212 2 - - 
* Public spending: Government and higher education, PPP: Purchasing power parity 
Sources: OECD Biotechnology Statistics Database (2011) and Wong (2011) 
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In addition, the active national investment to biotechnology is also identified in the rapid 
increase of the industrial researcher in biotechnology-based R&D including the 
pharmaceutical sector, as an outcome of national education (Figure 4.8).107 At the same 
time, it should also be noted that 70% of PhD researchers are estimated to belong to 
public R&D organisations such as universities and GRIs (Kim 2004). In the more specific 
context of drug R&D, for example, three GRIs, KRIBB, KIST, and Korea Research 
Institute of Chemical Technology (KRICT), were operating 474 researchers, including 
160 PhD researchers, with about US$50 million, mostly focusing on drug discovery 
research in 2004 (ibid.). It can be thought of as a considerably affluent R&D environment 
compared with the then total number of PhD researchers, 1,102, in an industry containing 
640 companies. 
 
Figure 4.8: Number of industrial researchers with PhD, master and bachelor 
degrees 
Source: Data from KHIDI (2006a) and MOTIE and KoreaBio Survey report (2014) 
4.5.3 Changes in detailed S&T policies for R&D support 
S&T policies, which directly influence the R&D patterns of innovation actors, have been 
reformed to promote innovative learning since the 1990s, i.e., explorative technological 
learning. The main changes have been fully reflected in the design and conduct of 
NRDPs. Specifically, incentive and evaluation structures for researchers in the public 
sector (GRIs and universities) have been rearranged from the stable allocation of R&D 
funds from the government to the performance-centred competition system, the so-
called project-based system (PBS). However, S&T policies have long been dominated 
                                                          
107 No data were available for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in Figure 4.8. 
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by civil service and professionals from the public sector (Song 2006) and reflect the 
selection environment of NRDPs. Administrative leadership of R&D support in 
biotechnology, including new-drug R&D, has rapidly diversified from MOST to MOHW 
and MOTIE. The multi-level change in S&T policies will be discussed as the main object 
of the analysis in the following chapter. 
4.6 Summary  
This chapter addressed the major institutional and technological pressures in the global 
and local contexts, and the resulting changes in the market selection environment that 
initiated and accelerated new-drug R&D in the KoPI. In addition, it presented the macro-
level changes in S&T policies that have directly affected the technological learning 
pattern of innovation actors in the transitional phase.  
First, the new-drug R&D process was presented. The illustration of the new-drug R&D 
process showed technological, institutional and financial barriers to entry into the new-
drug business by the latecomer firms. It also pointed out the decreasing productivity of 
new-drug R&D by Big Pharma and the increasing generic drug market. The changing 
industrial context has provided local latecomer firms with new opportunities for catch-up, 
regardless of whether they have taken on these opportunities in reality.  
Second, in the local context, this chapter illustrated the rapid change in the domestic 
institutional context, the introduction of the product patent system and the strengthening 
NHI, and thus the change in the market competition environment toward a 
technologically intensive ETC drug market (away from intensive marketing of OTC drugs). 
In response to the change, the domestic latecomer firms that were able to accumulate 
production capability by following reverse PLC have tried to transition from generic drug 
producers into new drug developers. The development of a few commercially successful 
new drugs (NCEs and IMDs) signals that the KoPI has been engaging in this transition.  
This chapter also showed that the increasing new-drug R&D has been implemented 
under the macro level S&T policy changes. The government has increasingly supported 
the emerging biotechnology, which is the major innovation source for new-drug 
development. It also presented that the general S&T policies for R&D support have also 
been changed towards innovation creation.  
Overall, this chapter clarified the general new-drug R&D activities and diverse 
institutional factors influencing the transition of the KoPI. However, while the causes (the 
product patent system and NHI) and intermediate outcomes (a few commercial 
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successes among about 20 new drugs developed) of the transition have been identified, 
the transitional process through new-drug R&D under the change of S&T policies 
remains unknown. The following three chapters address the transitional process. 
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Chapter 5: The rearranged S&T policies and Exploratory 
learning 
“It was the biotechnology that the last five presidential governments, from 
president Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) to Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), 
continuously declared as the economic growth engine. However, what is the 
result of the enormous financial input? Far from being a core industry of the 
country, it lags behind Thailand. Total sales size of the Korean 
pharmaceutical companies does not reach even top 20th company in the 
global pharmaceutical industry” (Dr Chang-ho, Ahn, a CEO of Rexahn 
Pharmaceuticals in the US, Korea Economic Daily, 3/5/2013). 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 (Sub-section 3.3.2) discussed the institutional promotion of exploratory 
learning  in terms of changes in the three policy dimensions surrounding national R&D 
programmes (NRDPs): R&D investment, an incentive regime and a ministerial pattern of 
administrating NRDPs.108  
By analysing the three policy dimensions surrounding new-drug-related NRDPs, this 
chapter uncovers the influence of reformed S&T policies on innovation actors’ 
exploratory learning. The analysis is mainly based on interviews with researchers from 
the three Frontier programmes, and complementary interviews with representatives of 
industrial associations, domestic pharmaceutical companies, DBFs and Big Pharma. 
Section 5.2 presents the overall increases in R&D investment in new-drug R&D and the 
increasing problems with R&D investment. Section 5.3 describes the incentive regime of 
NRDPs and their problematic influence on innovation actors’ R&D activities. Section 5.4 
identifies the administration pattern of the three leading ministries in supporting new-drug 
R&D and industrialisation. Section 5.5 presents the negative effects of the policy 
implementation on exploratory learning. Section 5.6 summarises the chapter.  
5.2 R&D Investment for New-drug R&D  
This section analyses the rapid development of NRDPs, which have been aimed at 
promoting new-drug R&D over the last 25 years. NRDPs are designed by government 
ministries on the basis of S&T policies. Both public and private innovation actors are 
                                                          
108 As noted, NRDPs were treated as the institutional interface that links S&T policies and innovation actors’ 
technological learning (Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.4.1). 
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beneficiaries of NRDPs as project leading organisations, main contractors or sub-
contractors. 
The positive effect of NRDPs on promoting exploratory learning is analysed in Sub-
section 5.2.1. By contrast, the second sub-section (5.2.2) discusses the increasing 
imbalance between the supply and demand sides of NRDPs, particularly in the past 10 
years. 
5.2.1 Positive effects on the promotion of new-drug R&D 
The rapid increase in government R&D investment in biotechnology, including new-drug 
R&D, has already been presented (Chapter 4, Sub-section 4.5.2). NRDPs have generally 
been structured as widely distributed small projects. For example, in 2007, government 
funding for drug R&D was allocated to 556 projects, each of which received an average 
of only KRW 331 million (about US$ 0.3 million) (Table 5.1). Essentially, government 
R&D funding has operated as a kind of ‘seed money’, although the amount of R&D 
funding per project has gradually increased (Interviews 19, 33 and 41). Despite this 
relatively small and fragmented R&D support, a few positive outcomes from R&D can be 
identified, particularly in the first round of innovative R&D in the 1990s.  
Table 5.1: Government drug R&D investment classified by actors in 2007  
Types of actors Number of projects Amount of funding Funding per project 
Public 
actors 
Universities 
391 
(60.6%) 
63,100 
(42.5%) 
161 
 
GRIs 
76 
(11.8%) 
29,500 
(19.8%) 
388 
 
Pharmaceutical 
          firms 
 
89 
(13.8%) 
39,800 
(26.6%) 
445 
 
Total109 
556 
(86.2%) 
132,400 
(95.7%) 
331 
          * Unit: Millions of KRW 
          Source: Recalculation based on the data from KHIDI Survey reports (2005, 2006a, 2008) 
First, the public primary actors, namely universities and GRIs, consolidated their 
research base by becoming the largest beneficiaries of the drug R&D projects. The role 
of these public actors in establishing a knowledge base for upstream biotechnology and 
downstream drug development was praised by the pharmaceutical industry (Interviews 
6, 9, 18 and 20 (DBF); 45 and 51 (K-Pharma)). For example, the scientific performance 
                                                          
109 The rest of these include government departments and other types of public actors. 
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of the Korean biotechnology sector rapidly increased, according to the number of papers 
in the SCIE (Science Citation Index Expanded), which placed Korea 11th in the world 
rankings in 2010, up from 29th in 1994 (Figure 5.1). The number of patents applied also 
increased in the last decade (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.1: The performance of biotechnology R&D in the transitional period 
Source: data from Biovision 2016 and KDRA white papers 
Second, for the pharmaceutical firms, although the NRDPs allocated to the 
pharmaceutical industry were relatively tiny and scattered (Table 5.1), such support was 
critical because it acted as a policy-induced promoter of the entry of domestic firms into 
highly uncertain technological exploration and new-drug development (Interviews 42, 44, 
48 and 51 (K-Pharma)). The pharmaceutical firms were able to accumulate basic 
experience in new-drug research (e.g., drug identification) and engage in collaborative 
R&D with GRIs and universities (KDRA 2005). All 15 NCEs domestically approved by 
KFDA were partially supported by NRDPs in the 1990s and the 2000s, accounting for 
7.97% of the total R&D investment for the 15 drugs (KDRA 2009). 
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Figure 5.2: Patent performance of innovation actors in drug R&D 
Source: Recalculation based on the data from KHIDI Survey reports (2006a, 2009) 
5.2.2 The mismatch between R&D investment and demand  
However, the small proportion of national R&D support for pharmaceutical firms has 
become one of the key grounds upon which industrial actors have criticised the 
effectiveness of NRDPs for drug R&D.      
In 2009, national R&D support accounted for just 10.7% of pharmaceutical firms’ drug 
R&D budgets, while self-funding accounted for 88.8% of total R&D expenditures (data 
from KHIDI 2010a). Moreover, for a total of 68 new drugs developed, including NCEs, 
IMDs, and biobetters/similars, government R&D funding accounted for just 7.1% of total 
R&D expenditure, according to the KHIDI Survey (2012). In this respect, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether firms’ rapid increase in patenting in the 2000s, and their advances in 
new-drug development, were really driven by the government’s R&D support. 
The recent discontent with national R&D support is mainly attributable to the increasing 
burden of new-drug R&D with only the slightest change in the support pattern of the 
NRDPs, which remain public-oriented and fragmented.110 There have been two changing 
needs for R&D support: a) an increasing demand for larger-scale NRDPs for clinical 
development, and b) an increasing demand for external sources of drug candidates.111 
a) Industry actors are seeking more large-scale support at the development stage, 
such as support for clinical trials, especially for the first and the second stages 
(Interviews 40, 46, 49 and 51 (K-Pharma), and 9, 19, 33 and 36 (DBF)). R&D support 
                                                          
110 The dissatisfaction with the NRDPs from the DBFs was also identified in the interviews, often with criticism 
of the behavioural pattern of pharmaceutical firms. This will be further explored in later sections. 
111 Five of the seven interviewed (from leading pharmaceutical companies and two DBFs that are now 
operating their own clinical development projects) pointed out the difficulty of conducting clinical trials by 
internal R&D investment alone: CKD, Dong-a, Hanmi, Yuhan, and Crystal Genomics and Viromed.  
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for clinical development was actually implemented primarily by the MOHW in the 
Health Technology Programme, but in the form of seed money. They claim that drug 
development itself intrinsically means a central role for private firms’ commercialising 
activities. Without the pharmaceutical firms, upstream research by the public and 
DBFs cannot bear the real fruit of commercially viable new drugs. Therefore, 
government support should strike a greater balance between upstream research 
support and downstream development support.  
b) The other demand has been directed towards a more effective institutional 
mechanism for collaborative research in deriving drug candidates (Interviews 39, 49, 
52 and 53 (K-Pharma)). This comes from a critique of R&D collaboration with public 
actors, particularly universities, through NRDPs. Pharmaceutical firms have 
increasingly demanded external sources that can supply potential drug candidates 
to complement their internal weakness in the upstream discovery research. While 
private sector interviewees admitted the importance of supporting public upstream 
research, they questioned the commercial viability of the candidate materials 
developed by universities and GRIs. 
KDRA data indicates that such changing demand is broadly applicable among domestic 
firms conducting new-drug R&D. In total, 42.9% of 35 responding firms (out of 55 
member firms of KDRA) chose the development stage (preclinical and clinical stages) 
as the highest priority for government support; 20.8% stated that the second highest 
need was effective support to outsource drug candidates (KDRA 2009). 
Overall, entering the 2000s, the demand of pharmaceutical firms for R&D support has 
noticeably intensified and been diversified, ranging from upstream research to the clinical 
development stages. In contrast, the pattern of NRDP fund distribution has hardly 
changed, concentrating on supporting upstream public research with seed money and 
paying attention to emerging biotechnology. This has resulted in an increasing mismatch 
between the on-going supply pattern and the changing needs of national R&D funds, 
although the scale and scope of drug R&D support has increased. 
5.3 Incentive Regime of National R&D Programmes 
This section discusses the NRDP incentive regime, which consists of evaluation 
mechanisms, represented by the project-based system (PBS), and professor-led 
selection of R&D projects, expressed as a closed policy network. Ultimately, this section 
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will trace how the incentive regime has, in effect, caused system-wide problems in 
promoting an exploratory mode of technological learning. 
The micro-level evaluation mechanism under PBS shows an increasing contradiction 
between the incentive structure for researchers and the goal of NRDPs to promote 
innovation (Sub-section 5.3.1). The NRDP selection environment exhibits an institutional 
lack of linking public and industrial R&D activities (Sub-section 5.3.2).  
5.3.1 Evaluation pattern of national R&D programmes 
5.3.1.1 Project-based incentive structure  
The allocation system of national R&D funds, which determines the incentive structure 
of beneficiary organisations and researchers, changed to the PBS in 1996. This new 
system was introduced to promote innovation by broadening the autonomy and 
strengthening the transparency of conducting R&D projects (Lee 2006). 
Prior to the introduction of the PBS, government R&D funds were stably supplied by top-
down, mission-oriented NRDPs (Lim 2000). Little competition among research groups 
and organisations was needed (Interview 13 (GRI)). Thus, NRDPs were able to be stably 
conducted by a team or department base comprising 10-20 researchers led by a team 
leader (Kim 2011). These mission-oriented NRDPs were effective in the catching-up 
stage at localising foreign technologies and products under a clear industrial policy (Suh 
2000). However, on the negative side, team leader-centred project allocation and 
operation caused bureaucratic and unclear management of NRDPs (ibid.). The PBS was 
introduced to solve such problems and encourage innovative research. 
Since the introduction of the PBS in 1996, research projects have been acquired by 
competition between research teams. The PBS operates via a quantity-based evaluation 
of research performance known as 3P; it looks at the number of publications, patents, 
and projects obtained (and the return of technology transfer). Under the PBS, 
competition to obtain R&D projects has been considerably intensified to supplement 
researchers’ salaries, which are set at a base level (Interviews 4, 13 and 28 (GRI)).  
5.3.1.2 Dual effects of the project-based system  
Amid competition to acquire research projects, and due to its stress on quantity-based 
performance, the PBS has had dual effects on the operation of NRDPs. As noted, on the 
positive side, a significant improvement in research performance, especially in terms of 
knowledge accumulation in the form of papers and patents, was identified (Figures 5.1 
and 5.2). 
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However, on the negative side, industrial potential became a secondary concern after 
publication and ‘blinding’ patenting (regardless of any real application or technology 
transfer). That is, the PBS forced researchers to prioritise quantitative performance 
based on publication and patenting (Lee 2003, Yim and Kim 2005) to secure the 
continuation of projects, which are normally evaluated every year (Interviews 11, 13, 26 
and 27 (GRI)).112 
Moreover, increased competition has caused inevitable overlap of research topics 
between R&D teams in a few trendy and popular areas such as ‘bio nano-’, ‘bio-drug’, or 
‘stem cell’. This tends to minimise the risk of selection failure when applying for NRDPs 
by benchmarking others’ research topics (Interviews 11 and 26 (GRI)). 
A team leader of a drug research project at a GRI, the Korea Research Institute of 
Bioscience and Biotechnology (KRIBB), characterised these negative effects as an 
overall outcome of the new incentive system (Interview 26): 
We [team leaders who were responsible for acquiring projects] could not put 
innovation and commercial potential first when we applied for a project, though 
we recognise the importance of industrial potentiality in national projects based 
on people’s tax. For us, guaranteeing the continuation of present projects and 
acquiring more projects are the most critical tasks for maintaining our research 
team and keeping our team members’ salary at a certain level.113 Because of this, 
a considerable part of our time at work is spent not conducting research, but 
applying for projects, networking with administrative officers and reporting the 
interim and final results every year.114 
Under the PBS, no researchers would be willing to conduct explorative long-term 
research. A failure in obtaining a successful research outcome means 
subsequent failure of acquiring the next NRDP. Thus, many projects implicitly 
attempt to benchmark other research projects to avoid the risk of failure. Thus, 
research topics become similar, focusing on a few popular research areas.115 
                                                          
112 Specifically, they pointed out PBS as the most serious inhibitor that disturbed the long-term, more 
exploratory research in GRIs, even within a long-term project, due to annual and quantity-based interim 
evaluations. 
113 ‘Besides, we [researchers] actually can perform a few research projects but we propose many projects 
by packaging them like different topics. Although we know it is wrong, we have to first concern ourselves 
with the evaluation based on the PBS. We make different project reports with a few original projects.’ 
114 In reality, in a survey of the PBS to researchers in GRIs and universities, conducted by a member of the 
National Assembly, Doo-un Chung in 2011, 43% of the total number of respondents indicated private 
networks as the most important factor to acquire NRDPs (the total number of respondents – 345). 
115 This was also pointed out by a team leader of the KIST, Dr Ji-yun, Kang (Interview 11). 
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In fact, in 2010, 95% of all NRDPs resulted in the successful completion of their projects, 
according to the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC). According to 
Dr Chang-gyu Hwang, former head of R&D strategy at MOTIE, this means that there 
was almost no risk-taking R&D. ‘R&D fund was given to projects that were almost 
guaranteed success’, he said. That is, R&D funds were used for technological validation 
in repetition rather than exploration. 
The prioritisation of quantitative criteria based on publication and blind patenting prevails 
not only at GRIs, but also at universities. An assistant professor in a biotechnology 
department at a university who succeeded in transferring a research outcome to a 
Chaebol (SKC) criticised the fact that the benchmark in evaluating promotion is the 
quantity of publications. Technology transfer is not regarded as being as valuable as 
publications, even though most of the university’s royalties are obtained through 
technology transfer (Interview 22 (university)).116 
Publication-centred evaluation has also influenced private innovation actors’ 
participation in NRDPs, particularly that of DBFs. The former president of the Korea 
Biomedicine Industry Association (KOBIA) pointed out that the government also based 
the distribution of R&D funds to industrial developers such as DBFs on publications 
(Interview 20 (DBF)).117 It is inevitable that DBFs will prioritise publication in order to 
acquire NRDPs. 
The negative effects of this quantitative, performance-oriented incentive structure are 
amplified by the low impact of scientific publication done in Korea. Korea had the lowest 
impact factor among OECD countries while producing the 11th highest number of 
publications (based on SCI), according to a survey conducted by NSTC in 2011 (The 
Hankyoreh, 14/2/2012). 
Related to this, a leading researcher at the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials 
(KIMM) pointed out that integrative R&D planning that reflects commercial potential and 
demand is difficult to set up if each team or researcher is making dispersed and 
competitive project applications. Under the present structure of the PBS, research results 
with high commercial potential will not be produced (Daedeok Net, 11/8/2011). 
Summarising remarks  
                                                          
116 Technology transfer about micro-needle technology in 2007.  
117 The CEO of Proteogen and the former head of Genetic research centre (GRC, the forerunner of KRIBB) 
of KIST. 
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Overall, this sub-section traced the problematic aspects of the PBS-based incentive 
structure. Innovation performance of NRDPs has been mainly expressed in the rapid 
accumulation of publications and patents, making the NRDPs appear successful for the 
science-driven transition. However, while a good quantitative performance in the short 
term means the ‘administrative’ success of NRDPs and guarantees the sequential 
acquisition of new research projects, it does not always lead to the establishment of 
promising research activities and successful industrial development. That is, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether PBS has promoted autonomous, long-term, risk-taking and 
industry-reflective research.118  
5.3.2 Selection mechanism of national R&D programmes 
5.3.2.1 Professor-led selection environment  
This sub-section investigates the selection mechanism for research teams and research 
projects.  
The most noticeable characteristic of this selection mechanism is the over-dominance of 
professionals from academia and GRIs and their close relationship with the civil service, 
which has administrative power of the allocation of R&D funds.119 Together they formed 
a ‘closed policy network’ when the NRDPs were planned and selected in a top-down 
style in the catching-up era (Song 2006). Participation in this network was one of the 
most important criteria for receiving national R&D funds (ibid.).  
In the imitation stage, planning and selection of NRDPs was relatively simple. As the 
targeted industries and technological fields were already present in the advanced 
countries, the closed policy network was relatively effective for R&D support (Song 2006), 
due to the lower level of technological uncertainty and institutional complexity in the 
imitation stage. That is, the technological goal of the NRDPs and learning path was clear. 
In contrast, at the beginning of the transitional phase, the complexity surrounding 
technologies and industrial upgrading exceeds the administrative ability of policy makers. 
Moreover, stakeholders related to innovation activities have also increased; they include 
expanding universities and incumbent firms as well as new technology-based start-ups. 
Notwithstanding the changing environment, this institutional custom still seems to be 
prevalent in the present NRDP selection process for new drugs and biotechnology.  
                                                          
118 A summary of comments on PBS is given in Appendix 5. 
119 The civil service assumed the top position in the social hierarchy (Kim 2001a). 
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More specifically, the closed policy network has continued in the interdependence 
between the civil service and professionals from universities and GRIs. Basically, the 
civil servants in charge of designing S&T policy lack knowledge of S&T (Kwon et al. 2002, 
Park 2008), because civil service personnel are generally promoted for their 
administrative abilities (Park 2008). Thus, policy makers have increasingly relied on 
these professionals, creating a closed policy network (Park et al. 2005, Song 2006), 
although the government has recently tried to better reflect the industrial voice by 
expanding the participation of industrial professionals in the process of planning S&T 
policy and selecting NRDPs.  
Table 5.2: Distribution of committee members in the NSTC by affiliated fields 
Period (Year) Academia GRIs Civil Service Industry Others 
1 (1991) 6 1 3 1 2 
2 3 4 4 1 1 
3 6 3 4 2 0 
4-1 4 4 2 1 0 
4-2 5 4 1 0 1 
5 7 3 1 2 1 
6 4 3 1 2 1 
7 (2005) 3 3 1 2 1 
8 11 5 2 7 5 
Total 49 30 19 18 12 
            * NSTC: National Science and Technology Commission 
            * Source: Park et al. (2005) 
For example, Tables 5.2 shows the overall dominance of academia (and GRIs) in the 
macro-level commission (National Science and Technology Commission; NSTC) led by 
the president. Between the first and seventh periods (from 1991 to 2005), there were 
very few members from industry on the commission. Table 5.3 also presents the 
prevailing distribution of committee members from universities in the real selection level 
of NRDPs, here, the Health Technology Programme.  
Table 5.3: Distribution of committee members on the HT Programme in 2006 
 Universities GRIs Industry Civil service 
Number of 
members 
12 
(from 7 universities) 
3 3 2 
          * HT Programme: Health Technology Programme 
          * Source: Recalculation from the data of KHIDI (KHIDI 2006b) 
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5.3.2.2 Problems of the closed policy network  
Related to this, an interviewee who has worked in both the civil service (1996 to 2006) 
and Big Pharma (2007 to present), discussed some of the negative effects of the civil 
service- and professor-led policy network in the institutionalising process of new-drug 
and biotechnology NRDPs and industrial promotion as follows (Interview 34 (Big 
Pharma)): 
 Lack of speciality and formation of closed policy networks 
Even as recently as about 10 years ago, Korea had no experience with 
institutions for fostering new drug R&D, including regulation and approval; the 
government essentially imitated the US FDA when establishing the relevant laws 
and rules. However, the administrative process by the civil service has been 
implemented with no experience or understanding of the global pharmaceutical 
industry, through armchair arguments.120 
Policy makers have suffered from a lack of knowledge of the industry and 
technology, and therefore they relied on professors. Thus, professors have 
become the most influential community in the design and operation of the 
relevant S&T policies and NRDPs. As most professors were involved in 
upstream research, the support of scientific research was their main interest, 
putting aside the potentiality of industrial development. 
 The combined effect of the incentive structure and the closed policy network 
Professors are in a kind of king’s position in Korea. They are best at doing 
scientific research rather than practical drug R&D, and their interest is generally 
directed at receiving more R&D funds and publishing papers. Few of them 
consider their opportunity to contribute to the industrial sector, and only a small 
number of experienced professors have any knowhow about the interrelationship 
between academia and industry. In this country, although the relationship is not 
actively hostile, it is like oil and water: Professors and industry have not 
interlinked well.  
                                                          
120 A similar comment was made by Dr Chang-ho, Ahn, the CEO of Rexahn Pharmaceuticals in the US: 
‘Civil service in Korea lacks expertise. In the US, many civil servants work in the same field for a long time, 
10 to 20 years. By contrast, in Korea, many policies are practically designed by 5th-grade junior officials (the 
position between 1st and 9th grade) who just graduated university’ (3/5/2013, Korea Economic Daily). 
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Under this culture, policy makers, who are informed by the academic community, 
easily come to conclude that if they supported biotechnology-based upstream 
research, new drugs would be automatically developed. 
The stem cell research scandal on Dr Hwang’s research team in 2006 can be seen as a 
negative result of the closed policy network between policy makers and a small number 
of professors under short-term, performance-based evaluation pressure. 121  Similar 
comments were made by the CEO of a DBF, Proteogen, who returned to the country in 
1974, drawn by the government policy to attract overseas Korean scientists (Interview 
20 (DBF)). 
What has long been misunderstood in Korea is the belief in the direct 
commercialisation of the scientific work published in Nature or Science. These 
magazines are for acquiring legitimacy of new knowledge, not technology. That 
is to say, a knowledge validation process is needed to further develop technology 
from knowledge. However, until recently, researchers and professors doing 
genetic engineering have misunderstood/misled that laboratory-based 
experimental performance can be easily scaled up and commercialised. 
Moreover, governmental R&D support to universities has been mainly produced 
and evaluated in publications. In this atmosphere, academics have tended to 
have an exaggerated belief that their research results would soon be on the 
market. This led to more R&D support. 
These remarks reveal that the underlying mechanism behind these problems is the 
deteriorated and inefficient NRDP resource allocation process, created by an implicit 
relationship between policy makers and a small number of professionals in the S&T area. 
Related to this, the CEO of a DBF pointed out that the dominance of professors in the 
selection mechanism has been a main reason for the fragmented allocation of national 
funds by NRDPs to universities (mainly for publications) and GRIs with no practical 
experience in new-drug development (Interview 33 (DBF)).122  
In the national promotion of biotechnology, academics and many DBFs seldom needed 
to acquire R&D funds and projects from the pharmaceutical industry since funding 
                                                          
121 Based on the critics of a professor in Aju University, of the close relationship between star scientists and 
policy maker, blog post (http://bric.postech.ac.kr).  
122 He appraised that the direction of overall S&T policy of biotechnology and NRDPs toward strengthening 
upstream research was the right decision. 
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through NRDPs met minimal funding requirements for operating their research (Interview 
38 (Big Pharma)). 
Summarising remarks 
The closed policy network between civil service and professors has continued to act as 
the dominant decision-making group in directing S&T policy and selecting NRDPs. As 
seen above, this institutional structure stemmed from the previous imitation period for 
effective resource allocation, and still underlies the recent innovation-oriented S&T policy 
and NRDPs (Park et al. 2005, Jung 2007). Consequently, biotechnology-oriented 
upstream research led by public actors (i.e., universities and GRIs) and DBFs has been 
the main beneficiary of the NRDP selection environment. Combined with the PBS 
incentive system, this has led to a high concentration of upstream and public 
biotechnology research in NRDPs, resulting in the relative segregation of technologically 
conventional synthetic-drug-based and downstream development oriented 
pharmaceutical firms from the rapidly increasing biotechnology-related NRDPs.123 
5.4 Ministerial Role of Supporting New-drug R&D  
This section addresses the macro-level administration pattern of NRDPs by three leading 
ministries in supporting new-drug R&D and its industrialisation: MOST, MOHW and 
MOTIE. It describes a number of underlying institutional problems in the three ministries 
that prevent the efficient implementation of S&T policies, such as compartmentalisation 
of R&D support. 
This section first discusses the macro-level administrative pattern surrounding R&D 
support, including ministerial leadership in S&T policies and the governance structure of 
GRIs (Sub-section 5.4.1). The substantial role of each ministry is then explained (Sub-
sections 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4, respectively). Lastly, the ministerial policies for drug R&D 
support are summarised (Sub-section 5.4.5).  
5.4.1 Governmental structure of drug R&D support 
The first round of NRDPs for drug R&D were mostly carried out by MOST and MOHW 
(Table 4.6 and Figure 5.3). At that time, the division of supplying NRDPs between the 
two ministries had operated relatively well because of the relative simplicity of R&D 
activities in the beginning stages of new-drug R&D, and thus the relatively low demand 
                                                          
123 A summary of comments on the selection problems of NRDPs is given in Appendix 6. 
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for NRDPs by industry.124 Interestingly, the ministries launching drug R&D programmes 
had begun to diversify in the 2000s, with a rapid increase in the total amount of R&D 
funding that each ministry could disburse (Figure 5.3). In particular, MOST, MOHW and 
MOTIE became the leading ministries for biotechnology and drug R&D support among 
10 relevant ministries. 
 
Figure 5.3: Amount of drug R&D funding support by ministry 
Source: Data from KHIDI Survey reports (2005, 2008, 2009) 
The other administrative change has to do with the establishment of the research council 
system. In 1998 under the national effort for the transition, the governance structure of 
GRIs was reformed to a research council system; this came alongside a change in the 
incentive structure to the PBS. The research council system was introduced to broaden 
administrative autonomy and reorient the mission (Yim and Kim 2005). However, the 
research councils have no authority in the compilation of budgets or in personnel 
management. Thus, GRIs have to deal with a dual administration structure with an on-
going lack of independence and autonomy (Figure 5.4). This structure also shows the 
priority of the umbrella organisations in allocating NRDPs such as GRIs (Kim 2000). 
The following sub-sections address the pattern of policy implementation by the three 
leading ministries in supporting new-drug R&D: MOST, MOHW and MOTIE.  
  
 
                                                          
124  Specifically, the domestic firms accumulated the basic experience in upstream research through 
participating NRDPs established by MOST (e.g., HAN Project and Special R&D programme). At the same 
time, the pharmaceutical firms' drug R&D directly benefited from NRDPs both for process innovation (i.e., 
localising process technologies) and product innovation (e.g., developing IMDs or NCEs) by the Health 
Technology Programme launched by MOHW (Interviews 45, 47, 48 and 52 (K-Pharma)). 
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Figure 5.4: Governance structure of GRIs surrounding new-drug R&D 
Source: Modification from STEPI Report (2008) 
5.4.2 Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
1) Supply pattern of NRDPs: Prioritisation of public research actors  
MOST has acted as the main supplier of NRDPs since the early stage of drug R&D; 61% 
of total drug R&D funding by the government to GRIs (and 49% of funding to universities) 
was disbursed by MOST in 2004.125 The GRIs directly administered by MOST and a few 
privileged universities have been prioritised in receiving NRDPs.  
For example, all eight Frontier Programmes, the largest NRDPs related to biotechnology 
and drug R&D, have been allocated to the two umbrella GRIs, KRIBB and KIST, and two 
universities (Table 5.4).126 Each programme operates a number of projects. KRIBB took 
charge of three Frontier Programmes, and the other two were led by KIST. 
Overall, the priority of GRIs in NRDPs has been maintained; there has also been an 
increasing proportion of universities in the last two decades. On the one hand, this 
pattern of R&D support is justifiable in that the main goal of the ministry is to strengthen 
upstream research capability; hence, it is perhaps inevitable that public research 
organisations will dominate. On the other, the high proportion of NRDPs that go to a 
relatively small number of public institutes and universities implies the relative exclusion 
of other public research and industrial actors.   
 
                                                          
125 They provided 308 projects under 31 NRDPs for drug R&D in 2008 and many programmes involved are 
mission-oriented led by GRIs (e.g., Frontier Programmes and Biotechnology R&D Group for biologics and 
organs). 
126 KRIBB: Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology (since 1990), KIST: Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (since 1966). Frontier Programme: the NRDP invest about US$10 million every 
year for each programme for 10 years. Another one has been led by the Korea Research Institute of 
Chemical Technology (KRICT) under MOTIE. 
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Table 5.4: Frontier R&D programmes for biotechnology 
Programme Programme leader Period 
Intelligent Microsystems KIST  1999~2010 
Functional Analysis of Human 
Genomics 
KRIBB  1999~2010 
Plant Diversity Research KRIBB 2000~2010 
Crop Functional Genomics Seoul National University  2001~2011 
Biological Modulators Research KRICT (Chemical technology) 2001~2011 
Stem Cell Research Yonsei University Medical Centre 2002~2012 
Microbial Genomics and Applications KRIBB 2002~2012 
Functional Proteomics KIST 2002~2012 
Brain Research Seoul National University 2003~2013 
Source: Website of each R&D programme 
2) Problems: Limited role of private innovation actors in NRDPs  
The role of private innovation actors has been limited by this administration pattern. In 
2010, only 14% of NRDPs for biotechnology and drug R&D were led by a firm as the 
programme/project leader (NSTC 2010). Private firms, DBFs and pharmaceutical firms 
have mainly participated in the NRDPs as contractors of individual projects under GRIs 
or universities, which, in many cases, serve as programme leaders (see Table 5.5). This 
public actor orientation of NRDPs has, to a large extent, limited the active participation 
of industrial actors in the NRDPs and impeded commercially viable innovation (the PBS 
incentive structure and professor-based selection environment have also contributed to 
this problem).  
For the DBFs, as the main recipients and often the final (sub)contractors of the NRDPs, 
the operational pattern of NRDPs led by MOST has considerably disrupted their R&D 
activities. They have participated in NRDPs with the aim of complementing deficient 
internal R&D funds. However, their original R&D activities are often delayed or disrupted 
by the public actor-centred evaluation system of the NRDP, which privileges publications.  
More specifically, the beneficiary DBFs are forced to produce their R&D products through 
publications (Interviews 5, 8, 12, 17, 20 and 36 (DBF)). DBFs interviewed point out that 
the publication-oriented selection and evaluation criteria do not reflect the characteristics 
of business-oriented scientific research. However, national R&D funds are relatively 
abundant, while investment from the pharmaceutical industry is fairly poor. Given this 
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situation, as many DBFs have still been struggling to survive, they have been eager to 
take part in NRDPs.  
Table 5.5: Projects in the biotechnology-related Frontier Programme broken 
down by programme/project leader  
Programme 
 (Programme leader) 
Universities  
 
GRIs  Industry  
Microbial genomics and 
applications (KRIBB) 
40 projects  
as the project leader 
(in total 151 
participating projects) 
25 (96) 
DBFs - 4  
K-Pharma -1 
Chaebol - 3 (56) 
Functional proteomics 
(KIST) 
75 (75) 20 (20) DBFs - 7 (36) 
Functional analysis of 
human genome  
(KRIBB) 
65 (95) 28 (28) 
DBFs - 4  
K-Pharma -2 
Chaebol- 2 (15) 
Plant diversity research 
(KRIBB) 
91 (165)  37 (58) 
DBFs - 14  
K-Pharma - 2 
Chaebol- 4 (118) 
Stem cell research 
(Seoul National 
University) 
131 (169) 5 (13) 
DBFs - 9  
K-Pharma - 3 (50) 
Total number of projects 402 (655) 115 (215) 
DBFs - 38  
K-Pharma -8 
Chaebol- 11 (265) 
The proportion of main 
projects 
61.3% 53.5% 21.5% 
Source: Data from programme websites and White Papers of the Frontier Programme 2010 and 2012 
This has resulted in the DBFs relying excessively on the NRDPs rather than seeking to 
supply innovation sources (e.g., promising drug candidates) to the pharmaceutical 
industry (Interview 38 (Big Pharma)). This was despite recognising the negative effect of 
public actor-centred, single-mode evaluation (i.e., the focus on publications) on their 
main R&D targets. As a result, while the upstream research performance in NRDPs has 
seemingly been strong, the programmes have undermined private actors’ identity as 
industrial developers (Interview 20 (DBF)). 
For pharmaceutical firms, as noted, there is an increasing need for external innovation 
sources from public upstream research due to weak internal research capability. 
However, even if they feel the project is attractive, they are concerned about becoming 
a sitting target when they join a NRDP because they are required to paying matching 
funds (50%) for project expenditures (Yakup Newspaper, 16/7/2007). Most participants 
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in NRDPs are GRIs and universities with different incentive bases, and the firms fear that 
they might be used only as financial sources for public sector upstream research rather 
than acquiring industrially useful research outcomes and complementing drug R&D costs. 
Firms could also be hesitant to join a NRDP due to the potential for conflict with GRIs 
over the ownership of patents (ibid.).  
In addition, in terms of the industrial potential of public actor-led drug R&D projects, a 
CTO in a leading pharmaceutical company criticised the amateurism of GRIs, which 
often try to develop new drugs on their own (Interview 51 (K-Pharma)).127 He pointed out 
the complexity of commercially viable new-drug R&D compared to upstream research, 
and said that GRIs often fail to consider business dynamics because they are 
overconfident about the potential of academically trendy research topics.128 
Overall, the dominance of public actors in both designing and conducting NRDPs has 
discouraged the active participation of pharmaceutical firms.  
3) Summarising remarks 
On the whole, the NRDPs administered by MOST have focused on biotechnology-based 
upstream research such as understanding biochemical mechanisms and discovering 
new bio-materials. Public innovation actors such as GRIs, universities and DBFs have 
been the main recipients of the various NRDPs administered by MOST. These NRDPs 
have been implemented in line with MOST’s ultimate policy goal of strengthening 
scientific research capability, and thereby contribution to innovation under the 
Biotechnology Promotion Act. However, in spite of the acknowledgement of the 
necessary role of pharmaceutical firms in national drug R&D projects (MOST 2006), the 
dominance of public actors in the operational mechanisms of NRDPs has disrupted 
effective relationships with pharmaceutical firms through NRDPs.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127 For example, a recent NRDP, namely the derivation of disease-based drug candidates, with the aim of 
technology transfer of drug candidates to private firms, selected three GRIs (KIST, KRIBB, and KRICT) in 
2007. Although the inter-GRI project leader was scouted from a private firm, LG Life Science, no 
pharmaceutical firm was put in this project as a main subject.  
128 Similarly, the CEO of Crystal Genomics developing NCEs criticised the attempt to directly lead new-drug 
development by GRIs, which have no experience or knowhow of the drug business. 
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5.4.3 Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) 
1) Supply pattern of NRDPs: Supporting firms’ survival and the production of generic 
drugs  
Since the middle of the 1990s, MOHW has increasingly played a role as another main 
supplier of NRDPs; this has led to the diversification of drug R&D support across 
ministries (Figure 5.3).129  
Unlike MOST, MOHW has had a tendency to support industrial-side R&D as well as 
public sector research. The Health Technology Programme launched by MOHW is 
administered by a single umbrella organisation, the Korea Health Industry Development 
Institute (KHIDI), which was established in 1999 to nurture the health industry. In 2004, 
about 70% of the total drug R&D funding to pharmaceutical firms was disbursed by 
MOHW (Trend of Healthcare Technology, 2006). In terms of performance, 83% of new 
drugs developed by domestic firms were partially supported by the NRDPs of MOHW 
(Yeo 2011). 
This Health Technology Programme for drug R&D administered by KHIDI has operated 
in a small-scale manner (i.e., as seed money in widely-fragmented small projects). For 
example, 174 projects in all were selected in 2006 under the Health Technology 
Programme. However, each project was only granted around US$10,000, although two 
clinical trials were granted about US$1 million.130 
In the first round of innovative R&D in the 1990s, this type of operating pattern contributed 
to broad feeding of domestic firms with minimum R&D funding (Interview 35 (DBF)). This 
is due to the greater responsiveness of the Health Technology Programme to demand 
from the industry, as opposed to the mission-oriented, large-scale and public-actor-
supportive NRDPs of MOST. Pharmaceutical firms could submit their own proposals to 
participate in an NRDP, utilising the funding as seed money for a R&D project. This was 
one of the main reasons for the relative balance between supply and demand patterns 
of NRDPs for drug R&D in 1990s.  
Overall, a small-scale but widely distributed Health Technology Programme was 
implemented to support the survival of the domestic pharmaceutical industry as a 
                                                          
129 The diversification of administrative leadership was not a special case for drug R&D, but a general 
institutional change in the country, as we can see from the case of the leadership of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MOIC) for ICT-related NRDPs at that time. 
130 Although, in the changing S&T policy for drug R&D, the size of funding started to increase in the late 
2000s, it is a very recent phenomenon. 
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production base for cheap and high-quality generic drugs, leading to cost savings for the 
NHI (Interviews 14 (Chaebol), 9 and 20 (DBF) and 34 (Big Pharma)).131  
2) Problems: The lack of innovation context in the support to firms’ survival 
While MOHW’s pattern of R&D support was appreciated by the industry, pharmaceutical 
companies have increasingly demanded more active R&D support for new-drug R&D in 
the 2000s. Their needs have become more sophisticated and diversified across the 
various R&D steps, from drug identification to clinical trials, depending on each firm’s 
R&D level (Interview 42 (K-Pharma)). As MOHW has acted as the leading ministry 
providing direct support to pharmaceutical R&D, new demands have been directed to 
MOHW.  
However, MOHW has also failed to meet recent industrial needs. The MOHW’s lack of 
consideration of industrial competitiveness is the main reason for its passive response 
to changing demand patterns of NRDPs. That is, the policy consideration of industrial 
upgrading and innovativeness has been subjugated to the support of the industry within 
the NHI frame. This has been pointed out by both pharmaceutical firms and emerging 
DBFs.  
Although MOHW has recently launched a division for fostering the healthcare 
industry, they have treated the pharmaceutical industry as a simple production 
sector for supplying cheap drugs (for the stable management of the NHI). The 
healthcare sector is a very extensive sector including pharmaceuticals, public 
health service, and so on. They didn't count the pharmaceutical sector as a 
significant industry ... With a lack of industrial mind-set, their R&D support has 
been implemented in dispersed fashion, mainly in line with the efficient production 
of generic drugs. The pricing policy, which is excessively favourable to generic 
drugs, guaranteeing about 80% of the original drugs’ prices, has come to be a 
signal for the domestic firms to discourage new-drug R&D (Interview 34 (Big 
Pharma)).  
In other words, instead of innovation facilitating policy for industrial upgrade, generic-
drugs-supportive policy under the NHI has acted as the only pulling factor from the 
market. In recalling the overall commercial failure of the domestically developed NCEs, 
one interviewee said  
                                                          
131 According to von Tunzelmman’s (2010) term. 
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The government introduced the product patent system very early, and thus 
several domestic companies have developed new drugs. However, the outcome 
of the R&D was not protected in the domestic market due to the generic-drug-
supportive pricing policy and … the KoPI became a crippled industry (Interview 
38 (Big Pharma)).  
Increasing complaints about the absence of industrial policy by the ministry were 
expressed by industrial actors, which sought to transfer the jurisdiction of the Korea 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (KPMA) from MOHW to MOTIE in the 
expectation of more active industrial support by MOTIE (Daily Pharm, 11/5/2011).  
Similar criticisms were identified by the biotechnology sector. The CEO of the first DBF 
in Korea, Bioneer, pointed out the lack of industrial mind-set in MOHW (Interview 9 
(DBF)): 
The administrative leadership of biotechnology in Korea has belonged to MOHW 
because of the juridical right of regulation and approval. MOHW’s problem is that 
it has no experience in fostering an industrial sector, and thus its mind-set is 
different from that of MOTIE, which has spearheaded the government-led 
industrialisation of Korea. Regulation and approval systems have been formed 
with little consideration of the industrial level and competitiveness. 
Although his remarks can be regarded simply as a kind of complaint about the 
biotechnology business in Korea, there is a notable absence of consideration of industrial 
innovation in the ministry that has also been widely criticised by the pharmaceutical 
industry. However, at the same time, it should be noted that the main policy goal of 
MOHW is the stable management of the public health service. 
3) Summarising remarks 
Overall, the R&D funds from MOHW have been used largely as seed money, not for 
industrial innovation, but to support the producers of generic drugs for the efficient 
management of the NHI. As a positive outcome, the KoPI’s chemistry-based synthetic 
drug R&D was able to get the support to upgrade production capability. However, with 
the lack of industrial policies, R&D support from MOHW has not met the industry’s 
evolving demand for NRDPs, such as more large-scale and market-reflective R&D 
support for the development of innovative drugs.132 
                                                          
132 The author does not disagree with the fundamental role of MOHW as the regulator of the public health 
sector. However, on the other hand, in terms of the sustainability of the semi-public industry, there must be 
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5.4.4 Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) 
1) Supply pattern: Emerging biotechnology-oriented industrial support 
MOTIE began to support the country’s fledgling biotechnology industry on the basis of 
the Plan for Fostering Biotechnology Industry in 1994. In 2001, just after the recovery 
from the Asian financial crisis, the government chose the biotechnology industry (referred 
to as ‘BT’) to be one of six next-generation growth engines (HeraldBiz, 17/1/2013). Since 
then, MOTIE has expanded its administrative scope. 
In line with this, MOTIE’s policy focus has been mainly to bring up DBFs. It started a 
certification system for so-called ‘bio venture’ companies, and the certified venture firms 
have benefited from both participation in NRDPs and tax breaks (Table 5.6).133 It also 
supported the construction of regional biotechnology clusters, although the policy has 
caused duplication of R&D investment (e.g., techno-parks and technopolises).134 That is, 
MOTIE is fostering biotechnology start-ups to further its ultimate policy goal, the 
industrialisation of biotechnology.  
Table 5.6: Number of new DBFs by year 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of 
new DBFs 
19 14 27 36 71 233 200 
Source: DBFs Survey by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy in 2001 
MOTIE is now broadening its supportive scope, mainly focusing on commercial 
development. Several large-scale NRDPs have been launched, such as the Bio-Star 
Project in 2005 and the New Growth Engine Projects in 2009 (Table 5.7). The Bio-Star 
Project was established to develop biotechnology-based commercial drugs (i.e., 
innovative biologics, biosimilars, stem cell therapy and converging technologies between 
biotechnology and ICTs).135 
                                                          
a certain role as an institutional promoter of developing new drugs by local companies for a cheaper and 
effective new drug supply for the people. Without the existence of local new drugs, the market dominance 
by a small number of Big Pharma firms would continue. Many developing countries are already facing many 
negative effects of this dominance, such as import cost, lack of appropriate drugs for locally common 
diseases, and further deficit of the national health system. 
133 Many leading DBFs were established in the period, such as Viromed (1996, drug R&D), Macrogen (1997, 
genomic R&D), and Crystal Genomics (2000, drug R&D). Bioneer, Viromed and Crystal Genomics have 
been published by the preferential system of a company having core technologies without proving the record 
of market performance by first registering in the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) 
in 2005, while Macrogen was the first IPO company as DBF in 2000. 
134 It is now estimated that a total of 34 bio-clusters are now being operated, mostly by regional governments, 
and the duplication of investment has been criticised (Kim, 2011). 
135 It, on average, supports about US$1 million annually for five years based on the annual evaluation system 
and matching fund style. 
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In terms of the authority in charge of drug R&D, a division administrating the 
biotechnology industry was first articulated in 1998 as a division of the chemical and 
biological industry under the life industry. In 2011, MOTIE established a new division of 
bio-health that was responsible for strengthening the promotion of biotechnology 
industrialisation and medical service-related industries in earnest.136 This indicates an 
expansion of the ministry’s administrative scope in the industrialisation of biotechnology 
beyond the chemical industry, with increasing R&D investment. 
Table 5.7: Main fields of the major R&D programmes by MOTIE  
Name of NRDP Main technological fields supported 
Bio-Star 
∙ Innovative biologics – Antibody, stem cell and gene therapy  
∙ Partly NCEs and phytomedicines (since 2008) 
New Growth Engine 
∙ Antibody drugs, stem cell therapy, gene therapy drugs (Core-
tech) 
∙ Commercialisation of biosimilars and their export 
(Infrastructure) 
∙ Biotechnology based contract research organisation (CRO) and 
contract manufacturing organisation (CMO), production base of 
bio-drugs 
∙ Support for the clinical trial base for bio-drugs 
Source: Various data sources 
2) Problems: Capability in implementing industrial policy in the science-based 
industries 
However, while MOTIE has focused on the industrialisation of emerging biotechnology 
in the past decade, the established, chemical-synthesis-based pharmaceutical industry 
has been barely comprehended by the ministry’s promotion of biotechnology-oriented 
commercialisation support. That is, the overall policy pattern of MOTIE toward emerging 
biotechnology in practice hardly considers the role of the established pharmaceutical 
industry for biotechnology industrialisation.  
MOTIE has been drawn to support emerging biotechnology and its 
industrialisation. Their focus on commercialisation was a step in the right direction, 
given the upstream research-oriented support by MOST. However, MOTIE has 
hardly recognised the importance of the pharmaceutical industry as the final gate 
for biotechnology industrialisation... (Interview 34 (Big Pharma)).  
                                                          
136 In this line, MOTIE started to gradually comprehend the development of the phytomedicines and NCEs, 
in keeping with the new biotechnology-oriented industrial policy.  
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This poses another risk that national resources will be overly concentrated on the 
emerging new technologies that have a high degree of uncertainty in terms of both 
technology and market.  
Although in the long-term view, biological drugs will definitely supplant the 
present chemistry-based drugs, the latter type of drugs are still far more dominant 
in the pharmaceutical market, and this trend will continue for a long time. However, 
in spite of that technological stability and the regulatory environment of biological 
drugs, even biosimilars, is still estimated to be opaque, the government seems to 
deliver their institutional efforts only to biotechnology (Interview 42 (K-Pharma)).  
In reality, since 2010, biosimilars (and the stem-cell business) have (re)gained 
governmental attention as the most promising biotechnology businesses. Samsung 
Biologics was selected as the main player for developing biosimilars under the New 
Economic Growth Smart Project in 2009, despite the absence of any previous industrial 
experience in the area. In 2011, the country approved a novel stem cell therapy, followed 
by two more stem cell therapies in 2012, although concerns about their safety have been 
constant. Celltrion has been the largest company listed on the Korea Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) since 2009, even though it has not shown clear profit 
realisation of its business model in biosimilars. The company acquired the world’s first 
approval of its monoclonal antibody biosimilar in Korea in 2012.  
Related to this, interviewees who conduct chemical drug R&D were sceptical of the 
commercial possibility of stem cell-based therapy in the short- and medium-term.137 In 
addition, they regard the industrial support of biosimilars with the aim of taking global 
market leadership through mass production as a ‘policy bet’ due to technological 
instability, an immature market (only a few biosimilars had launched as of 2012) and 
regulatory uncertainty.  
3) Summarising remarks 
On the whole, MOTIE has actively driven the industrialisation of emerging biotechnology 
by launching development-oriented NRDPs, fostering DBFs and attracting Chaebol to 
the new industrial area. However, in spite of these active efforts in biotechnology, the 
incumbent pharmaceutical industry was hardly included in MOTIE’s policy 
implementation. The reason lies in MOTIE’s misunderstanding of the role of the 
established pharmaceutical industry as the commercial channel when they fostered the 
                                                          
137 Among them, one of most pessimistic views was the impossibility of the ‘real’ commercialisation of stem 
cell therapy within 10 years. 
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upstream research-based biotechnology business. At the same time, the established 
pharmaceutical industry has been regarded as the juridical right of MOHW. 
Table 5.8: Inter-ministerial comparison of institutional momentum  
 MOST  MOHW  MOTIE 
Policy goal 
Scientific capability  
as innovation source 
Sustaining stable NHI  
for public health  
Biotechnology as next 
economic growth 
engine  
Fundamental 
law 
Biotechnology 
Promotion Act 
(1983) 
Health Technology 
Promotion Act (1995) 
Biotechnology 
Promotion Act (1994) 
Technological 
focus  
∙ Upstream research  ∙ Efficient production  
∙ Pre/ clinical trial  
∙ Clinical development 
Main recipients 
∙ GRIs and 
universities 
∙ DBFs 
∙ Universities, GRIs  
∙ Pharmaceutical firms  
∙ GRIs  
∙ Chaebol and DBFs 
Role practiced  
Biotechnology-
oriented public 
research support  
Focus on survival 
support of generic drug 
producers 
Biotechnology-
oriented development 
support 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on various data sources 
5.4.5 Summary of the ministerial role  
The three leading ministries involved in drug R&D have reinforced their administrative 
leadership to further each ministry’s own goal (Table 5.8): for MOHW, developing high 
quality generic drugs to ensure the stable management of NHI; for MOST, bolstering the 
scientific research capability of public primary actors in biotechnology; and for MOTIE, 
supporting the industrialisation of biotechnology.  
On the one hand, the inter-ministerial diversification of R&D programmes and the 
ministries’ different policies make sense, given their different goals. However, in the view 
of the KoPI, no ministry has directly met the changing demand patterns of NRDPs, even 
though the three ministries have strengthened national resource input to drug R&D and 
its industrialisation in the category of biotechnology.  
5.5 Effect of Policy Dynamics on Drug R&D Practices 
The start of this section traces the outcomes of the problematic operational mechanism 
of NRDPs surrounding new-drug R&D (Sub-section 5.5.1). It then briefly reinterprets the 
operational mechanisms of NRDPs in view of exploratory learning (Sub-section 5.5.2). It 
implies a mismatch between the institutional revisions and the nature of exploratory 
learning.  
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5.5.1 Expressed outcomes of the policy dynamics  
1) Overlapping R&D investment and high success rates of research projects  
Two related phenomena caused by the operational mechanism of NRDPs are over-
competition to acquire more support among public innovation actors and overlapping 
NRDP investment. 
As seen, the PBS-based incentive structure has led public actors to acquire more 
projects in a risk-averse fashion. It has forced public actors to propose many similar 
research projects within a few popular research areas. Under the prioritisation of 
umbrella research organisations by the ministries, these projects were launched without 
a thorough investigation of dual R&D investment. An officer of the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance (MOSF) expressed the difficulty of the budgeting involved in biotechnology 
and new-drug R&D:  
Each ministry [MOHW, MOST and MOTIE] asks for a budget allocation for own 
biotechnology investment every year… Although we recognise it is overlapping 
investment, we inevitably accept their requests to a certain extent because of the 
sectoral speciality (Yakup Newspaper, 23/10/2001). 
In 2004, the government tried to clarify the division of R&D support between ministries; 
for example, MOHW dealt with clinical trials and MOST dealt with upstream research. 
However, soon after the inter-ministerial coordination agreement, each ministry again 
began to compete in launching drug R&D projects (Interviews 2 (university) and 20 
(DBF)]. Ministries have continued to expand their administrative power in the enlarging 
biotechnology and new-drug R&D sectors.  
NSTC has acknowledged the overlapping investment of national R&D funds in drug R&D; 
at one point, 21 public institutes (mostly GRIs and universities) were found to be 
conducting similar drug R&D projects (Yonhap News, 1/8/2011).138 At the same time, it 
should be noted that most NRDPs, designed to promote innovative research, were 
counted as successful projects. As noted, in 2010 about 95% of all NRDPs were reported 
to have resulted in the successful completion of their projects. This indicates a high level 
of risk aversion in conducting research projects or choosing research projects in the first 
place (See Sub-section 5.3.1.2). 
                                                          
138  The National Assembly Budget Office pointed out the seriousness of an overlap in NRDPs of 
biotechnology-based drug R&D between ministries as one of the representative cases of dual investment 
(NABO 2009). 
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2) Tension between industrial communities surrounding R&D support 
The operation pattern of NRDPs also triggered competition between DBFs and 
pharmaceutical firms in acquiring more national R&D support. DBFs have, to a large 
extent, relied on governmental support for their survival rather than utilising 
pharmaceutical companies. Meanwhile, the demand for R&D support from 
pharmaceutical firms has also rapidly increased due to their weak financial base.  
While the tension between the two industrial communities had long been latent under 
the rapid increase in national R&D investment in biotechnology, with its some benefits 
for pharmaceutical firms, it eventually came to a head in 2011 with the re-emergence of 
the industrial policy for promoting the pharmaceutical firms’ new-drug R&D, the 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Act. The conflict was exposed through the controversy 
between relevant industrial communities.  
While the promotion act had been one of the main institutional demands by the 
pharmaceutical industry since the 1990s (Interview 42 (K-Pharma)), for the 
biotechnology communities that concentrate on upstream research, the policy was 
regarded as a potential threat that could undermine national support for biotechnology 
R&D due to the limited national R&D funds. In line with this, the Biotechnology 
Association of Korea, the largest industrial association of DBFs (under MOTIE), came 
out against the act (Health Korea News, 11/3/2009). The Biotechnology Association 
argued that the Biotechnology Promotion Act had already been in place for the last 
decade as the comprehensive supportive policy for the industry, and that the new 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Act would overlap with the Biotechnology Promotion Act 
(ibid.). Moreover, it claimed that the Pharmaceutical Promotion Act should be 
coordinated by other concerned ministries, not only led by MOHW (ibid.).  
The Korea Drug Research Association (KDRA) refuted this, arguing that the 
Biotechnology Promotion Act was meant to facilitate R&D activities while the new act 
aimed to strengthen comprehensive industrial competitiveness, such as by giving 
preferential treatment in NHI drug pricing to firms with high R&D intensity. The KDRA 
further demanded more transparency in the performance relationship between R&D 
funding support and industrial outcomes under the Biotechnology Promotion Act (Pharm 
21, 11/3/2009). In particular, the KDRA pointed out that, in fact, national R&D funds had 
been limitedly flowing into the pharmaceutical industry under the Biotechnology 
Promotion Act (Interview 42 (K-Pharma)). 
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Underlying the tension seems to be a longstanding distrust between pharmaceutical 
firms and DBFs that disrupts active R&D collaboration. The pharmaceutical firms have 
tended to depreciate the value of research outcomes of DBFs and public actors due to 
the need for further development with large-scale investment, while the DBFs and public 
actors have tended to exaggerate the commercial potentiality of the research outcomes.  
Moreover, in the absence of a real industrial policy on the part of MOHW, there have 
been increasing complaints by the industry that the jurisdiction of the Korea 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (KPMA) should be transferred from MOHW 
to MOTIE, since MOTIE prioritises industrial support. By doing so, once KPMA becomes 
an umbrella industrial association of MOTIE, the industry can expect more industrial 
support (Daily Pharm, 11/5/2011). At present, it seems to compete for institutional 
leadership to influence the direction of biotechnology and new-drug R&D support under 
the different jurisdictions of each ministry (MOHW – KPMA and MOTIE – Biotechnology 
Association of Korea).139 
On the whole, these cases show that the problematic allocation and management of 
NRDPs has caused intensified competition among industrial actors that in theory should 
have been collaborating on successful drug discovery and its commercialisation.  
5.5.2 The policy dynamics in view of exploratory learning 
As a result, effective exploratory learning seems to have been difficult under the 
operational mechanisms of NRDPs. A publication-oriented and risk-averse tendency 
among public innovation actors and DBFs has become common in conducting NRDPs 
under the PBS. The professor-led selection environment has tended to prioritise their 
research interests in upstream biotechnology research, which might be better suited to 
academic publication than innovation viability. Moving forward, the fragmentation and 
competition of administrative leadership in new-drug R&D and biotechnology across the 
three leading ministries has also failed to link upstream, biotechnology-centred R&D 
support to pharmaceutical firms’ industrial R&D. In other words, exploratory learning 
among public innovation actors and inter-organisational exploratory learning have been 
disturbed under the current policy dynamics. The effect of these policy dynamics on 
innovation actors’ exploratory learning will be discussed in depth in Chapter 8. 
                                                          
139 Korea Biomedicine Industry Association: a new industrial society approved by KFDA. It consists of 
several Chaebol affiliates and operates a biotechnology based drug business (e.g., CJ, Samsung Electronics, 
SK Chemical), several leading DBFs (e.g., Celltrion and Viromed), and a few multinational companies (e.g., 
GSK and Sanofi Pasteur). 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined the effect of S&T policies on innovation actors’ new-drug 
R&D by analysing the operational mechanisms of NRDPs in view of exploratory learning, 
which was conceptualised as the key mode of technological learning for new-drug R&D.  
First, the analysis found that the PBS, as the main incentive system of NRDPs, has 
caused grave side effects on R&D practices, such as an overemphasis on short-term 
and quantitative research performance (e.g., the number of publications). While the 
macro-level landscape of national S&T policies is oriented to innovation generation, the 
micro-level evaluation system has driven institutional contradictions in promoting 
research for innovation generation among public organisations. 
Second, the selection environment of NRDPs, which is dominated by academics and 
civil servants, a closed policy network, has created a reinforcing mechanism for the 
publication-oriented incentive pattern in upstream biotechnology research, with little 
consideration for industrial potential. 
Third, the administrative pattern of NRDPs showed that the three leading ministries 
(MOST, MOHW and MOTIE) have rapidly increased support to the biotechnology 
industry, including new-drug R&D. However, the ministries are uncoordinated and have 
limited administrative ability to interlink their various NRDPs under their different policy 
goals.  
On the whole, this chapter showed that the revised S&T policies aimed at innovation 
generation are defective in promoting innovative R&D. In view of exploratory learning, 
these policies can be seen as inhibiting risk-taking and collaborative R&D for industrially 
meaningful new-drug development. That is, the operational mechanisms of NRDPs 
seem to convert ample resource investment and learning effort into vague industrial 
performance.  
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Chapter 6: Firms’ Exploratory Learning in New-drug R&D 
New drug development itself, in retrospective view, became the 
ultimate goal of the new drug R&D by the domestic firms. Their first new 
drugs can be regarded as the preparation process for the real new drug 
R&D which just started nowadays, not as a sincere new drug R&D with 
thorough development strategy (Dr Ku-chan Kim, the science 
ambassador of MSD). 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates Korean pharmaceutical firms' new-drug R&D activities over the 
past 25 years, with the goal of understanding the exploratory mode of technological 
learning that is performed by latecomer firms. The investigation is based on the 
conceptual framework of a firm-level learning pattern transformation that allows a 
company to develop more innovative drugs beyond imitative generics. Ultimately, this 
chapter argues that new-drug R&D itself does not guarantee successful catch-up if a 
firm’s intensive learning does not reflect the key characteristics of the exploratory mode 
of technological learning and changed competition environment in the transitional phase. 
As noted in the methodological chapter (Chapter 3, Sub-sections 3.5.1.2 and 3.4.2), the 
empirical analysis has drawn on new-drug R&D projects of nine Korean firms. The new-
drug R&D projects were analysed across two transitional rounds. The first round of new-
drug R&D, which spans a period from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, consists of a 
series of early projects that failed to commercialise, and some later successful projects 
that created the case firms’ first NCEs. The second round of new-drug R&D projects 
includes recent projects that started from the middle 2000s in an effort to reconfigure the 
previous new-drug R&D pattern.  
For both rounds of new-drug R&D, the empirical analysis is reported in two stages: a 
description of a specific firm or project case, and then an overall presentation of other 
aggregated cases to support the representative case. This approach is used to avoid the 
risk of over-complex description. Moreover, data on new-drug pipelines in about 30 
pharmaceutical firms are partly drawn upon to confirm the drug-R&D pattern in the KoPI.  
Prior to the main analysis, the present technological level and market position of the case 
firms are presented (Section 6.2). Section 6.3 identifies the R&D process, strategy and 
marketing pattern in the first-round new-drug R&D. The subsequent section (6.4) 
investigates the case firms’ recent reconfiguration of new-drug R&D that was triggered 
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by previous commercial failure of their first new drugs. Section 6.5 determines the 
common features of the latecomer firms’ new-drug R&D patterns in view of exploratory 
learning. Section 6.6 summarises the chapter. 
6.2 Market Position and Technological Level  
This section briefly presents the market position and overall technological level achieved 
by the case firms, and then recalls a question that underlies this chapter.  
Domestic market position 
Most case firms have remained in the top ten in terms of sales size over the transitional 
period since 1987, after the introduction of the product patent system and the reform of 
NHI in 2000 (Table 6.1). Dong-a has maintained first place for more than 40 years, since 
1967. Green Cross (GC) has grown based on biological products such as blood plasma 
and vaccines. As an affiliate of a Chaebol, LG Group, LG Life Sciences (LGLS) has been 
the most R&D-intensive pharmaceutical company until very recently. Hanmi rose rapidly 
to second position in 2006, from just around 15th in the 1990s, leading the generic drug 
boom in the 2000s. In contrast, two other case firms, Dongwha and Ilyang, have declined 
sharply to around 20th in the 2000s, from 4th and 5th, respectively, in the 1990s.140 
Table 6.1: Case firms’ sales ranking between 1985 and 2011 
Companies 2011 2000 1985 
Dong-a 
Green Cross 
Yuhan 
Hanmi 
CKD 
JW 
LG Life Sciences 
Dongwha 
Ilyang 
1 
2 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
13 
18 
1 
3 
6 
7 
2 
5 
- 
8 
11 
1 
5 
6 
18 (in 1995) 
2 
8 
- 
3 
7 
Source: Based on KPMA (2005)  
Technological level achieved  
All nine case firms have accumulated innovative (technological) capability to some 
degree by developing new drugs over the past two decades. Their technological level 
                                                          
140 Other firms, Yuhan, CKD, Joongwae (JW), have stayed within the top ten sales companies over the 
period.  
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can be estimated approximately through the present pipelines of new drugs that they 
operate and their link to the global market.141 
On the one hand, the case firms have levelled up the technological novelty of new drugs. 
All of the case firms (except Hanmi) have succeeded in licensing out their NCEs to Big 
Pharma, and have operated several pipelines of new molecular entities (NMEs), 
including both NCEs and biologics (Table 6.2). Factive by LGLS acquired an NDA from 
the US FDA in 2002. This makes Korea only the second non-Western country, after 
Japan, to succeed in acquiring an NDA from the US FDA for an NCE developed in-house; 
this reflects the attainment of a certain level of advanced technological capability.  
Table 6.2: New-drug pipelines of case firms in 2012 
Company 
No. of  
NME pipelines 
No. of  
out-licensed 
NMEs 
No. of 
overseas 
clinical trials 
No. of 
IMDs 
Alliance with  
Big Pharma 
Dong-a 
Green Cross 
Yuhan  
Hanmi  
CKD          
JW    
LGLS 
Dongwha 
Ilyang  
20  
11  
15 
11  
7 
5  
17  
8  
2 
3 
1 
4 
3 (DDS) 
2 
1 
8 
3 
3 
4 
5 
0 
5 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
2 
0 
6 
11 
6 
10 
0 
0 
2 
GSK (share) 
- 
- 
MSD (sales) 
- 
Chugai (JV) 
- 
- 
- 
Source: Author’s elaboration from various data about the companies. NME: new molecular entities, including 
NCEs. DDS: drug delivery system. JV: joint venture 
The case firms are now approaching the level of ‘first-in-class’ NCEs, beyond ’me-too’ 
and ‘me-better’ NCEs (see Figure 3.4 for an explanation of the technological level of new 
drugs). For example, CKD, GC and JW are now conducting clinical development for first-
in-class NCEs in the US. LGLS and Dongwha have licensed out first-in-class NCEs to 
the Big Pharmas (Gilead in 2007 and P&G in 2008), although their clinical development 
ceased in further clinical trials.  
On the other hand, they have also maintained imitative drug development that falls at a 
level between generic drugs and NCEs in terms of technological level, such as 
incrementally modified drugs (IMDs or supergenerics) (Table 6.2), as they are a major 
source of market profits.  
The relationship between technological achievement and market performance 
                                                          
141 The case firms’ technological effort, of course, has increased in parallel with the reinforcement of R&D 
personnel (Appendix 9). 
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One thing to note is that commercial performance of their technological effort seems to 
have stagnated in both the domestic and the global market. To begin with, their long-run 
new-drug R&D has been poorly compensated by the domestic market.142 Only a handful 
of case firms have been successful commercially, such as Dong-a. Moreover, as of 2012, 
no case firm has succeeded in satisfactorily penetrating the markets in developed 
countries such as the US and the EU, with either its own new drugs or generic drugs.143 
Herein, one question is raised about the gap between the firms’ technological level and 
their (domestic and global) market position. As shown above, if one looks only at the 
technological dimension of the transition, they have reached a certain level of technology 
that has created at least a minimal level of innovation, such as developing NCEs and 
IMDs.  
However, the question of why the KoPI is still struggling with commercial failure of new 
drugs remains unanswered. The following firm-level analysis focuses on answering the 
question through the following two chapters.  
                                                          
142  For example, Yuhan (the second-biggest domestic company) and LGLS (the most R&D-intensive 
domestic company) have been stuck in a rut in their R&D pipelines due to a series of failures in the 
development stages. Others, such as Dongwha and Ilyang, have seen their market ranking for long-term 
innovative R&D considerably reduce. 
143 Essentially, most case firms intending to enter the global drug market focused only on technology export 
of their research outcomes (i.e., drug candidates), but this has proven largely unsuccessful. However, as a 
very recent phenomenon, the case firms seem to be making strenuous efforts to exploit the global market in 
a more strategic manner in terms of both export products and export regions. That is, they are now seeking 
to recoup their R&D investments from the global market. This movement has received additional impetus 
from recent change toward an unfriendly market environment for generic drugs in the KoPI. This has pushed 
the case firms to expand into overseas markets. 
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6.3 The First Round of New-drug R&D  
This section examines the case firms' first round of new-drug R&D, which consists of the 
initial drug development projects and the later successful projects in which they 
developed their first NCEs.  
The early projects are briefly discussed to present an overview of the difficulties the case 
firms faced as latecomers when they attempted new-drug R&D for the first time. New-
drug projects of Dong-a are drawn upon, as this firm was the earliest domestic entrant 
to new-drug R&D; this is followed by aggregated supportive data from other case firms’ 
projects (Sub-section 6.3.1). Next, the projects that produced the first marketed NCEs 
are analysed with regard to R&D process, strategy and marketing. As these were the 
first in-house developed drugs in these case firms, they had to go through the entire 
cycle of new-drug development, from drug discovery to approval and marketing (Sub-
section 6.3.2).  
Through this analysis, this section identifies the major challenges in conducting the 
exploratory mode of technological learning, and explores the possibility of overcoming 
those challenges. 
6.3.1 Initial challenges to new drug development (after 1987) 
Three NCE projects by Dong-a that failed to reach the market, and the overall failure of 
NCE projects by other case firms, are presented to analyse the barriers in exploratory 
learning that the latecomer firms faced in their first attempts at new-drug R&D (Sub-
sections 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2).  
6.3.1.1 The case of Dong-a 
Dong-a directed technological learning away from process development toward product 
innovation after 1987. Prior to 1987, Dong-a only focused on accumulating production 
capability in manufacturing generic drugs and APIs. The company then started to 
conduct new-drug R&D through focusing on chemical compounds (derivatives of known 
lead compounds) and phytomedicines (Table 6.3). In particular, the chemical 
compounds research was intended to develop “improved” NCEs in terms of efficacy and 
safety, rather than immediately trying to develop unknown lead compounds. 
a. The first new drug projects focusing on upstream research 
After the introduction of the product patent system in 1987, Dong-a launched a new 
project for developing NCEs. The company chose two clinical areas, the circulatory 
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system and antibiotics, based on their prior knowledge base of cardiac stimulation, 
antibiotics and anti-cancer drugs. In the former, Dong-a picked up ARB (angiotensin-II 
type beta blocker), which was of global interest at the time; ARB is a peptide responsible 
for the constriction of blood vessels and hypertension. However, the company ended the 
project once superior rival materials were presented (Interview 48 (K-Pharma)).  
Table 6.3: Dong-a’s patenting trends, broken into technological focal areas 
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 
NCEs (derivatives and lead compounds) 
   13 
Phytomedicine  
   4 
IMDs (DDS, composition, structure) 
   
9 
Process development 3 10 21 26 
Biotechnology 
   20 
Total number of patents 3 10 21 72  
Source: Author’s elaboration from Korea patent office patent data. 
Dong-a launched a research team to develop a carbapenem antibiotic (DA-1131) and an 
anthracycline anti-cancer drug (DA-125). Necessary prior knowledge bases for new-drug 
R&D, such as advanced synthetic technologies and screening skills, were accumulated 
through overseas training in the 1980s.144 However, the two projects both failed in the 
preclinical and clinical stages. In particular, DA-125 was patented in 1990 and was 
believed to be the first commercial NCE developed in Korea. However, the development 
failed in the phase II clinical trial due to side effects and tolerability issues. The company 
finally gave up on the project in 2003. 
b. Shift from upstream research to midstream research 
We have continuously failed in developing NCEs and thus, entering the 1990s, 
the R&D strategy for developing own drugs was switched away from the trial on 
screening and developing innovative lead compounds towards focusing on the 
further development of outsourced drug candidates. This outsourcing strategy 
was devised because we recognised a problem: upstream research was not able 
                                                          
144 In the previous project for developing a phytomedicine in 1983 as their first new drug project, they were 
confronted with technological deficiency in testing and validating the effectiveness. To solve these 
technological problems, in 1985, Dong-a sent a researcher (Yung-moon Choi) to a Japanese pharmaceutical 
company, Otsuka, to train in HTS (high-throughput screening) technology for a year, and restarted the 
research the following year. 
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to produce any commercial value at all. Then, we decided to focus on R&D that 
can directly create market profit (the CTO of Dong-a) 
With realistic recognition of its limited research capability in the upstream stages, Dong-
a tried to focus on the intermediate stages of validation research and the clinical 
development of the outsourced drug candidates, skipping the upstream research stage. 
Although new types of technological capability were needed for the intermediate stage 
(e.g., optimising the outsourced candidate materials, such as testing toxicity and drug-
likeness, and preclinical-related technologies), the midstream technologies were 
relatively easier (tangible and definite) to master in a shorter time than those of drug 
discovery (Interviews 48 and 49 (K-Pharma)). 
In the outsourcing strategy, one NCE pipeline was launched: a non-narcotic analgesic, 
DA-5018, originally developed by a GRI as a G-7 project by MOST. The preclinical and 
clinical development was conducted by Dong-a partly supported by MOHW for domestic 
clinical trials. At the same time, Dong-a also licensed out a drug candidate to Stiefel (now 
an affiliate of GSK) for multinational clinical trials in 1999. However, the project was 
ultimately dropped in the second clinical phase in 2006 due to toxicity issues.  
All initial NCE projects that were launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s failed to 
reach the commercialisation stage due to an overall lack of technological capability in 
the upstream research and downstream development stages. Although there was a 
successful phytomedicine project, developing a phytomedicine does not require full 
upstream research capability due to the pre-existence of a natural plant as a drug 
candidate. 
6.3.1.2 Learning by failure 
Other case companies also embarked upon new-drug R&D for coping with the product 
patent system. By entering into new-drug R&D under the partial support of the NRDPs, 
case firms were able to accumulate initial stages of upstream research capability and 
distribute the risk of R&D investment to the upstream research (Interviews 45 and 52 (K-
Pharma)). However, the initial projects, which were conducted between the late 1980s 
and 1990s, mostly failed to reach NDA (Table 6.4). From the viewpoint of technological 
capability building, two perspectives on the failed R&D projects can be pointed out.  
On the one hand, these failures can be attributed to the absolute lack of competency 
(i.e., the amount of R&D resources) and technological capability across most stages of 
new-drug development, from upstream research (i.e., drug identification) to downstream 
development (i.e., clinical trials). 
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On the other hand, the initial trials to modify existing NCEs (i.e., the development of 
derivatives) and validate them pre-clinically allowed the latecomers to establish 
midstream research processes for new-drug development (Interview 42 (K-Pharma)). 
The midstream research processes was almost unnecessary in the previous production 
stage of copied drugs. As a result, learning by failure led to the accumulation of beginner-
level innovative capability for further technological exploration. 
Table 6.4: Trials to develop NCEs in the initial stage of new-drug R&D145 
Case firms 
Clinical indication of         
new-drug development 
Projects launched 
(* : Support through NRDPs) 
Result  
Dong-a 
 
 
 
Yuhan 
CKD 
 
 
JW 
 
 
Ilyang 
 
 
Dongwha 
∙ Circulatory system 
∙ Antibiotics 
∙ Anti-cancer 
∙ Analgesic 
∙ Liver disease 
∙ AIDS  
∙ Antibiotics 
∙ Anti-cancer 
∙ Antivirus 
∙ Arrhythmia 
∙ Anti Thrombin 
∙ Peripheral vascular 
∙ Anti-cancer 
∙ Liver disease 
∙ Antibiotics 
∙ Hepatitis B 
∙ Anti-cancer 
∙ An ARB 
∙ DA-1131* 
∙ DA-125* 
∙ DA-5018* 
∙ YH-439* 
∙ CRB-405, 
∙ CRB-529 
∙ CRB-401 
∙ NP-77A 
∙ KCB-328 
∙ AT-1258 and AT-1340 
∙ BO-V-2* 
∙ KI-30606* 
∙ G009* 
∙ DW-116* 
∙ DW-471 
∙ DW-2282 
∙Failed 
∙Failed 
∙Failed 
∙Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
∙ Failed 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from various data about the companies 
6.3.2 The first new drug - R&D process and strategy  
After the series of failures of new-drug projects, the case firms, finally succeeded in 
developing their own NCEs for the first time. As noted, analysing the first successful 
projects helped identify the obstacles to latecomers’ exploratory learning and the 
possibility of overcoming these obstacles, especially as the projects show the entire 
process of new-drug development, from drug discovery to commercialisation. The key 
barriers to understand are those faced by the case firms when, as latecomers, they rose 
to the challenge of new-drug development, a high-value market segment dominated by 
Big Pharma. 
                                                          
145 Other firms - Hanmi: launched a new drug R&D project from the late 1990s, GC: biological products 
based company, LGLS: not identified as a research unit of LG Chemical in the 1990s. 
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In total, seven NCEs were developed by the case firms. Among them, four projects will 
be examined in this analysis: Factive (an antibiotic drug by LGLS), Revanex (an anti-
gastric ulcer drug by Yuhan), Noltec (an anti-gastric ulcer drug by Ilyang) and Zydena 
(an erectile dysfunction drug by Dong-a). These projects were selected because they 
have some salient features of new-drug development and could therefore help 
characterise the challenges and possibilities of exploratory learning in the latecomer 
context.  
Factive is the only NCE that acquired an NDA in the US before 2014, implying entry to 
the global market. Revanex is the only first-in-class NCE, although it competes with an 
established class of proton pump inhibitors (PPIs). Noltec was developed over the 
longest R&D period (21 years). Of these drugs, Zydena was the only successful drug in 
the domestic market. All four projects were started prior to the market launch of their rival 
first-in-class NCEs (Figure 6.1). They were all out-licensed to Big Pharma, aiming at the 
global market. 
        Korean followers            Time gap to project launch/market                 First movers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
*TAP: Takeda-Abbott Pharmaceuticals in the US, WCRX: Warner Chilcott in the US, L/O: License-out  
Figure 6.1: Catch-up pace between the first NCE and follow-up NCEs 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from various data about companies 
To begin with, the first three projects, Factive, Revanex and Noltec, are presented as 
cases of commercial failure (Sub-sections 6.3.2.1, 6.3.2.2 and 6.3.2.3), whereas the 
fourth project, Zydena, was an exceptional case of commercial success (Sub-section 
6.3.2.4). The following subsections identify common obstacles of the latecomer firms’ 
exploratory learning, mainly by looking at the first three project cases. It also presents 
the possibility of overcoming these obstacles in the case of Zydena. Each project case 
2/4 years 
Losec/Nexium by Astra Zeneca 
 (Project launch in 1972) 
 (NDA in 1989, upgraded Nexium) 
No competitors in the APA class,  
but the PPI drugs  
such as Prevacid and Nexium 
 
Noltec by Ilyang 
 (Project launch in 1987) 
 (NDA in 2008, L/O to TAP) 
Revanex by Yuhan 
 (Project launch in 1991) 
 (NDA in 2005, L/O to GSK) 
Factive by LGLS 
   (Project launch in 1991) 
   (NDA in 2003, L/O to GSK) 
Zydena by Dong-a 
   (Project launch in 1997) 
   (NDA in 2005, L/O to WCRX) 
Avelox by Bayer 
 (Project launch in 1989) 
 (NDA in 1999) 
Viagra by Pfizer 
 (Project launch in 1985) 
 (NDA in 1998) 
 
Other competitive follow-up NCEs:  
Prevacid (Takeda, 1995), 
Protonix (Wyeth-Pfizer, 2000) 
First-in-class in the APA class 
 
Levitra (Bayer and GSK, 2003),       
Cialis (Eli Lilly, 2003)  
15/19 years 
12/7 years 
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is described across the three phases of R&D: product strategy and drug discovery, 
clinical development including preclinical and clinical trials, and market penetration.   
6.3.2.1 Commercial failure 1 – The first global-level drug: Factive by LG  
Gemifloxacin (brand name: Factive), a recent generation (i.e., fourth generation) 
quinolone class antibiotic, has been referred to as the only Korean drug approved by the 
US FDA (as of 2012). Its NDA from the US FDA was acquired in 2003 after 13 years of 
R&D. However, global and domestic marketing of the drug largely failed (Interviews 33 
and 36 (DBF)).146 This case in particular reveals the barriers that must be overcome 
when a local latecomer firm takes up the challenge to develop a new drug targeting the 
global market (primarily the US and EU markets).  
1) Product strategy and drug discovery  
The Factive project was launched under the strategic focus on antibiotics. Antibiotics 
generally require continuous improvement due to drug resistance. Thus, in many cases 
the development of new antibiotics is attempted based on a known lead compound; and 
this implies less risk of cost and technology than the development of innovative NCEs.147 
Because of that, not only LGLS but also other case firms such as JW and Dongwha 
focused on antibiotics in the early 1990s.  
                        
 
Figure 6.2: Ciprofloxacin (by Bayer) and its formula modification to 
Gemifloxacin (Factive) 
Source: Left picture is from Wikipedia and right picture is from Hong (2001) 
Derivation of the final drug candidate took four years. In the upstream stage, two 
research teams operated; this was the organisational set-up for competition and 
complementation, as it helped speed up drug identification (Lee and Kim 2001). The 
research teams were led by researchers scouted from outside, mostly in the US. One of 
                                                          
146 Interviewees: the former heads of the new drug research centre of LGLS. 
147 Thus, it is easier to identify any commercial possibility in the early clinical trials (i.e., the ease of detecting 
side effects and efficacy and performing pharmacokinetic tests) compared with the other indications of 
disease. Comment: Dr In-chol Kim, the former CEO of LGLS (Medipharms Today, 9/4/2003).  
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them, Dr Hong, played a major role in deriving the final drug candidate.148 The teams 
derived the drug candidate, LB20304a, by modifying the second generation of 
Ciprofloxacin in 1994 (Figure 6.2). 
2) Clinical development  
The preclinical trial was conducted overseas due to the deficiency of technological 
capability in middle-stage research for validation. After the clinical phase I trial in the UK, 
LGLS licensed out LB20304 to SmithKline Beecham (SB, now GSK) for co-development 
in 1997.149 This decision was made for two reasons. One was the firm’s limited capability 
to operate large-scale clinical trials as a latecomer firm inexperienced in multinational 
clinical development and suffering from financial insufficiency. The other was the time 
pressure of development against a competing project by Bayer, Moxifloxacin (brand 
name: Avelox, Avalox and Avelon), which was far ahead of LB20304a (Figure 6.1) 
(Interview 36 (DBF)). 
SB carried out large-scale multinational clinical trials to cut down the drug’s lead-time. 
Clinical trial phases II and III were consecutively conducted in 1,500 clinical centres in 
40 countries involving more than 8,000 patients. Finally, in December 1999, SB filed an 
NDA with the US FDA. The full-scale commitment to development in such a short time, 
and the prompt NDA, showed that SB was desperately trying to overtake Bayer’s 
competitive pipeline. Bayer's moxifloxacin was already approved by the US FDA in 1999 
when SB completed its clinical trials.  
While LG Chemical was certain of approval of its NDA, it was rejected by the US FDA in 
2000 on the grounds of an imperfect toxicity study; the FDA demanded a more in-depth 
study.150 As a result, SB renounced the reapplication of the NDA in April 2002, and 
returned all rights and clinical documents to LG Chemical.  
From the perspective of SB, dropping the project allowed the company to avoid potential 
additional losses, which could have been enormous if it continued developing the drug, 
which had already cost around US$300 million.151 In addition, SB had merged with Glaxo 
Wellcome, which had already experienced a suspension of marketing of its own 
                                                          
148 See Lee and Kim (2001) for the explanation of drug identification in detail. 
149 LG Chemical exported LB20304a to SB with a US$37 million upfront payment and US$30 million of 
running guarantees for 20 years after its launch in 1997. The company also acquired the exclusive right to 
supply the API of Factive to SB. 
150 A rash had been expressed in 8% of fertile women in the clinical trial (Interview 36 (DBF)). 
151 SB input about US$300 million into the clinical trial phases II and III. LGLS invested approximately US$60 
million for R&D, recording 29.4% of R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/total sales) in 2005 as the most R&D-
intensive domestic pharmaceutical company. 
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quinolone antibiotic, Grepafloxacin (brand name: Raxar), in 1999 due to a series of 
toxicity accidents. In the end, GSK was sceptical of the possibility of successful 
marketing due to a few incumbent quinolone antibiotics already on the market (Interviews 
33 and 36 (DBF)). 
Therefore, the time had arrived for LG Chemical to decide whether to continue the project. 
For them, it was the first NCE they had put a lot of investment into, and they were 
confident of the technological superiority of the drug to the rival drug on the market 
(Interview 36 (DBF)).152 In the end, they decided to continue the project by looking for a 
new overseas partner to complement the preclinical and clinical data, and to co-market 
after the NDA. Finally, in November 2002, LG Chemical entered into a contract with 
GeneSoft (now Oscient Pharmaceuticals, bankrupted in 2009), a biotechnology start-up 
in the US.153 No better choice existed for LGLS because its NDA had failed once before 
and competing products were already popularised in the market (Interviews 33 and 36 
(DBF)). This imposed practical constraints on partnering with another Big Pharma 
company. 
3) Market penetration 
LGLS and GeneSoft obtained approval as a Class 2 prescription medication in the US in 
April 2003.154 However, the scope of indications was narrowed in the second attempt at 
NDA from four to two indications.155 In the end, the scope-down of indications and 
approval for a Class 2 rather than a Class 1 drug led to severe restrictions on marketing 
activity and re-licensing out to Big Pharma (Interview 35 (DBF)).156 Moreover, the drug 
had missed the most competitive time window (Interview 36 DBF)). As a result, its market 
performance remained under the expectations of LGLS, leading to the contraction of 
subsequent innovative R&D.  
LGLS’s present alternative strategy for marketing Factive appears to focus on the 
developing world, which is relatively easy to enter due to low levels of regulation. This 
makes local companies marketing easier. Globally, Factive has acquired approval in 
more than 28 countries. Interestingly, Factive was the top fluoroquinolone-class antibiotic 
                                                          
152 At that time, an NDA of Factive from New Zealand was already under approval (December 2001). 
153 LGLS received US$40 million as a down payment and 14% share in GeneSoft. This meant that GeneSoft 
also anticipated the commercial success of Factive. 
154 AECB (acute bacterial exacerbations of chronic bronchitis) and CAP (community-acquired pneumonia). 
155 SB originally applied for approval for four indications in the first NDA application including ABS (acute 
bacterial sinusitis) and UTI (urinary tract infection). 
156 Factive was prescribed more than one million times, creating US$16 million in sales in the US in 2008. 
Oscient went bankrupt in 2009 and its promotion rights were transferred to several companies, depending 
on the region. A small pharmaceutical company specialising in respiratory system diseases, Cornerstone 
Therapeutics, started to market Factive in the US.  
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in Jordan in 2010, although the country’s market is small in absolute terms. The drug 
was marketed in Jordan by Hikma, the largest pharmaceutical company in the country. 
This underscores the possibility of exploiting emerging markets for the sale of new drugs.  
4) Summary  
In conclusion, the case of Factive was the first full completion of new-drug R&D among 
Korean latecomer firms. In the process from local drug discovery to global marketing in 
the US, LGLS encountered a series of challenges. The first challenge was the company’s 
weak upstream research capability to derive drug candidates. The second barrier was 
the absolute reliance on Big Pharma for global development, which caused a delay in 
further development. The last hurdle was the difficulty in penetrating both domestic and 
global markets due to the cumulative effect of the former two reasons and the domination 
of the targeted market by Big Pharma.  
While LGLS finally reached the global marketing stage, overcoming the barriers in R&D, 
it was by virtue of the company’s relative wealth as an affiliate of Chaebol. However, 
development success by no means always leads to marketing success. The following 
two cases more vividly reveal the difficulties that small latecomer firms commonly 
encounter in the three dimensions of new-drug R&D.       
6.3.2.2 Commercial failure 2 – The most innovative drug: Revanex by Yuhan  
Two further examples of new-drug development, Revanex by Yuhan (Sub-section 
6.3.2.2) and Noltec by Ilyang (Sub-section 6.3.2.3), are analysed in this section with 
consideration of the replication logic (in case study) of the identified barriers, as well as 
in the complementary approach for identifying other barriers unrecognised in the Factive 
case.  
1) Product strategy and drug discovery 
The project to develop Revaprazan (YH-1885, brand name: Revanex) by Yuhan, an anti-
gastric ulcer drug, was launched in 1991 and took 15 years of R&D, costing about US$40 
million. Technologically, Revanex had a different lead compound structure as the existing 
drug Omeprazole, the first-in-class NCE in the active pump antagonist (APA) drug class 
(Figure 6.3). That is, it had a different mechanism of action from the H2 Receptor 
Antagonists (H2RA) and proton pump inhibitor (PPI) classes that had dominated the 
market for anti-gastric ulcer drugs.157         
                                                          
157 Example of H2RA class drug: Zantac (API: Ranitidine, by GSK), PPI class drugs: Losec (Omeprazole, 
by Astra Zeneca) and Prevacid (Lansoprazole, by Takeda) 
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In spite of the risk of focusing on a novel target, Yuhan predicted a demand change to 
substitute-class drugs that could solve drug tolerance issues for H2RA drugs and had 
better efficacy than PPI drugs (Interview 47 (K-Pharma)). In 1995, the company’s 
research team developed a candidate material, YH-1885, after four years of drug 
discovery.                  
                                                    
 
 
 
                   
 
Figure 6.3 Structural formulae of Revaprazan (APA class) and other PPI drugs  
Source: Wikipedia 
2) Clinical development 
After three years of preclinical trials and several failures, the drug candidate entered 
clinical trials in 1998. Yuhan out-licensed the compound to GSK in 2001 for global clinical 
trials and marketing.  
However, the drug’s clinical development was then suspended. GSK renounced clinical 
development in 2002 (just a month after renouncing LGLS’s Factive). One reason for this 
was the low market potential of YH-1885 in the Western market after the merger of Glaxo 
Wellcome and Smith Kline Beecham in 2000, which saw the companies’ R&D portfolios 
rearranged (Interview 47 (K-Pharma)). At the time, the Western market had much more 
market demand for drugs to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) than gastric 
ulcers sparked by Helicobacter pylori (Money Today, 14/5/2002). The absorption rate of 
the compound presented another technological problem (Mirae Asset Report, 2002). 
The renunciation by GSK again triggered scepticism about the project, and some 
suggested that it was just a waste of money and should be given up entirely (DongaIlbo, 
Omeprazole (Astra Zeneca) Revaprazan (by Yuhan) 
Lansoprazole (by Takeda) 
≠ 
 
Ilaprazole (by Ilyang) 
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29/5/2005). However, the project was maintained after an alternative formulation was 
developed, resolving the problem with the absorption rate; Yuhan decided to market the 
drug domestically and acquired an NDA from the KFDA in 2005.158 
3) Market penetration 
However, in terms of market performance, Revanex only recouped its investment costs 
in 2010 after four long years of marketing, and its recent sales have been decreasing. 
Its stagnant market performance was due to changes in market trends and dominant 
drugs based on the PPI class. While the market for gastric ulcer treatment was larger 
when Yuhan started development, the GERD segment of the market now leads the 
domestic market. The segment for GERD had expanded to about 70% of the total gastric 
ulcer treatment drug market by 2011, but Yuhan did not respond by expanding the 
indications of the drug to GERD until later, in 2012 (EDaily, 10/10/2012). This indicates 
an organisational problem that inhibited the company from reflecting market dynamics in 
their new-drug R&D.159 
While the drug’s commercial performance lagged in the domestic market and global level 
development failed, efforts to penetrate the global market have been relatively successful 
in emerging markets, like with Factive. Revanex was out-licensed to both Chinese and 
Indian pharmaceutical companies: Zihzun in 2008 and ZydusCadila in 2009. 
6.3.2.3 Commercial failure 3 – The longest R&D: Noltec by Ilyang  
Ilaprazole (IY-81149, brand name: Noltec) by Ilyang followed a similar path and 
encountered the same difficulties as Revanex, revealing an even bumpier process of 
new-drug R&D. Ilyang launched the project to develop, a PPI-class gastric ulcer drug, 
with the aim of developing a best-in-class drug. The company acquired an NDA in Korea 
in 2008.160 This drug had the longest development lead-time—21 years (1987 to 2008)—
among the seven new drugs developed in the first round of R&D, at an estimated 
investment of about US$30 million. Meanwhile, the company fell to 20th place (in 2010) 
from around 3rd place (in the mid-1980s) in sales ranking, indicating that this very long-
term new-drug R&D had caused the company severe difficulties.  
                                                          
158 At the time, foreign pharmaceutical companies such as Sankyo and Astra Zeneca were still developing 
APA-class drugs in clinical trial stages I and II. CS-526 by Sankyo and Novartis, and AR-HO44277 by Astra 
Zeneca. 
159 In the interview and conferences, the lack of reflecting change in demand in the new-drug R&D was 
pointed out by the researcher of Yuhan, Dr Myung-ho Bae (Interview 46), and Dr Su-yeon Nam (the head of 
the R&D centre). The organisational problem will be seen in detail in the following chapter.  
160 Furthermore, this company acquired NDA in 2012 with their second NCE, Supect (API: Radotinib), for 
treating chronic myeloid leukaemia (CML), and were the first Asian developer of a CML drug to compete 
with a blockbuster drug, Glivec by Novartis.  
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1) Product strategy and drug discovery  
Ilyang’s research team originally started to develop an H2RA-class gastric ulcer drug, 
but it soon changed its development focus to PPI-class drugs in 1987. This was due to 
predictions of growth in the PPI-based gastric ulcer drug market. The H2RA-class drug 
market was shrinking in response to the emergence of PPI-class drugs such as 
Omeprazole (in 1989 by AstraZeneca), Lansoprazole (in 1995 by Takeda) and 
Pantoprazole (in 2000 by Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories and Pfizer). Ilyang rightly seized a 
market opportunity by developing a me-better drug in this emerging PPI class.  
However, the firm was faced with continuous failures in deriving drug candidates and did 
not succeed in developing Ilaprazole until 1996, as the 1,149th derivative, nine years from 
the project’s start (the compound structure of the drug is shown in Figure 6.3). In the 
meantime, other modified NCEs, such as Lansoprazole and Pantoprazole, had already 
been launched on the market. 
2) Clinical development  
As the project targeted the global market from the start, Ilaprazole was transferred in 
2005 to TAP, a joint venture between Takeda and Abbott Laboratories. TAP completed 
clinical trial phase II in 2007.161 However, Takeda is also the original developer of the 
competing Lansoprazole. 
Unexpectedly, Ilyang was faced with the renunciation of TAP prior to conducting clinical 
trial phase III in 2008. This was not because of any technological deficiency, but because 
of a strategic change by TAP (Daewoo-Securities 2010). TAP was a joint venture 
company that sold Lansoprazole in North America. The aim of in-licensing Ilyang’s 
Ilaprazole was to substitute it for Lansoprazole, for which the product patent was about 
to expire (Pharmnews, 28/9/2008). Interestingly, TAP was also developing an in-house 
candidate as a substitute for Lansoprazole, TAK-390MR (Doctor's News, 24/3/2008).  
In 2008, Takeda fully took over TAP. As a result, Ilaprazole was downgraded to a backup 
material for Takeda’s own TAK-390 in case of negative results during clinical 
development. From the perspective of Ilyang, it would have been better if the rights to 
Ilaprazole had been taken by Abbott Laboratories, as Abbott had no PPI drugs. 
Hence, Ilyang was faced with the decision to either continue the project or drop it. As the 
company chose to continue, Ilyang was left looking for a Big Pharma to complete clinical 
                                                          
161  Takeda Pharmaceuticals: the largest pharmaceutical company in Japan, the original developer of 
Lansoprazole 
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trial phase III in the US. For them, dropping the project due to external reasons was a 
difficult decision because they had bet on the NCE overcoming 20 years of financial 
deficiency. 
3) Market penetration 
While the drug was launched in the domestic market in late 2009, it showed a sluggish 
market performance, recording only about US$2 million in 2010.162 As with Revanex, the 
company also missed the chance to market it for GERD from the start, and only 
completed clinical trials for expanding the indications to GERD in 2012. However, Noltec 
has found better marketing contracts in emerging markets such as China (Livzon in 2002) 
and India (Merck KGaA in 2009), as in previous cases. 
4) Summary 
On the whole, the cases of Revanex and Noltec met with similar difficulties. First, 
independent pharmaceutical firms, unlike LGLS, struggled with weak upstream research 
capability due to insufficiently experienced researchers and finances that undermined 
the acceleration of drug discovery. Second, absolute reliance on Big Pharma delayed 
the overall development lead time. Big Pharma’s renunciation of clinical development 
damaged both drugs’ credibility and made it more difficult to transfer them to another Big 
Pharma. Again unlike LGLS, Yuhan and Ilyang were not able to continue global 
development on their own as small, independent firms. Third, their R&D process failed 
to properly respond to changing market needs. When the new drugs were first launched 
in the domestic market, major demand had already changed to another indication. The 
companies belatedly conducted additional clinical trials to deal with this indication, rather 
than engaging in simultaneous clinical development.      
6.3.2.4 Commercial success – Drug for local & niche: Zydena by Dong-a  
In contrast to the previous cases, Zydena was an exceptional commercial success 
immediately after its market launch. This section compares this drug’s success with the 
previous cases of commercial failure in order to identify the factors that can overcome 
the latecomers’ obstacles identified above.  
1) Product strategy and drug discovery  
In the late 1990s, Dong-a again attempted to develop an NCE through its own upstream 
research for drug discovery. This was based on internal confidence about drug discovery 
                                                          
162 Interestingly, the sales of Noltec have rapidly increased since 2013 after the expansion of the indication 
to GERD. This implies the importance of the R&D strategy that reflects the market dynamics from the start 
of product conception and drug research.    
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based on technological accumulation in midstream research of outsourced drug 
candidates through previous projects (Interview 49 (K-Pharma)).  
In line with this, Dong-a aimed at improving a first-in-class NCE that was being developed 
by other firms, hoping that this could create a new market of indications in the near future. 
The benchmarked first-in-class NCE was within the technological scope that Dong-a had 
previously accumulated and experienced. This development strategy is similar to that of 
LGLS and Ilyang, that is, the ‘me-better’ strategy. However, Dong-a was more agile in 
its shift from the initial target market to a less competitive niche market.  
The Zydena project was inspired by the mechanism of action of Viagra (compound: 
Sildenafil), the drug for erectile dysfunction (ED) developed by Pfizer, and its close 
relevance to Dong-a's prior knowledge base about cardiovascular disease.163 Dong-a 
had previously accumulated extensive knowledge of cardiovascular disease during the 
ARB project in the late 1980s, even though that project failed. 
Prior to the approval of Viagra (launched in 1998), Dong-a started to develop a modified 
NCE based on the lead compound of Viagra under the strong initiative of the company’s 
owner, Dr Shin-ho Kang. In 1999, the research team derived a drug candidate, DA-8159 
(Udenafil), a novel phosphodiesterase5 (PDE5) inhibitor (Figure 6.4). It just took two 
years to derive this drug candidate based on a prior knowledge base and simultaneous 
work by the functional team (meaning that synthesis of derivatives, screening of efficacy 
and pharmacokinetic research and toxicological tests could occur at the same time).  
                                       
 
Figure 6.4: Modification of the first-in-class NCE of Viagra to Zydena 
Source: Wikipedia 
2) Clinical development 
Dong-a completed a phase I clinical trial in the UK in 2002. Under partial funding from 
the MOHW, Dong-a completed domestic clinical trials and then acquired an NDA from 
the KFDA in 2005. As a result, Zydena became the fourth PDE5 inhibitor for the erectile 
                                                          
163 Viagra was originally intended to treat angina pectoris, until its efficacy for overcoming ED was probed in 
clinical trials in 1994 (for angina pectoris). 
Viagra (Sildenafil) Zydena (Udenafil) 
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dysfunction market, following Viagra (Pfizer, 1998), Levitra (Bayer and GSK, 2003) and 
Cialis (Eli Lilly, 2003). 164  It should be noted that this project prioritised domestic 
development over global clinical development. 
3) Market penetration 
The unusually rapid development of Zydena was successfully converted to good 
performance in the domestic market and the export market to developing countries. The 
drug has recorded about a 30% domestic market share in the erectile dysfunction market, 
behind only Viagra, with about US$25 million in sales in 2011. Dong-a is also conducting 
further clinical trials to expand its scope of prescription to indications such as pulmonary 
hypertension.   
Global marketing remains a challenge; Zydena is now in the approval process in the US 
and at the start of marketing in Brazil. Warner Chilcott (specialising in dermatology and 
urology) licensed the drug from Dong-a, and the phase III clinical trial was completed in 
the US in 2013. Interestingly, the product right to Zydena was returned to Dong-a in 2014 
after the merger of Warner Chilcott with Actavis, the largest US generic drug producer. 
Zydena is now being prepared for an NDA. 
4) Summary 
On the whole, Dong-a’s first NCE, Zydena, has found extraordinary commercial success. 
This success was driven by the fact that the company’s approach was different from the 
previous three firms in coping with the obstacles facing latecomers to new-drug R&D. 
First, Dong-a also had weak upstream research, in particular in drug discovery, and few 
resources. While Dong-a adopted a ‘me-better’ strategy to overcome this difficulty, like 
the other case firms, the company targeted its market better than the other firms. It 
strategically searched for a niche market that could utilise its prior knowledge 
accumulation, rather than sticking to major markets. Dong-a attempted to develop an 
improved NCE of Viagra, which was in the clinical development stage, at a time when 
the erectile dysfunction market was still emerging. By virtue of its prior knowledge base, 
such as a chemical library built through previous failed projects, Dong-a succeeded in 
developing an NCE within two years. In contrast, the other three drugs examined took 
longer to develop and were developed for a competitive major market, making it easier 
to miss the changing market needs and lowering commercial potential.      
                                                          
164 The technological competitiveness of Zydena is based on its faster and longer-acting efficacy compared 
to Cialis and its reduced side effects compared to Viagra. 
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Second, Dong-a intentionally prioritised the domestic market, while other firms aimed at 
global development through partnerships with Big Pharma. By focusing on the domestic 
market, the company was able to lessen the lead time of clinical development and 
product approval. Early entry is particularly important for me-better NCEs because the 
first-in-class NCE and the earliest me-better NCEs achieve a stronger market position 
than follow-on NCEs who enter later. While Dong-a was able to take a strong market 
share through its domestic-first strategy, which meant that it was competing with only a 
few drugs, the market entry of the other three firms’ NCEs was considerably delayed by 
the failure of global development. These three cases showed that success in global 
development depends not only on technological superiority, but also on the competitive 
environment surrounding Big Pharma. These cases demonstrate the difficulty for 
latecomers entering an advanced market with weak capability for dealing with Big 
Pharma and overseas regulatory frameworks.    
Overall, on the one hand, the case of Dong-a shows that there is a possibility for Korean 
latecomer firms to do well in the new-drug business by taking alternative routes to 
success. On the other hand, the other three cases show that there are many common 
obstacles that latecomer firms face in new-drug R&D and market entry. The following 
section shows how Korean latecomers have tried to overcome the obstacles that they 
faced in the first round of new-drug development.       
6.4 The Second Round of New-drug R&D 
This section discusses how Korean firms reconfigured new-drug R&D in the 2000s as a 
direct response to the commercial failure of the case firms’ first in-house-developed 
NCEs. This reconfiguration was also influenced by the changing institutional and 
technological environment, such as the growth of the ETC drug market after NHI reform, 
the growing threat from Big Pharma under the FTAs with the US and the EU, and the 
deepening influence of biotechnology. With firms under increasing pressure from these 
changes, intensive involvement in innovative R&D became seen as the only way for 
survival if they did not want to continue to be generic drug producers. 
The reconfiguration of new-drug R&D occurred through the diversification of the paths of 
new-drug development. This section describes these new paths by presenting the case 
of a specific firm that adopted each path, then presenting other firms’ cases at an 
aggregated level. 165  By doing so, this section explains how the case firms have 
                                                          
165 Note that the diversification does not indicate the differentiating trajectories of innovative R&D across 
case firms; it represents the overall expansion of the scope of innovative R&D in each single case firm.   
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reconfigured the overall pattern of the exploratory mode of technological learning in new-
drug R&D.             
First, the synthetic drug development that was the main focus in the previous round of 
new-drug R&D was diversified in two ways: through a focus on incrementally modified 
drugs (IMDs) based on process innovation (Sub-section 6.4.1), and by redirecting NCE 
development to less competitive niche markets (Sub-section 6.4.2). Moreover, 
diversification into non-synthetic drugs occurred through two routes: the rush to 
phytomedicines (Sub-section 6.4.3), and the refocus on biological drugs including 
biologics and vaccines (Sub-section 6.4.4).  
6.4.1 Process innovation - Incrementally modified drugs 
Development of IMDs is one alternative path to the singular concentration on the 
development of NCEs. This path is technologically driven by upgrading the process 
technologies that were accumulated from previous imitation stages. IMDs are often 
based on developing new drug delivery systems (DDSs). 
Under the enforcement of SPD in 2000, domestic pharmaceutical companies were 
forced to rapidly shift their development focus to the ETC market. The case firms 
immediately responded by launching the first generic drugs. The focus on the first 
generics was driven by a favourable drug pricing policy, which priced them at 87% of the 
price of the original drug (until 2008). 
This first generics strategy, which hinged on making minor modifications to a drug, such 
as changing a base in the original compound, evolved into the development of more 
novel IMDs, such as combination drugs and application of new DDSs. In doing so, 
innovative capability could be incrementally accumulated. The following example shows 
the successful adoption of an IMD-based incremental innovation path.  
1) The case of Hanmi as the first entrant into the IMD market166 
Domestic pharmaceutical companies crowded into the generics market to survive NHI 
reform. This resulted in intense competition within a few popular therapeutic areas. 
Hanmi launched 120 generic drugs between 2000 and 2009, the most of any domestic 
company. In particular, Hanmi focused on launching first generics with differentiated 
                                                          
166 Interview 44 (K-Pharma).  
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process technologies at formulation to evade patent barriers accumulated in the 
1990s.167 As a consequence, Hanmi has dominated the generic market since 2000.   
On the basis of the strong imitative technological capability, Hanmi started to take on 
exploratory learning by focusing on its own DDSs, using them as platform technologies 
that could then be used to develop more innovative drugs.168 In 2004, Hanmi launched 
Amodipin, a modification of Pfizer’s anti-hypertensive drug Norvasc (API: Amlodipine), a 
calcium channel blocker (CCB). At that time, Novarsc monopolised the domestic market. 
As the original API, Amlodipine, was unstable in oral administration, Norvasc was 
formulated by attaching a besylate salt to improve stability and absorption rate. While 
the scope of patent rights of Amlodipine besylate (Norvasc) was due to expire in 2010, 
that of Amlodipine itself had already expired in 2003. 
Hanmi tried to break the original patent of Amlodipine besylate by developing an 
alternative salt. The company succeeded in developing camsylate (an alternative salt) 
and attached it to Amlodipine in 2004, improving the drug’s stability and absorption 
rate.169 The modified drug, Amodipin, overtook Norvasc in terms of sales size, recording 
US$195 million in cumulative sales in the local market by 2009.  
Moving forward, the incremental IMD strategy of changing new salts and single isomers 
evolved into a more active IMD strategy that focuses on developing new administration 
routes and new combinations of existing APIs. In 2009, Hanmi launched a new 
combination drug, Amosartan, a combined version of Amodipin and Losartan (ARB: 
angiotensin receptor blocker, Brand name: Cozaar by Merck), an anti-hypertensive and 
analgesic, respectively. As Amosartan was a new combination of two APIs, it was 
required to undergo a full clinical trial as with NCEs, whereas the previous IMD, Amodipin, 
underwent only selective and small-scale clinical trial phases I and III.170 Amosartan was 
the second therapeutic combination IMD, after Exforge by Novartis (in 2007). The 
                                                          
167 Several Big Pharmas filed lawsuits against Hanmi alleging patent infringement about manufacturing and 
formulation in 1984 (by Hoechst, now Sanofi-Aventis about Claforan), 1987 (by Roche about Ceftriaxone), 
and 1990 (by AstraZeneca about manufacturing omeprazole). In particular, Hanmi won the lawsuit against 
Roche through proving the novelty of the synthetic pathway and then Roche conversely suggested the 
technological transfer of Hanmi's new synthetic pathway in 1989. It was the first technological export (a 
manufacturing process patent) by the domestic pharmaceutical company, recording US$6 million as the 
fixed royalty. 
168 The focus on DDSs was based on their technological strength in synthesis and formulation process 
technologies previously accumulated for imitative production.  
169 This salt-changing strategy has not only been a local phenomenon, but has also occurred in the US. The 
patent conflict between Pfizer and India's Dr Reddy about Novarsc show a similar story.  
170  That is, technologically it was a more complex and explorative type than new salt-based IMDs, 
demanding firm proof of safety and efficacy, although it was a combination of the two pre-existing APIs. 
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development of Amosartan demonstrates the technological capability of Hanmi to 
develop more advanced IMDs.  
Through the incremental innovation process, a series of new DDSs has been developed, 
such as an integrated controlled release system for longer or more immediate efficacy. 
Hanmi finally established two key DDSs as its core platform technologies in the late 
2000s: Orascovery for chemical drugs and Lapscovery for biodrugs. These undergird the 
company’s on-going IMD and NME pipelines.   
2) Dual perspectives on incremental innovation through IMDs  
Hanmi’s incremental innovation reveals two perspectives on latecomers’ exploratory 
learning. In the positive view, the company used this technological path as a 
‘technological bridge’ between imitative development and more exploratory R&D; this 
was assumed to be the most suitable R&D strategy for small Korean pharmaceutical 
companies. From an external point of view, it was seen as the most technologically 
adaptive strategy for the increasing ETC market, as drug pricing policy was favourable 
to generic drugs (Interview 39 (K-Pharma)). 
In addition, incremental innovation gave companies the potential to acquire a global 
marketing channel through Big Pharma. This ‘stepwise’ technological upgrade was the 
KoPI’s first real opportunity to catch up with the global market. In 2009, Merck was 
contracted to co-market Amosartan in six Asia-Pacific countries under the brand name 
Cozaar XQ. In 2011, the contract was then expanded to 30 countries, including the EU 
market (estimated to be around US$2 billion over 10 years). With the increasing global 
competition in the hypertensive drugs market, Merck was being forced to strengthen its 
original product, Losartan, against the rival combination drugs Exforge by Novartis and 
Pfizer, and Sevikar by Daiichi Sankyo.  
However, there are also critics of this incremental approach. One leading researcher at 
a case firm, who once worked for a Big Pharma company in the US, noted that the 
approval of IMDs had distorted the pattern of new-drug R&D by domestic companies, 
leading to the conception that this was simply a way to evade patents (Interview 51 (K-
Pharma)). He argued that focusing on minor modifications prevented companies from 
becoming fully involved in ‘real’ new-drug R&D. In fact, the initial pattern of ‘minor’ 
modification of the base has become so common among domestic companies that the 
NHI now denies salt-changed super-generics as a form of new IMD; they are regarded 
as no more than a generic drug. 
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Nonetheless, the incremental strategy has provided real market profits for short-term 
survival and organisational slack for further new-drug R&D. Indeed, Hanmi finally 
succeeded in reaching the innovation stage of developing a first-in-class drug. The 
company licensed out two first-in-class drug candidates, HM71224 and HM61713, an 
oral Bruton's tyrosine kinase (BTK) inhibitor to Eli Lilly and a 3rd generation epidermal 
growth factor receptor (EGFR) targeting agent to Boehringer Ingelheim in 2014. Both 
drugs are licensed out with an initial royalty of US$50 million, and a potential maximum 
royalty of more than US$600 million, depending on development and sales performance.    
3) Other case firms in the IMD-based R&D path 
Other case firms, and most domestic firms seeking R&D, have engaged in similar R&D 
activities in IMDs and DDSs. Most case firms are now operating IMD pipelines (Table 
6.2), and by 2011, 200 IMD pipelines were being operated by 30 domestic companies 
(KDRA 2013).171 Of the 200 pipelines, 111 were being conducted to improve formulations 
(i.e., DDS related) or develop combination drugs, while 15 pipelines were involved in 
minor modification in the structure of original compounds.  
As pointed out earlier, the IMD path based on incremental innovation is widely regarded 
as the most realistic strategy for latecomer firms. This is based on the close technological 
relationship between the prior knowledge base of the synthetic and the formulation 
technologies used to efficiently copy the original drug. This initial exploratory learning 
showed high market profitability, at least within the short term. Incremental innovation is 
also the same path used by other major Korean catch-up industries. Overall, the entry of 
firms into innovation through IMDs has proceeded relatively smoothly until now, 
compared with the following emerging paths. 
6.4.2 Product innovation – Quality-of-life drugs 
The shift to ‘quality-of-life’ (QOL)-related market segments was identified as another path 
of new-drug R&D that would help firms emerge from a single focus on antibiotics/anti-
cancer drugs and other major market segments. QOL drugs treat lifestyle-related 
diseases, as opposed to necessary drugs such as antibiotics. This new direction was a 
strategic response to the commercial failure of the case firms’ first new drugs, which 
were largely antibiotics and anti-cancer drugs. In the search for a profitable NCE, for 
example, metabolic, cardiovascular and urinary diseases have received new attention 
                                                          
171 By 2008, 92 pipelines of IMDs were operated by 22 of the 35 domestic companies, including all of the 
case firms (KDRA 2009). 
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(Table 6.5). The case of LGLS shows the redirection of R&D focus and the underlying 
difficulties that face latecomers seeking to develop commercially viable new drugs.   
Table 6.5: The NCE pipelines of non-antibiotic and anti-cancer in 2012 
Case firms 
Pipelines 
in QOL  
Anti-
cancer/ 
antibiotics 
Indications in the QOL pipelines (No. of pipelines) 
Dong-a 
 
Yuhan 
 
Hanmi 
CKD 
JW 
Green Cross            
LGLS 
 
Ilyang 
Dong-wha 
8 
 
8 
 
0 
3 
3 
1 
9 
 
1 
2 
1 
 
2 
 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
 
2 
2 
Diabetes (1), Erectile dysfunction (1), Gastritis/dry eye (1),  
Hypertension (3), IBS* (1), Premature ejaculation (1),  
Allergic Rhinitis (1), Atherosclerosis (1), Degenerative Disc 
(1), GERD* (1), IBS (1), Osteo Arthritis (1), Diabetes (2),     
- 
Diabetes (1), Lipidosis (1), Obesity (1) 
Arrhythmia (1), Gout (1), Osteoporosis (1)  
Parkinson’s Disease (1) 
Atherothrombosis (1), Diabetes (3), Gout (1),  
Hypertension (1), Liver fibrosis (1), Obesity (1), Prokinetic (1) 
Leukaemia (1) 
Cerebral Apoplexy (1), Osteoporosis (1)    
* IBS: irritable bowel syndrome, GERD: gastroesophageal reflux disease  
1) Redirection of the development of NCEs by LG Life Sciences 
The pharmaceutical business unit of LG Chemical was spun off due to the expectation 
of successfully marketing their first NCE, Factive, in 2002. However, the global marketing 
failure put pressure on the newly established company, LGLS, to restructure its R&D 
portfolio for more profit-creating drug development. 172  One of the most noticeable 
changes was the rearrangement of the company’s R&D pipelines, which had once 
focused on antibiotics and anti-cancer drugs, to focus on QOL drugs for metabolic, 
cardiovascular and neural systems. The latter market segments were estimated to have 
less competition than the former. This strategic change has brought both positive and 
negative effects to the company’s new-drug R&D. 
On one hand, LGLS has seemed to succeed in developing drugs that are commercially 
more prominent. In 2012, the company launched its second NCE for the diabetic market, 
Zemiglo, and the drug was also licensed out to Sanofi Aventis for export to emerging 
markets in 2012. Its sales reached about US$ 13 million in 2014, and it is regarded as a 
domestic blockbuster.  
                                                          
172  Behind the sudden change, LGLS was pushed by the holding company, LG, to show managerial 
performance as an independent company; LG demanded a change in its tendency to be an R&D institute 
sheltering behind a Chaebol (Interview 35 (DBF)). In the end, LGLS’s choice was to promote the 
development of generic drugs, which could guarantee a short-term profit. 
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However, the redirection of the R&D focus resulted in a hole in the NCE pipelines for a 
considerable period and the loss of experienced researchers in the late 2000s. As of 
2014, there was only one NCE pipeline in the clinical stage, while other two remain in 
the drug discovery. Moreover, about 200 researchers concentrating on antibacterial and 
anti-cancer drugs were dispersed across the new QOL research areas, and many of 
them left the institute to continue their research topics elsewhere. 173  Although the 
company, as an affiliate of Chaebol, has gradually recovered its loss in R&D personnel, 
it is clear that this strategic conversion weakened the technological capability that had 
been accumulated over 15 years of exploratory learning.  
2) Other case firms redirecting NCE development 
Returning to the main point, the shift in LGLS’s focus to QOL drugs is supported by the 
experience of two other case firms, Dong-a and Yuhan. For example, one of Dong-a’s 
most recent projects in clinical trials is an anti-diabetic compound to treat Type 2 diabetes 
(DA-1229). Dong-a focused on deriving a superior alternative compound to Sitagliptin, a 
dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP-4) inhibitor, which was launched by Merck (brand name: 
Januvia) in 2007, following the same strategy as its previously successful project of 
Zydena, that is, a me-better strategy in the QOL area. 
There are two main reasons why Dong-a continues to focus on the me-better strategy 
rather than the first-in-class strategy. First, the company has still relatively few resources 
to devote to upstream research on identifying new targets and lead compounds. 
Additionally, Dong-a has shown relatively strong middle-stage R&D capability, 
concentrating on the modification of existing lead compounds like Zydena. 
Indeed, based on internal midstream R&D capability, Dong-a seems to be aiming to be 
a specialised developer in a few QOL market segments by taking advantage of external 
opportunity from Big Pharma’s tendency to outsource drug candidates. The CTO of 
Dong-a argued that, for a late-mover firm, it was most effective to place R&D focus on 
middle-stage development within a few niche markets: 
"We aim to become an innovator in disease areas that the Big Pharmas are not 
eligible to directly enter because of the market size, i.e., niche markets. The QOL-
based niche market will allow a small-sized, late entrant to acquire more market 
opportunity than intensely competitive antibiotics. We will quickly develop better, 
best, or innovative NCEs in these areas and complete clinical trials by the phase 
                                                          
173 For example, some involved in antibody research moved to KRIBB and others set up DBFs to continue 
their own research (e.g., LegoChem Bioscience). According to an interviewee, almost 100 researchers left 
the company. 
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IIA stage, minimising the R&D period. Then we will transfer [the drugs] to Big 
Pharma for multinational development (2A model). Through this strategy, we will 
grow as a specialised innovator in a few therapeutic areas."  
Other case firms also diversified their NCE pipelines from necessary drugs to QOL drugs, 
although their switchover was not as radical as that of LGLS and Dong-a (Table 6.5). By 
2012, QOL drugs accounted for 77% of all 238 pipelines (by 35 R&D intensive firms), up 
from 64% of 89 NCE pipelines by 32 R&D intensive firms in 2008 (KDRA 2009, 2013).174 
In 2012, among all 238 pipelines by 35 R&D-intensive firms, there were only 55 pipelines 
dedicated to anti-cancer drugs and antibiotics. Overall, the redirection of NCE 
development towards QOL drugs reflects firms’ search for innovation paths with more 
commercial potential, especially given competitive pressure from Big Pharma in the 
major market segments.  
6.4.3 Production innovation - Phytomedicines 
Phytomedicine R&D is another important path of diversification (Table 6.6). It is based 
on the local knowledge base of traditional Korean medicine. The exceptional commercial 
success of a phytomedicine developed in early 2000 ignited the phytomedicine R&D 
expansion of the 2000s.175 Five of the nine case firms have operated nine phytomedicine 
pipelines. Furthermore, 64 phytomedicine pipelines by domestic companies are 
estimated to be in clinical trials (Popular Science, 24/12/2010). 
Table 6.6: KFDA approval of phytomedicine clinical trials 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Phase I    1  1  
Phase II 1 1 6 6 4 7 8 
Phase III   1  3 5 4 
Total 1 1 7 7 7 13 12 
Source: KDRA (2009) 
1) Motive for the rush to phytomedicine R&D 
The phytomedicine Stillen, an anti-gastritis agent (DA-9601, eupatilin), became a best-
seller in the 2000s. It was first outsourced by a university research team in 1994 under 
                                                          
174 However, it should be noted that the total pipelines of 238 consists of not only NCEs but also other 
types of new-drugs: NCEs – 112, Biological drugs – 71, Phytomedicines – 55. 
175 Shinbaro by Green Cross for osteoarthritis, Motilitone by Dong-a for functional gastrointestinal disorders, 
Synatura by Ahn-kook for cough and congestion, Layla by Viromed for osteoarthritis in 2011. After only a 
year, Synatura and Motilitone recorded sales of approximately US$35 million, US$10 million in 2012. In 
particular, Synatura was licensed out to Gravity Bio, a US-based specialised pharmaceutical company to 
cough, cold and allergies, in 2013.  
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pressure to develop new drugs. The drug candidate entered clinical development 
partially supported by a NRDP from the MOHW in 1995 and then was approved by the 
KFDA in 2002. Stillen is the most prescribed ETC drug in 2012, reaching about US$ 90 
million in sales. The drug’s remarkable commercial success compared with NCEs 
attracted other domestic firms to phytomedicine development in the second round of 
new-drug R&D. 
In general, phytomedicine R&D costs less (Table 6.7), and the concept of the drug is 
easier to substantiate, compared with the development of NCEs. Moreover, efficacy is 
largely already known through the use of corresponding herbal plants throughout 
generations.  
Table 6.7: Comparisons between NCEs and phytomedicines176 
R&D stages 
R&D Cost (millions of $)  Development lead time (months) 
NCE Phytomedicines NCE Phytomedicines 
Drug discovery/ 
Pre-clinical trials 90 2-3 33.5 36-60 
Clinical trial 1 48 0.2 15.5 Exemption to 12 
Clinical trial 2 54 0.5-1 24.3 14 
Clinical trial 3 36 3-5 30.3 24 
NDA 6 0.3 30.3 18 
Total 234 5.9-9.5 11 years 7 to 10 years 
Source: Cho (2003)  
These technological and cost advantages compared with NCE development are 
essentially based on the profound knowledge base of traditional Korean medicine. 
Koreans have accumulated a large body of knowledge about herbal drugs and clinical 
practice, although this knowledge has been largely unexploited by modern science. As 
the CTO of Dong-a put it, this makes it “relatively easier to generate a research idea from 
the existing traditional materials as sources of new drugs. Because we can utilise this 
information and knowhow, the R&D costs and time are reduced compared with 
developing NCEs. Moreover, the possibility of market success is higher because of the 
lower psychological barrier to herbal materials.” 
                                                          
176 This data, in fact, is a rather incorrect comparison using different criterion. In the case of NCE, it seems 
to refer to the drug development at the global level, i.e., by the Big Pharma, while the phytomedicine data 
seems to be based on the company’s internal costs. According to the KDRA data, NCE’s domestic 
development to date constituted about US$23 million, while that of phytomedicine constituted around US$17 
million on average.   
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Specifically, the development of phytomedicine drugs based on traditional medicine 
offers two technological advantages that can help overcome the most critical barriers to 
latecomers. First, upstream research for the identification of target and lead compounds 
is unnecessary. Scientific extraction and validation of the existing materials can replace 
the key steps of upstream research. Second, the clinical development success rate is 
higher due to prior knowledge about efficacy and safety based on traditional medicine. 
Although standardisation of the raw materials remains a challenge, this is an easier task 
than drug discovery research. Thus, for most domestic firms with weak upstream 
research and financial capability, the development of phytomedicine is a solution to 
overcoming R&D barriers. 
Moreover, the government has supported phytomedicine development. Unlike NCE 
development, traditional medicine-based phytomedicine development has received 
direct policy attention since the mid-1990s, when the NRDP for Korean new-drug 
development was launched. In 2000, the government established a promotion act for 
phytomedicine development that exempted phytomedicines from initial safety and 
efficacy tests as long as they were being developed for the indications referred to in the 
officially acknowledged 12 books of traditional medicine.  
On the whole, the recent rush to phytomedicine R&D has the same cause as the focus 
on IMDs (and DDS) and QOL-oriented NCEs: Firms needed to find alternative routes of 
exploratory learning to realise profits amid technological uncertainty. In particular, the 
innovation path for phytomedicines can be seen as the outcome of both firms’ active 
participation and direct governmental support for R&D and regulation.    
6.4.4 Product innovation – Biological drugs 
Biotechnology R&D, ranging from imitative development to innovation trials, has long 
been one of the most promising alternative paths for pharmaceutical companies. In fact, 
the attention to biotechnology by case firms was a relatively less novel phenomenon than 
their focus on QOL drugs and phytomedicine. Rather, biotechnology R&D can be said to 
have been occurring across the entire transitional period of the KoPI, in parallel with NCE 
development trials. Biotechnology was once regarded as an alternative business 
opportunity that could lift a company up to the level of innovator in the early 1990s, at 
least by a few case firms. To date, however, these firms have still remained at an imitative 
learning stage.  
The recent refocus on biotechnology R&D can be attributed to the joint effects of the 
national ambition for biotechnology and the firms’ search for new business opportunities. 
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Under a regime of active governmental support to biotechnology, ranging from 
biosimilars and new biologics to stem cells, vaccines and bioinformatics, case firms have 
continued biotechnology research, with a recent refocus on commercialisation. 
1) Early entry into biotechnology, but passive expansion to commercialisation  
For example, Dong-a has shown continuous R&D investment in the emerging 
biotechnology field since the 1980s, although its market performance is still opaque. The 
company has paid no less attention to biotechnology than to synthetic drug R&D, in terms 
of entry time and persistence (Table 6.8). Dong-a has conducted biotechnology research 
for about 25 years and now maintains about 80 researchers focusing on biotechnology, 
accounting for almost 30% of its entire research staff. In spite of this long-term 
investment, the biotechnology business has only just started to contribute to the 
company’s revenue, comprising about 15% of total sales entering into the middle of the 
2000s, mainly from imitative protein drugs, i.e., biosimilars.  
Table 6.8: Dong-a’s R&D achievements in biotechnology 
Year Biological drugs Chemical drugs 
1980s ∙ Hepatitis B virus (HBV) diagnostic agent in 1986 
∙ AIDS diagnostic agent in 1988 
 
1990s ∙ Interferon-alpha (IFN-alpha) in 1994 
∙ Hepatitis C virus (HCV) diagnostic agent in 1995. 
∙ Human growth hormone in 1999 
∙ Croserine 
(anti-tuberculosis)  
2000s ∙ Erythropoietin and Granulocyte colony- 
stimulating factor (GCSF) in 2001 
∙ Follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) in 2006 
∙ Zydena (NCE) in 2005  
∙ Sivextro (NCE) in 2014  
 
Source: Interviews (49 and 50 (K-Pharma)) 
Specifically, Dong-a started to acquire expertise in biotechnology by overseas training in 
rDNA technology in the early 1980s (in Japan and the US) and by experimental 
production of diagnostic agents.177  The development of diagnostic agents aimed at 
accumulating basic knowledge of biotechnology rather than making profitable products 
(Interview 49 (K-Pharma)). On this basis, Dong-a started to localise off-patent first 
generation protein drugs, such as human growth hormone and erythropoietin, in the 
1990s.  
                                                          
177 Overseas training became the main channel of technological learning in the early stages of the company’s 
biotechnology R&D. Over the 1980s and 1990s (until 2002), 12 biotechnology researchers were trained 
through overseas R&D organisations such as RIKEN (a Japanese leading public institute, the Institute of 
Physical and Chemical Research) and Otsuka (a pharmaceutical company, the developer of the blockbuster 
drug Abilify (Aripiprex) for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder). 
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However, the company missed the right time of entry to build large-scale production 
facilities for biosimilars and therapeutic antibodies in the early and mid-2000s (Interview 
49 (K-Pharma)). This prevented Dong-a from taking the ‘first follower’ position in the 
emerging biosimilars business, and it also caused a delay in recouping its long-term R&D 
investment in biotechnology. In spite of its technological accumulation, LGLS also 
missed the optimal entry time because it was reluctant to invest in large-scale production 
facilities for biosimilars in the early and mid-2000s (Interview 35 (DBF)).178 A large-scale 
investment in biosimilar production under the commercial and regulatory uncertainty of 
this emerging market was impossible for small- and medium-sized domestic companies. 
In the midst of the Korean biotechnology boom, Dong-a belatedly decided to build a new 
factory for mass production of biological drugs in the form of a joint venture with a 
Japanese pharmaceutical company, Meiji, in 2011. It will produce a biosimilar of 
Herceptin starting in 2017.  
Overall, although Dong-a is gradually enhancing its imitation-based biological drug 
business (it has 10 biosimilar or biobetter products in the pipeline), the company seems 
to need more time to obtain commercial success due to its relatively late start at building 
production capability compared with competing biosimilar developers.  
Interestingly, in the meantime, new entrants such as Celltrion (a capital-intensive DBF) 
and Samsung are now swiftly trying to take the lead in the emerging global market in 
biosimilars, while the case firms such as Dong-a and LGLS were more passive in 
entering full-scale mass production. Remsima by Celltrion, a biosimilar of the rheumatoid 
arthritis drug Remicade by Johnson & Johnson, became the first monoclonal antibody 
biosimilar approved by the European Medicines Agency in 2013. Samsung also applied 
for product approval of two biosimilars of Enbrel and Remicade in the EU in 2015. 
2) Other case firms in biotechnology R&D 
Other case firms have also shown increasing attention to the biotechnology business 
beyond small-scale R&D activities. As seen in the case of Dong-a, technological learning 
generally starts through the accumulation of fundamental genetic engineering 
techniques by developing diagnostic agents and further localising first- and second-
generation protein drugs (GC, Yuhan and LGLS). Other companies have taken similar 
reverse engineering paths. Hanmi started by attempting mass production of first-
generation protein drugs utilising transgenic animals, and moved on to develop DDS for 
biobetters. Dong-wha, Ilyang and JW have maintained small-scale R&D units for 
                                                          
178 Interview: the CFO of LegoChem Bioscience, a former manager of LGLS.  
165 
 
biotechnology since the 1990s. On the basis of technological accumulation, the case 
firms now deal with diverse areas in biotechnology, from biosimilars and cell-culture-
based vaccines to new biologics and stem cell research (Table 6.9).    
Table 6.9: Biotechnology R&D pipelines of the case firms 
Case firm 
Pipelines 
in biologics 
Main areas of R&D in biotechnology 
Starting year of 
biotech R&D 
Dong-a  
Yuhan 
Hanmi 
CKD 
JW 
Green Cross 
LGLS 
Ilyang 
Dong-wha 
13 
not specified 
6 
2 
3 
1 
12 
2 
- 
Biosimilar, biobetters, stem cell 
New biologics, process research 
Biobetters  
Biosimilars, Vaccines 
Stem cell 
Vaccines, new biologics, biobetters  
Vaccines, new biologics, biobetters, biosimilars  
Vaccines, new biologics 
- 
1988 
1992 
1996 
1992 
1998 
 1970s 
1982 
1990 
1994 
Source: Each company’s website and IR reports 
Overall, diversification into biotechnology R&D can be seen as an effort to overcome the 
existing organic-chemistry-based technological and market leadership by Big Pharma. 
The difficulty of developing and marketing NCEs, as the case firms have experienced, 
leads latecomer countries and firms to discover strong alternative routes to catch up in 
an emerging biotechnology paradigm.  
However, there is a key point that should be recalled concerning this transition. As seen 
in the previous chapters, biotechnology R&D and its industrialisation involve various 
innovation actors. That is, successful entry into this new technological paradigm requires 
collective and interactive learning among diverse innovation actors. However, the 
collaboration of the pharmaceutical firms with DBFs for biotechnology industrialisation 
has been limited until very recently, whereas internal learning in biotechnology has 
increasingly continued.179  
6.5 Features of Drug R&D in View of Exploratory Learning 
This section identifies common features of latecomer firms’ new-drug R&D. It focuses in 
particular on barriers to new-drug R&D and the possibility of overcoming these barriers.  
6.5.1 The first round of new-drug R&D 
                                                          
179 This does not mean that they have never conducted R&D collaboration with DBFs, but indicates a rather 
passive pattern of collaboration. This is discussed further in Chapter 7.  
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In the first round of new-drug R&D between 1987 and the mid-2000s, seven NCEs were 
developed by case firms (Table 6.10). Among these, four NCEs were examined in detail. 
Failures in three of these cases revealed several obstacles that latecomer firms face in 
new-drug R&D, particularly in terms of the development of commercially viable drugs. In 
contrast, the case of Zydena by Dong-a showed how such firms can overcome these 
obstacles. In this sub-section, these barriers and the possibilities to overcome them are 
summarised from three perspectives: (a) upstream research, (b) downstream 
development, and (c) marketing stages.  
Table 6.10: Summary of the development of the first new drugs by case firms 
(unit: millions of US$) 
Brand of 
NCEs 
(Firm) 
Indication 
R&D 
period 
(Lead 
time) 
R&D investment Cumulative 
domestic 
sales  
(Sales 
period) 
Technology 
Export Internal NRDPs Total 
Milican 
(Dongwha) 
Anti-cancer 
1995 ~ 
2001 (8) 
4.3 - 4.3 
1.3 
(10 years) 
- 
Q-Roxin 
(JW) 
Antibiotic 
1991 ~ 
2001 (11) 
4.7 
0.3 
(MOHW) 
5 
(6%) 
15 
(10 years) 
- 
Factive 
(LGLS) 
Antibiotic 
1991 
~2002 
(11) 
50 
(GSK 
:250) 
- 300 
84 
(8 years) 
GSK in 1997 
-renunciation 
Camtobell 
(CKD) 
Anti-cancer 
1994 ~ 
2003 (11) 
13 
2 
(MOHW) 
15 
(13%) 
12.6 
(7 years) 
ALZA in 
2000 
-renunciation 
Revanex 
(Yuhan) 
Peptic ulcer 
1991 ~ 
2005 (15) 
37.2 
2.8 
(MOST) 
40 
(7%) 
42 
(6 years) 
GSK in 2000 
-renunciation 
Zydena 
(Dong-a) 
Erectile 
dysfunction 
1997 ~ 
2005 (9) 
17.8 
2.3 
(MOHW) 
20 
(11%) 
80 
(5 years) 
Warner 
Chilcott 
in 2009 
-in progress 
Noltec 
(Ilyang) 
Gastric ulcer 
1987 ~ 
2008 (22) 
26.3 
3.7 
(MOST 
/MOHW) 
30 
(12%) 
2.8 
(2 years) 
TAP in 2005 
-renunciation 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from several sources 
a) During upstream research, all firms were faced with a lack of capability needed to 
identify targets and develop lead compounds. They had few experienced researchers 
and relatively few funds to invest in R&D. Although they had accumulated strong imitative 
capability through localising APIs, drug discovery needs advanced scientific research 
beyond the process technologies.    
Thus, under this limited research capability, modification of existing lead compounds 
(that is, the me-better strategy) was adopted as a way to lift the barrier of drug discovery. 
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The latecomer firms could thus skip upstream research on target and lead identification 
and reduce technological risk. They could finally derive improved drug candidates based 
on existing lead compounds. However, this strategy generally failed to generate 
satisfactory commercial outcomes, and the firms were unable to decrease the 
development time gap against revival products due to their overall lack of research 
capability. In addition, the prolonged development lead time made it difficult to penetrate 
the market.    
In contrast, the case of Zydena by Dong-a shows how this upstream research barrier 
could be overcome, even as Dong-a followed the same me-better strategy. Dong-a 
actively utilised the prior knowledge base it had accumulated from previous failed 
projects.  
b) In terms of downstream development, the case firms were unable to complete 
multinational clinical trials. Big Pharma companies that acquired case firms’ drug 
candidates for global development saw low market potential, while the clinical 
development of licensed-out drugs was directly affected by changes in the global 
pharmaceutical industry’s competition structure, such as mergers and acquisitions. 
Renunciations by Big Pharma resulted in the failure of global development of locally 
derived NCEs. It also caused a delay in the development lead time and apathy toward 
the NCEs after their local NDA in the domestic market.  
In contrast, Dong-a recognised the importance of lead time for drug development as a 
critical factor in the me-better strategy; a short lead time would allow a me-better drug to 
be included in the first tier of follow-up NCEs to the first-in-class NCEs (such as Levitra 
and Cialis, in the case of Viagra). They were less attached to global development, 
prioritising the domestic market. In so doing, they narrowed the time gap to market 
launch between their drug and the first-in-class drug. They were also able to avoid 
absolute subordination to the development leadership of Big Pharma.  
c) From the perspective of marketing, the three NCEs failed to generate expected market 
profits. This was due to the cumulative results of the delay in drug identification, the focus 
on a more competitive market, reliance on Big Pharma and a failure to reflect changing 
market needs in the R&D process.  
On the other hand, Dong-a developed Zydena for a niche market segment with a weak 
degree of market competition. This allowed the company to penetrate the domestic 
market and create successful profit in a fairly smooth manner; Domestic success then 
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bolstered their technological credibility, which aided further global development. Zydena 
is being launched in Brazil in 2015 and in the process of product approval in the US.  
Overall, an analysis of the first round of new-drug R&D shows that technological barriers 
can be overcome to some extent over the course of a long R&D process. However, it 
also reveals the technological success finally gained cannot be proportionately 
translated to market performance if the R&D process does not reflect market needs and 
the global competitive environment. 
6.5.2 The second round of new-drug R&D  
The second round of new-drug R&D was started in response to the commercial failure 
of the first round of new drugs, and the changing institutional environment. This round 
saw diversification of drug R&D, moving away from NCE development for the major 
markets. Four alternative R&D pathways were identified: incremental innovation through 
IMDs, niche NCEs related to QOL, traditional medicine-based phytomedicines and 
biological drugs in both imitative and innovative areas (Tables 6.11 and 6.12). This 
diversification can also be seen by looking at the distribution of R&D personnel in the 
KoPI (Table 6.13). 
Table 6.11: Diversification of R&D pipelines  
Case firms 
Chemistry-based R&D Biotechnology R&D 
Own 
DDS 
IMD 
NCE  
in QOL  
Anti-cancer/ 
Antibiotics 
Phytomedicine Biologic Vaccine 
Dong-A 
Yuhan 
Hanmi 
CKD 
JW 
Green Cross 
LGLS 
Ilyang 
Dong-wha 
○ 
○ 
○ 
○ 
○ 
- 
○ 
○ 
○ 
2 
6 
11 
6 
10 
- 
- 
2 
- 
9 
10 
- 
3 
3 
1 
9 
 
4 
1 
2 
5 
2 
2 
- 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
- 
○ 
- 
1 
- 
- 
2 
8 
○ 
6 
1 
○ 
9 
7 
○ 
○ 
○ 
- 
- 
1 
- 
3 
5 
○ 
- 
Source: Own elaboration based on data acquired from each firm’s annual reports 
The incremental innovation path of IMDs could maximise prior imitative capability (i.e., 
process technologies) without full-scale exploratory research. This path was rapidly 
established to deal with institutional changes, such as the introduction of SPD. Similarly, 
the recent boom of phytomedicine R&D is seen as a way to minimise technological risk 
in drug discovery through ‘scientifying’ the herbal plants that are already used locally. At 
the same time, the focus on NCE development has shifted to the less-competitive QOL-
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related diseases, which represent a niche market opportunity. Lastly, companies are 
paying more attention to biological drugs in an effort to overcome the technological 
limitations in synthetic drug R&D and the industrial dominance by Big Pharma.  
This diversification reveals an experimental diversity in the latecomers’ technological 
catch-up in the science-based and Big-Pharma-led pharmaceutical industry. As seen, 
the first new drugs often failed commercially after 10 to 20 years of R&D. The analysis 
in this chapter has shown that a single focus on technological performance hardly 
secured the creation of significant profit sources or a successful transition. Companies 
therefore diversified in an effort to find more realistic innovation paths to overcome the 
transitional barriers. This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 8.  
Table 6.12: Patent trends of all case companies, by R&D field 
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 
1988-
1999 
2000- 
2010 
 
Chemistry 
NCEs 
(Innovative & derivatives) - - 1 129 147 
Phytomedicine - - - 10 16 
IMDs  
(DDS, composition, structure) 
- - - 82 174 
Process development 4 20 80 137 132 
Biotechnology 
Product (& materials) - - 1 135 112 
Method - - 5 140 92 
Total number of patents 4 20 
86 
(1%)* 
633 
(56%)* 
  673 
 (66%)* 
* The ratio of non-process development related patents (i.e., closer to product development) 
Table 6.13: Distribution of R&D personnel in the KoPI, by product field 
R&D fields 2009 2010 2011 
 
Chemistry 
NCEs 1,186 1,214 1,290 
Phytomedicine    431    477    605 
IMDs  1,170 1,190 1,251 
Generics 1,404 1,528 1,684 
APIs (Bulk drugs)    473   425   445 
Biotechnology 
New biologics  553   591   594 
Biobetters  224   243   284 
Biosimilars  320   328   353 
Total number of researcher 5,760 5,996               6,496 
 Source: KHIDI (2011) 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed the latecomer firms’ new-drug R&D processes, which were 
characterised by the commercial failure of their first in-house-developed NCEs, and 
subsequent diversification into new-drug R&D paths.  
An analysis of the first round of new-drug R&D, which failed to produce a market profit 
from firms’ first NCEs, identified three major barriers to technological learning. The first 
barrier was the absolute lack of upstream research capability. Because of this, 
latecomers largely adopted a me-better strategy, trying to produce their own versions of 
existing NCEs in popular market segments to overcome their limited scientific research 
capability. Second, Korean firms’ lack of development capability led them to simply 
transfer their technology to Big Pharma, which resulted in the subordination of 
development leadership to potential competitors. Third, their new-drug R&D activities 
failed to reflect downstream market factors. 
The second round of new-drug R&D involved the deployment of four diversified paths, 
which was more realistic in terms of creating market profitability. Firms hoped to 
overcome the barriers encountered in the first round of new-drug R&D by focusing on 
niche markets and allocating their projects to various drug categories: Short-term 
incremental innovation through developing IMCs, QOL-oriented NCE development as a 
long-term innovation source, phytomedicine development as a mid- and long-term profit 
source and biotechnology R&D to reap the benefit of the changing technological 
paradigm. 
Overall, this chapter showed the latecomer firms’ awkward practice of an exploratory 
mode of technological learning in their new-drug R&D process. In terms of R&D strategy, 
it also showed that technological learning never allows proportionate market catch-up if 
it does not match the changed catch-up environment in the transitional phase.  
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Chapter 7: Organisational change in New-drug R&D 
7.1 Introduction  
This last empirical chapter presents the alignment process of the organisational structure 
with the new drug R&D activities. 180  It points out that the delayed change of the 
organisational structure compared to the changing nature of technological learning 
toward exploration partly led to the problematic new-drug R&D process. This chapter 
consists of a single main section (Section 7.2).  
7.2 Organisational Structure for New-drug R&D  
This section addresses the changes in organisational structure to deal with new drug 
development. Specifically, it focuses on whether or not organisational structure has been 
rearranged with the same pace and proper form, as the case firms expand new drug 
R&D activities over the first and second rounds of new-drug R&D. In conclusion, 
organisational structure is revealed to have been altered in a late tempo compared to 
the changing mode of technological learning. The main focus is Dong-a’s case of 
organisational change as this is the most successful (Sub-section 7.2.1). This is followed 
by examples of other firms (Sub-section 7.2.2). It adds two exceptional cases that 
operate independent R&D organisation for conducting long-term drug research as small 
latecomers (Sub-section 7.2.3).  
7.2.1 Change in the R&D organisation of Dong-a 
In the 1980s: During the reinforcement of the product patent system in the 1980s, the 
simple development organisation of final products was first expanded into the 
fundamental steps of drug R&D, such as the synthetic research and toxicity test (from 
Figure 7.1a to Figure 7.1b). The expansion of R&D organisation mainly focused on the 
analysis and localisation of existing drugs and partly on synthetic chemistry research 
related to new drugs. Biotechnology research units were also set up during this period. 
Between 1987 and 1998: The most substantial start of new-drug R&D began after the 
enlargement of the R&D centre in 1987. Figure 7.1c shows that new-drug R&D had been 
conducted under the function-based organisational structure in that period (between 
1987 and 1998). Organic synthesis, pharmacology and safety tests were conducted by 
                                                          
180 This organisational perspective has scarcely been treated as the main perspective in understanding 
latecomers’ catch-up in the literature, as the focus on technological learning activities has provided sufficient 
in-depth understanding of the successful catch-up by Asian NIEs. 
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individual teams, devoted to these specific functions, respectively. This was partly a 
result of the incremental entry strategy for new-drug R&D under the main focus on 
imitative development of generic drugs based on the function-based structure.  
Between 1998 and 2002: At the beginning of 1998, Dong-a rearranged the R&D 
organisation by introducing a mixed organisational form of function (e.g., safety team) 
and project (organic drug teams) (Dong-a 2002) (Figure 7.1d). Through organisational 
change, they highlighted the importance of “reality based R&D activity and its 
advancement”, rather than aiming at setting up an organisation for long-term R&D 
(Interview 48 (K-Pharma)).181 In fact, it was to speed up the development of commercially 
viable drugs by making the competition structure between organic drugs teams 
(Interview 48 (K-Pharma)). The continuous failure of upstream drug research, and the 
economic crisis in late 1997, underlay the trial of organisational rearrangement. It 
exposed the difficulty of holding up innovative R&D in the long-term as a small size 
latecomer firm.  
Between 2002 and 2007: The R&D centre was later reorganised by the division of the 
R&D field in 2002 (Figure7.1e). This period is viewed as the beginning of the full 
involvement of new-drug R&D: a drug research division (based on organic chemistry), 
biopharmaceutical division (based on biotechnology), and product development division 
(which included most imitative development and in-licensed drugs). In the drug research 
and biopharmaceutical divisions, each team was comprised of an R&D project base 
rather than a function base. The organisational design delineated the main functions of 
drug research into a team, and was intended to promote interactions between functional 
areas, such as synthesis and pharmacology (Interview 49 (K-Pharma)). The CTO 
pointed out the continuous change in organisational structure was mainly due to the 
ongoing underperformance of their upstream research.  
Between 2007 and 2012: The organisational structure shows a more sophisticated and 
enlarged form of the previous project-based R&D organisation (Figure7.1f). The 
differences from the previous form are the transfer of a preclinical evaluation team from 
the product development division to the drug research centre, and the establishment of 
an independent phytomedicine team.182 In particular, the former change was intended to 
agglutinate the upstream and middle-stage research.183 The latter, as seen, reflects the 
innovation strategy of Dong-a, focusing on a niche market based on the success of its 
                                                          
181 For example, the development of economically high added APIs, such as cycloserine and ondansetron, 
which indicated the achievement of more successful imitative R&D. 
182 The product development research centre is mainly devoted to developing IMDs and DDSs.  
183 The phytomedicine research unit moved to the product development centre in 2012. 
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first phytomedicine, Stillen. Overall, the present R&D organisation reveals an 
incremental transformation of the R&D organisation that seems more suitable for 
conducting more interactive learning between each function of new drug R&D.  
a. Until 1984 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Between 1985 and 1987 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Between 1987 and 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
d. Between 1998 and 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
e. Between 2002 and 2007 
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f. 2007 and 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g. In 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The change in R&D organisation of Dong-a 
Sources: Interviews and internal reports, company website, and Dong-a 70 years (2002)  
Late establishment of R&D organisation for systemic new-drug R&D  
In the present form of the R&D organisation (Figure 7.1f and g), three managerial 
decisions are worth noting in view of exploratory learning.  
(i) First, the newly launched R&D committee, formed in 2009, consisted of seven senior 
managers from the headquarters (or departments) of research, development (for clinical 
development), production, management planning, marketing, and international business. 
Monthly meetings checked progress and determined the possibility of launching new-
drug projects and whether on-going projects should be continued or dropped.  
In 2011, the decision was made through the R&D committee to drop a pipeline product 
that had completed its clinical phase I, despite an R&D investment of about US$6 million 
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(i.e., about 10% of the total R&D expenditure in 2011). The abandonment of this project 
was attributed to the lack of commercial viability in the global market. 
It is particularly important to note that the company had begun to reflect market trends in 
their R&D processes in a systemic manner. While dropping this type of project is not 
uncommon in Big Pharma, it was the first time for Dong-a. Prior to this, most projects 
were dropped in the R&D process due only to technological reasons (e.g., derivation, 
toxicity, or efficacy), as shown earlier. More specifically, factors on the downstream side, 
such as demand changes in the targeted market, seldom influenced the decisions at 
each R&D stage. The first round of new-drug R&D revealed this perspective.  
(ii) Second, the small R&D centres were based on their R&D fields (NCEs including 
phytomedicine, IMDs and DDSs) with the underlying tone of competitive resource 
allocation. Allocation of R&D investment to the three R&D centres became based on 
their performance. That is, the firm introduced a kind of competition system between 
small research groups, with the aim of speeding up the R&D process. This type of small 
research group-based organisational management was operated by GSK in various 
pipeline products. 184  However, it is unclear that the competition structure would 
encourage the long-term exploratory R&D. 
(iii) Interestingly, in 2013 Dong-a reallocated the three R&D centres into the two 
companies. The R&D centres of biotechnology and innovative new drugs were placed 
under the Dong-a Socio Holdings, the holding company of all Dong-a subsidiaries. R&D 
centres of (me-too/better) new drug R&D and product development were allocated in 
Dong-a ST (Science and Technology), which focused on the ethical drug business. The 
reorganisation of R&D centres indicates the rearrangement of drug R&D depending on 
the degree of exploration and possibility of commercialisation. The former R&D fields, 
innovative new drug R&D (first-in-class) and biotechnology R&D, requires higher 
technological and business risk than the latter R&D. Thus, placing the former R&D in the 
holding company seemed to secure its stability of long term research investment. The 
case of LGLS showed the direct influence of the commercial failure of Factive on later 
R&D projects under the same organisational boundary. The following examples of GC 
and JW support the effectiveness of the division of R&D organisations depending on 
their nature of technological learning. 
On the whole, the change in organisational structure at Dong-a has shown that an 
exploratory mode of technological learning has been run in parallel with managerial 
                                                          
184 Comment by the CEO of GSK, Andrew Witty (ChosunIlbo 13/10/2010).  
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efforts to design an "appropriate" organisational structure. The most noticeable change 
in R&D organisation was not just the physical enlargement of the R&D centre but also 
the change in organisational structure from function-based to project-based, adding the 
characteristics of a matrix organisation. 
However, determining whether or not this organisational change has been sufficiently 
synchronised with their exploratory learning is difficult. Rather, their organisational 
change can be said to be laggard, as a post-response to the continuous failure of new-
drug development, not as a pre-emptively designed R&D organisation, at least until the 
middle of 2000s. The practical change in organisational structure, that could comprehend 
the main functions of new-drug research within a team for more interactive and prompt 
responses, was not formed until 2002. Furthermore, full-scale organisational change has 
been conducted within the last few years, since 2007. 
7.2.2 Lag in restructuring R&D organisation  
Firms in other case studies reveal the lag in synchronising the organisational structure 
with their rapidly expanding exploratory learning more clearly. Many case firms have 
recently started to change their R&D organisation after their continuous failures in 
innovative R&D, which had been operated under the function-based R&D organisation. 
Herein, the internal estimation of their organisational structure in new-drug development 
(e.g., Yuhan, CKD) is presented briefly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The organisational structure of the R&D centre of Yuhan (after 2009) 
First, in 2010 Yuhan completely reformed their R&D centre into a project-based 
organisation (Figure 7.2). This reconstitution was linked to continuous failures in their 
pipeline products after the development of their first drug, Revanex, in 2004. They were 
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faced with the absence of any prominent pipeline products in the second or last phase 
of clinical trials (Interview 46 (K-Pharma)). Prior to the change, their innovative R&D had 
mainly been operated as a functional-based organisation. To solve the static R&D 
process in a function-based R&D organisation, they introduced a unit-based matrix 
organisation, rather than one that used departments or teams.185 
The firm has also established an interdivisional strategic team, called the disease 
strategy team (DST), which consists of leading researchers, developers, marketing 
specialists, and clinicians for planning and checking on their R&D and commercialisation 
strategy across nine areas of disease. The DST was initially set up to probe unmet 
medical needs, and to monitor the potential for commercialisation of their pipeline 
products in the nine disease areas on which the company has focused. On the whole, 
through both the execution units of the real R&D activities and the monitoring of DSTs, 
they intended to develop a dynamic reflection system of the clinical and market 
information on the R&D process (Figure 7.3).186 
Therefore, the DST meeting can be regarded as a similar organisational form to the R&D 
committee newly established by Dong-a. It should also be noted that the recent 
reformation was led by a newly-scouted executive director (for R&D strategy) from Big 
Pharma of Bristol-Myers Squibb (Dr Su-yeon, Nam, who worked as a global medical 
director in 2009) (Interview 46 (K-Pharma)). 
 
  
                                                          
185 Comment of the CTO of Yuhan, adopted from DailyPharm, 2/5/2011. The concept of unit seems to stress 
the dynamics and coherence of drug research-related functions within each drug development project, based 
on the interviews. 
186 In Figure 3, CV – cardiovascular, GI – Gastrointestinal, Respi – respiratory, Onco – oncology, CNS – 
central nervous system, and Immun – immunology.   
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Figure 7.3: The operation of the R&D organisation of Yuhan (after 2009) 
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In the case of CKD, no data for substantial organisational structure were acquired. 
However, interviews with their CTO confirmed that their R&D organisation had also been 
entirely restructured in the rapid enhancement of innovative R&D. In 2011, three small 
R&D centres were formed: a new drug research centre, a biotechnology research centre, 
and a formulation research centre. This is a similar organisational structure to that of 
Dong-a.  
In each research centre, the interaction between R&D functions is stressed for efficient 
new-drug R&D. The scouted head of the new-drug research centre, Dr Sung-gon Kim, 
former researcher at Merck, emphasised the importance of interactive research activities 
between functions:  
In the past, our (Korean firms) new-drug R&D was considerably retarded because 
each research stage did not simultaneously or immediately provide feedback for 
each other under the function-based team structure. Between the functional 
teams, a time lag was caused when the research outcomes were transferred to 
the next steps and further, feedback from other functional teams also lagged. 
Now we are really trying to build better organisational structures that can 
encourage the interactive research activities between medicinal chemistry, 
pharmacology, toxicity, formulation, and so on (Interview 51 (K-Pharma)). 
In short, the function-based compartmented R&D activities caused a lowering of 
interaction between each R&D step. This has been one of the critical factors degrading 
the commercial potentiality of new drug R&D activities by latecomer firms. Interestingly, 
this point was particularly emphasised by the interviewees who had experienced the 
R&D activities in Big Pharma (Interviews 34, 38 and 51). The CTO of Yuhan points out 
the degradation of interactive R&D and translational research between upstream and 
downstream R&D:  
At present, researchers tend to concentrate only on their main tasks. Chemists 
only conduct chemical research in the laboratory. Animal experimenters only 
implement toxicity tests. In this routine, research outcomes are not shared and 
integrated until the completion of clinical trials. Thus, if the company doesn’t 
acquire the expected R&D outcomes in the clinical development, they have to go 
back to the first step and do it again. R&D progress should be monitored and 
discussed in every step between different functional researchers and then the 
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company can derive more prompt alternatives. Time and cost efficiency can be 
achieved by conducting such translational research.187 
The case of LGLS provides an understanding of the practical operational mechanism of 
the changing R&D organisation: the matrix form of R&D organisations in the mix of 
project and function that underlie the recent rearrangement of the R&D organisations in 
most case firms, although it is a rough sketch based on interviews (Figure 7.4) (Interview 
37 (Chaebol)). 
As seen, in 2006 they turned their R&D focus from competitive antibiotics to QOL drugs 
due to the influence of the marketing failure of their first new drug, Factive. In line with 
this, their R&D organisation was converted to a matrix of project-based (i.e., disease 
area-based) R&D research groups. The formal R&D organisation is comprised of the 
R&D functions (i.e., technological category-based research groups, generic 
development, pharmacology evaluation, and clinical development). On this basis, as the 
pool of R&D personnel, their real drug development projects are conducted by forming 
the transitory project groups that depend on pipelines and R&D progress.  
                                                          
187 Speaking in the Seoul New Drug Development Conference in 2010.  
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Figure 7.4: The organisational structure of the R&D centre of LGLS 
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Overall, although detailed organisational structures differ across the case study firms, 
they also show broad commonalities (Table 7.1). First, their present organisations for 
new-drug R&D were purposefully designed to facilitate more integrative/interactive R&D 
activities between upstream and downstream R&D functions in each drug development 
project. Second, the reformed R&D organisations show the dual R&D strategy that 
comprehends both new-drug R&D and the development of generic drugs, but with 
intentional separation of these two tasks. In most of these firms, generic drug 
development is deployed in the product development division. Lastly, it should be 
remembered that these organisational efforts are the evolutionary result of the 
continuous failure in new-drug R&D under the function-based R&D organisation, and 
thereby the weak interaction between R&D functions. 
Table 7.1: Summary of the restructuring of internal R&D organisations  
Name of 
firm 
Number of R&D 
centres (in 2010) 
Organisational 
structure 
Year of the 
organisational 
change 
Year of 
starting 
innovative 
R&D 
Dong-a 
Yuhan 
Hanmi 
CKD 
JW 
Green Cross 
LGLS 
Ilyang 
Dong-wha 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
6 
1 
1 
Project and Matrix 
Project and Matrix 
Project  
Project and Matrix 
Project  
Not identified 
Project and Matrix 
Function 
Function  
2007 
2009 
2010 
2010 
2007 
- 
2006 
- 
- 
1987 
1987 
2000s 
1987 
1987 
1970s 
1987 
1987 
1987 
Source: Data from various documents  
7.2.3 The arm’s length R&D organisation  
Lastly, the other firms under study, Green Cross (GC) and JW, have shown notable 
differences in their way of maintaining R&D organisations for upstream research, which 
has been one of the fundamental obstacles to new-drug development. While other firms 
have managed upstream research organisation under their direct command as central 
R&D centres, GC and JW have tried to deepen the upstream research through a dual 
approach by maintaining both the central R&D centres and independent organisations 
devoted to upstream research. These two examples support the effectiveness of 
autonomous R&D organisation in sustaining exploratory learning, as the literature argues. 
GC established the Mogam Biotechnology Research Institute (MBRI), Korea’s first 
privately funded non-profit research institute, in 1984, and JW set up a drug discovery 
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oriented JV, C&C, with a Japanese company (Chugai Pharmaceuticals) in 1992.188 Until 
now, they have concentrated on upstream and mid- and long-term research, escaping 
their mother companies’ direct control and market performance. Interestingly, the 
present pipeline products of these two companies are mostly involved in the first, or best, 
class of drugs that aim to penetrate the global market, and many of their pipelines have 
been first established based on drug identification by external R&D organisations.189 
The establishment of MBRI as an independent research institute was the decision of the 
owner after the commercial success of the in-house developed hepatitis B vaccine 
(Hepavox - the third hepatitis B vaccine developed worldwide). MBRI has operated on 
royalties from their research performance that have been mainly transferred to their 
parent company, GC. The institute also holds about 10% of the shares of the holding 
company of GC. Through establishing an independent R&D entity, on the one hand they 
have come to provide researchers with a more autonomous research environment. On 
the other hand, GC has been able to secure their explorative research activities, freed 
from its own market performance. That is, GC has tended to save their profits from 
Hepavox to secure the continuation of upstream research that has been interrupted by 
the external economic situation and GC’s annual market performance:  
The former chairman, my late father, aimed at setting up a reservoir of 
technological sources both for society and for us (GC). In reality, MBRI has 
played as a dam for GC in the last three decades. When we (GC) have made a 
surplus in market profit, we’ve stocked this in Mogam and thus they have been 
able to continue and expand their research. On the contrary, Mogam has played 
as a stronghold of R&D activities when we (GC) have been stuck in difficulties in 
market performance or other factors (Interview 40 (K-Pharma)).  
Overall, GC’s present R&D organisation is comprised of the directly-commanded R&D 
centre of GC and the indirectly-controlled MBRI, through an arm’s length transaction. 
The latter concentrates on mid- and long-term upstream research, and the former 
focuses on short- and mid-term downstream R&D. In short, almost half of GC’s 
publications were conducted by MBRI. As a result, their long-term research has been 
secured through MBRI. 
Although the case of JW is not exactly the same as GC, it also shows the possibility of 
the successful management of explorative research. Through the successful foundation 
                                                          
188 The institute has been registered as a collaborating research centre of WTO in vaccines and diagnostic 
agents since 1989.  
189 Example: the first in class NCE candidates – GCC1290K by GC and CWP231A by JW.   
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of C&C with Chugai, JW was able to accumulate upstream research-related technologies 
and knowledge, such as screening technologies, CADD (Computer Aided Drug Design), 
ADME and efficacy test, IPR management, and project and pipeline management, 
including clinical development. C&C has provided eight drug candidates for JW and 
Chugai in the last 20 years.190 
7.3 Summary 
This chapter has addressed the restructuring process of organisational structure to deal 
with increasing new-drug R&D activities. Internal R&D organisations and, at times, arm’s 
length R&D units were analysed.  
First, the analysis showed that organisational structure of R&D centres is a somewhat 
later response to the changing nature of technological learning, from exploitation to 
exploration. The function-based organisational structure disturbed the interactive 
learning between R&D teams and did not adequately reflect market changes. Most case 
firms have belatedly transformed their function-based R&D centres to project- (product) 
based R&D organisations, adding matrix forms. This was a response to the continuous 
failures in linking their exploratory learning with their commercial outcomes.  
Second, the analysis presented the effectiveness of arm’s length R&D organisation for 
continuing long-term upstream research. GC and JW have operated entities independent 
of the explorative upstream research organisation, in parallel with their central R&D 
centres. In doing so, they have, to some extent, been able to secure autonomous and 
mid- and long-term research environments. 
The following chapter answers the research question of the factors that influenced the 
enhancement of an exploratory mode of technological learning, taking into account both 
the macro-level policy perspective (Chapter 5) and firms’ organisational perspective 
(Chapters 6 and 7). 
  
                                                          
190 Furthermore, in 2000, JW launched a new R&D centre (Theriac Pharmaceutical) in Seattle, USA, that 
concentrates on more upstream oriented research (target identification and validation, and drug discovery), 
based on the newly emerging proteomics and chemical genomics. At the same time, they are in charge of 
the clinical development of their first-in-class pipeline product in the US (CWP231A, the first inhibitor of Wnt 
signalling pathway, for treating acute myeloid leukaemia, now in clinical trial 1). 
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Chapter 8: Analysis and Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the institutional and organisational factors that have influenced 
the enhancement of the exploratory technological learning that drives industrial transition 
from imitation to innovation. The conceptual framework used in the thesis was built on a 
transformative view of institutional and organisational mechanisms that can promote 
exploratory learning (Chapter 3). The institutional and organisational elements discussed 
were determined based on the literature review. The empirical case studies then 
examined the process of institutional and organisational transformation and its positive 
and negative effects on exploratory learning (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). This chapter 
discusses the empirical findings through the lens of the literature review and the 
conceptual framework. Prior to this discussion, the thesis’s research questions are 
recalled:  
RQ 1: How have S&T policy rearrangements affected innovation actors’ enhancement 
of the exploratory mode of technological learning?  
            RQ 1.1) How have the reformed S&T policies influenced exploration practices 
within organisations?  
RQ 1.2) How have the reformed S&T policies influenced interactive learning 
between public and private innovation actors?  
RQ 2: How have latecomer firms strengthened the exploratory mode of technological 
learning for new-drug R&D? 
RQ 2.1) How has the exploratory mode of technological learning been 
reinforced in new-drug R&D practices? 
RQ 2.2) How have organisational mechanisms been reconfigured to deal with 
exploration-driven new-drug R&D activities?  
The pattern of institutional factors that influences exploratory learning is first discussed 
in relation to RQ 1 (Section 8.2). The following section (8.3) illuminates the firm-level 
organisational factors necessary to proceed with exploratory learning, seeking to answer 
RQ 2 (Section 8.3). This is followed by a summary in Section 8.4.   
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8.2 Institutional Factors Influencing Exploratory Learning  
This section discusses the research findings in relation to the influence of S&T policies 
on exploratory learning (Research Question 1). To do this, the prior literature is briefly 
compared to the findings of the empirical analysis (Sub-section 8.2.1). The effects of the 
S&T policy revisions on exploratory learning are then discussed in detail (Sub-sections 
8.2.2 to 8.2.5), followed by a summary of the overall findings (Sub-section 8.2.6). 
8.2.1 Literature and empirical findings  
• Institutional complexity surrounding exploratory learning in literature 
Exploration is generally seen as distant search and learning in order to create novel 
products and processes. This goes beyond latecomers’ traditional proximate search and 
learning associated with the refinement of existing products and process, that is, 
exploitive learning (Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.2.3). The literature on exploitation and 
exploration, on the one hand, emphasises the complementarity of the two modes of 
learning; they are the source of both today’s profit creation and tomorrow’s survival. Once 
the outcome of exploration is translated into a novel product or process, the learning 
mode then changes to exploitation to improve quality and economic efficiency. On the 
other hand, the literature also points out the mutual exclusivity of the two modes of 
learning, particularly given the limited resources available to most organisations. They 
have different learning goals and processing mechanisms, and require different 
institutional and managerial conditions.  
The literature review on successful catch-up in Asian NIEs showed how relevant policies 
can be effectively deployed to support the incremental increase of exploratory learning, 
starting from an initially ‘extreme’ focus on exploitive learning (Chapter 2, Sub-section 
2.3.2). This typically involves the vertical composition of S&T and industrial policies to 
support technological learning and market penetration. Under the classic catch-up 
framework, innovation actors, such as Chaebol in Korea and SMEs in Taiwan, were 
intensively fostered, allowing them to gradually strengthen technological exploration and 
rapidly create market profit. Modular architecture-based industries, such as the 
electronics and ICT industries, are classic cases of this type of incremental transition. 
Meanwhile, the literature on science-based innovation highlighted the complex 
institutional setting surrounding technological learning in the pharmaceutical industry. 
This institutional complexity stems from three features of sectoral knowledge dynamics. 
First, pharmaceutical innovation is based on intense scientific research, meaning that 
firms must typically draw on a wide range of public research institutes and universities. 
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Public actors have different incentives and behavioural rules from industrial actors, 
leading to institutional complications in a pharmaceutical SIS. Second, the proliferation 
of new biotechnology-based drug discovery paradigms also increases the complexity of 
industrial organisation, previously led by synthetic chemistry-based pharmaceutical 
companies, because of the increasing influence and importance of biotechnology-based 
start-ups and public institutes. Finally, the nature of the integral product architecture of 
drugs necessitates horizontal and cohesive networks between these innovation actors.  
Consequently, the literature review implied that one might expect significant challenges 
in dealing with the institutional complexity of the pharmaceutical industry’s transitional 
phase. Common barriers present in the transitional phase, such as the wide distance 
between the imitation and innovation stages, are intensified in the pharmaceutical 
industry due to sector-specific knowledge dynamics.  
In this regard, the literature review raised the importance of changing institutional settings 
to promote technological exploration. In particular, the review indicated that the key 
characteristics of exploratory learning should be accommodated in the latecomers’ 
institutional rearrangement for a science-based transition. 
• Institutional influence in empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis showed both the applicability and the limitations of the literature. 
A few historical experiences of the KoPI support the analysis in the literature. First, the 
empirical analysis showed that a positive institutional role can be played in the imitation 
stage, particularly in relation to incentive policy, to strengthen exploitive learning. The 
mastery of production technologies for existing drugs was sped up by the import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy and a loose IPR regime. These policies support 
the argument of that a favourable institutional environment must be nourished for rapid 
catch-up in Korea. Second, the focus on supporting emerging biotechnology is consistent 
with the argument about latecomers’ opportunities to take advantage of new 
technological paradigms by quickly moving to them, rather than sticking with the 
dominant technological paradigm. Third, the overall effort to reform S&T policies 
supports the general suggestions about the institutional conditions for science-based 
innovation found in the existing literature.191  
• Limitations in interpreting the institutional influence on exploratory learning  
                                                          
191 For example, the KoPI witnessed the reinforcement of the IPR regime, that of R&D investment, to science, 
fostering DBFs and a risk-capital funding system like the venture capital system found in the USA. 
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However, the empirical findings of the thesis are only partially explained by the prior 
literature on catch-up and science-based innovation in terms of understanding the micro-
level influence of institutional factors on exploratory learning.192  
First, the influence of the reformed S&T policies on the exploration practices was rarely 
subjected to in-depth empirical analysis in the prior literature, particularly in relation to 
science-based industries with integral architecture products. The literature mostly 
focused on addressing the institutional mechanisms that led to the successful catch-up 
that mainly took place in modular architecture-based industries (e.g., Choung et al. 2006, 
Choung and Hwang 2007, Forge and Bohlin 2008). Second, the increasing intervention 
of non-industrial institutional spheres in industrial catch-up, such as the public science 
and public health systems, was often overlooked in the existing studies.193 Third, the 
complication of relevant policies, often due to the involvement of several governmental 
ministries, and its impact on attempting a ‘transformative/discontinuous’ pattern of 
technological learning in the latecomers’ transitional phase was hardly explained in 
previous work.  
With this in mind, the following sub-sections discuss the influence of the four institutional 
mechanisms involved in innovation generation in accordance with the conceptual 
framework and empirical analysis: a) investment policy, b) incentive and evaluation 
policy, c) industrialisation-related policy in each concerned ministry and d) the alignment 
of relevant policies.  
  
                                                          
192 A few recent studies pointed out several institutional problems in fostering the biotechnology industry in 
Asian NIEs: top-down governmental leadership, loose coherence among innovation actors, lack of market 
incentive for innovation activities, and Chaebol-based biotechnological industrialisation (Dodgson et al. 2008, 
Hsieh and Lofgren 2009, Wong 2011). However, recent works identified only macro-level political and 
economic problems.  
193 While some recent studies focused on the linkage between universities and industries, they mostly 
remained in the macro-level quantitative analysis, rather than the in-depth analysis of the operational 
dynamics of the S&T policies (e.g., Eom and Lee 2010, Park and Leydesdorff 2010). 
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Table 8.1: Summary of institutional and organisational dynamics 
Institutional and organisational factors 
 
Influence on exploratory learning 
Pharmaceutical 
SIS  
 
(Governance of 
S&T policies) 
a) Investment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Incentive and 
evaluation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
c) Industrialisation of 
science research 
 
 
 
 
d) Policy alignment  
• Structural establishment of public and private 
innovation actors conducting exploratory learning 
• Active investment in exploratory learning in new 
biotechnological paradigm 
• Seed money style investment with dual effects on 
exploratory learning 
 
• Rapid accumulation in scientific research; publication 
• Establishment of formal channels for collaborative 
research between public and private actors 
• Inhibition of exploratory learning by short-termism of 
performance evaluation of national R&D projects  
• Low interaction between public and industrial actors  
• Institutional inertia towards risk-averse and short-term 
performance 
 
• Inter-ministerial compartmentalisation and lack of inter-
ministerial coordination in R&D and industrialisation 
support; Support for new biotechnology by MOST and 
MOTIE, Support for synthetic drug-based 
pharmaceutical firms by MOHW 
 
• Failure to align upstream and downstream incentives 
for mutually compatible exploratory learning  
• Mismatch between the product nature and division of 
R&D support by compartmentalised ministries 
Firms’ 
organisational 
mechanisms 
 
(Technological/ 
organisational) 
 
 
g) R&D process  
 
 
h) R&D strategy  
 
• Lack of active feedback between R&D teams 
• The overlooking of market needs in drug development 
 
• Late rectification of the long time frame of exploratory 
learning to market 
• Late search for niche innovation pathway 
• Limitation in achieving economy of scale of R&D  
i) Organisational 
structure 
• Function-based drug R&D  
• Delayed structural change in the R&D centre 
188 
 
 
 
j) Top management 
 
k) Organisational code  
• Emergence of the arm’s length R&D organisation 
 
• Active support for exploratory learning by owners 
 
• Exploitation-oriented organisational code 
Source: Own elaboration  
8.2.2 Investment policy  
The structural establishment of competent innovation actors is the first institutional task 
needed to strengthen exploratory learning (Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.3.2). Various public 
and private innovation actors must work together due to the industry’s reliance on 
science and the fragmented nature of its knowledge base. The empirical evidence 
suggests that this precondition for enhancing exploratory learning has been met with the 
help of active governmental support.  
8.2.2.1 Direction, manner and outcomes  
Three aspects of national R&D investments to support technological innovation are 
examined here: the direction, manner of allocation, and outcomes of national R&D 
funding.  
First, the majority of R&D funds were directed to upstream biotechnology research. It 
seems to be an effective R&D strategy for latecomers to aggressively move to an 
emerging technological paradigm (Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.3.1). The main driver of 
support for biotechnology was the national aim of compensating for the technological 
inferiority of the synthetic chemistry-based pharmaceutical industry by helping it adopt 
new technologies. Latecomers have relatively weak technological capability in dominant 
synthetic drugs. In contrast, they seem to have more opportunities in biotechnology due 
to the wide range of biotechnological drugs and their very early technological and market 
stage. A few studies and the present empirical cases show Asian latecomers’ attempts 
to take advantage of emerging niche markets with different technological focuses, such 
as protein drugs and cell therapy in various therapeutic fields.194  
The experiences of the US and Germany partly support Korea’s investment in emerging 
biotechnologies as a latecomer. The US has taken a firm lead in bio-pharmaceutical 
innovation ahead of Germany over the last two decades because it actively fostered 
                                                          
194 The movement of the other first-tier Asian NIEs, such as Taiwan and Singapore, towards biotechnology 
has already been noted (e.g. Dodgson et al. 2008). This implies that fast-following countries intend to use 
new technological opportunities as their next developmental engine and vehicle for taking over the market. 
They have relatively weak technological and systemic attachment to the dominant synthetic drugs. 
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biotechnology by supporting public research and a number of competent DBFs in the 
1960s and 1970s (Collins 2004). Meanwhile, Germany, which led the synthetic drug-
based pharmaceutical industry with its large chemical companies, struggled to establish 
a commercial base for emerging biotechnology during the 1980s and 1990s (Kaiser and 
Prange 2004). The systemic attachment to synthetic drugs by large chemical firms and 
their influence on R&D policy is seen as a main reason inhibiting Germany’s rapid move 
to biotechnologies (ibid.).  
Second, R&D funds were allocated on a small scale across the large number of 
innovation actors. The empirical evidence suggests that the small-scale distribution of 
funds contributed to establishing the initial capability for technological exploration. The 
‘seed money’ style of investment helped build the overall knowledge base of various 
GRIs and universities. It also helped incumbent pharmaceutical companies engage in 
new-drug R&D by decreasing the initial risks of exploration. However, the empirical 
evidence suggests that this ‘seed money’ style of R&D support is having increasingly 
negative effects as the cost of companies’ new- drug R&D intensifies and they need 
larger-scale support. These negative effects are connected to other policy factors and 
are discussed in the next sections. 
Finally, the empirical results, at first glance, suggest that efforts to promote innovation 
actors’ exploratory learning have been successful in terms of investment performance. 
The number of publications and patent applications rapidly increased under the new 
policy regime. However, up to this point in time, few R&D investments have been 
developed into commercially successful products. With this in mind, the following sub-
sections discuss policies relating to the operational mechanisms of national R&D 
investment. 
8.2.3 Incentive regime  
The conceptual framework underscored the vital role of incentive policies in the 
successful promotion of exploratory leaning (Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.2). In essence, 
the empirical results showed that two institutions shaped the incentive regime of national 
R&D: the PBS, with its emphasis on publications, patents and products (3P), and S&T 
policy networks led by professors. The PBS acted as the fundamental incentive system 
for individual researchers, with some exceptions. The closed-policy networks led by civil 
servants and professors influenced the establishment of the national R&D agenda and 
the selection of innovation actors to participate in NRDPs. There were both positive and 
negative effects of the incentive regime in terms of meeting the two key dimensions of 
exploratory learning: the basic features and interactivity of learning. The basic features 
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consist of the intra-organisational aspect of exploratory learning (RQ 1.1), while 
interactivity involves an inter-organisational aspect (RQ 1.2).  
8.2.3.1 Dual effects on exploratory learning 
• Positive effects on exploratory learning 
The incentive regime had a positive effect on the establishment of basic research 
capabilities and institutional arrangements for public and industry collaboration. First, the 
rapid increase in academic publications and patents was driven by the quantity-oriented 
evaluation of research performance under the PBS system. Without a prior knowledge 
accumulation of scientific research to some extent, latecomers are unable to advance 
towards an exploratory mode of technological learning. Due to the cumulative nature of 
science, a certain number of scientific experimental results is necessary to advance 
research in a new area, such as AIDS (Barbot 2002, referred to in Callon 2003, p. 62).195 
The PBS system was important in this respect. 
The incentive regime also provided the institutional base for channelling public research 
and industrial R&D. The selection of NRDPs increasingly involved technological 
transfers and co-participation of public and private actors in R&D projects. As noted, this 
is an important institutional arrangement for funnelling innovation from public research 
to industrial development. This is due to the weak research and financial capabilities of 
industry in the latecomer context, and the fragmented nature of knowledge in a science-
based industry. 
• Negative effects on exploratory learning: intra-organisational aspect 
However, the quantity-focused incentive regime partly counteracted the bold national 
investment in R&D. The emphasis on quantity interrupted both intra- and inter-
organisational aspects of exploratory learning.  
In terms of intra-organisation, the incentive regime failed to provide a stable and 
autonomous research environment for continuing exploratory learning in public research 
organisations. Evaluation criteria incentivised short-term performance based on the 
number of publications and patents produced. This led public innovation actors to avoid 
risk-taking and long-term exploratory learning. Under the annual quantity-based project 
evaluation, almost 95% of NRDPs were reported to be successful. Research teams 
                                                          
195  Moreover, the science-based technologies/products of advanced countries have been increasingly 
protected by the patent system and thus latecomers’ internal accumulation of scientific knowledge base has 
become critical in the industry.   
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tended to imitate each other due to the fear of failing to obtain future projects, and 
research topics were often decided by the possibility of receiving project funding.  
• Negative effects on exploratory learning: inter-organisational aspect 
The other dimension of exploratory learning, interactive learning, was also considerably 
disturbed under the incentive regime. The conceptual framework highlighted the fact that 
innovation requires dynamic interactions among innovation actors. However, in practice, 
publication-oriented incentives reduced this kind of practical collaboration.  
First, in public research, organisations did not actively interact with each other because 
they competed for projects. Second, the industrial potential of research took a lower 
priority in GRIs and universities due to the short-term pressure to maximise the number 
of publications. DBFs, which found it difficult to continue business R&D under the weak 
venture capital system, relied heavily on NRDPs; they were set on publications being the 
main evaluation criterion for survival. In turn, pharmaceutical companies often lacked 
motivation to participate in joint NRDPs. While they sometimes formed consortia to apply 
for NRDPs, due to the requirement for joint applications, their interests were not aligned 
under the incentive regime. 
Moreover, NRDPs run by professors cemented the attachment to publication-based 
incentives. Professors dominated the NRDP selection process. They were primarily 
interested in producing publications about emerging upstream research fields and issues, 
while the pharmaceutical industry tended to search for proven research outcomes for 
rapid industrial application. The former group was often attracted to leading-edge 
research topics in biotechnology, while the latter preferred to focus on methodologically 
proven synthetic drug-based R&D.  
As a result, inter-organisational collaboration, the other critical feature of effective 
exploration, often remained at the superficial level of collaboration to acquire NRDPs. 
This study’s micro-level qualitative analysis is consistent with recent macro-level 
quantitative studies on the collaboration between universities, GRIs and industry in 
Korea (e.g., Eom and Lee 2010, Park and Leydesdorff 2010). The studies suggest that 
changing the quantity-based evaluation system would promote interactive learning. They 
found that there were low rates of co-authorship across the organisations, even as the 
number of publications rapidly increased (Park and Leydesdorff 2010). In addition, Eom 
and Lee (2010) note that there is only a weak relationship between the rapid increase in 
the number of patents resulting from university and industry collaboration and firms’ 
performance.  
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8.2.3.2 Institutional inertia in the incentive regime 
Institutional inertia stemming from strong support for technological assimilation and 
improvement in the rapid catch-up stage is argued to be one of the underlying causes of 
the problematic incentive regime. This inertia leads to an over-emphasis on the short-
term performance of technological learning. 
In general, it can be said that fast followers, such as Asian NIEs, enjoy a latecomers’ 
advantage by reversing the PLC. This reduces the amount of risk they face compared to 
forerunners. 196  Starting from a simple assembly of components, latecomers can 
gradually learn to design their own entire products. In the case of the major catch-up 
industries in Asian NIEs, their modular products further decreased the risk of such 
learning and led to the rapid conversion of learning into commercial profit. The high 
decomposability of modular products into components makes it easier to engage in 
stepwise technological learning, and to convert this learning to profit. 
In these cases, the main risk of the latecomers’ learning was reduced to how quickly they 
could master and improve existing products and technologies. That is, the probability of 
technological failure was inherently low, and the amount of time it took to learn was the 
key issue. Mission-oriented NRDPs, which were the most common type operating until 
the mid-1990s were effective in decreasing the time taken for learning. Hence, the 
evaluation of short-term learning performance was reasonable. 
However, in the transitional phase, there was an increasing gap between the continued 
expectation for short-term performance and the rapidly changing knowledge dynamics. 
As seen in the empirical analysis, the main risk of learning was extended to include what 
and how to learn. Increasing the exploratory mode of learning thus became necessary, 
but this takes far more time. Moreover, a high project failure rate became inevitable due 
to an immature knowledge base of emerging sciences and discovery-oriented learning. 
However, the incentive regime lagged behind, still focusing on short-term performance; 
it was unable to accommodate long-term, high-risk research.  
As a result, it can be said that the incentive regime negatively affected exploratory 
learning. It encouraged learning in some new high-tech areas of science, such as stem 
cell therapy. However, it continued to focus on understanding and validating emerging 
knowledge fields, rather than seeking new knowledge and opportunities. Out of concern 
that they would not receive research projects and funding, researchers avoided risk and 
                                                          
196 The latecomers were able to gradually learn from the simple assembly of components to own design of 
the entire product by following the reversed PLC. 
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failure. In this case, defective exploratory learning was partly due to the out-dated 
institutional criteria for success; incentivising short-term performance was initially 
successful in promoting rapid catch-up, but was not helpful in facilitating exploratory 
learning during the transition.  
Interestingly, aversion to risk and a short-term focus were not policy-specific flaws but 
common among innovation actors in the Korean innovation system. The empirical results 
showed that venture capital tends to evaluate the DBFs’ R&D pipeline within a fairly short 
time, usually around three years. Five years was the longest period of investment. The 
results also showed the reluctance of Chaebol to undertake long-term investment in 
biotechnology-related R&D. Pharmaceutical firms started exploratory learning only when 
they recognised they needed to develop their own new drugs in order to survive.197  
To sum up, the main problem with the incentive regime was its strong bias towards 
quantity-oriented, short-term performance. While such incentive regimes were effective 
in facilitating technological learning in the imitation stage, in the transitional phase they 
inhibited innovation actors’ efforts to strengthen exploratory learning and further 
interrupted the smooth transition to a knowledge-generating SIS.  
8.2.4 Industrialisation policy  
The conceptual framework, for the effective industrialisation of scientific research 
emphasised the need for synergetic connections between research-oriented and 
business-based exploratory learning. This is fairly different from the ways in which 
technological learning took place during the imitation stage, when the focus was 
generally on exploitive learning. Thus, policies for industrial utilisation of technological 
learning rarely needed to consider the lengthy R&D process associated with upstream 
research.  
Unlike the imitation stage, the transitional phase in the pharmaceutical industry requires 
the extension of policies for industrial utilisation of technological learning to cover 
upstream scientific research. This institutional change can be seen in the different 
                                                          
197 Inertia associated with risk aversion is also observed in other Asian NIEs’ biotechnology investment, 
although it is not directly related to the case of incentive systems. In the case of Singapore, they focused on 
investment in infrastructure and human resources to attract multinational companies (Wong 2011). This was 
the same development pattern of attracting multinational firms and placing them in the global production 
network as they used for the ICT industries (ibid). Thus, the risk of failure in fostering local innovation actors 
could be avoided (ibid).This is a kind of “survivalism” of Singapore as a small city state (Wong 2011, pp.165-
189). In contrast, Taiwan is seen as having relatively risk-tolerant tendencies in its government support of 
biotechnology because of the SME-led national developmental trajectory, referred to as “many sprouts” 
(Wong 2011). 
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administrative patterns of the three leading ministries involved in R&D support and 
industrialisation of drug R&D: MOST, MOHW and MOTIE. 
8.2.4.1 Policy pattern of the three ministries  
This sub-section begins by summarising the diverse institutional motivations of the three 
leading ministries to join drug R&D support. It then discusses how the compartmentalised 
administration of S&T policies by each ministry interrupted connections between diverse 
innovation actors’ technological learning. Note that interactivity has been argued to be a 
key condition for successful exploratory learning.  
First, MOST ultimately aimed at strengthening scientific research capabilities (thereby 
leading to innovation) under the Biotechnology Promotion Act. The ministry strongly 
supported umbrella organisations, GRIs and universities. DBFs, as the commercial base 
for upstream research, were also supported by the ministry’s various NRDPs.  
However, the empirical results of this study showed other, unexpected effects of the 
interactive learning between industrial and public organisations. The dominance of public 
organisations, together with the incentive regime, the PBS-based incentives and the 
professor-led selection environment of NRDPs, turned the public actors’ exploratory 
learning away from the needs of industrial actors. The results of public research tended 
to remain within their organisations, given the short-term, publication-oriented 
performance evaluation policy. As a result, the pharmaceutical firms’ demands for 
commercially viable sources of innovation were largely unmet by NRDPs. 
MOHW’s R&D support was generally not used for industrial innovation, but to support 
the industry as a supplier of qualified generic drugs. This was to help ensure the stable 
management of the NHI. Thus, the funds were distributed through small-scale R&D 
projects to generic drug developers for encouraging process innovation.198 One positive 
outcome of this was that there was direct R&D support for ‘old’ chemistry-based synthetic 
drugs, which currently dominate pharmaceutical markets. MOST, on the other hand, 
focused on supporting upstream new biotechnology research.  
However, the empirical analysis revealed another perspective on the policy pattern in 
terms of exploratory learning. The increasing R&D support did not meet the changing 
demands of NRDPs, which included demands for larger-scale funding and more market-
reflective R&D support. Although MOHW NRDPs continued to support new-drug R&D 
with small-scale funding (7.97% of the total R&D investment in 15 NCEs), support for 
                                                          
198 The NRDPs embraced the bottom-up style projects often proposed by pharmaceutical firms. 
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new-drug R&D was not the focal area of the ministry. This is reflected in the recent 
dissatisfaction of MOHW’s umbrella industrial association (KPMA) with new-drug R&D 
support (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1). 
More specifically, there was a lack of industrial policies concerned with industrial 
upgrading, although MOHW took charge as the juridical ministry of the pharmaceutical 
industry and hence was responsible for its industrial development.  
The underlying reason was that the ministry did not have institutional experience in 
fostering an industry. It did not even attempt to foster the pharmaceutical industry until a 
few years ago. As a consequence, it can be said that MOHW has failed to embrace the 
movement of the KoPI towards new-drug development within the institutional framework 
of public health policy.199  
MOTIE focused on the industrialisation of emerging biotechnology, launching a series of 
downstream-oriented NRDPs to foster DBFs and attract Chaebol to the emerging 
industrial area. The empirical results of this study illustrated the clear benefit of this policy 
to DBFs and a few Chaebol, which both benefited from MOTIE’s active resource inputs.  
However, the empirical evidence also revealed that MOTIE did not embrace exploratory 
learning by incumbent pharmaceutical firms. When it fostered an upstream research-
based biotechnology industry, MOTIE overlooked the importance of the role of the 
incumbent pharmaceutical industry as a key commercial channel. There were two 
underlying reasons for this.  
First, even for MOTIE, which was the key player in the series of industrial policies leading 
to the country’s fast catch-up, the fostering of science-based industries was an unfamiliar 
policy challenge. The institutional unfamiliarity is particularly related to three policy 
spheres: technological learning, market creation and inter-actor relationships. In terms 
of technological learning, biotechnology industrialisation is based on a high degree of 
exploratory learning that starts from upstream science. In contrast, the industrial policies 
of MOTIE had mostly dealt with the downstream development and localisation of foreign 
technologies. In terms of the market, the market for biological drugs was not yet 
articulated, whereas markets in other catch-up industries were already established when 
                                                          
199 The author does not disagree with the fundamental role of MOHW as the regulator of the public health 
sector. However, on the other hand, in terms of the sustainability of the semi-public industry, there must be 
a certain role as an institutional promoter of developing new drugs by the local companies for cheaper and 
effective new drugs for the people. Without the existence of local new drugs, the market dominance by a 
small number of Big Pharma firms will continue. Many developing countries are already facing many negative 
effects of this, such as high import costs, a lack of appropriate drugs for common local diseases and further 
deficit of the national health system. 
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Korean companies entered. In other catch-up industries, policies focused on the 
protection of the domestic market and penetration of the export market. In the case of 
biological drugs, the creation of initial market demand was critical. In terms of inter-actor 
relationships, innovation actors in the pharmaceutical industry were more diverse and 
horizontal, while MOTIE’s industrial policies often focused on vertical organisation of 
industries led by Chaebol.  
The second reason, as noted, was that the established pharmaceutical industry was 
seen as falling under the institutional power of MOHW. While MOTIE supported 
biotechnology-based new-drug R&D, the regulatory and approval policies were 
administered by MOHW. The support by MOTIE to infrastructure and new start-ups for 
biotechnology was not closely linked to the final commercial channel, that is, the 
incumbent pharmaceutical industry. Rather, biotechnology was treated as an 
independent industry rather than a new technological base for the pharmaceutical 
industry. As seen, the industrial association of biotechnology was administered by 
MOTIE, while the pharmaceutical association was administered by MOHW. In contrast, 
most other catch-up industries were fostered and regulated by the same ministry, which 
allowed them to achieve rapid technological learning. 
8.2.4.2 Inter-ministerial compartmentalisation  
The empirical results showed bureaucratic competition to expand their juridical scope 
and budget in the rapidly growing biotechnology and healthcare sectors (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.5.1). Based on the analysis, it is argued that the inter-ministerial 
compartmentalisation of policy implementation conflicted with the key characteristic of 
exploratory learning, that is, effective interaction. Specifically, the translation of 
exploratory learning into commercially viable innovation sources was disturbed by this 
administrative pattern. As shown above, the three ministries continuously launched their 
own NRDPs and other policies to support biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. 
However, they made little practical effort to arrange and connect the dispersed NRDPs 
to one another. The need for inter-ministerial coordination remained at the top level of 
the policy agenda.  
One negative effect of this was to inhibit the transfer of the outcomes of NRDPs from 
upstream research to downstream development, as this would have required cutting 
across the three ministries’ juridical scopes. In principle, the upstream research projects 
launched by MOST should have advanced to downstream development projects 
administered by MOTIE and MOHW. However, they encountered an institutional 
bottleneck. If a project received R&D funds from one ministry, there was a smaller 
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chance it would receive R&D support from the other ministries. This was because of the 
difficulty involved in assessing the performance of the projects (Interview 42 (K-Pharma)). 
Among seven NCEs developed by the case firms in the first round, only one drug 
received R&D support from two ministries (see Table 6.13). The other negative effect 
was overlapping investment. The results showed that 21 public institutes (mostly GRIs 
and universities) were conducting similar drug R&D projects.200  
To sum up, the strong R&D investment on the part of the three ministries was 
counteracted by compartmentalisation of policy implementation. Each ministry had 
different policy goals for R&D support, and there was a very weak mechanism to 
coordinate between ministries. This inhibited the development of cohesive connections 
between the exploratory learning of different innovation actors, which is necessary for 
industrialisation based on scientific research.  
8.2.5 Policy alignment  
The final emphasis in the conceptual framework was on the alignment of heterogeneous 
institutions as a critical factor to facilitate exploratory learning in individual organisations, 
and joint exploratory learning between innovation actors. This was conceptualised in 
terms of the alignment of relevant policies to produce mutually compatible outcomes 
related to exploratory learning. The empirical data showed that latecomers’ exploratory 
learning in the transitional phase was significantly influenced by the increasing 
intersection of emerging science and public health policies and the conventional 
industrial policy.  
The following sections discuss two macro-level aspects of policy alignment that can 
affect innovation actors’ exploratory learning: the alignment of incentive-related policies 
between public science and industrial R&D (Sub-section 8.2.5.1), and the inter-
ministerial division of R&D support in dealing with science-based industries with integral 
product architecture (Sub-section 8.2.5.2).  
8.2.5.1 Failure to align diverse incentives  
It can be argued that effective exploratory learning was disturbed by the limited 
institutional capability to align the incentives of public research and industrial R&D. A key 
factor driving the successful commercialisation of pharmaceutical research is a 
                                                          
200 Moreover, the administrative delay in the reapplication and selection of NRDPs was pointed out as a 
problem. 
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comprehensive incentive regime with both ‘push and pull’ (technology and demand) 
incentives (Daems et al. 2005, Hsieh and Löfgren 2009).  
With regard to public research, the results of this study showed that push incentives were 
widely provided by MOST, focusing on upstream biotechnology research. PBS and the 
strong influence of professors on the selection mechanism of NRDPs made the incentive 
system revolve around upstream scientific research. For a latecomer, this may seem to 
be the right focus to make up for the limited science knowledge base necessary for 
industrial innovation. However, as highlighted above, there is a critical problem with this. 
The incentive regime forced public innovation actors to become excessively attached to 
scientific publications. DBFs, which must come into play to translate upstream research 
into downstream development, were also locked into publication. Downstream 
development became a second priority.  
In contrast, the key market-side incentive for industrial R&D arose from developing first 
generic drugs, specifically not NCEs. The MOHW’s goal of stable management of NHI 
led pharmaceutical companies to focus on the technological exploitation of established 
synthetic technologies. A relatively high price was guaranteed to first generic drugs in 
the NHI’s drug reimbursement scheme, 81% of the price of the original drugs until 
2008.201 Given the small difference in economic return between first generic drugs and 
new drugs, few pharmaceutical firms were willing to take the high financial and 
technological risk of actively investing in new-drug R&D.  
Note that during the successful industrial catch-up in Korea, both technological learning 
and market-side incentive/penalty policies were effectively aligned with each other. In 
this context, it might be thought that the misalignment of the (science) push and (market) 
pull incentives decelerated the rate of science-based transition by disturbing the 
emergence of mutually synergetic exploratory learning between upstream and 
downstream innovation actors. The pharmaceutical firms’ development focus became 
synthetic drugs, often focusing on generic drugs, while upstream research was 
concentrated on new biotechnology. In policy practice, as pointed out, the misalignment 
of incentive policies was also an issue of inter-ministerial misalignment, as a single 
industry was being administered from diverse institutional perspectives.  
Interestingly, other Asian NIEs have shown similar limitations in aligning research 
incentives with downstream incentives. Hsieh and Löfgren (2009) suggests the need for 
                                                          
201 This is a very recent move to lower generic drug prices in order to reduce NHI costs. The policy to 
decrease the cost of generic drugs seems to result in pressure to develop new drugs.       
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institutional comprehension of both the active support of upstream biotechnology 
research and a favourable pricing policy for new drugs (Hsieh and Löfgren 2009). 
8.2.5.2 Product nature and inter-ministerial relationships 
The other issue of policy alignment has to do with inter-ministerial coordination in dealing 
with science-based industries that have integral product architecture. The physical 
decomposition of a drug into subcomponents is difficult because of the high 
interdependence of product functions, such as safety and efficacy. As a result, the clear 
allocation of R&D tasks to innovation actors becomes relatively hard. The difficulty in 
clarifying the organisational boundaries of R&D tasks seems to result in an institutional 
challenge when the three ministries all attempt to support drug R&D.  
In the case of modular product-based industries, the deliberate consideration of the 
product nature at the policy level was unnecessary. The development of new products 
could be supported by selecting specific R&D actors based on the physical 
decomposability of products into components or subsystems. This industrial R&D 
support was mainly led by MOTIE, while the applied research was supported mainly by 
MOST. There was relatively little institutional conflict or confusion between the ministries, 
and a series of modular products could be successfully developed by a public-private 
R&D consortium led by a single concerned ministry. For example, support from the 
Ministry of Information and Communication led to the development of a digital electronic 
switching system called TDX in 1982, and the first commercialisation of CDMA in 1996.  
In contrast, in the case of integral products such as drugs, it is difficult to give the 
administrative leadership to one ministry due to the deep linkage of upstream research 
and downstream development, and the difficulty of physical decomposition. Thus, in 
theory, the concerned ministries should collaborate to provide consistent R&D support. 
However, as seen, this was not effectively dealt with in the case of the Korean 
pharmaceutical industry because of the compartmentalised structure of the relevant 
governmental ministries.202 The empirical analysis implies that the present governmental 
structure might have caused inefficiencies in promoting joint exploratory learning in 
pharmaceutical R&D. The ambiguity of dividing R&D support into the juridical boundary 
of each ministry (particularly for an integral product) may be an underlying obstacle 
impeding the inter-ministerial division of R&D support and policy alignment.  
                                                          
202 Moreover, several NRDPs launched by different ministries overlapped, which might have led to wasting 
R&D funds. These overlapping projects arose from the ministries’ tendency to expand their juridical scope 
to cover new technology. 
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The nature of an integral product might require an integrated or highly coordinated R&D 
programme that embraces the long process from upstream research to downstream 
development. No studies dealing with this issue were found, at least within the literature 
on catch-up and science-based innovation among latecomers. 
8.2.6 Overall findings of Research Question 1  
Research Question 1 addresses the influence of the rearranged S&T policies on 
innovation actors’ exploratory learning. It paid attention to whether and how effectively 
the policies facilitated exploratory learning in order to create new sources of innovation. 
A sub-question seeks to determine the impact of these policies on exploration within 
organisations (RQ 1.1). It addresses the effect of policy in promoting the basic features 
of exploratory learning, such as highly uncertain and long-term learning of ill-defined 
problems, from the intra-organisational perspective of technological learning. A second 
sub-question deals with the interactivity of exploratory learning between diverse 
innovation actors (RQ 1.2). This concentrates on the impact of policy on interactive 
learning between the public and industrial actors, paying attention to the nature of 
science-based innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.  
With regard to RQ 1.1, the analysis ultimately argues that the operational mechanisms 
of reformed S&T policies both promoted and impeded exploratory learning in some ways. 
There are two major ways in which the new policies had a positive impact on exploratory 
learning. First, there has been active national investment in the newly emerging 
biotechnological paradigm, and Korea has rapidly established necessary innovation 
actors able to engage in the exploratory mode of technological learning. Public 
organisations, such as GRIs and universities and new technological start-ups, became 
the main beneficiaries of investment in biotechnology. This allowed the country to 
accumulate a critical mass of knowledge, which is vital for further exploratory learning. 
The empirical evidence shows a rapid increase in scientific publication and patenting in 
biotechnology. Second, the pharmaceutical firms were able to lessen the initial risk of 
attempting a high degree of exploratory learning (that is, engaging in new-drug research) 
by joining NRDPs when they faced the new product patent system for the first time. 
However, the S&T policies also undermined the generation of key characteristics of 
exploratory learning in innovation actors’ real learning practices. The risk-tolerant and 
persistent nature of exploratory learning, which is critical in new-drug research, was 
largely ignored by the new incentive and evaluation system. This study’s findings suggest 
that the underlying incentive regime favoured short-term, visible performance.  
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A few examples of this have been highlighted over the course of the analysis. One is the 
contrast between the rapid growth in the number of science publications and the low 
impact factor of these publications. In the same vein, there has been a rapid increase in 
patenting and vague commercial contributions, which is sometimes referred to as ‘blind’ 
patenting. Moreover, the NRDPs’ success rate of 95% suggests a risk-avoiding tendency 
in learning practices. The findings further suggest that this risk-averse tendency is not 
confined to national R&D support but also relates to broader national and organisational 
inertia stemming from the pattern of technological learning in the rapid catching-up stage. 
To sum up, the findings suggest that Korea has limited institutional capability to promote 
exploratory learning during the transitional phase, in particular in a fast-following 
developmental context. On one hand, the strong investment undertaken in the catch-up 
stage established necessary innovation actors for a (innovative) knowledge-generating 
pharmaceutical SIS. On the other hand, the rearranged S&T policies still emphasised 
short-term performance, which has constrained enhancement of real exploratory 
learning.  
With regard to RQ 1.2, the empirical evidence and analysis reveal that the reformed S&T 
policies tended to interrupt joint exploratory learning between incumbent pharmaceutical 
firms and public research institutes and DBFs. In other words, under the new S&T 
policies, the interactive features of exploratory learning were not cross-fertilised between 
the upstream and downstream innovation actors. Three pieces of evidence support this 
argument.  
The first relates to the direction of R&D investment and its lack of ability to connect the 
new biotechnology-oriented public actors and synthetic chemistry-based industrial actors. 
Government investment in biotechnology missed the critical role of incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms in commercialising upstream biotechnology research. 
Biotechnology was regarded as an independent sector from the old synthetic chemistry-
based pharmaceutical industry rather than as a multi-purpose, generic technology. While 
the government focused on innovation based on new technology, the incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms focusing on synthetic drugs received a minimal level of 
governmental investment. 
Second, the incentive regime had a negative effect on interactive learning between the 
public and industrial actors. In public organisations, the emphasis on short-term 
performance led researchers to concentrate on producing publications rather than 
searching for real innovation sources. It locked DBFs into the same publish-or-perish 
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evaluation system, because they heavily relied on national funds. At the same time, the 
pharmaceutical firms were demanding commercially viable innovation sources. As a 
consequence, the incentive regime surrounding the NRDPs, in the industry view, 
disturbed synergetic interactive learning between the public and the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
Third, there was inter-ministerial misalignment of R&D support in science-based 
industries, in particular those that manufactured integral architecture-based products 
such as drugs. The findings revealed that the compartmentalised governmental structure 
and expansive nature of each ministry’s juridical scope hindered the interconnection of 
diverse exploratory learning.203 MOST and MOTIE focused on supporting biotechnology, 
which has an unarticulated market. In contrast, MOHW supported synthetic drug R&D 
for the stable management of NHI, not for an industrial upgrade. The ministries’ policy 
goals and practices were misaligned. Moreover, the nature of an integral product made 
difficult to clearly divide R&D support between the concerned ministries.  
Summing up, the findings suggest that S&T policies disrupted the formation of cohesive 
interactions between public and industrial actors, even as a high degree of 
interconnection was particularly necessary in the pharmaceutical industry due to the 
nature of drugs as integral products. The low levels of interaction in exploratory learning 
can be empirically characterised, in a broad sense, as a decoupled evolution of upstream 
biotechnology research and industrial R&D focusing on synthetic drugs.  
8.3 Organisational Factors Influencing Exploratory Learning 
This section discusses the firm-level intensification of exploratory learning from both 
technological and non-technological perspectives (RQ 2). The initiation and increase of 
new-drug R&D activity by some leading Korean pharmaceutical firms reveals latecomers’ 
organisational mechanisms to enhance the exploratory mode of technological learning.  
It first presents the applicability of the literature to the empirical findings (Sub-section 
8.3.1). It then discusses four organisational perspectives on firms’ exploratory learning, 
including R&D process and strategy, organisational structure and some minor factors 
(Sub-sections 8.3.2 to 8.3.5). Finally, the overall findings are presented (Sub-section 
8.3.6).  
                                                          
203  The expansive tendency of the governmental departments can also be interpreted as a case of 
Parkinson’s law (1955) that explains the multiplication of subordinates in the public administration.  
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8.3.1 Literature and empirical findings 
 Latecomers’ exploratory learning in literature 
The literature review suggested that the nature of technological learning becomes more 
exploratory as latecomer firms transition to developing novel and sophisticated products. 
Exploratory learning by latecomers is discussed in the literature on both catch-up and 
science-based innovation. 
First, in the catch-up literature, two common drivers of catch-up were identified. One was 
the continuous enhancement of absorptive capacity to rapidly reverse the PLC. The other 
was the rapid translation of their intensified learning into market profits through 
participation in the global production network. This pattern of catch-up is often 
represented as the OEM-ODM-OBM model. Second, the literature review pointed out 
the features of the transitional phase – a less favourable competitive environment and 
institutions for latecomers, more direct competition with advanced rivals and increasing 
pressure to comply with global institutional standards such as TRIPS.  
The review showed the literature’s recent focus on catch-up, and its emphasis on the 
variety of technological paths for transition and the increasing need for firms and nations 
to develop a transition strategy. Three technological paths for transition can be 
conceptualised (Figure 2.2):  
i) an emphasis on developing improved products that advance the reverse PLC  
ii) an architectural differentiation of the product, entering just after fixing a 
dominant design  
iii) a direct attempt to develop novel products prior to the establishment of a 
dominant design  
The last two paths in particular indicate latecomers’ exposure to direct competition 
against forerunning innovators. The issue of strategic capability deals with the dilemma 
of whether to build relationships with forerunners. Specifically, the choice between 
competition and collaboration received special focus in the literature.  
The literature review also pointed out the discontinuous learning pattern and environment 
between the imitation and innovation stages in the science-based pharmaceutical 
industry. Specifically, it argued that the need for a broad and deep scientific knowledge 
base and access to emerging biotechnology capabilities require a high degree of 
exploratory learning for transition. Additionally, the integral product architecture of drugs 
heightens the interactive and interdependent features of exploratory learning. These two 
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points are unfamiliar in the knowledge dynamics of latecomers’ previous technological 
learning during the imitative production stage.  
In this regard, the literature review highlighted the need for radical change in latecomers’ 
technological learning to a more exploratory mode that will allow them to engage in 
science-based catch-up.  
• Latecomers’ exploratory learning in empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis showed both the applicability and the limitations of the previous 
literature. First, the overall catch-up paths of Korean pharmaceutical firms fit the stepwise 
catch-up model and the conceptualised technological path for transition. The empirical 
data showed that latecomer firms start technological learning through the imitative 
production of raw materials, that is, the localisation of APIs. They then engage in new-
drug R&D in two ways, observed here. One is the development of better/best-in-class 
new drugs, which can be classified under architectural differentiation. The other is the 
development of first-in-class new drugs, which can be seen as new products for the world. 
Therefore, a kind of OEM-ODM-OBM model is applicable to the long-term evolution of 
the KoPI. Second, the case study firms’ on-going struggles to profit from their exploratory 
learning suggests relatively higher technological and market barriers to transition than 
are found in most modular-product-based industries. Third, the latecomer firms’ 
continuous attention to biological drugs supports the literature’s focus on the 
opportunities latecomers can find in emerging technological paradigms, although no 
successful cases have been yet realised. 
• Limitation of the literature in explaining the transition of Korean pharmaceutical firms  
However, there is also a gap between the literature and the empirical results in 
understanding how latecomers enhance their exploratory learning, and in explaining the 
possibilities and limitations of the more complex innovation environment associated with 
the production of novel drugs. This gap is mainly due to the literature’s focus on specific, 
remarkably successful cases of rapid catch-up. These cases involve a few modular 
products-based industries that operate in diverse market segments. In contrast, the 
pharmaceutical industry is basically divided into two polarised markets, off-patent 
generic drugs and patented new drugs, requiring a high degree of exploratory learning. 
Latecomers’ catch-up in this kind of industry is hardly addressed in the existing research. 
Moreover, the literature on science-based innovation barely deals with latecomer firms’ 
science-based catch-up.  
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Overall, exploratory learning in latecomer pharmaceutical firms has not been studied in-
depth. The literature tends to limit itself to answering the following questions: Is the 
mismatch between the reinforcement of exploratory learning and overall commercial 
stagnation due to organisational problems? Is it just attributable to the natural process of 
learning-by-failure that novice innovators have to undergo?  
Given these challenges, the following sub-sections discuss the four organisational 
mechanisms associated with firms’ exploratory learning investigated in the empirical 
chapters: exploration practices in new-drug R&D (8.3.2), R&D strategy for new-drug 
development (8.3.3), organisational structure (8.3.4) and other organisational 
mechanisms such as top management and organisational code (8.3.5). Finally, Sub-
section 8.3.6 summarises the overall findings. 
8.3.2 Exploration practices in new-drug R&D 
The conceptual framework interpreted new-drug R&D activities in terms of the 
actualisation of the new exploratory mode of technological learning. In particular, it 
emphasised the many simultaneous interactions that must occur among R&D actors over 
the course of the long R&D process from discovery to commercialisation. The framework 
also pointed out that enhancing the process of exploratory learning coincides with the 
need to unlearn previously established learning patterns associated with imitation. 
Overall, changing the direction, learning logic and habits of technological learning were 
considered key points for successful drug R&D practices. The empirical data showed a 
gradual change in the learning pattern of pharmaceutical firms over time. It also revealed 
that this change was a bumpy process of learning by failure and readjustment. 
Two aspects of the R&D practices concerned with exploration are worth noting. First, the 
R&D teams did not practise a high degree of mutual interaction during the drug R&D 
process, which can be considered one of the main reasons for the slowdown and relative 
inefficiency of Korean firms’ new-drug R&D. Second, their new-drug R&D failed to reflect 
market needs to a large extent; instead, the firms’ exploratory learning tended to be 
conducted following an upstream research-push approach. The analysis pointed out that, 
until recently, most pharmaceutical companies carried out new-drug R&D without 
employing clinical doctors who would be able to capture the changing preferences of 
patients.204 
                                                          
204 These two behavioural patterns of learning are discussed further in the following sub-sections on the 
organisational perspectives. 
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8.3.3 R&D strategy in the transitional phase 
The conceptual framework emphasised the increasing importance of latecomers’ 
strategic capability to cope with changing market and institutional environments. It should 
be noted that the science-based pharmaceutical industry operates under a polarised 
technological and market gap between novel and imitative drug markets. In line with this, 
strategic capability here refers to the profitability and sustainability of latecomers’ 
exploratory learning. Profitability involves the commercial effectiveness of exploratory 
learning, that is, the smooth translation of new-drug R&D into market profit. Sustainability 
concerns the vulnerability of exploration, particularly in small latecomer firms.  
The changing focal areas of R&D between the first and second rounds of new-drug 
development are associated with both profitability and sustainability. In the initial round, 
the case firms exclusively concentrated on antibiotics and anticancer drugs; the market 
in these areas was already well articulated, created by Big Pharma. In contrast, the 
second round was characterised by the diversification of R&D areas into four fields in 
each firm. The first field comprised therapeutic areas related to quality of life, referred to 
as QOL drugs, beyond the single focus on necessary drugs such as antibiotics. The 
second category involved the development of incrementally modified versions of original 
drugs, known as IMDs. The third class consisted of phytomedicines based on existing 
natural plants combined with local traditional knowledge of medicines. The fourth was 
the growth of biological drugs from purely imitative learning to more innovative and 
commercial R&D. 
The following discussion explains how the latecomers’ means of succeeding in the new-
drug business differ from those of Big Pharma, thus indicating the need for an 
idiosyncratic pattern of technological exploration. Specifically, three aspects of 
latecomers’ strategic capability are related to latecomers’ success in exploratory learning: 
the time risk of learning (Sub-section 8.3.3.1), the pathway of learning (Sub-section 
8.3.3.2), and the scale and sustainability of exploration (Sub-section 8.3.3.3).  
8.3.3.1 Time-to-market of exploratory learning  
The empirical analysis found that the long lead time associated with new-drug R&D, often 
taking over 10 years with considerable commercial uncertainty, posed a key difficulty for 
latecomers. In the first round of new-drug R&D, many firms had to endure a prolonged 
R&D period because of a lack of stable profit sources (except for generic drugs). The 
large numbers of commercial failures after the market launch of the new drugs further 
aggravated the difficulty of continuing expensive exploratory learning.  
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In this context, diversifying drug R&D into a few areas can be seen as an effort to 
differentiate exploratory learning, depending on the time-to-market associated with 
technological exploration. Phytomedicine R&D took about 5-8 years, shorter than that of 
NCEs. IMDs took even less time to develop, just 2-6 years, which allowed companies to 
extract profit more swiftly from technological learning.205  
Thus, the diversified R&D areas reflect the recent strategic attempt to fill the gap of profit 
uncertainty between the 10-year period of NCE R&D and the short-term profit that is 
gained from generic drug production. The empirical data captured the increasing 
possibility of creating profits by differentiating exploratory learning based on the length 
of the learning cycle, although it is still too early to assert that this strategy has met with 
success. 
In the literature, the issue of time at the firm level has largely dealt with the relationship 
between innovation speed and influencing factors, such as organisational processes and 
structures (Markman et al. 2005).206 207 In the latecomer context, Bell (2006) similarly 
pointed out the importance of the time of technological learning in addressing the catch-
up of industrialising countries:  
Over what time period must the investments in particular kinds of learning be 
made? When will the returns be realised and over what time period? How does 
this vary between types of phases of learning? What circumstances might affect 
those time-scales? (p. 32) 
While the preceding quote emphasises the overall importance of considering learning 
time, interestingly, the issue of learning time tends to be relatively less well considered 
in the literature on the catch-up of East Asian firms. The main focus in the literature is 
the ‘entry strategy’, and timing is addressed in terms of market entry as latecomers.  
The relatively lower amount of attention given to learning time in the literature is partly 
due to the literature’s focus on a few successfully caught-up, modular product-based 
industries. Modular products have a relatively short learning cycle, making it highly 
feasible for latecomers to gain an understanding of the overall design logic through 
reverse engineering. Components that latecomers are unable to develop internally within 
a short learning period can be purchased outside. Given these technological features, 
                                                          
205 The other side was to overcome the intensified competition of generic drugs and stringent IPR.  
206 It is based on the definition of innovation speed as the converting rate from discoveries to profit-making 
products (Stalk and Hout 1990). 
207At the macro-level economic dimension, the time issue has been viewed in the diffusion rate of innovation 
such as new technologies (e.g., Kessler and Chakrabarti 1996). 
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concerns about the learning time can be managed to a large extent by strengthening the 
non-time factors of learning, and thereby speeding up the learning process. These 
factors include technology transfer, hard work, overseas training and crisis construction 
(e.g., Kim 1997a, Hobday 1998a).208  Moreover, in Korea’s case, the organisational 
advantage of a heavy investment in resources by virtue of the Chaebol structure also 
lightened the burden for firms in considering the time frame associated with learning.  
For example, in a transitional phase, the matter of timing can be captured in a fast-
follower strategy that focuses on swift entry into the early stage of a growing market with 
mass production capability. Samsung and LG entered the liquid crystal display (LCD) 
and secondary batteries (mainly lithium ion) business later than the Japanese original 
manufacturers (Sharp and Sony), but rapidly overtook them over the last decade. In the 
same vein, Samsung has successfully caught up with the first-moving Apple in the smart 
phone business. As for some core components that Samsung cannot develop yet, it is 
able to outsource these items to foreign suppliers and can, to some extent, skip the time-
consuming part of learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, the new drug business entails a much longer technological learning period. 
Design logic is difficult to master through reverse engineering; this only enables 
latecomers to master the synthetic process to produce generic drugs. Additionally, NCEs 
are protected by patents for about 10 years after market launch. Thus, it is difficult for 
                                                          
208Of course, we should not overlook the importance of previous knowledge bases and enhanced absorptive 
capacity.  
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latecomers to acquire good benchmark products that can guide the development process 
of new drugs. In turn, the learning time of latecomers becomes necessarily long, with a 
wider uncertainty gap between technological learning and profit creation.  
Consequently, the present study points out that Korean latecoming pharmaceutical firms 
did not strategically consider the time frame of short-term, medium-term and long-lasting 
learning. However, the deployment of the R&D projects based on the time frame of 
exploratory learning was just as important for the latecomers as other time issues, such 
as the reduction of the development time of NCEs and the timing strategy for market 
entry (Figure 8.1).  
8.3.3.2 The paths of exploratory learning 
The difference in new-drug R&D between the first and second rounds reveals another 
area of strategic complexity surrounding latecomers’ exploratory learning: the paths for 
transition. Specifically, the empirical data showed that there was a latecomer’s dilemma 
in challenging the new-drug business in the first round, leading to an incremental 
reconfiguration using a strategic mix of competition and complementarity. This shows 
why it is important for each firm to develop specific catch-up paths, depending on its 
circumstances and internal resources (e.g., Lee and Lim 2001, Hobday et al. 2004, 
Hobday 2005, Wong and Quach 2006), and why it is useful to have a strategic mix 
(Hobday et al. 2004).209 210  
In the first-round of R&D, the latecomers encountered strong antecedent movers, that is, 
Big Pharma, directly competing against them in the early transitional phase. The case 
firms targeted primary disease markets that were already dominated by Big Pharma. 
They therefore had to compete with Big Pharma in the race for both new-drug R&D and 
marketing. However, for the global development and marketing of their new drug 
candidates, the local latecomers relied on Big Pharma. Most drugs transferred to Big 
Pharma turned out to be commercial failures. This isolated the local latecomers from the 
                                                          
209 Basically, the effectiveness of forming specific catch-up paths by substituting for missing prerequisites 
was argued for by drawing on the late industrialisation of Germany (Gerschenkron 1965). Different paths of 
industrialisation taken by East Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, and South East Asian countries, 
such as Singapore and Malaysia, were similarly exemplified to support Gerschenkron’s perspective (Hobday 
2003). Basically, the arguments stemmed from the fact that latecomers emerging after the antecedent 
industrialised countries have faced different external environments, internal resources, knowledge bases 
and institutions. While the formulation of catch-up paths at the national level has received relatively more 
attention, often in inter-country comparisons (e.g., Gerschenkron 1965, Hobday 2003, 2011, Rodrik 2008, 
2010), that of the catch-up path at the firm level seems to remain in a conceptualising stage (Hobday et al. 
2004, Hobday 2005). 
210 This was pointed out in the context of the strategic complexity and increasing need for dynamic capability 
of the catch-up in the transitional phase (Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.3.1.2).  
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global market due to the loss of the then almost singular marketing channel for exporting 
their own new drugs.211  
There are few historical instances in which an industry has caught up by exploiting only 
the domestic market. Participation in the global production network (Ernst 1997, Ernst 
and Kim 2002) is necessary for stepwise catch-up due to weak local demand for high-
cost novel products until a certain income level. Therefore, detachment from the global 
market implies the failure of market catch-up for most latecomer countries. 
In contrast, the diversification of R&D areas in the second round signifies the possibility 
of solving the latecomers’ dilemma, that is, the blind dependence of the new-drug 
business on Big Pharma. The newly diversified R&D fields can be regarded as an 
expression of the dual strategy of complementarity with and competition against Big 
Pharma. The complementary strategy is performed by specialising in developing new 
drugs in relatively small niche markets. Big Pharma is rarely willing to be directly involved 
with such small markets. For latecomers, this R&D path offers a higher possibility of 
supplying innovation sources to Big Pharma. At the same time, the competition strategy 
is attempted by continuing R&D in the primary disease areas with a diverse array of 
drugs, such as NCEs, phytomedicines and IMDs. 
The industry’s small successes in supplying IMDs and transferring QOL-oriented drug 
candidates to Big Pharma for global marketing, as well as the domestic competition 
against Big Pharma in phytomedicines and QOL drugs, suggests the potential 
effectiveness of a strategic mix. In other words, the KoPI is competitive in the domestic 
market, but complementary in terms of global development. 
The following comments by the CTO of Dong-a (Interview 48) explain the strategic 
change in the latecomers’ new-drug-based catch-up from single-mode competition in a 
major market to complementary competition in niche markets:  
In our long experience of trial and error in the new drug business, including the 
recent success of Zydena [a QOL drug], we came to realise that specialising in a 
few niche therapeutic areas in developing new drugs such as Actellion and 
Gilead212 and their transfer to Big Pharma after the II/a clinical trial is the most 
realistic way of survival and growth for Korean companies. … In brief, we refer to 
                                                          
211 For Big Pharma, the renunciation of further development of in-licensed drug candidates is regarded as a 
strategic option as latecomers operate substitutable drug candidates in general. 
212Actellion specialised in pulmonary arterial hypertension. Gilead was the original developer of Hepsera and 
Tamiflu. 
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the new strategy as the ‘2A model in the specialised QOL areas’ ... Moreover, we 
also captured market opportunity in East Asia through phytomedicine R&D based 
on our similar culture of traditional Oriental medicines. … We refer to this as a 
‘semi-globalisation’ strategy.  
Overall, the analysis suggests that the key to latecomers’ dual strategy is to concentrate 
on exploratory learning by considering the weaknesses of the dominant players' product 
portfolio, both complementarily and competitively. From a stepwise catch-up perspective, 
the complementary strategy can be perceived as an ODM strategy for the global market, 
while the competitive strategy is an OBM strategy focusing on local and emerging 
markets. 
8.3.3.3 The scale of exploratory learning 
The last strategic perspective on the commercial effectiveness of exploratory learning 
involves its scale. It is closely related to the issue of the reduction of development lead 
time mentioned above. The empirical data showed frequent delays in the timely market 
launch of domestic firms’ new drugs. Regardless of the other external factors such as 
the relationship with Big Pharma, one fundamental reason for prolonging the 
development time was the limited availability of resources for an intense investment in 
each new drug project, unlike Big Pharma.  
While new drug discovery has a highly explorative nature, it also has labour-intensive 
features. The more researchers there are who can be involved in upstream research and 
synthetic experiments, the higher the possibility of discovering the right drug candidates 
within a shorter time frame in general. As a Chaebol affiliate, LGLS showed better 
investment capability than other case firms. For most case firms with a small number of 
researchers (200-300 on average), the drag of the development lead time is likely 
unavoidable, leading to exposure to more uncertainty and market change. The scale 
aspect of exploratory learning made the KoPI very different from other catch-up cases in 
industries driven by Chaebol. 
8.3.4 Organisational mechanism  
Turning to the organisational aspects of technological learning, the conceptual 
framework pointed out the importance of the organisational structure in promoting the 
key characteristics of exploration. There are two key aspects of the organisational 
structure in terms of its impact on exploratory learning: its influence on the interactive 
feature of exploration (Sub-section 8.3.4.1) and the sustainability of exploration (Sub-
section 8.3.4.2).  
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8.3.4.1 Delay in changing R&D organisational structure 
The empirical data showed that in the first round and at the beginning of the second 
round, new drugs were developed under a function-based organisational structure. In 
the imitation stage, a function-based team structure worked well because the goal and 
content of technological learning were well defined. The division of R&D tasks was clear, 
eliminating the necessity for a high level of interaction. A synthetic team would only need 
a minimum level of feedback from a safety and efficacy testing team, because it was 
working on already validated drugs. Each team’s mechanistic concentration on its given 
learning tasks per team was critical for the rapid mastery of the imitative development 
process. 
However, the empirical findings showed that this function-based organisational structure 
is inefficient for new-drug R&D. Specifically, the function-based R&D teams had 
structural limitations in moving between the repeated synthesis of chemical compounds 
and the subsequent biological tests for toxicity and safety. Because of the explorative 
trials necessary to identify potential drug candidates, continuous feedback between the 
R&D teams, including the marketing department, was critical (Interviews 48 and 51 (K-
Pharma)).  
After the commercial failure of the first new drugs, firms began to reorganise for the 
second round of R&D. This included the reorganisation of R&D centres from a function-
based to a product/project/matrix-based structure. The reconfiguration also created 
research evaluation committees consisting of medical doctors and team leaders from 
various upstream and downstream functions.213 Moreover, the case firms also tried to 
recruit Korean senior researchers who had experience in new-drug development in Big 
Pharma.  
These changes imply that firms recognised the differences in organisational structure 
between exploitive and exploratory learning. A product/project/matrix-based 
organisational structure seems to have a stronger affinity with the interactive nature of 
exploratory learning than does a function-based structure.  
In general, it is difficult to devise an optimal intra-organisational structure for exploratory 
learning. However, the literature on project management suggests that interactive and 
flexible learning is easier with project/product/matrix-based organisational structures 
than with a strictly divided function-based team (e.g., Galbraith 1971, 1974, Ford and 
                                                          
213 For example, drug identification, preclinical development, clinical development and marketing. 
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Randolph 1992, Hobday 2000, Sydow et al. 2004).214 Particularly, the literature shows 
that organisational structure tends to evolve from a function-based hierarchy to a project-
based framework, then to a matrix-based structure that deals with the changing 
environment (Ford and Randolph 1992).  
In line with this, the matrix-based structure can be seen as an effective organisational 
structure for new-drug R&D. This argument is partly supported by organisational reforms 
in a few Big Pharma firms. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Swiss-based Novartis and 
Roche changed their R&D organisation from a hierarchical function base to a cross-
functional project/matrix base (Zeller 2002). This approach was aimed at integrating the 
various R&D functions and decision-making processes, thereby speeding up the 
development process (ibid.).215 The results of Biopartnering Survey (IBM Institute 2010) 
presented a similar viewpoint, indicating that collaborative R&D can be better promoted 
by a therapeutic-based than a fixed-function-based organisation. Here, ‘therapeutic-
based’ can be seen as the equivalent of ‘product-based’ in the pharmaceutical industry.  
Overall, the literature reports that there are many positive attributes of a matrix/product-
based organisation for interactive learning. It also notes that the influence of 
organisational structure on exploratory learning, at least in terms of interactivity, is 
commonly applicable to latecomers, although these studies have tended to focus on 
globally networked, large-scale R&D organisations. The empirical analysis showed a 
delayed change in the organisational structure as the passive response to failure or a 
lag of exploratory learning in creating market profit. 
8.3.4.2 The arm’s-length R&D organisation 
The conceptual framework highlighted the fact that that the autonomy of an R&D 
organisation is necessary for sustaining exploratory learning. It is based on the mutual 
exclusivity between exploitation and exploration, given a firm’s limited resources. A 
common architectural solution offered in the literature is to operate a decentralised R&D 
organisation for exploration. This is ultimately aimed at avoiding potential conflicts and 
tensions between the two modes of learning.216  
                                                          
214 Although this discussion focuses on the reason for the organisational change from the function base to 
the project/product base in latecomer firms, the literature on project management originally covered the 
difficulty of operating the matrix/project organisation because of dual control systems and resource 
allocations.    
215 The decreasing productivity in new drug development, compared to the case of US rivals, underlay the 
organisational change (Zeller 2002). 
216 For example, the latecoming Seiko operated an autonomous R&D organisation for learning the emerging 
technology of quartz movement and overtook the mechanics-based SSIH, a then-dominant Swiss watch 
company (Benner and Tushman 2003). Meanwhile, SSIH was attached to the dominant market share based 
on the old technology, although they kept learning the new one (ibid). 
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However, in contrast to the literature’s focus on the ambidexterity of large or 
technologically advanced companies (e.g., Celltech by McNamara and Baden-Fuller 
1999, Seiko by Benner and Tushman 2003), the case firms were small- and medium-
sized, technologically inferior latecomers. The empirical data showed that as small-sized 
latecomers, they had insufficient resources to operate independent R&D organisations 
devoted solely to technological exploration. Moreover, an independent R&D organisation 
would seemingly be unnecessary for long-term exploratory learning because the firms’ 
R&D organisation remained small and was thus easier to manage.  
However, the empirical analysis found that there was an arm’s-length R&D organisation 
played a positive role in sustaining long-term exploratory learning in small latecomer 
firms. This finding is supported by the experiences of two case firms. One is Mogam 
Biotechnology Research Institute, a public entity funded by GC. The other is C&C 
Research Laboratories, a drug discovery-oriented joint venture between JW and the 
Japanese company Chugai. Both R&D organisations have continuously supplied 
potential drug candidates or the upstream knowledge to their funding companies. Dong-
a’s recent reallocation of innovative drug research to its holding company also seems to 
support the argument in favour of autonomous, exploration-oriented research units. The 
holding company is not directly involved in the marketing activities for drugs. 
After the commercial failure of its first NCE, LGLS reorganised its R&D, including the 
generic drug business. Similarly, Yuhan experienced a pipeline gap when it faced sales 
lags of its first NCE and thus restructured its new-drug R&D business. These cases 
indicate that latecomers also need a stable organisational base to provide potential drug 
candidates.  
The experiences of some Chaebols are more vivid. Their attempts at biotechnology R&D 
were often disrupted by internal conflict and external shock, such as managerial pressure 
over the lack of profit generation after a few years of exploration and the Asian economic 
crisis in 1997. As a result, most Korean Chaebols that started biotechnology R&D in the 
late 1980s and 1990s gave up exploratory learning. Some of them, such as Hanwha and 
Samsung, are currently seeking to re-enter the biotechnology business through imitative 
learning associated with the development of biosimilar drugs.  
In this context, the empirical analysis suggests the potential of an arm’s-length, 
autonomous R&D organisation to preserve latecomers’ sustainable exploratory learning, 
free from internal and external managerial risks. This is particularly true in science-based 
industries that are fed by long-running but highly uncertain technological learning. The 
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CTO of Green Cross referred to the Mogam Biotechnology Research Institute as a 
‘reservoir of mid- and long-term technology’ for future profits and slumps.  
8.3.4.3 Role of top management and ownership  
Two other organisational mechanisms were also considered in the conceptual 
framework as influential elements of latecomers’ exploratory learning: the role of top 
management in initiating and sustaining exploratory learning and the effect of the 
organisational code on efficient exploratory learning. Both perspectives were partly 
traced throughout the firm-level analysis of Chapters 6 and 7. 
The empirical data showed that family-based ownership and the family’s direct 
participation in management across generations are common in the KoPI, including in 
most case firms. There are both positive and negative effects of strong ownership on 
exploratory learning.  
On one hand, company owners (often CEOs in the case firms) played an active role in 
sustaining exploratory learning. For example, the continuous long-term, new-drug 
development projects by LGLS, Dong-a and Ilyang were driven by the owners’ strong 
willingness to remain engaged. The analysis showed that the latecomers would have 
been unable to continue the long-lasting new drug projects without the owners’ support. 
This observation confirmed the findings of studies that have argued for senior 
management to play critical role in guiding the direction between incremental and radical 
innovation activities, and resolving the tension between the two modes of learning 
(e.g.,Tushman et al. 1997, Benner and Tushman 2003). On the other hand, strong 
ownership and its leading role in management seemed to inhibit joint exploratory learning 
among firms. The interviewees often pointed out the strong tendency to secure 
ownership as one of the critical barriers to inter-firm R&D, even though most owners 
realised the need for collaboration among small-sized latecomers.  
Overall, it can be said that an instinct for survival and a strong sense of ownership among 
family owners underpinned the increasing support for exploratory learning within the 
firms. However, such strong attachment to family-based ownership also caused a lag in 
industry-wide exploratory learning. 
8.3.4.4 The latecomers’ organisational code  
The conceptual framework pointed out that an imitation-oriented organisational code can 
influence exploration-oriented R&D by individual researchers. Although this issue was 
not dealt with in the empirical chapters, the individual-level mechanism of exploration 
undoubtedly affects the efficiency of organisational learning.  
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Prior to starting new-drug R&D, the case firms and their researchers mainly engaged in 
reverse engineering for the imitative production of original drugs with little technological 
risk. The researchers were accustomed to single-mode learning, that is, exploitation. The 
empirical data showed the difficulty of the smooth conversion of behavioural patterns 
between exploitation- and exploration-routinised researchers. Researchers conducting 
generic drug development were mostly concerned with timing so that they could launch 
ahead of their rivals, as they were working in a field with low technological risk and 
uncertainty. In contrast, researchers implementing new-drug R&D were faced with higher 
technological uncertainty. The timing strategy for the swift market entry was of relatively 
little concern for the latter type of researcher.  
In this regard, a few senior-level researchers pointed out that researchers in most Korean 
firms were still predominantly coded by imitative and risk-averse mind-sets. This situation 
caused inefficiency in exploration-driven new-drug R&D. Kale (2005) similarly captured 
the importance of an organisational routine coded to individuals in Indian latecomer firms’ 
R&D. In his study, the difficulty of switching from an imitative to innovative mind-set was 
revealed when generic researchers tried to switch to new-drug R&D. Below is an 
observation from the head of new-drug discovery in a leading Indian firm, Lupin:  
There is this scientist; he was head of one group of the generic people. So I tried 
this scientist for eight months in new drug discovery, he couldn’t ... deliver 
anything to me. Finally I have to ask him to please go back to generics now. This 
is my personal experience; with reverse-engineering experienced scientists, it is 
difficult (Kale 2005). 
Similarly, the following two examples reveal the individual-level differences between 
exploitive and exploratory learning and the importance of organisational receptivity to 
these differences.  
The first example shows the difficulty of switching between exploratory and exploitive 
modes of learning. When LGLS failed in marketing its first NCE, Factive, it set up a 
branded generic (BG) team in its R&D centre to focus on short-term profit. For the generic 
drug market, launching generics at the correct, earliest possible by evading patents is 
the most important factor in competing in this kind of market. However, the company 
underestimated the uniqueness of the technological and approval activities of the generic 
drug business (Interview 38 (Big Pharma). 217  The researchers at LGLS had little 
experience and related developmental knowhow in the time-sensitive generic drug 
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business. They had accumulated knowledge and knowhow in technological exploration 
for a long time, but were unfamiliar with technological exploitation. That is, the ‘core 
competence of developing new drugs and generic drugs were different’ (Interview 36 
(DBF)). As a result, the company’s generic drug business has shown little 
competitiveness. 
The second example shows the changing pattern of technological learning towards ‘real’ 
exploration (acquired from Donga Science, 08/03/2010). In 2006, a team from LGLS 
identified by chance a new chemical entity named Cytopro. When the research team led 
by Dr Sun-ha Kim tested the hepatotoxicity of a drug candidate for diabetes, they 
originally expected to see rapid necrosis as the candidate material increased. However, 
the result showed the opposite phenomenon. The measuring instrument reported an 
increase in the number of cells from 100 to 140. The researcher who conducted the 
experiment assumed that there was a defect in the measuring instrument; he was 
focused on the experiment’s original goal. However, the team leader, Dr Kim, noticed 
that the cells involved in the experiment had become more active and healthy; he 
decided to redirect the experiment to test the effectiveness of Cytopro in protecting cells 
from necrosis. The team examined the mechanism of necrosis inhibition and then 
confirmed Cytopro’s potential as a protective material for cells that can prevent necrosis.  
Although this seems to be an example of a normal change in an experiment, it should be 
noted that the discovery was only made possible when the experimenters changed the 
way they thought and communicated with each other. As the former CEO of LGLS (Dr 
Incheol Kim) commented, the discovery of Cytopro meant failure of the researchers’ past 
research pattern (or goal-oriented organisational routine) of implementing experiments, 
as it yielded a result contrary to their expectations: ‘This drug would have been discarded 
if the same event had occurred in the past’.218 Cytopro is now believed to be the only 
material that can protect cells from necrosis with commercial potential.  
Overall, despite its accidental discovery, the recognition of Cytopro as a valuable 
material was driven by an emerging exploratory mode of learning. The research team 
started to reconceptualise the problem by reversing the known relationship between 
cause and effect. This signified an attempt to overcome mission-oriented, linear problem-
solving activity.  
                                                          
218 Similarly, the erectile function of Viagra was identified when Pfizer was implementing clinical trials for a 
cardiovascular drug. 
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To sum up, the analysis suggests that the exploitation-oriented organisational code was 
an underlying barrier hampering the smooth conversion to exploratory learning in 
latecomer firms. However, it also shows the possibility of a change of learning pattern to 
exploration.  
8.3.5 Overall findings of Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 is concerned with how effectively latecomers performed 
exploratory learning, which is the key mode of technological learning for new-drug 
development. Two sub-research questions were formulated by focusing on two aspects 
of exploratory learning: R&D practices, including the real drug R&D process and strategy 
(RQ 2.1), and the organisational perspectives that correspond to these R&D practices, 
such as organisational structure (R.Q 2.2). 
The empirical analysis was conducted by reviewing 25 years of attempts to develop new 
drugs by nine local pharmaceutical firms. The first round of new-drug R&D was initiated 
by the reinforcement of the product patent system in 1987, a precursor of TRIPS. The 
second round was performed after 2000, when NHI reform led to a change in market 
structure and competition. The analytical dimensions were developed from the drug 
development practices and organisational processes. 
Regarding RQ 2.1, the analysis concluded that latecomer firms had long struggled with 
building a virtuous cycle of the exploratory mode of technological learning and profit 
creation. New-drug R&D is characterised as the initial failure of profit extraction from first-
round drug R&D, and a reconfiguring process in the second round. Three underlying 
reasons for this transitional pattern were laid out from the perspectives of R&D practices 
and strategy.  
The first relates to the initial failure of managing the time frame of new-drug R&D to profit 
creation. Most case firms put an early focus on developing NCEs, which took 10-15 years. 
This led them to struggle to acquire stable profit sources. On the other hand, the analysis 
also found that more recently, the time scale of exploratory learning has been at the 
forefront of strategic considerations. New drug projects were deployed over three 
different time windows: short- (less than 5 years), mid- (5-8 years) and long-term learning 
(10 years). This was the outcome of concern with the payback point of the R&D 
investment. 
The second reason is that R&D paths changed from single-mode direct competition to 
dual-mode complementary competition with the first movers. In the first round, the 
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latecomers blindly replicated Big Pharma’s innovation model, the development of NCEs 
in major markets, such as antibiotics and anticancer drugs. The data revealed that the 
main problem of this innovation path was encountering direct competition with Big 
Pharma, leading to a decrease in commercial possibilities. In contrast, emerging 
alternative paths in the second round aimed to avoid direct competition with the market 
dominator by searching for niche markets. Case firms explored three paths of innovation, 
IMDs, phytomedicines and QOL-oriented NCEs, in parallel with biotechnology R&D. The 
biotechnology path aimed to seize opportunities for latecomers by quickly exploiting a 
new technological paradigm.  
The third indication is the low intensity of exploratory learning in terms of investment 
scale. Most case firms, as small-sized latecomers, found it difficult to engage in 
exploration at the scale that was needed. They could not afford to allot sufficient 
resources to drug discovery in a timely manner and to actively take the risk of intense 
investment. As a result, the period of exploratory learning was prolonged and their 
pipeline drugs often fell behind those of competitors. 
Overall, the findings suggest a weakness in latecomers’ exploratory learning due to 
procedural and strategic errors in three aspects of technological learning concerning the 
speed of transition. The recent change implies that firms are continuously rectifying their 
learning patterns by considering strategic elements of exploration. 
For RQ 2.2, the analysis concluded that the case firms’ exploratory learning was 
performed under imitation-routinised organisational mechanisms, causing inefficiency in 
exploration practices. Three findings support this argument.  
The first finding relates to the difficulty in actualising the key conditions of exploration in 
latecomers’ real R&D practice, even when new-drug R&D itself is strongly supported by 
the top management. The literature review pointed out that a high degree of interactive 
learning is necessary for exploratory learning in science-intensive, integral architecture-
based drug R&D. However, the empirical data revealed a low level of interaction among 
R&D teams and the absence of the demand consideration in their technology-push-style 
new-drug R&D.  
The second piece of evidence involves the late restructuring of the R&D organisation as 
an underlying cause of the first point, that is, the defective R&D. The case firms’ new-
drug R&D was conducted under the then on-going influence of a function-based 
organisational structure, which was established at the imitative learning stage. The close 
interaction and rapid feedback among various concerned teams including R&D and 
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marketing parts were interrupted in the function-based organisation. The firms did not 
adopt more exploration-favourable structures, such as a product/project/matrix-based 
organisation, at a full scale until the late 2000s.  
The third fact concerns the negative influence of the researchers’ risk-averse and 
imitation-oriented mind-set on the firms’ exploratory learning to develop new drugs. The 
researchers’ imitative habit originated from the latecomer firms’ focus on reverse 
engineering at the imitation stage. The data indicated that this approach is still influential 
in current exploration practices. 
Overall, the findings confirmed that the case firms’ reconfiguration of organisational 
mechanisms to promote exploratory learning was relatively delayed. Their imitation-
favourable organisational routines disturbed the exploratory mode of technological 
learning. However, it should also be noted that the firms were gradually modifying their 
organisational mechanisms in a more exploration-friendly way, and were particularly 
concerned with the interactivity, business potential and sustainability of exploration. 
8.4 Summary  
This chapter answered the research questions concerning the factors that determine the 
enhancement of the exploratory mode of technological learning and ultimately influence 
the rate of the transition of the KoPI towards science-based industry. The institutional 
and organisational factors in the transition were discussed by comparing the study’s 
empirical findings with the key characteristics and conditions of exploratory learning, 
such as its high-risk, long-running and interactive nature. 
First, the institutional factors that influence innovation actors’ exploratory learning were 
determined in terms of the effectiveness of the three policy categories and their 
alignment perspective in promoting exploratory learning. These categories consist of the 
investment policy, the incentive regime and the administrative pattern of R&D support by 
the three concerned ministries. 
The discussion concluded that these institutional factors have both positive and negative 
effects on exploratory learning. The positive effects of the investment policy and incentive 
regime included the structural establishment of the necessary public and private 
innovation actors for enhancing exploratory learning and the rapid accumulation of 
knowledge stock in scientific research, particularly in the emerging field of biotechnology. 
However, under the quantity-based performance criteria and compartmentalised R&D 
support of the three involved ministries (MOST, MOHW and MOTIE), there were 
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interruptions in conducting individual and joint exploratory learning between the public 
and industrial R&D organisations. The discussion also argued that institutional inertia, 
short-term performance orientation and the integral product architecture of drugs 
underlie the poor implementation of the reformed S&T policies. 
Second, the latecomer firms’ pattern of exploratory learning was examined by focusing 
on the effectiveness of various technological and organisational factors in generating the 
key characteristics of exploratory learning. The thesis examined four technological 
factors – R&D practice, R&D strategy including the time frame and paths of exploration, 
and the intensity of the exploration – and three organisational factors – organisational 
structure, the role of top management and individual researchers’ mind-set.  
Based on the findings, the latecomer firms’ new-drug R&D was finally characterised as 
an initial failure and its later reconfiguration to build a virtuous cycle of exploratory 
learning and market profitability. The first round of new-drug R&D involved the replication 
of established innovation models, focusing on the development of NCEs in major market 
segments. It failed to achieve market catch-up with Big Pharma. The second round was 
characterised by the search for alternative-niche innovation opportunities; companies 
diversified exploratory learning based on the strategic factors identified above. They 
tended to focus on four paths of exploration: IMDs, phytomedicines, QOL-oriented NCEs 
and biological drug R&D. A complementary competition strategy and an arm’s-length 
R&D organisation can be an effective and strategic means of heightening the profitability 
and sustainability of latecomers’ exploratory learning. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction  
This thesis set out to explore the 25-year transitional process of the KoPI, from its initial 
focus on the imitative production of generic drugs to its own development of new drugs. 
The thesis was motivated by curiosity about the pace of catch-up in the science-based 
pharmaceutical industry, particularly in the development context of fast-following Asian 
NIEs. Unlike most successful catch-up industries, such as electronics and ICTs, which 
catch up within a relatively short period of development, the pharmaceutical industry 
seemed to achieve only modest catch-up performance after entering the transitional 
phase in the late 1980s.  
The thesis was underpinned by four theoretical and contextual bodies of literature. First, 
the different styles of organisational learning, exploitation and exploration were 
employed to understand technological learning in the transitional phase. Second, the 
literature on innovation systems provided insight into institutional and interactive 
perspectives of technological learning. Third, the contextual literature on the fast 
followers’ catch-ups and transitions was used to understand the developmental context 
of Asian NIEs. Fourth, the literature on the sectoral knowledge dynamics of the 
pharmaceutical industry was reviewed, focusing on the science base of drugs and their 
integral product architecture.  
The literature review recalled the critical role of institutional and organisational 
mechanisms in strengthening exploratory learning as the key mode of technological 
learning for transition. In line with this, it further determined the key characteristics of 
exploratory learning in the science-based pharmaceutical industry, such as its high-risk, 
long-term and densely interactive nature. 
The thesis finally argued that the rate of transition of the KoPI was affected by the degree 
of promotion of exploratory learning by institutional and organisational mechanisms. It 
also noted that the institutional and organisational promotion of exploratory learning is 
related to a ‘pattern change’ in the previously established institutional and organisational 
routines associated with imitative learning of existing technologies and products. 
The argument and empirical analysis were theoretically based on a conceptual 
framework that viewed the transitional phase as a transformational process associated 
with certain institutional and organisational mechanisms. The key institutional focus in 
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this framework was the influence of revised S&T policies on the exploratory learning of 
innovation actors. The organisational transformation was investigated from the point of 
view of firms’ increasing exploration in new-drug development.  
The multidimensional investigation provided a broad picture of fast-following countries’ 
bumpy transition process in the science-based pharmaceutical industry. It did not 
measure the exact speed of the transition of the KoPI or assess the success or failure of 
the transition. Rather, it uncovered a pattern of institutional and organisational factors 
that might have influenced the transition.  
In terms of institutional factors, the study discussed the two-sided effects of the fast 
followers’ STI policies on the innovation actors’ exploratory learning. In terms of 
organisational factors, it revealed not only the latecomer firms’ strategic awkwardness 
and organisational errors, but also the emerging potential to rectify these problems by 
focusing on niche markets. Synthesising these facts, it characterised the present 
transition rate as the combined outcomes of distorted exploratory learning on the part of 
public and private innovation actors and the lag in building a virtuous cycle of exploratory 
learning and profit creation. It can be argued that if the KoPI dealt more proficiently with 
these institutional and organisational factors, exploratory learning would be more 
efficient and the transition speed would be faster.  
This final chapter first recapitulates the main findings (Section 9.2) and presents the 
theoretical contributions of the thesis (Section 9.3). Some implications of the research 
for policy and management are then suggested (Section 9.4), followed by a discussion 
of the limitations of the thesis and recommendations for future research (Section 9.5). 
Some closing remarks conclude the chapter and the thesis (Section 9.6).  
9.2 Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings were based on an investigation of the distinctive transitional 
dynamics of the science-based pharmaceutical industry, which produces integral 
products and is confronting an emerging biotechnological paradigm. The findings were 
discussed in four chapters: the technological, market and institutional context of the 
deepening transitional phase of the KoPI (Chapter 4), S&T policy reform and its influence 
on exploratory learning (Chapter 5), the evolution of new-drug R&D among latecomer 
firms (Chapter 6) and the corresponding organisational reconfiguration of such firms 
(Chapter 7). 
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In line with the research objective and research questions, the findings will be 
summarised along three lines: the specifics of the transitional phase in the science-based 
pharmaceutical industry (Sub-section 9.2.1), the institutional mechanisms’ influence on 
the exploratory mode of technological learning (Sub-section 9.2.2) and the organisational 
mechanisms’ impact on exploratory learning (Sub-section 9.2.3).  
9.2.1 Transition in the science-based pharmaceutical industry  
This thesis contended that the industrial transition from the imitation to the innovation 
stage requires not only an incremental accumulation of knowledge, but also changes in 
institutional conditions and organisational mechanisms. This is referred to as ‘pattern 
change’ and ‘qualitative transformation’. Specifically, these views of the need for change 
were derived from the need to overcome the two common barriers to latecomers’ 
transitions identified in the literature. In the transitional phase, latecomers are exposed 
to more direct competition against the forerunning innovators, and have to strictly comply 
with global institutions and regulations such as the IPR. In turn, they face increasing 
pressure to build innovative capability.  
The existing studies on Asian NIEs examined the ways in which latecomers dealt with 
the common barriers found in fast-following contexts. Technological learning in most 
successfully caught-up industries was strengthened by reversing the PLC and under a 
highly vertical SIS, placing Chaebol in the highest position. They were mostly electronics 
and ICT hardware. These markets were stratified by price and quality, making it easier 
for latecomers to gradually penetrate them. The physical decomposability of the products 
to subcomponents also contributed to the stepwise technological and market catch-up, 
that is, modular product-based industries.  
In contrast, this thesis captured the quite unfamiliar picture of the industrial 
characteristics surrounding the transition in the KoPI. First, the pharmaceutical industry 
operates in the dichotomised markets between off-patent generic drugs and patented 
original drugs. A significant science base is a necessary condition for entering the market 
for original drugs. In terms of technological learning, the industry has a long product 
development cycle from bench to market. Moreover, in the midst of the KoPI’s transition, 
the burgeoning biotechnology paradigm expanded the science base associated with 
drug R&D.  
Accordingly, public innovation actors and biotechnology-based start-ups increasingly 
undertake some of the central R&D roles in the pharmaceutical SIS. Meanwhile, no 
incumbent pharmaceutical firm has served as an ‘anchor’ firm, as Chaebol do in other 
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industries. The lack of large firms that can invest in start-ups’ research outcomes and 
bear the risks of the extended R&D time frame can be problematic. Moreover, the nature 
of an integral product, combined with the difficulties posed by the physical 
decomposability of drugs into subcomponents, necessitates more in-depth and 
simultaneous interactions among the heterogeneous innovation actors. The division of 
R&D becomes particularly blurred for integral products.  
While the thesis mapped the different dynamics of the transitional phase in the 
pharmaceutical industry, it highlighted the need for the radical reinforcement of the 
exploratory mode of technological learning to deal with the transition barriers. Thus, the 
key issue of the thesis is about the transformation of imitation-supportive institutional 
conditions and organisational processes to promote exploratory learning for developing 
new drugs. Few previous studies have dealt with the complex dynamics of a transition in 
a science-based industry with integral product architecture.  
The following sub-sections summarise the transformational process in dealing with the 
institutional and organisational dynamics unveiled in the empirical work. There is an 
emphasis on the overall pattern of the transition, and the factors that influenced 
exploratory learning and transition rate are reported. 
9.2.2 Institutional mechanisms of exploratory learning  
The thesis addressed the influence of revised S&T policies on innovation actors’ 
exploratory learning, which is the key mode of technological learning for new-drug 
development (RQ 1). Three major S&T policies to promote exploratory learning were 
considered: investment policy, an incentive regime and the administrative pattern of R&D 
support by relevant ministries. The findings suggest that the present status of the 
transition can be thought of as the synthetic outcome of both positive and negative 
influences of the policy factors on technological exploration. 
Specifically, the investigation focused on capturing how each policy category promoted 
or interrupted the expression of the key characteristics of exploratory learning in each 
R&D organisation, such as risk taking and the long-term nature of learning (RQ 1.1). The 
investigation also traced whether the policies facilitated or disturbed interactive learning 
between the public and industrial innovation actors, which is the other key feature of 
exploration in the science-based pharmaceutical industry (RQ 1.2).  
The investigation first showed that the active investment policy contributed to the 
establishment of exploration-capable public and private innovation actors. However, it 
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also revealed that the latecomers’ ‘real’ exploratory learning was fairly inhibited in 
organisations; it was also not cross-fertilised between the public and industrial actors 
given the incentive regime and administrative pattern of R&D support. Moreover, the 
findings pointed out that the negative aspects of the policy factors partly stemmed from 
the fast followers’ institutional legacy of risk-averse and short-term performance, 
together with institutional inexperience in promoting exploratory learning in integral 
product-based industries. The operational patterns of the policy factors identified in the 
discussion (Chapter 8) are summarised as follows: 
Policy factors that promoted exploratory learning 
• R&D investment led to the establishment of the necessary innovation actors for 
science-based innovation, such as universities, GRIs and biotechnology start-
ups (RQ 1.1).  
• R&D investment decreased the initial risk in conducting technological exploration, 
that is, new-drug R&D, for incumbent pharmaceutical firms (RQ 1.1).  
• The incentive regime emphasising publication led to the rapid accumulation of a 
stock of scientific research, which can drive further exploratory learning (RQ 1.1). 
Policy factors that interrupted exploratory learning 
• R&D investment focusing on emerging biotechnology missed the importance of 
the incumbent pharmaceutical industry as the commercial channel for 
biotechnology research (RQ 1.2) 
• The incentive regime overemphasised quantity-based performance, such as the 
number of publications, which led to a risk-averse tendency in public actors’ 
exploratory learning (RQ 1.1).  
• The incentive regime – specifically the publication-oriented evaluation of most 
innovation actors – disturbed joint exploratory learning between the public and 
industrial innovation actors (RQ 1.2).  
• The incentive regime, led by the professor-dominated selection environment of 
NRDPs and their interest in upstream research, overlooked the commercial 
viability of exploratory learning (RQ 1.2).  
• R&D support under compartmentalised ministries (MOST, MOHW and MOTIE) 
failed to coordinate their different goals for R&D support and caused the 
misalignment of upstream and downstream incentives for exploration (RQ 1.2).  
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• R&D support under the compartmentalised ministries disturbed the close 
exploratory learning links across diverse NRDPs, although such links are 
important for exploration in integral architecture-based drug R&D (RQ 1.2). 
To sum up, the thesis showed that fast followers have limited institutional capability to 
promote exploratory learning. The negative effects of Korea’s S&T policies led to a 
systemic inefficiency that counteracted the positive policy effect of enhancing exploratory 
learning. Specifically, the S&T policies inhibited risk-taking and long-term exploration 
practices in public R&D organisations and DBFs (RQ 1.1). Moreover, they also 
interrupted mutually compatible joint exploratory learning between the public and 
industrial actors (RQ 1.2). This means that upstream biotechnology research (led by the 
public actors) and pharmaceutical R&D (headed by industrial actors) were largely 
decoupled from each other.  
9.2.3 Organisational mechanism of exploratory learning  
The thesis also examined firm-level R&D processes for new-drug development. It aimed 
to gain an understanding of latecomer firms’ enhancement of the exploratory mode of 
technological learning (RQ 2). An empirical analysis was conducted by examining the 
changes in the new-drug development process of nine latecomer firms between the 
completed first round of new-drug R&D and the on-going second round, in terms of both 
technological development (RQ 2.1) and organisational mechanisms (RQ 2.2). Findings 
suggest that the present status of the industrial transition is partly an outcome of the 
continuous error correction process of latecomers’ awkward exploratory learning over 
the past 25 years. 
Specifically, the findings showed that procedural, strategic and organisational learning 
factors were limited in effectively actualising the key characteristics of exploratory 
learning in new-drug R&D. The results further showed that this limitation was 
considerably due to the intermingling of the organisational effort for innovation and the 
on-going organisational memory of imitative learning. Taking these together, there is an 
overall commercial failure in the initial replication stage to follow first movers’ exploration 
model, and recent rectifying efforts to improve the profitability of technological exploration. 
The most influential factors identified in the discussion (Chapter 8) are summarised as 
follows: 
Factors influencing latecomer firms’ exploratory learning  
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• The drug R&D practice was conducted with a low degree of interaction among 
R&D teams, and used the technology-push approach without profound market 
consideration (RQ 2.1 and 2.2). 
• The time strategy of new-drug R&D, that is, the time-to-market of exploratory 
learning, was considered late after the commercial failure of the NCEs, which 
took 10 years (RQ 2.1). 
• R&D paths have recently started to diversify into four niche fields – IMDs, QOL-
oriented NCEs, phytomedicines and biological drugs – after the failure of the 
NCEs that solely focused on antibiotics and anticancer, which have a major 
market (RQ 2.1).  
• The organisational structure of R&D showed a tardy change from a function-
based to a product/project/matrix-based structure to promote interactive and 
market-reflective R&D (RQ 2.2).  
• The arm’s-length organisational structure of R&D showed the effectiveness of 
securing long-lasting exploration in small latecomer firms (RQ 2.2).  
• Top management, often company owners, played a supportive role in maintaining 
long-running new-drug R&D within firms. However, the other concerned groups 
had a more negative view of company owners’ roles in industry-wide innovation 
activities (RQ 2.2).  
• A risk-averse and imitation-routinised mind-set still underlay the firms’ exploratory 
learning to some extent (RQ 2.1 and 2.2). 
On the whole, the findings show that latecomer firms were delayed in building a virtuous 
cycle of exploratory learning and profit creation because of certain procedural and 
strategic defects involved in the new-drug R&D process (RQ 2.1). The delay can be 
partly attributed to some problems in the organisational mechanism of conducting 
exploratory learning (RQ 2.2).  
Particularly, the tough R&D process demonstrates that intense exploratory learning itself 
does not necessarily guarantee a successful transition for latecomers. This is particularly 
true if learning is not considered in the strategic and organisational context of direct 
competition against Big Pharma. The thesis further argues that complementary 
competition against Big Pharma can be an effective niche model for latecomers’ 
exploratory learning.  
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9.3 Theoretical Contribution  
This thesis makes four theoretical contributions, particularly in relation to the conceptual 
framework for understanding technological learning in the transitional phase: the catch-
up dynamics of latecomers’ science-based transition in an industry that operates integral 
product architecture (Sub-section 9.3.1), the system perspective of exploratory learning 
(Sub-section 9.3.2), the suggestion for a transformative capacity (Sub-section 9.3.3), and 
the non-technological factors that commercially vitalise technological learning (Sub-
section 9.3.4). These four conceptual perspectives help build a comprehensive 
conceptual framework for the transitional phase of industrial development. 
9.3.1 Science base, product nature and catch-up  
The thesis fills a theoretical lacuna in the literature on both science-based innovation and 
latecomers’ catch-up. Studies on science-based innovation have largely focused on 
advanced countries and their firms. They have generally emphasised the collaboration 
between public science and industrial actors. Behind this, the literature has tended to 
assume the prior accumulation of research capability in the innovation actors observed 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3). However, this thesis addresses latecomers whose public and 
industrial actors only started to accumulate a science base in the past two decades. Thus, 
understanding the initiation mechanism of science-based innovation activities becomes 
as important of an issue as collaboration.  
The literature on catch-up also overlooks the process of catch-up in a science-based 
industry, particularly in an integral architecture-based sector such as the pharmaceutical 
industry. Instead, the literature mainly focuses on modular, product-based industries, 
which were notably successful in a rapid catch-up led by Chaebol (Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.3). However, as shown, the technological nature of integral products is very different, 
and these differences affect the organisational and institutional mechanisms of 
technological learning.  
The thesis provided a deeper understanding of the dynamics of latecomers’ 
technological learning and competition in a science-intensive and integral product-based 
industry that was fairly distinctive from the modular, product-based industries traditionally 
associated with catch-up (See Sub-section 9.2.1). Few studies have examined science-
based catch-up by latecomers making integral products, at least in the context of Asian 
NIEs. 
9.3.2 System perspective of exploratory learning  
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The conceptual framework combined a firm-level theory of organisational learning 
(focused on the distinction between exploration and exploitation) with literature on the 
innovation system. It attempted to identify the inter-organisational and systemic influence 
of exploratory learning. As seen, interdependence and interactivity among 
heterogeneous innovation actors and the influence of diverse policy elements undergird 
the exploratory learning of an individual innovation actor. Thus, the application of the 
concept of organisational learning to the systems level enabled the thesis to analyse 
institutional perspectives on the concept of exploratory learning. The existing literature 
on exploration and exploitation has mostly focused on firm-level ambidexterity and inter-
firm perspectives on exploration in advanced countries. The systemic aspects of 
exploratory learning, such as institutional influence, were rarely addressed in the 
latecomer context. 
9.3.3 Transformative capacity  
The transformative view, associated with the idea of a pattern change, provided a 
complementary conceptual lens to conventional catch-up frameworks; this helped 
capture the procedural problems that latecomers encountered in the transitional phase. 
Knowledge is accumulated continuously by ascending the catch-up stages, but, as 
shown in this study, the transition to advanced development stages requires a 
discontinuous mode of organisational mechanisms and institutional settings from the 
previous imitation stage. The transformative view expounded in this thesis helps show 
that the underlying problems of the KoPI’s technological learning stemmed from 
institutional and organisational discontinuity in the transitional phase.  
This transformative view has rarely been employed in the literature analysing Asian NIEs’ 
rapid catch-up at both firm and national levels. Some concepts widely adopted in the 
literature, such as absorptive capacity (e.g., Kim 1997b), combinative capability 
(Mathews and Cho 1999) and government-led, strong innovation systems (Kim 1998), 
tended to focus on the dynamics of the incremental improvement of technological 
learning. This seems to be an academic response to interpret the rapid catch-up of Asian 
NIEs and their firms. However, this thesis noted that such an incremental and continuous 
view of catch-up has limitations in interpreting the changing pattern of technological 
learning and its procedural difficulties in the transitional phase. 
The transformative view did not extend to theorise the factors of transformation. However, 
by interpreting some factors that were discussed in the literature on science-based 
innovation and the catch-up, this thesis was able to trace the institutional and 
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organisational strengths and weaknesses in promoting the key characteristics of 
exploration in a science-based industry. 
In this regard, idea of transformative capacity can be seen as a more comprehensive, 
dynamic capability for latecomers that embraces institutional and organisational factors. 
This concept seems to be particularly appropriate for understanding the system’s and 
firm’s momentum to advance to the next development stage. 
9.3.4 Non-technological factors  
The thesis extended the recent theoretical argument on the non-technological factors in 
latecomers’ advanced catch-up (e.g., Dutrenit 2004, Hobday et al. 2004, Hobday 2005). 
By examining the strategic and organisational factors of the exploratory mode of 
technological learning, the thesis shed light on the reasons why latecomer 
pharmaceutical firms failed to reach a position of more value creation, despite achieving 
a moderate level of innovative technological capability.  
One of the most noticeable non-technological factors discussed in the recent literature 
(Hobday et al. 2004, Hobday 2005) is the conceptualisation of alternative innovation 
paths for catch-up, aspired for by the Gerschenkronian view (1965). However, few 
empirical studies have been conducted on such conceptualisation, and little attention 
has been paid to the elements that can enable it to occur. This thesis empirically captured 
the practical effectiveness of latecomer firms devising their own catch-up paths. It further 
suggested a few strategic and organisational tactics that would enable firms to do so.219 
9.4 Implications in Practice 
A few practical lessons are suggested to policymakers and managers. These lessons 
are particularly concerned with the institutional and non-technological conditions that 
promote long-running, highly uncertain and interactive technological learning in the 
transitional phase.  
9.4.1 Implications for S&T policies 
                                                          
219 Although a few recent studies of successful cases of innovation stressed non-technological learning 
factors in latecomers’ advanced catch-up (e.g., Dutrénit 2000, Kale 2005, Medeiros 2011), some of the key 
non-technological factors identified in these cases had to do with the institutional factors, rather than the 
firms’ internal factors. These included the loose IPR regime (Kale 2005) and domestic market protection 
(Medeiros 2011). In contrast, the transition of the KoPI apparently added more weight to, first, the latecomers’ 
strategic and organisational capability to deal with the growing institutional and technological complexity 
during their transitional phase, and, second, the ability to deal with the competition against first movers.     
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First, it seems to be necessary for the government to consider the differences between 
fostering technologically ill-defined science-based innovation and supporting 
engineering industries in which the development route of technologies is largely 
predictable. As discussed above, the distance between technological learning and the 
market in science-based innovation is far wider than that in engineering industries. This 
research pointed out the negative effects of the short-term performance oriented 
evaluation system of national R&D investment in pharmaceutical R&D. The evaluation 
policy should be reformed to accept more long-term and failure-tolerant R&D activities. 
For example, one possible solution is a change in evaluation interval from annually to 
every three to five years. 
Second, the government’s capability to align diverse industrial and non-industrial (social) 
policies should be reconsidered. Although the government increasingly supported 
biotechnology, led by MOST and MOTIE, its R&D investments were poorly linked with 
industrial R&D. Industrial R&D was mainly guided by the non-industrial public-health 
policy of the NHI. As a result, all innovation actors responded to their various incentives 
differently, with some focusing on publications and others on imitation-based generic 
drugs. 
Another issue is the institutional mismatch between the integral architecture products of 
the pharmaceutical industry and the compartmentalised R&D support of concerned 
ministries. This caused institutional confusion in implementing S&T policies.  
Overall, the government in the transitional phase should put more emphasis on policy 
alignment with sector-specific knowledge dynamics and with heterogeneous incentive 
mechanisms, as many industrial sectors now have multi-technological bases and a 
variety of social and environmental perspectives. Policy alignment seems to be the major 
challenge for the government, given the on-going ministerial tendency to control umbrella 
organisations and expand the juridical scope to relevant sectors. 
9.4.2 Implications for innovation management 
This thesis highlighted the complementarity of the latecomers’ innovation path, which 
sought to fill gaps in the product and technology portfolio of Big Pharma. In doing so, 
latecomers can create niche business opportunities, bypassing direct competition 
against leading industrial players. This is a very useful strategy to tackle transitional 
barriers. 
233 
 
There are three practical lessons for those who would pursue such a strategy in the 
context of complementary competition. First, a commercially feasible alternative 
innovation path can be formulated by focusing R&D on product segments that have a 
low degree of exposure to direct competition against market dominators. At the same 
time, the time frame of exploratory learning to market should be jointly conceived with 
the selection of the focal R&D area. Second, modifying the organisational structure of 
R&D centres should be properly timed, in tune with the changing pattern of technological 
learning. However, organisational experiments seem to be inevitable in the absence of 
a universal solution to the relationship between technological learning and organisational 
structure. Third, in this context, the operation of a quasi-arm’s-length R&D organisation 
would be an alternative way to maintain mid- and long-term exploratory learning. 
9.5 Limitations and Possible Further Studies 
The limitations of this study mainly concern the methodology. The first methodological 
limitation relates to the absence of a specific case study of NRDP that could integratively 
show the effect of S&T policy reform on firms’ exploratory learning. Most NRDPs were 
fragmented, focusing only on certain R&D steps, and no NRDP conducted 
comprehensive upstream and downstream R&D stages. Thus, the policy influence on 
exploratory learning was probed by observing the operational pattern of several NRDPs 
in a general context. Ironically, this limitation of selecting proper and specific NRDPs may 
partly reflect the structural defects of the present S&T policies, which are led by 
compartmentalised ministerial leadership. 
Second, reliance on qualitative data based on interviews might have misled the argument 
regarding the problematic policy implementation to indicate the complete failure of the 
joint exploratory learning, that is, the entire absence of R&D collaboration. Interview data 
may suffer from recall bias or other biases that mislead the researcher. The research 
was meant to reveal the underlying qualitative problems of the transitioning innovation 
system, which were generally concealed by the quantitative performance of national 
resource input, such as the rapid increase in publications, patents, and technological 
transfer. Such data, when considered out of context, can veil the innovative viability of 
technological learning in the transitional phase.  
Third, as Bell (2006) pointed out, it is worth remembering the effect of the observation 
period in making a correct research argument. As the analysis showed, if the KoPI is 
considered after completing the second round of new drug R&D in the coming ten years, 
some might say that the sectoral transition has proceeded smoothly. For example, a few 
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new drug candidates are now in the process of NDA or the last stage of clinical trials in 
the US.220 However, in 2013, this research uncovered institutional and organisational 
problems that the KoPI has clearly experienced for the last 25 years of new drug R&D. 
When other latecomers attempt to challenge the technological exploration, these 
institutional and organisational problems should not be neglected.  
Therefore, the following issue is recommended for investigation in future research: the 
government reinforced the Pharmaceutical Industry Promotion Act to facilitate 
innovation-oriented R&D as the first industry-specific industrial policy in the last 15 years. 
In 2012, the government launched a large-scale multi-ministerial and public-private 
collaborative R&D programme to develop innovative drugs, the Korea Drug 
Development Fund, which now supports 23 projects. It also established a policy to 
support exports to the US market called the Columbus Project (The Korea Herald, 
04/03/2011). Moreover, the drug pricing policy under the NHI system has begun to be 
linked with the rate of firms’ R&D expenditure. That is, at the macro-level, the government 
at last seems to be attempting to emulate the industrial policy supporting the KoPI and 
to align relevant S&T policies.  
Thus, KDDF projects could be analysed to determine the effect of institutional 
rearrangement on the enhancement of Korean pharmaceutical firms’ exploratory 
learning. Such research would provide a deeper understanding of the science-based 
innovation and institutional and organisational problems in cultivating the key mode of 
technological learning for the latecomers’ transition.  
9.6 Final Remarks  
The transitional dynamics explored in this thesis addressed how firms strengthen 
technological exploration for innovation at the micro-level, and how institutions 
reformulated exploratory learning-friendly innovation systems at the macro-level. These 
tasks involved unbundling the imitation focused learning routines and institutional 
frameworks. This research has highlighted the difficulties involved in this 
transformational process. In spite of increasing national resource input and the moderate 
success of technological catch-up, the transition has demanded sophisticated 
institutional and non-technological learning strategies for successful changes in patterns 
to highly uncertain, long running and interactive learning. As the thesis has shown, this 
                                                          
220 E.g., NCEs: DA-7218 and Zydena by Dong-a; Biological drugs: IVIG (Intravenous immunoglobulin) by 
GC and SR-hGH (Sustained Release-human Growth Hormone) by LGLS; IMD: Esomezol by Hanmi as the 
first IMD of Nexium by AstraZeneca. 
235 
 
has not been easy. But important lessons have been learnt. We end on a quote that 
summarises this well: 
The development of new drugs differs greatly from that of generic drugs. New 
drug R&D can be compared to musical composition, in which an original work is 
created. The composition requires various steps and skills, such as theory, 
creativity, musical notation, orchestration, and repeated experimental 
performances. Before a performance, even the composer cannot confirm 
whether the work will properly be realised in the harmonisation of players and 
instruments. In contrast, the development of generic drugs can be regarded as 
the proficient performance of a well-known musical masterpiece. The players 
concentrate only on mastering the existing piece to achieve a good performance 
(Comments by Dr Seung-ju Lee, Director of Sanofi-Aventis). 
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Appendix 1    A summary of the literature on the influence of 
biotechnology on the pharmaceutical industry 
 
Title (Authors) Theoretical framework Implications 
Complementarity and 
external linkage: The 
strategies of the large 
firms in biotechnology 
   (Arora and 
Gambardella 1990) 
 Firms’ strategies for 
external linkage  
 
 The correlation between large 
firms’ four strategies of external 
linkage. 
 The strategies are 
complementary (agreements with 
other firms, research agreements 
with universities, investments in 
the capital stock of NBFs and 
acquisitions of NBFs). 
 Suggestion that the locus of 
innovation is considered as 
a ’network’ of inter-organisational 
relations. 
Does biotech reflect a 
new science-based 
innovation regime?  
   (Coriat et al 2003) 
 
 Technological 
regimes 
 Science-based 
industry 
 Institutional 
complementarities 
(e.g. university, patent, 
finance) 
Distinction between two types of 
science-based regimes, stressing 
the role of basic sciences and 
thereby universities, patents and 
venture capital in Type 2. (Type 1 
generally describes electronics & 
ICTs) 
Pharmaceutical firms 
and the transition to 
biotechnology: A study 
in strategic innovation 
   (Galambos and 
Sturchio 1998) 
 The emergence of 
new technologies 
 Strategic alliances 
 Pharmaceutical firms’ changing 
strategies as biotechnology 
continues to develop.  
 Strategic alliances with start-ups 
in order to acquire specific 
biotechnology, followed by the 
establishment of in-house R&D 
capabilities in biotechnology.  
 Networking and collaboration 
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Title (Authors) Theoretical framework Implications 
When does start-up 
innovation spur the gale 
of creative destruction? 
   (Gans et al 2002) 
 Innovation by start-
ups 
 Inter-industrial 
differences  
 Identifies firms’ commercialisation 
strategies with respect to 
cooperation and competition. The 
probability of cooperation is 
highest in biotechnology where 
the relative costs of acquiring 
complementary assets are high 
and the environment offers a 
strong IPR regime.  
 The degree of IPR strength, and 
transaction and sunk costs for 
entering a product market 
determine a firm’s 
commercialisation strategy. c.f. 
electronics. 
Does good science lead 
to valuable knowledge? 
Biotechnology firms and 
the evolutionary logic of 
citation patterns                                                               
   (Gittelman and Kogut 
2003) 
 Scientific research 
and innovation 
performance 
 Epistemic community 
of scientists and firms’ 
activities 
 Shows a conflicting evolutionary 
logic between scientific research-
generating knowledge and 
innovation activities due to firm’s 
private use of scientific 
knowledge.  
Social networks, 
learning, and flexibility: 
Sourcing scientific 
knowledge in new 
biotechnology firms 
(Liebeskind et al 
1996) 
 Social networks  
 Organisational 
learning and flexibility  
 Supports the positive effect of 
boundary-spanning social 
networks to promote 
organisational learning and foster 
organisational flexibility in two 
identified biotechnology start-ups. 
This is difficult to achieve due to 
the market and/or self-contained 
hierarchy mechanisms.  
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Title (Authors) Theoretical framework Implications 
Innovation and market 
structure in the 
dynamics of the 
pharmaceutical industry 
and biotechnology: 
towards a history-
friendly model 
(Malerba and 
Orsenigo 2002) 
 The evolution of the 
industry 
 Modelling the 
innovation activities in 
search, research and 
the market  
 The penetration of biotechnology 
into the pharmaceutical industry 
does not represent a 
competence-destroying process. 
It shows the relationship between 
a lack of cumulativeness in 
innovation activities, market 
fragmentation (and concentration) 
and the emergence of a new 
technological paradigm 
(biotechnology), suggesting the 
necessity for collaboration 
between incumbents and start-
ups.  
Coherence of the 
knowledge base and 
firm innovative 
performance: Evidence 
from the US 
pharmaceutical industry 
  (Nesta and Saviotti 
2005) 
 The economy of 
scope and scale 
 The dynamics of the 
knowledge base 
(coherence and 
scope) 
 Incumbents and 
DBFs 
 The positive effects of the 
coherence of the knowledge base 
on firms’ innovative performance.  
 Coherent firms are more 
successful than incoherent ones 
because they can enjoy the 
economies of knowledge scope 
by sharing similar scientific and 
technical competencies and 
common complementary assets.   
Knowledge networks as 
channels and conduits: 
The effects of spillovers 
in the Boston 
biotechnology 
community 
  (Owen-Simit and 
Powell 2004) 
 Dynamics of the R&D 
network 
 Economic geography 
 The central role of key nodes in a 
network as carriers of the rules 
and practices of inter-
organisational R&D based on 
geographical propinquity and the 
institutional characteristics of the 
key members in the network.  
 The practices and commitment of 
network nodes can be identified 
through two types of network 
nodes:  
○ A permeable channel is 
suitable for a set of 
organisations that emphasises 
open science in variable 
environments.  
○ Closed conduits offer reliable 
and excludable information 
transfer at the cost of fixity in 
stable environments, and are 
more contractual.  
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Title (Authors) Theoretical framework Implications 
Knowledge, integration, 
and the locus of 
learning: An empirical 
analysis of process 
development 
  (Pisano 1994) 
 Knowledge 
integration 
 Learning process 
 The choice between learning by 
doing and learning before doing 
depends on the degree of 
accumulation of prior knowledge 
bases. 
 Traditional chemical-based drug 
production processes are 
relatively governed by learning 
before doing, while learning by 
doing is more important for 
biotechnology-based production.  
 These choices influence the lead 
times between process research 
and real production.    
Interorganizational 
collaboration and the 
locus of innovation: 
Networks of learning in 
biotechnology 
  (Powell et al 1996) 
 R&D network 
 Learning process 
 The locus of innovation is found 
within the inter-organisational 
networks that sustain a fluid and 
evolving community. Access to 
these networks is thus critical in 
order to explore and learn. Two 
processes of learning occur to 
enhance the inflow of specific 
information, resources and 
products.   
 The emergence of networks is 
due to the disparate sources of 
knowledge and the uncharted 
pathways of technological 
development in biotechnology. 
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Title (Authors) Theoretical framework Implications 
Network dynamics and 
field evolution: The 
growth of 
interorganizational 
collaboration in the life 
sciences 
  (Powell et al 2005) 
 R&D networks and 
centrality 
 Institutional evolution 
 
 The diversity of institutional forms 
– public, private and non-profit – 
that are active in the evolution of 
the organisational field of the life 
sciences arises from the different 
selection environments. These 
institutional features promote 
dense webs of connectivity that, 
once in place, influence both 
subsequent decisions and the 
trajectory of the field.  
 Shows how the topology of 
networks emerged and injected 
novelty into an institutional 
system. It argues that the 
evolution of the field is 
predominantly shaped not by 
money or market power but by 
organisations positioned in the 
centre with diverse portfolios of 
well-connected collaborators. 
This was tested by the 
introduction of four logics of 
attachment – accumulative 
advantage, homophily, follow-the-
trend and multi-connectivity. 
Organizational 
integration of acquired 
biotechnology 
companies in 
pharmaceutical 
companies: The need 
for a hybrid approach 
  (Schweizer 2005) 
 M&A research 
 Organisational 
integration and the 
capabilities of firms 
 Stresses the importance of post-
acquisition processes in 
integrating biotech know-how, 
technology (biotech knowledge) 
and capabilities. It argues in 
favour of an integration strategy 
to realise preservation, symbiotic 
acquisitions and absorption 
acquisitions at different paces 
across the diverse value chain 
components.   
Commercializing 
knowledge: University 
science, knowledge 
capture, and firm 
performance in 
biotechnology 
  (Zucker et al 2002)  
 Commercialisation of 
universities 
 Science and firms’ 
performance 
 The nature of 
knowledge and the 
role of scientists 
 The involvement of star scientists 
in teamwork (production) between 
universities and firms is critical for 
successful innovation. It is 
attributed to the complexity and 
tacitness of knowledge. 
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Appendix 2    List of interviewees and background 
 Interviewee Position – Organisation 
(the former or present position) 
Area  Date of the 
Interview 
1 Dr. Han-seung Ko Managing director of bio-health research 
– 
Samsung Advanced Institute of 
Technology 
(The present CEO of Samsung Bioepis) 
Large firm 
(Chaebol) 
20 August 
2008 
(Phone 
interview) 
2 Dr. Eun-kyu Lee Professor, Department of chemical 
engineering – Hanyang University  
University 27 August 
2008 
3 Dr. Seung-yong 
Hwang 
CEO – Genocheck; Professor, 
Department of biochemistry, Hanyang 
University  
DBF 27 August 
2008 
4 Dr. Bong-hyun 
Chung 
Director of bionano research centre – 
Korea Research Institute of Bioscience 
and Biotechnology (KRIBB)  
GRI 28 August 
2008 
5 Beyong-wha Lee CEO – Macrogen DBF 28 August  
2008 
6 Dr. Jong-ho Lee Director – Macrogen DBF 28 August  
2008 
7 Jin Kong Director of biochip department  
– Optrontech 
DBF 29 August  
2008 
8 Dr. Su-kyung Kim CEO – Nanostroage DBF 1 September 
2008 
9 Dr. Han-oh Park CEO – Bioneer  DBF 2 September 
2008 
10 Dr. Eui-sung Yun Principal researcher of biomicro-system 
research – Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) 
GRI 3 September 
2008 
11 Dr. Ji-yoon Kang Principal researcher of bionano research 
centre –KIST 
GRI 3 September 
2008 
12 Dr. Won-yong Ko Director – Panagene DBF 4 September  
2008 
13 Dr. Mun-yeon 
Jeong 
– Electro Telecommunication Research 
Institute  
GRI 4 September 
2008 
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14 Dr. Kookjin Lim Manager of Diagnostic research  
– LG Life Sciences 
Large firm 
(Chaebol) 
5 September 
2008 
15 Dr. Je-kyun, Park Professor, Department of Biosystem – 
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology 
University 8 September 
2008 
16 Pan-yun, Park Researcher – Biomedlab DBF 9 September 
2008 
17 Keum-yeong Lee Team manager – Biomedlab DBF 9 September 
2008 
18 Dr. Sung-hwan Ahn CEO – GenomicTree  DBF 11 September 
2008 
19 Seok-kyun Jeong Director of technology marketing – KMac SME 11 September 
2008 
20 Dr. Mun-hee Han CEO – Proteogen  (the former president 
of Korea BioIndustry Organization and the 
former head of genetic research centre of 
KIST) 
DBF 12 September 
2008 
21 Seul-ki Lee General manager – Proteogen   DBF 12 September  
2008 
22 Dr. Hyung-il Jeong Professor, Department of life science and 
biotechnology – Yonsei University 
University 18 September 
2008 
23 Dr. Se-whan Park Professor, Department of biotechnology 
and bioinformatics – Korea University 
University 22 September 
2008 
24 Dr. Seok-kwan Kim Research fellow – Science and 
Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) 
GRI 25 September 
2008 
25 Dr. Eu-jin Han Research fellow – Korea Institute of 
Intellectual Property (KIIP)  
GRI 26 September 
2008 
26 Dr. Min-gon Kim Principal researcher of bionanotechnology  
research – KRIBB 
GRI 30 September 
2008 
27 Dr. Eun-seong Kim Senior researcher of biotechnology policy 
centre –KRIBB 
GRI 30 September 
2008 
28 Dr. Mu-ung Kim Researcher of biotechnology policy centre 
–KRIBB 
GRI 30 September 
2008 
29 Dr. Jin-seo Park Researcher – Korea Institute of Science 
and Technology Information (KISTI) 
GRI 2 October 
2008 
30 Seung-yeon Cho Researcher, LIG Investment & Securities  Company 20 October 
2008 
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31 Dr. Sung-wook 
Hong 
Professor, College of life science – Seoul 
National University 
University 23 October 
2008 
32 Dong-hun Hyun Researcher, R&D planning and 
coordination team, Daeduk R&D Institute 
– Honam Petrochemical Co. 
Large firm 
(Chaebol) 
26 February 
2009 
33 Dr. Joong-myung 
Cho 
CEO – Crystal Genomics (the former 
head of drug research centre of LG Life 
Sciences) 
DBF 31 August 
2010 
34 M.D., PhD. Ku-
chan Kim 
Science Ambassador of MSD – Merck & 
co (the former head of the centre for the 
genome science, Korea National Institute 
of Health)  
Big 
Pharma 
8 September 
2010 
35 Se-jin Park Chief Financial Officer (CFO)  – 
LegoChem Biosciences (the former 
manager of LG Life Sciences)  
DBF 10 September 
2010 
36 Dr. Yong-ju Kim CEO – LegoChem Biosciences (the 
former head of drug research centre of LG 
Life Sciences) 
DBF 10 September 
2010 
37 Nak-keun, Seong Manager of the product development – 
LG Life Sciences 
Large firm 
(Chaebol) 
 
38 Dr. Sung-ju Lee Director of R&D in Korea, Sanofi-Aventis 
(the former researcher of LG Life 
Sciences) 
Big 
Pharma 
13 September 
2010 
39 Dr. Sung-ik Park Manager of the product development – 
Green Cross 
K-Pharma 14 September 
2010 
40 Dr. Eun-cheol Heo CTO – Green Cross K-Pharma 14 September 
2010 
41 Jong-ik Park Head of the planning and coordination – 
Celltrion 
DBF 15 September 
2010 
42 Heon-je Cho Head of drug R&D policy – Korea Drug 
Research Association (KDRA) 
Industrial 
associatio
n 
28 September 
2010 
43 Jae-soon Kim Head of global business development – 
Hanmi Pharmaceutical 
K-Pharma 6 October 
2010 (Phone 
interview) 
44 Chang-ju Choi Manager of information management, 
Central R&D institute – Hanmi 
Pharmaceutical 
K-Pharma  7 October 
2010 
45 Dr. Maeng-sup Kim CTO – Hanmi Pharmaceutical K-Pharma 7 October 
2010 
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46 Dr. Myung-ho Bae Head of R&D strategic planning, Central 
R&D centre – Yuhan Corporation 
K-Pharma 8 October 
2010 
47 Dr. Jae-gyu Kim Director of new drug research, Central 
R&D centre  – Yuhan Corporation 
K-Pharma 8 October 
2010 
48 Dr. Soon-hoe Kim CTO – Dong-a Pharmaceutical K-Phama 8 October 
2010 
49 Dr. Byung-moon 
Kim 
Managing director of Biotechnology R&D 
centre – Dong-a Pharmaceutical 
K-Pharma 8 October 
2010 
50 Dr. Kyu-heum Na Senior research scientist – Dong-a 
Pharmaceutical 
K-Pharma 8 October 
2010 
51 Dr. Sung-gon Kim Head of new drug research group, Central 
R&D centre – CKD 
K-Pharma  
52 Dr. Sung-sook Lee CTO – CKD K-Pharma  
53 Yon-sam Oh Chief Legal Officer (CLO) – HanAll 
BioPharma 
K-Pharma 14 October 
2010 
54 4 e-mail interviews 
Viromed (DBF),  
Ilyang (K-Pharma) and JW (K-Pharma) 
Korea Health Industry Development 
Institute (KHIDI) 
DBF 
K-Pharma 
GRI 
8 July 2010, 
15 July 2010 
14 June 2013 
55 
2 anonymous 
interviewees 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) 
MOST July 2011 – 
Aug 2011  
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Appendix 3    Interview questionnaire  
1. The technological capabilities of Korean pharmaceutical companies 
 The degree of innovation of the Korean pharmaceutical industry 
○ Technological quality of the new drugs developed by local companies 
○ Reasons for the commercial failure of new drugs  
○ Levels of upstream research, translational research and clinical 
development  
○ Reasons for the focus on incrementally modified drugs (IMDs) and 
phytomedicines 
○ Commonalities and differences between the drug R&D and engineering 
industries and their influence on the emergence of the science-intensive 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries – organisational, cultural, 
business and institutional contexts 
 
 Involvement in biotechnology R&D 
○ Overall direction of R&D in the industry: new biological drugs vs. biosimilars 
○ Potential of the stem cell business and reasons for the business rush in 
Korea  
○ Entry of Chaebol into the biotechnology industry and the potential for its 
success 
○ Relationship with synthetic drugs: complementary vs. competitive 
 
2. Technological and organisational capabilities of own company 
 The drug R&D strategy of the company 
○ History of its R&D activities 
○ Background and processes with respect to the R&D of its first new drugs  
○ Reasons for the failure/success of its new drugs  
○ Changes in its new drug R&D focus between the initial and present stages  
○ Reasons for a focus on both generic and new drug R&D 
○ Strengths and weaknesses of its R&D capabilities 
○ Biotechnology strategy: new biological drugs, biosimilars, stem cell therapy 
○ Strategy for global development and relationship with Big Pharma 
○ Technological and commercial potential of phytomedicines  
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 Organisational and managerial issues 
○ Organisational structure of R&D centre and its strengths and problems  
○ Organisational differences in the development of generic drugs and new 
drugs 
○ Organisational integration of biologists and chemists 
○ Role of the owners in new drug R&D 
○ Role of the experienced researchers recruited from Big Pharma  
○ Organisational inertia: generic drug developers vs new drug researchers 
○ Reasons for the stagnancy in M&A in the industry 
○ Internal inhibitor/promoter to open innovation 
 
3. Technological capabilities of and relationships with other types of 
innovation actors 
 Perceived innovativeness and drug R&D strategy of other case firms  
 Relationships with GRIs, universities and DBFs (conversely, their 
perspective of the pharmaceutical companies) 
 Reasons for collaboration with public actors/DBFs 
○ Positive and negative perspectives regarding the behavioural patterns of 
public actors and DBFs  
○ Trust/distrust among the innovation actors (especially, between the 
pharmaceutical firms and DBFs) 
 
4. Regulatory and market environments 
 Influence of the reform of National Health Insurance on new drug R&D 
 Regulatory and approval systems of KFDA 
 Influence of other stakeholders such as medical doctors and chemists 
 Problems with the venture capital system in its support of high-risk long-
term drug R&D (compared to the ICT industry)  
 Roles of the ministries and their support of biotechnology and NRDPs 
○ Positive/negative role of MOST: S&T policies, its inclusiveness of industrial 
R&D 
○ Positive/negative role of MOHW: public health policies and industrial R&D  
○ Positive/negative role of MOTIE: New technology centred industrial policies 
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Appendix 4    Survey questionnaire for the interview 
 
Innovation Capability of Korean Bio-pharmaceutical Firms  
Do you think the development of the biopharmaceutical industry has been successful 
until now in Korea?  
             successful         lagging         failure 
Annual R&D expenditure:      (KRW) 
 
Bio and pharmaceutical related SCI papers and domestic patents:  
N. of articles-     ,      N. of patents-      
N. of Researchers for biotechnology business  
N. of PhD -      N. of MSc -      N. of BA -      
 
 
1  Which R&D activities are the relatively strong and weak points of your company? 
                 Strong                                                                                   weak 
 Basic, explorative and discovery research                         
 Validation, application and translational research              
 Exploitation stages (development or preclinical test)         
 Clinical stage                                                                      
 Regulatory and approval stage                                           
 Reverse engineering                                                           
 Others:       
 
  
2  Has your company participated in national R&D projects based on biotechnology?       
                   Yes                                                   No 
 If you have, what is the main reason for participating in the national R&D projects? 
:       
 
 
3  What types of R&D capability does your company want to acquire and learn when it 
collaborates with universities and GRIs?  
 Discovery, exploration and basic research      
 Application and translational research 
 Core technologies            Technology transfer only   
 Peripheral or frontier technologies and knowledge  
 Others:        
  
 
4  Number of R&D collaborations or alliances for exploration and discovery:            
               What type of organization has been your main partner for collaborative research?  
 hospitals     universities    pharmaceutical firms 
 DBFs          GRIs              focusing on in-house development 
 
 
설문조사자: 황성웅(s.hwang@sussex.ac.uk) 
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(5 ~ 7)           Questions Difficult 
Relatively 
difficult 
Average 
Relatively 
successful 
Successful 
Effectiveness of collaborative     
R&D with GRIs 
     
Effectiveness of collaborative    
R&D with universities  
     
Effectiveness of collaborative    
R&D with DBFs  
     
 
 
8   What is the main obstacle in collaborating with universities and GRIs?  
 Lower potential to commercialize or for scale-up 
 Different value estimation between universities/GRIs and private sectors            
 Others:        
 
9  What is the main obstacle in collaborating with DBFs  
 Lower potential to commercialize or for scale-up  
 Different value estimation between DBFs and pharmaceutical firms            
 Others:        
 
10  What is your firm’s main strategy to make profits with your drug R&D projects?  
 Sales of patents 
 Technology transfer after pre-clinical trial 
 Technology transfer after clinical stage 1 
 Technology transfer after clinical stage 2 
 Technology transfer after clinical stage 3 
 Through own marketing channel 
 Others:       
 
11  If you have ever suspended or stopped R&D projects before their completion, what has 
been the main reason for this?  
 Delay or failure in screening, discovery or exploration 
 Delay or failure in validation, application or translation 
 Delay or failure in pre-clinical or development stage 
 Delay or failure in clinical test or the test of prototype 
 Delay or failure in meeting approval and regulatory system 
 Failure in collaboration with outside organizations 
 Insufficiency of financing              Lack of capability in marketing          
 
 
12 What are the other institutional reasons of the laggard in commercialization of research 
and discoveries, and of the unilateral upstream research lacking the reflection of 
downstream or market issues?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
267 
 
      (13 ~ 15)           Questions 
Not  
at all 
Not 
much 
Average Important 
Very 
important 
How much has the government’s R&D 
programme influenced the direction 
of R&D projects? 
     
How important is the benchmarking or 
imitation of existing products in 
R&D activities? 
     
How much has the government’s policy 
of fostering biotechnology sectors 
influenced the direction of R&D 
projects? 
     
  
 
16 Have you ever experienced any organizational or technological resistance when your 
company moves from the existing main R&D activities to the emerging biotechnology 
R&D?          
 
 
17. Question Difficult 
Relatively 
difficult 
Avera
-ge 
Relatively 
successful 
successful 
Do you think that your company’s 
R&D strategy and direction 
have adapted well to the 
health and welfare policies? 
     
 
 
18  If the development of Korea’s biotechnology industry is lagging in commercializing or 
making profit, what are the reasons for this?  
                     Mismatch between the health and welfare policies, and the industrial policy  
 Regulation and approval system 
 Ineffectiveness of the industrial policies to foster 
 Mismatch between the pharmaceutical-related policies and the biotechnology-   
     policies 
 Lack of medical centres for clinical testing 
 IPR regime  
               Others:       
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Appendix 5 Comments about the evaluation system based on PBS 
Interviewee Comments 
Interview 7 
(DBF)  
Researchers in DBFs have tended to consider their R&D projects not as 
market products but as research performances. 
Interview 9 
(DBF)  
In Korean DBFs, the first business model is to acquire NRDPs. To do so, 
the publication performance must be good. 
Interview 12 
(DBF)  
The government focuses on where the R&D funds are spent (i.e., auditing). 
They do not concentrate on research performance because they lack the 
ability to evaluate scientific research. 
Interview 19 
(SME)  
In the past, there was little to gain in collaboration with universities through 
NRDPs. Although the recent quantitative accumulation of scientific 
publications is remarkable, creative and industrial-potential research 
performance should be emphasised. In the public sector, displaying 
research performance through publications is critical in securing R&D 
projects, whereas private firms give priority to the industrial value of 
research for profit.  
Interview 22  
(University)  
In most NRDPs, strictly speaking, there is no clear demarcation between 
science and technology projects. One of the reasons is the criteria used in 
performance evaluation. NRDPs weigh the impact factor of publications as 
the value of the innovative application of the projects. In this situation, it 
would be very difficult to generate industrially meaningful innovation. 
Researchers in GRIs and universities have no choice but to follow the 
criteria of evaluation. If the performance were evaluated in terms of its 
quality, they would have to follow the norm. If the performance were 
considered based on the quantity of publications, they would have to meet 
this criterion. 
Interview 26 
(GRI)  
The research in GRIs generally takes both directions of R&D – industrial 
R&D, which can directly contribute to the firms' technological development, 
and the implementation of fundamental R&D. In reality, however, the yearly 
publication based evaluation system inhibits both types of R&D activities.  
Interview 31 
(University)  
In Korean universities, there has been a strong tendency to focus on 
studies published by a small number of scholars and to publish follow-up 
articles on these studies. Even so, there are few problems in maintaining 
academic fame and acquiring new projects.  
Interview 33 
(DBF)  
The total amount of national R&D funding for biotechnology is by no means 
small. The problem is that the allocation of funds has become excessively 
fragmented. The funds have been transmuted to budgets for publishing 
research in universities. Meanwhile, GRIs have directly engaged in new 
drug development. How can inexperienced researchers really develop 
[marketable] new drugs? After all, NRDPs turned to sharing funds across 
the various stakeholders in biotechnology R&D.  
Interview 36 
(DBF)  
The success rate of NRDPs is over 80%. Why? Because NRDPs do not 
allow failure. Hence, researchers are supposed to ensure the success of 
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their projects. However, nothing really has been produced. Short "termism" 
persists. Why can't a project continue for 10 years?  
Interview 38 
(Big Pharma)  
Although new drug R&D needs to start by identifying the market demand by 
medical doctors, because of the evaluation system GRIs and universities 
have tended to concentrate on research topics that are easily published and 
patented. These topics are generally far from the demands of the clinical 
market.  
Interview 39 
(K-Pharma)  
In academia, professors have tended to concentrate on the latest research 
topics, which get the attention of policy more easily, thus acquiring NRDPs. 
In contrast, in private companies, the technological realisation and 
commercial potentiality of the newest research topics are difficult to predict. 
 
Appendix 6     Comments about the selection problems of NRDPs   
Interviewee Comments 
Interview 2 
(University)  
It cannot be denied that there has been a tendency by committee members 
to prefer their own academic or research subjects when they select projects 
for the NRDPs. 
Interview 7 
(DBF)  
National R&D projects are concentrated on a small number of DBFs, which 
are based on academic networks and the reputations of CEOs. 
Interview 9 
(DBF)  
In NRDPs, even NRDPs in industrial development, academia is too 
influential, although recently the industrial voice seems to have gradually 
gained attention.  
Once the direction of NRDPs is suggested by a small number of specialists, 
most researchers have tended to follow the research trend, much like ‘flying 
geese’. 
Interview 14 
(Chaebol)  
The professors are too powerful in planning S&T policies, so these policies 
are less reflective of the industrial situation. Under the Chaebol led catch-up 
stage through imitation, it was not a big problem for industry. The demand 
level of university research was low from the industry at that time. However, 
in order to cope with the pressure to innovate, industry has increasingly 
demanded higher levels of university research and direct support by NRDPs 
of industrial R&D.  
Interview 34 
(Big Pharma)  
Biotechnology research itself is of the utmost importance. However, in terms 
of the global R&D trend in new-drug development, of 7,500 clinical trials, only 
about 400 are of biological drugs. That is, the main market is still in synthetic 
drugs, although biologics have potential in the future. In the case of the UK, 
there is the MRC, which controls the big picture and macro level strategies. 
We don't have such an organisation. Although the national science and 
technology commission is under the President, government-sponsored 
professors are in charge. They routinely seek to make policy plans for their 
own interests such as upstream research.  
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Interview 36 
(DBF) 
The total number of NRDPs is almost 8,000, which is too fragmented. Many 
similar projects are given in different names among public R&D actors. For 
effective new drug R&D, NRDPs need to be more selective and have a 
longer focus. 
 
Appendix 7   Patent trend broken by R&D fields in the case firms 
Dong-A  
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs      13 22 
        Phytomedicine     4 5 
        IMDs 
        (DDS, composition,  
         structure) 
   
9 26 
         Process development 3 10 21 26 7 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    5 8 
  Method    15 2 
Total number of patents 3 10 21 72  70  
 
 
Green Cross (GC) 
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs    3 10 
        Phytomedicine     2 3 
        IMDs      
         Process development   4 1 3 
  Biotechnology 
  Product   1 90 47 
  Method   5 67 30 
Total number of patents   10 163 93 
*  
 
 
Yuhan  
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs   1 15 22 
        Phytomedicine       
        IMDs 
        (DDS, composition,  
         structure) 
   13 15 
         Process development 1 1 12 20 20 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    2 13 
  Method    10 10 
Total number of patents 1 1 13 60  80  
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Hanmi  
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs    1 16 
        Phytomedicine       
        IMDs 
         (DDS, composition, 
structure) 
   18 59 
         Process development    7 37 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    2 10 
  Method    2 11 
Total number of patents    30 133 
 
 
 
 
LG Life Sciences (LGLS) 
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs    35 38 
        Phytomedicine     2 3 
        IMDs 
         (DDS, composition,             
          structure) 
   3 20 
         Process development    18 20 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    22 16 
  Method    28 31 
Total number of patents    108 128  
 
 
 
 
ChongKeunDang (CKD) 
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs    10 13 
        Phytomedicine      1 
        IMDs 
         (DDS, composition,            
          structure) 
   10 20 
         Process development  2 11 18 24 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    5 6 
  Method   2 9 5 
Total number of patents  2 13 52 (35%) 69 (35%) 
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JoongWae (JW)  
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs      17 10 
        Phytomedicine       
        IMDs 
         (DDS, composition,  
          structure) 
   
12 12 
         Process development  3 16 25 6 
  Biotechnology 
  Product     5 
  Method    2 1 
Total number of patents  3 16 56 (46%) 34 (18%) 
 
 
 
Dongwha  
R&D fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs    27 13 
        Phytomedicine      4 
        IMDs 
         (DDS, composition,  
          structure) 
   4 10 
         Process development  1 9 8 7 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    3 1 
  Method    3  
Total number of patents  1 9 45 (18%) 35 (20%) 
 
 
 
Ilyang  
Technological fields 1960s 1970s by 1987 1988-1999 2000- 2010 
        NCEs    8 2 
        Phytomedicine     2  
        IMDs 
         (DDS, composition,  
          structure) 
   
13 12 
         Process development  4 7 14 8 
  Biotechnology 
  Product    6 1 
  Method    4 2 
Total number of patents  4 7 47 (30%) 25 (32%) 
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Appendix 8   Case firms’ increase in publication and those of 
subject areas221 
Companies By 1987 1988-1999 2000-2005 2006-2011 Total 
Dong-A 7 (5) 21   (21) 44   (31) 54   (39) 126 (49) 
GC (Green Cross)222 2 (3) 117 (44) 134 (50) 191 (53) 444 (73) 
Yuhan 5 (5) 35   (20) 15   (17) 38   (32) 93   (41) 
LGLS - 117 (38) 78   (35) 138 (40) 218 (51) 
Hanmi - 6      (3) 6     (7) 44   (25) 56   (28) 
CKD - 9      (2) 12   (7) 16   (16) 37   (17) 
JW - 26    (18) 24   (13) 32   (20) 82   (31) 
Dongwha - 24    (27) 37   (28) 9     (13) 70   (43) 
Ilyang - 7      (11) 7     (8) - 14   (17) 
Total number of 
publication 
14 362 357 522 1,140 
 
Appendix 9   Change in the R&D personnel of case firms 
Companies 2014 2005 (No. of PhDs)    1998 
Dong-a 
Green Cross 
Yuhan 
Hanmi 
CKD 
JW 
LG Life Sciences 
Dongwha 
Ilyang 
227 
448 
315  
434 
405  
171 
300  
102 
95 
194 (18) 
161 (31) 
227 (23) 
150 (11) 
64 (11) 
144 (25) 
328 (62) 
73 (8) 
68 (5) 
90 (9) 
- 
131 (12) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
66 
61 
Source: Data from the Financial Supervisory Service (http://dart.fss.or.kr), Kim (2006), Medipharma news 
(11/12/2014), and interviews.  
 
 
                                                          
221 Although the publication data (based on a search of ISI Web of Knowledge data) is not directly related to 
the main analysis, it clearly shows the deepening and widening scientific knowledge base of the case firms 
over the last 20 years’ transitional phase as primary evidence of the transition towards SBFs.   
222 The number includes the publication by its independent research institute, MGRI. GC only published 245. 
Also, the number of JW includes publications by its joint research institute of C&C Research Laboratories. 
JW only counted 45. In the case of LGLS, it was established as an independent company in 2003. There 
seem to be some omissions in counting the number published between 2000-2005, due to its name change 
(at maximum about 62). Dongwha and Ilyang have struggled with the shrinking market performance over 
the last ten years, while they have kept their active drug R&D. 
